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iFOREWORD
“Now grows together what belongs together,” former West German Chancellor 
Willy Brandt famously remarked in Berlin in November 1989. He was talking 
about German reuniﬁ cation, but his statement might well apply to European 
integration. Over the past 20 years, the European Union has grown by 12 Central 
European members and has helped millions get to high incomes. The single 
market now stretches from Lisbon to Łódź and from the North Cap to Nikosia. 
Trade and capital ﬂ ows unrivaled in economic history have fueled the European 
convergence machine. Shared aspirations of Europeans in the east and the 
west, the north and the south, for prosperity that is both sustainable and 
socially inclusive have brought the continent together.
This economic integration makes it difﬁ cult to view one part of the continent in 
isolation. So this report looks at Europe as a whole — from the Atlantic Ocean to 
the Azov Sea. It is unusual for a development institution like the World Bank to 
be writing about countries in Western Europe that reached high-income status 
many years ago. But the geographical scope of this report is appropriate, and 
not just because what happens in the west affects prospects in the east. It is 
appropriate because the European Union’s new member states in the east have 
undergone an unprecedented transformation over the past two decades — and 
their experiences have lessons for their western peers struggling with the 
structural exigencies of an integrated continent. It is also appropriate because 
the experience of Southern Europe with economic integration — and common 
monetary policy in particular — can help Central and Eastern Europe.
The Polish authorities, who inspired the work on this report in preparation for 
their presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2011, understood 
from the outset that a report on European growth had to be about European 
integration. But it was also clear that it had to be about the lessons that 
Europeans can learn from each other and from successful countries in other 
parts of the world, to adjust better to an integrated Europe and a changing 
world. The Polish Presidency’s report to the European Council in October 2011, 
“Towards a New Consensus on Economic Growth,” previews some of this 
report’s conclusions. These, in turn, are informed by the successes of countries 
in Europe and around the world in policy areas that are pertinent today. The 
subjects range from regulating banks to reducing public debt; the countries 
range from the Czech Republic to Canada, and from Turkey to New Zealand.
When work on this report started, the world was recovering from the global 
economic crisis. Growth had returned to Europe too, but it was fragile. As the 
report went to print, Europe was again in crisis. Poland is not a member of the 
eurozone, and this report is not about the euro. It is about the future of the 
European economic model. But as Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, 
said in Berlin in November 2011: “The biggest threat to the security and 
prosperity of Poland would be the collapse of the eurozone.”
Foreword
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Equally serious, trouble in the eurozone prompted questions about the 
achievements of European integration. It should not. The message of this 
report for Europe is this: in reacting to the debt crisis, do not abandon the 
attractive features of the European model. The report distinguishes three main 
attributes of the European economic and social model. The ﬁ rst is economic 
and political enlargement. The second is the combination of enterprise and 
social responsibility. The third is a focus on social inclusion and solidarity. These 
attributes have produced a prosperity that has been shared between people 
and countries in a manner not seen before or elsewhere. They should be 
nourished.
To be sure, though, some policies and institutions that have shaped Europe’s 
progress need to be changed. The analysis in this report unveils a graduated 
reform agenda. Some parts of the European model require smaller adjustments: 
these include trade and ﬁ nance, the two main drivers of the European 
convergence machine. Other parts require deep reform, such as labor and 
government. In between are enterprise and innovation, whose organization 
across the continent ranges from world class to mediocre.
Three objectives should guide policy makers. First, the single market should 
be strengthened to unleash new drivers of productivity growth. Second, 
enlargement should continue and fully integrate the 100 million people in 
Southeastern Europe, and help another 75 million in the eastern partnership 
beneﬁ t from the same European aspirations and institutions. Third, Europe’s 
global economic inﬂ uence, which has been enabled and shaped by the values 
of inclusion and enterprise, should be preserved.
But this report is not just for Europe. It is also for people and policy makers 
outside the continent who follow Europe’s progress and are interested in its 
prospects. Its message for them is: don’t count Europe out. There are countries 
— both advanced and emerging — where the European model has been made to 
work, and the results are gratifying. Europe’s trials must not intimidate those 
working toward progressive goals; its successes should inspire them.
The report draws inspiration and its title from the golden rule of economic 
growth, which requires that today’s decisions are viewed by later generations 
neither with regret nor resentment. The shared aspirations of Europeans 
for inclusive development have led to decades of success, and Europe’s 
development has been distinct. If they can learn the right lessons from the 
reforms in and outside Europe, its development will be distinguished. This 
would be good not just for Europe, but for the world as well.
Philippe Le Houérou
Vice President, Europe and Central Asia 
The World Bank
Marek Belka
President, National Bank of Poland
Chairman, World Bank/IMF Development Committee
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1OVERVIEW
Overview
Restoring Europe’s lustre
Fifty years ago, the American Economic Review published a 
short article titled “The Golden Rule of Accumulation.”1 
In it, Edmund Phelps, an American economist, proposed a 
simple rule for a nation’s wealth to grow and provide the 
highest standard of living for its citizens — present and future. 
The rule essentially speciﬁ ed how much people had to work, 
save, and invest today so that future generations could be at 
least as well off as they were. The golden rule had European 
origins as well. The paper used the insights of economists from 
France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.2 
And just a few months before Phelps’ article was published, a 
German economist, Christian von Weizsäcker had submitted a 
dissertation that proposed the same rule.3 In 2006, the Nobel 
Committee awarded the prize to Phelps for “his analysis of 
intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy.”
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Many economists still consider the golden rule the most basic proposition of 
optimum growth theory. It is the inspiration for the title of this report, and 
forms the roots of its policy prescriptions. Following the golden rule means that 
today’s Europeans work and consume just so much that future generations 
do not resent them for consuming too much, nor pity them for consuming too 
little. Keeping to the rule is perhaps the most telling sign of a country’s — or a 
continent’s — economic maturity.
Europe’s growth is already different from other economies’ in two aspects, 
reﬂ ecting its cultural and demographic maturity. Perhaps more than others 
around the world, Europeans want economic growth to be smarter, kinder, and 
cleaner, and they are willing to accept less for “better” growth. The single word 
that summarizes these ideals might be “golden.”
Europe’s growth will have to be golden in yet another sense. Economic 
prosperity has brought to Europeans the gift of longer lives, and the continent’s 
population has aged a lot over the last ﬁ ve decades. Over the next ﬁ ve, it 
will age even more: by 2060, almost a third of Europeans will be older than 
65 years. Europe will have to rebuild its structures to make fuller use of the 
energies and experience of its more mature populations — people in their golden 
years.
These desires and developments already make the European growth 
model distinct. Keeping to the discipline of the golden rule would make it 
distinguished. This report shows how Europeans have organized the six 
principal economic activities — trade, ﬁ nance, enterprise, innovation, labor, and 
government — in unique ways. But policies in parts of Europe do not recognize 
the imperatives of demographic maturity and clash with growth’s golden rule. 
Conforming growth across the continent to Europe’s ideals and the iron laws 
of economics will require difﬁ cult decisions. This report was written to inform 
them. Its ﬁ ndings: the changes needed to make trade and ﬁ nance will not 
be as hard as those to improve enterprise and innovation; these in turn are 
not as arduous and urgent as the changes needed to restructure labor and 
government. Its message: the remedies are not out of reach for a part of the 
world that has proven itself both intrepid and inclusive.
A distinctive model
It is common these days to hear Europeans calling for a “new growth model.” 
The public debt crisis has shaken conﬁ dence not just in the euro but in 
Europe.4 Aging Europeans are being squeezed between innovative Americans 
and efﬁ cient Asians, it is said. With debt and demographics weighing down 
European economies, the argument runs that they will not grow much unless 
they discover radically new ways.
The end of complacency among Europeans is good, because developments in 
and outside the continent have made changes necessary. But loss of conﬁ dence 
could be dangerous. The danger is that in rushing to restructure and restart 
growth, Europe may throw out the attractive attributes of its development 
model with the weak ones. In fact, the European growth model has many 
strong points and enviable accomplishments.
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Between 1950 and 1973, Western European incomes converged quickly toward 
those in the United States. Then, until the early 1990s, the incomes of more 
than 100 million people in the poorer southern periphery — Greece, southern 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain — grew closer to those in advanced Europe. With the 
ﬁ rst association agreements with Hungary and Poland in 1994, another 100 
million people in Central and Eastern Europe were absorbed into the European 
Union, and their incomes increased quickly. Another 100 million in the candidate 
countries in Southeastern Europe are already beneﬁ ting from the same 
aspirations and similar institutions that have helped almost half a billion people 
achieve the highest standards of living on the planet. If European integration 
continues, the 75 million people in the eastern partnership will proﬁ t in ways 
that are similar in scope and speed.
It is no exaggeration to say that Europe invented a “convergence machine,” 
taking in poor countries and helping them become high-income economies. Over 
the last four decades, the countries in Europe experienced a convergence in 
consumption levels that is unmatched (ﬁ gure 1). Annual per capita consumption 
in the poorer parts of Europe grew by 4 percent while in the wealthier countries 
it increased at a still- impressive 2 percent. The rest of the world — except for East 
Asia — has seen little or no convergence. That is why the European model was so 
attractive. That is why European growth is unique.
Given Europe’s diversity, it is not easy to identify a single “European growth 
model.” There are big differences in how Italy and Ireland regulate work and 
enterprise, and how Greece and Germany balance ﬁ scal policies and social 
objectives. There are big differences in what Spain and Sweden export, and 
how they regulate commerce. There are differences in how Portugal and Poland 
have regulated their banks, and not just because one of them shares a common 
currency while the other has one of its own. And there are differences in how 
Finland and France provide government services such as education and health.
But these differences in speciﬁ cs do not rule out the existence of a common 
approach to economic growth and social progress. This approach consists of 
policies and institutions that govern trade and ﬁ nance, enterprise and innovation, 
and labor and government that have common elements. Together, these elements 
deﬁ ne an economic and social model distinctly European (chapter 1).
These elements have been associated with Europe’s biggest successes since 
World War II: unprecedented regional integration, global economic power, and 
the attainment of the highest quality of life in human history.
 · Trade, ﬁ nance, and unprecedented regional integration. Europe’s rich and 
poorer economies are more integrated through trade in goods and services 
than in any other part of the world, resulting in quicker convergence in 
incomes and living standards. Private capital in all its forms — foreign direct 
investment (FDI), ﬁ nancial FDI, and portfolio funds — has ﬂ owed from richer to 
poorer countries, and from low- to high-growth economies. Trade and ﬁ nance 
— facilitated by the single market instituted by the European Union and its 
forebears — have fueled convergence in incomes and living standards.
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 · Enterprise, innovation, and global economic inﬂ uence. Private enterprises 
are held accountable for proﬁ ts by shareholders, but are also more socially 
and environmentally responsible than companies in most other parts of the 
world. Research and development and tertiary education, recognized around 
the globe for their economic spillovers, are seen as a responsibility not just 
of ﬁ rms but also the state. Enterprise and innovation — aided by deep and 
comprehensive regional economic integration — enable Europe to account for 
about a third of world gross domestic product (GDP) with less than one-tenth 
of its population.
 · Labor, government, and high living standards. Workers in Europe 
are accorded strong protection against abuse by employers, and have 
unprecedented income security after job loss and in old age. European 
governments are the most decentralized and representative of local interests, 
Figure 1: In Europe, a rapid 
convergence in living standards—
not much elsewhere
(annual growth of consumption per 
capita between 1970 and 2009, by 
level of consumption in 1970)
*** Statistically signiﬁ cant at 1 percent.
Note: n = number of countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and 
Aten 2011); see chapter 1.
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and Europe has developed the most effective institutions for regional 
coordination in human history. Europe’s model of labor and government — 
facilitated by the growing consensus for continental cohesion and made 
affordable by its economic heft — has made the European lifestyle admired 
and envied around the world.
What has Europe accomplished that other parts of the world could not? Which 
aspects of the model are no longer sustainable, either because of unanticipated 
changes in Europe and elsewhere or because some European countries have 
transformed themselves too fast? Which changes are needed now, and which 
can wait? These are the questions that this report asks.
The short answers: Europe has achieved economic growth and convergence 
that is unprecedented (table 1 and spotlight one). Most countries in Europe 
are doing well in trade and ﬁ nance, many in enterprise and innovation, but far 
fewer are doing well in labor and government. So Europe needs many changes 
to make its governments and labor markets work better, fewer to foster 
innovation and productivity growth in enterprises, and fewer still to reform 
ﬁ nance and trade. These deﬁ ciencies are rooted in how some activities are 
organized — and they will need to be reorganized. Stalled productivity, declining 
populations, and growing ﬁ scal imbalances have made some changes urgent.
But in addressing these shortcomings, Europeans should not forget the singular 
successes of their growth model. By fostering a regional economic integration 
unique in both depth and scope, Europe has become a “convergence machine.” 
By engineering entrepreneurial dynamism in the countries that balanced market 
forces and social responsibility, it has made “brand Europe” globally recognized 
and valued. And by allowing a balance between life and work, it has made 
Europe the world’s “lifestyle superpower.” To continue the progress of the last 
ﬁ ve decades, Europeans now have to do three progressively tougher tasks: 
restart the convergence machine, rebuild Europe’s global brand, and recalibrate 
the balance between work and leisure to make their lifestyles affordable.
Table 1: Relentless growth in the United States, revival in Asia, and a postwar miracle in Europe
(average annual compound growth rates, GDP per capita, 1820–2008, US$ 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP estimates)
Year
Western 
Europe
Southern 
Europe
Eastern 
Europe
Former 
Soviet 
Union
United 
States Japan East Asia
Latin 
America
1820–1870 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.3 0.2 –0.1 0.0
1870–1913 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.4 0.8 1.8
1913–1950 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.7 1.6 0.9 –0.2 1.4
1950–1973 3.8 4.5 3.6 3.2 2.3 7.7 2.3 2.5
1973–1994 1.7 1.9 –0.2 –1.6 1.7 2.5 0.3 0.9
1994–2008 1.6 2.7 4.0 4.2 1.7 1.0 3.9 1.6
Note: Regional aggregates are population-weighted; see spotlight one for details.
Source: Maddison 1996; Conference Board 2011.
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The convergence machine
An increasingly vigorous ﬂ ow of goods, services, and ﬁ nance over the last ﬁ ve 
decades has fueled European growth. Europe’s economies are the most open in 
the world. Before the global crisis of 2008–09, half of the world’s approximately 
$15 trillion trade in goods involved Europe (ﬁ gure 2). Two-thirds of it was among 
the 45 countries discussed in this report. Financial ﬂ ows have been equally 
vigorous. In 2007, for example, annual FDI in Europe exceeded $1 trillion. Big 
and growing trade and ﬁ nancial links facilitated by the single market form the 
core of the European convergence machine.
Increasingly sophisticated trade
During the last two decades, the new member states of the European Union 
have done especially well at taking advantage of the opportunities offered to 
them, integrating westward by trading goods and modern business services. 
During the last decade, the candidate countries of Southeastern Europe have 
been doing it through trade in merchandise and more traditional services such 
as travel and transport. This has helped enterprises in Western Europe too. With 
FDI and offshoring, enterprises in Western Europe such as Fiat, Renault, and 
Volkswagen have made themselves and eastern enterprises like Yugo, Dacia, 
and Škoda more efﬁ cient and sophisticated. Simpler tasks are being given to 
countries outside Europe; advanced Europe is getting emerging Europe to do 
more difﬁ cult things, and both regions are beneﬁ ting (chapter 2).
Figure 2: Almost half of the global 
goods trade involves Europe
(merchandise trade 
in 2008, US$ billion)
Source: World Bank staff, based on WTO (2009); 
see chapter 2.
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The goods trade between advanced and emerging Europe has grown rapidly 
since the mid-1990s — when the European Union signed its ﬁ rst association 
agreements with Hungary and Poland — and this does not appear to be injuring 
trade with other parts of the world. Europe does a brisk goods trade with North 
America, Asia, the former Soviet Union, and Africa (ﬁ gure 2). But trade within 
the region has grown much more sophisticated over the last decade, aiding 
quick convergence in productive capacity and living standards. It is helping 
to create a bigger and stronger economic union between the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), the EU15, the new member states, the EU candidate 
countries, and even the eastern partnership economies.
Factory Europe may not be expanding as fast as Factory Asia, but it has become 
smarter. And it could expand a lot too. With economic recovery and better 
trade facilities — especially information and communications infrastructure in the 
European Union’s new member states and the candidate countries — regional 
goods trade could double over the next decade.
The trade in modern services in Europe is increasing too, but not fast enough 
for many Europeans. The benchmark for merchandise trade is East Asia, a 
developing region, but the European Union gauges the Single Market for 
Services against the United States, a developed country. Trading services 
is not easy: it often requires movement of people across borders, ease in 
establishing a local presence, and harmonious home–host regulations. Given all 
this, Europe’s trade in services does not seem stunted (ﬁ gure 3). But progress 
is mixed: travel and ﬁ nancial services have done well but transport and other 
business services — especially those involving new technologies and the Internet 
— have not. With reforms that make adopting newer technologies easier, better 
regulations, and greater mobility of workers, Europe’s trade in services could 
triple in size over the next decade. More important, productivity in the general 
services sector — which is about 70 percent of GDP in Europe — would increase.
The opportunity that Europe might really be missing involves regional trade 
in agriculture. The European Union pays for its agricultural trade policies not 
just with the roughly €50 billion a year the European Commission spends on 
agriculture and rural development and their large indirect efﬁ ciency costs, but 
also through missed opportunities for closer economic integration with eastern 
partnership countries. In Georgia and Ukraine, a third of all workers still depend 
on agriculture for a living. Allowing better access to European farm markets 
would aid their development, win friends, and inﬂ uence policies in the countries 
of the eastern partnership.
Despite these weaknesses, the overall assessment of European trade is 
positive. In 2009, Europe’s merchandise trade was worth about $4.5 trillion, 
more than East Asia’s and North America’s combined. Its trade in services was 
worth $2.25 trillion, more than that of the rest of the world combined. Trade is 
the mainstay of the European economic model and its most attractive attribute.
Finance that ﬂ ows downhill
Financial integration is the second part of the convergence machine. Finance 
has served Europe well. This may come as a surprise to those who blame 
the current crisis in the eurozone on banks that lent money to spendthrift 
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governments. But European ﬁ nance has a desirable attribute: capital of all 
types ﬂ ows from richer to poorer countries, from low- to high-growth countries. 
Financial FDI — big investments by Austrian, French, Italian, and Swedish banks 
in Central and Eastern Europe — is a unique feature of Europe. In the east, it has 
helped (chapter 3).
Figure 4 shows the relationship between economic growth and current account 
deﬁ cits in the new member states of the European Union, its candidates, the 
eastern partnership countries, and other emerging economies. An upward 
sloping arrow means that countries that ran smaller deﬁ cits or larger external 
account surpluses grew faster. In other words, a country grew faster if it lent 
Figure 3: More trade in services 
in Europe, but apparently in 
more traditional activities
(services exports in the European 
Union, United States, and Japan, 2008)
Note: The numbers in parentheses refer to the 
sum of traditional and modern service exports as 
a percentage of GDP.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
IMF BOPS; see chapter 2.
Figure 4: In Europe, foreign 
capital has boosted growth 
in emerging economies
(current account deﬁ cits and per 
capita growth, 1997-08, by groups of 
countries, percent)
Note: Average growth rates calculated using 3 
four-year periods in 1997–2008.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
IMF WEO; see chapter 3.
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rather than borrowed abroad. And for emerging economies outside Europe, 
this is indeed what we see: capital ﬂ ows from poorer, high-growth countries to 
richer, low-growth countries (green arrow). Call this the “China syndrome.”
In Europe, capital behaves the way it should: it ﬂ ows from richer to poorer 
economies, and countries receiving more capital grow faster. The laws of 
economics have held in Europe. They hold more ﬁ rmly the more institutionally 
integrated the economies have become with Western Europe — by membership 
in the European Union or by signaling the intention to join. Belarus and Ukraine, 
for example, have done neither, and they look a lot like emerging market 
economies outside Europe, growing faster when they have external account 
surpluses (capital outﬂ ows) or smaller current account deﬁ cits.
In 2008, when the ﬁ nancial crisis hit, people who were familiar with earlier 
crises in Asia and Latin America expected a massive pullout by western banks. 
It did not happen: foreign banks stayed, renewing 90 percent of the loans they 
had made, a much higher proportion than in previous crises. Of course, during 
the preceding boom some governments, enterprises, banks, and households 
abused the opportunities provided by this model of ﬁ nancial integration. And 
today, as western banks face pressures to offset losses in Southern Europe, 
they may have to sell their proﬁ table businesses in Eastern Europe. But the 
beneﬁ ts have been greater than the excesses, and some reforms can make the 
ﬂ ows more stable and their beneﬁ ts even greater: better management of public 
ﬁ nance during booms in both advanced and emerging Europe, and more adept 
regulatory structures to crisis-proof private ﬁ nance. To grow at high and steady 
rates, economies in emerging Europe have not had to “become Asian.” Nor 
should they have to now.
Restarting the convergence machine
In the early 2000s, an important debate took place. For two decades, 
economists had been puzzled by the ﬁ nding that a country was able to invest 
only as much as what it could itself save. In theory, capital ﬂ ows should allow 
savers in wealthier, or low-growth, countries to ﬁ nance investment in poorer, or 
high-growth, economies. They would get a higher return on their money, and 
these ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows would allow the people in developing nations to save less 
and consume more, and invest more and grow faster. Unfortunately, it did not 
seem to happen; instead, there was a strong correlation between saving and 
investment across countries (Feldstein and Horioka 1980). But in the European 
Union between 1992 and 2001, especially the eurozone, research showed that 
something had changed. Greece and Portugal had run large current account 
deﬁ cits ﬁ nanced by foreign capital inﬂ ows; their savings had fallen, investment 
had increased, and their economies had grown (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). 
The question was whether policymakers — national governments, the European 
Union, and the European Central Bank — should welcome these growing 
imbalances, or worry about them.
With the beneﬁ t of hindsight the answer is, of course, both. The capital inﬂ ows 
were the result of trade and ﬁ nancial integration, and they were supposed to 
make Greece and Portugal more productive and richer economies. Until about 
2001, they did, and their living standards converged to those of more advanced 
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European economies. But since 2002, labor productivity in Europe’s southern 
countries has been falling. The sheer volume of ﬂ ows meant that inﬂ ows 
replaced domestic saving. Increasingly, though, they did not fund productive 
investment. Obviously, the borrowed money had not always been used well. It 
had ﬂ owed in on the belief that Greek and Portuguese debts would be serviced 
or repaid. By 2009, it was clear that this was going to be difﬁ cult.
In the new member states, the same story was being played out, but with 
many more happy endings than sad. In countries such as the Czech Republic 
and Poland, foreign savings ﬂ owed into productive uses, and both Western 
European savers and Eastern European investors beneﬁ ted. In some others, 
ever larger ﬂ ows began to ﬁ nance consumption, sometimes by the government 
but more often by households. In these countries, economic growth went into 
reverse during the global ﬁ nancial crisis.
Restarting the convergence machine will not be difﬁ cult. The Single Market for 
Services is becoming more efﬁ cient, and national governments can accelerate 
the process by fully implementing the European Union’s Services Directive. For 
many services, measures to increase mobility of labor among countries will help 
greatly. For other more modern services that can be sold digitally, harmonious 
regulations may be much of what is needed. New member states of the 
European Union and the candidate countries in Southeastern Europe will have to 
continue easing the bottlenecks in transport and communication infrastructure 
and modern services, so that trade in manufactures can facilitate the production 
networks that have been growing in size and sophistication. The European 
Union can also help millions of people in the eastern partnership countries — 
whose combined GDP is less than $0.5 trillion — by giving better access to its $1 
trillion market for food and other farm products.
A lot of this is happening. It is ﬁ nance, the fuel for the machine, which needs 
more attention. Europe’s convergence machine needs a better regulator of 
ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows. Finance ﬂ ows in the right direction in Europe — proof positive of 
the soundness of the system. But the ﬂ ows are erratic, ﬂ ooding Europe’s less 
advanced economies when ﬁ nance is plentiful, and starving them of ﬁ nance 
when savers and investors in advanced countries become skittish. Financial 
ﬂ ows could be made steadier through conservative ﬁ scal policies and prudential 
regulations, so that they do not suddenly stop when growth slows. Canada, 
the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Poland showed what can be done during good 
times, and Sweden and the Republic of Korea have shown ways to quickly 
get ﬁ rms and households out from under a debt overhang when boom-time 
ﬁ nances fuel excesses and cause busts (Iwulska 2011).
“Europe” — a global brand
As convergence has slowed and even gone into reverse in parts of Europe, the 
entire region is getting a bad press. Europe’s best days are behind it, it is now 
said. High unemployment among young people, stagnant worker productivity, 
unsustainable public ﬁ nances, and archaic social protection and innovation 
systems that are unsuited for a globalized economy are all presented as 
symptoms of economic decay. But the heart of an economy is neither labor nor 
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government — it is enterprise. Since the mid-1990s, during a period when Asia 
had a huge ﬁ nancial crisis and bigger recovery, and the United States had a 
spectacular technology boom and a massive ﬁ nancial crisis, European enterprise 
has quietly ﬂ ourished.
This is no mean achievement, because Europe expects much from its 
enterprises. Their shareholders expect them to add value and turn a proﬁ t, 
workers expect them to create jobs, and governments want them to bring 
in export earnings. Remarkably, over the last decade and a half, European 
enterprises have delivered all three (ﬁ gure 5). Between 1995 and 2009, job 
growth in advanced Europe outstripped that in the United States. The new 
member states of the European Union and the candidate countries engineered 
productivity increases that outstripped those in East Asia and Latin America. 
Exports of goods and services in advanced and emerging Europe rose faster 
than output, and exceeded the growth rates even of the heralded BRIC 
economies (chapter 4). German and Swedish manufactures, produce from 
France and the Netherlands, and British and Italian banks have global reach and 
reputation; Czech engineering, Estonian information technology, and Turkish 
construction companies are quickly acquiring them. These are not the signs of a 
region in decay.
With Asian enterprises becoming more active globally, the next few decades 
might well require European enterprises to make changes in how and where they 
do business. For now, the numbers show that in aggregate, European enterprise 
has been a reliable component of the economic model.
Southern enterprise falters
But not all is well. Employment growth in the EU12 could have been quicker, 
productivity growth in the EU15 should have been faster, and EU candidate 
and eastern partnership countries should raise exports to levels seen in the 
rest of Europe (see top ﬁ ve bars in ﬁ gure 5). Perhaps most worrisome are the 
productivity patterns since 2002, which show that parts of Europe have been 
faltering (ﬁ gure 6). Northern countries such as Finland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom — and later the Baltic economies — have done well, and continental 
economies such as Austria, France, Luxembourg, and Germany — and later the 
Czech Republic, Poland, and others — have been doing well too. But countries 
in Southern Europe — Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain — have not. From 2002 to 
2008, they created jobs, but mainly in cyclical activities like construction or in 
less productive enterprises (like micro and family ﬁ rms). And the productivity of 
their workers has been falling.
A premature adoption of the euro by southern economies is sometimes blamed 
for this reversal of fortune. Others say that letting the formerly communist 
countries into the European Union so soon did not give the south enough time 
to become competitive. But perhaps the most likely explanation is that of all the 
economies in Europe, the entrepreneurial structures of Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain were least suited for the wider European economy. For one thing, 
a sizable part of net output in southern economies is generated in small ﬁ rms 
— almost a third of it in tiny enterprises (with fewer than 10 workers; ﬁ gure 7). 
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Figure 5: European enterprises 
have delivered jobs, 
productivity, and exports
(performance of European subregions 
and benchmark countries, 1995–2009)
Figure 6: Much of 
Europe is becoming 
more productive, 
but the south has 
fallen behind
(labor productivity 
levels in 2002, 
thousands of 2005 
US$) 
Note: For Belgium, Greece, and Norway, productivity levels refer to 2003 (top panel). In the bottom panel, the period considered varies: Belgium and 
Norway (2003–08); Greece (2003–07); and the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Romania, and the United Kingdom (2002–07). The three lines in each panel 
show average values for countries covered by each line. Expected growth for EU15 South is obtained by computing gaps in productivity levels between 
EU15 South and each of the other two groups and then applying these shares to the difference in growth between the ﬁ rst (that is, EFTA, EU15 North, and 
EU15 Continental) and the third (EU12) groups.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; see chapter 4.
(labor productivity 
growth, 2002–08, 
annual percentage 
increase)
Note: Growth rates in employment and productivity are compound annual growth rates. Average values by group are shown. China and Japan are also 
included in the calculation of East Asia’s regional average.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WDI and ILO (2010); see chapter 4.
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This is not an entrepreneurial proﬁ le suited for a big market. Unsurprisingly, with 
the expansion of the single market in the 2000s, foreign capital from the richer 
economies of Continental Europe quickly changed direction, going east instead 
of south as it had done in the 1990s (ﬁ gure 8).
Did the south need more time to adjust, or did it squander opportunities? 
The latter seems more plausible. Ireland has shown that EU institutions and 
resources can be translated quickly into competitiveness. The Baltic economies 
are now doing the same. The chief culprits for the south’s poor performance 
were high taxes and too many regulations, often poorly administered. While 
these mattered less when its eastern neighbors were communist and China and 
India suffered the least business-friendly systems in the world, they are now 
crippling southern enterprise (ﬁ gure 9).
But there are reasons to be optimistic. The sovereign debt crisis has led to a 
resumption of regulatory reform in these countries, and the experience of 
countries such as Latvia and Lithuania shows that the necessary improvements 
can be done over years, not decades. And they need to be done quickly. From 
2003 to 2006, Europeans who felt that globalization was an opportunity for their 
enterprises fell from 56 to 37 percent (Morley and Ward 2008). By 2006, the share 
of people who felt it was a threat to European enterprises and employment was 
almost half. The Danes, Swedes, Dutch, and Estonians were the most positively 
disposed to globalization; the French, Greeks, Belgians, and Cypriots the least. It is 
not a coincidence that the countries where people are wary of competition have 
the worst business climate in Europe.
Europe would get even more from its enterprises if it made doing business 
easier. Southern Europe must start doing this now, and Central and Eastern 
Europe should continue improving the investment climate. Otherwise, 
enterprises will remain small and unproductive — increasingly unable to attract 
foreign investors, incapable of taking advantage of a pan-European market that 
will only get bigger and more competitive, and progressively uncompetitive 
in global markets, where they have to contend with enterprises from East 
Asia and North America. A better business climate will help to stem the 
growth of imbalances within Europe, restart the convergence machine, and 
make European enterprises globally competitive. Countries such as Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom show how it can be 
done (Iwulska 2011).
The north innovates
But making it easier to do business will not be enough on its own. When 
productivity gaps were growing within Europe, the gap between the advanced 
economies of Europe and the United States started to widen after almost 
disappearing in the mid-1990s. Indeed, the 2000s were a decade of declining 
productivity in the EU15 relative to both the United States and Japan, the 
world’s next two largest economies after the European Union during that time 
(ﬁ gure 10). Between 1995 and 2009, labor productivity in the United States grew 
at 1.6 percent annually, in Japan at 1.2 percent, and in the EU15 at just 1 percent 
(ﬁ gure 5).
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Reassuringly, productivity in Northern Europe grew at 1.7 percent per year 
during the same period. What has the north done to encourage enterprise and 
innovation? Much of its success has come from creating a good climate for 
doing business. All the northern economies are in the top 15 countries of 183 
in the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings; at 14th, Sweden is the lowest-
ranked among them. They have given their enterprises considerable economic 
freedom. Their governments are doing a lot more. They have speeded up 
innovation by downloading the “killer applications” that have made the 
United States the global leader in technology: better incentives for enterprise-
sponsored research and development (R&D), public funding mechanisms and 
intellectual property regimes to foster proﬁ table relations between universities 
and ﬁ rms, and a steady supply of workers with tertiary education. Tellingly, 
Europe’s innovation leaders perform especially well in areas where Europe as 
a whole lags the United States the most. These features make them global 
Figure 7: Smaller ﬁ rms contribute 
half of value added in the EU15 
South, but just a third elsewhere
(contributions to value added by size 
of enterprises, 2009)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the total 
value added expressed in billions of constant 
2005 U.S. dollars. The EU15 comprises Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
(North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands (Continental); and Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain (South). The EU12 comprises 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (North); the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, 
and Slovenia (Continental); and Bulgaria and 
Romania (South).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
Eurostat; see chapter 4.
Figure 8: Western European investors 
have been looking east, not south
(foreign direct investment inﬂ ows in 
Europe, percent, 1985, 1995, 2005, and 
2008)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the 
amount of inﬂ ows expressed in billions of U.S. 
dollars.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
UNCTAD (2010); see chapter 4.
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Figure 9: Southern and Eastern Europe 
must make it easier to do business
(principal components index of the 
ease of doing business in 2011, scaled 
from 0 [poor] to 100 [excellent])
Note: Averages are computed using principal 
component analysis. EFTA here comprises 
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. The EU15 
comprises Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom (North); Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands (Continental); and Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain (South). The EU12 comprises 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (North); the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, 
and Slovenia (Continental); and Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
and Romania (South).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
Doing Business; see chapter 4.
Figure 10: Productivity growth in 
Europe’s larger economies has 
slowed down since the mid-1990s
(EU15 labor productivity, indexed to 
the United States and Japan)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
the OECD Productivity database; see chapter 5.
leaders; combining them with generous government spending on R&D and 
public education systems makes their innovation systems distinctively European 
(chapter 5).
For Europe’s larger continental economies that have reached or exceeded U.S. 
standards in physical, ﬁ nancial, and human capital, R&D and other innovation 
deﬁ cits are likely to be growth inhibitors. In dynamic Eastern Europe, countries 
need not invest much more in R&D and the production of knowledge. But they 
must still innovate through osmosis: they have considerable scope for the 
quick adoption of existing technologies, using FDI and trade links as conduits. 
The south is becoming slower in importing new technologies: FDI inﬂ ows and 
outﬂ ows have been falling since the economies in emerging Europe integrated 
with Continental and Northern Europe. For these increasingly service-oriented 
economies, reform of domestic regulations — not more R&D spending — may be 
the best way to speed up innovation.
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What has been more perplexing is Europe’s generally poor performance in 
the most technology-intensive sectors — the Internet, biotechnology, computer 
software, health care equipment, and semiconductors. Put another way, Korea; 
Taiwan, China; and the United States have been doing well in sectors that are 
huge now but barely existed in 1975. Europe has been doing better in the more 
established sectors, especially industrial machinery, electrical equipment, 
telecommunications, aerospace, automobiles, and personal goods. The 
United States has young ﬁ rms like Amazon, Amgen, Apple, Google, Intel, and 
Microsoft; Europe has the older like Airbus, Mercedes, Nokia, and Volkswagen.
Europe’s young leading innovators (called “Yollies” for short) are as R&D-
intensive as those in the United States. Europe just has a lot fewer Yollies. 
As a result, while more than a third of U.S. R&D spending is by Yollies, it is 
less than one-ﬁ fteenth in Europe. The United States focuses its R&D efforts 
on innovation-based growth sectors (ﬁ gure 11). Europe specializes in sectors 
with medium R&D intensity. Japan is showing other East Asian countries 
how productivity growth can be maintained in established industries such as 
automobiles and electronics, and Germany may be doing the same. With the 
size and diversity of the European economy, productivity growth will likely 
come both from doing what Japan has done and adopting parts of the American 
innovation system. But to do either, the common market will have to become 
more of a single economy.
All European countries should have the friendly business climate that Denmark, 
Ireland, and Norway have. It is not a coincidence that the only large European 
economies that rival the United States and Japan in innovation are Germany 
and the United Kingdom, which were both ranked in the top 20 countries for 
ease of doing business in 2011. Many more European countries should have 
the universities like those in the United States and Japan, where more than one 
Figure 11: The United States 
specializes in younger, more 
R&D-intensive products
(relative technological advantage 
and R&D efforts by young and old 
innovation leaders in the United 
States, Europe, and the rest of the 
world)
Note: R&D intensity is measured as the 
ratio of R&D spending to total sales, for 
ﬁ rms established after 1975 (young leading 
innovators or “Yollies”) or before 1975 
(“Ollies”). The relative technological advantage 
is calculated as the share of each region or 
country (say, Europe) in the R&D of a particular 
sector (say, the Internet) relative to the 
share of Europe in world R&D; values greater 
than one indicate the region is technology-
specialized in the sector.
Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff 
calculations, based on the European 
Commission’s Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies R&D Scoreboard; see 
chapter 5.
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out of two people ages 30–34 have completed college; in Europe, only Ireland, 
Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, and Finland exceed 45 percent. More countries 
will have to improve their business–science links to rival those in the United 
States and Japan; currently, only Switzerland and Scandinavia do as well.
Burnishing the brand
Perhaps the simplest and most reliable way to assess the innovation 
performance of a country is to see how much more productive its enterprises 
become every year — that is, how much better they are in buying, producing, 
and selling. During the last decade, two things have happened that should 
worry Europeans. The ﬁ rst is that since the mid-1990s, labor productivity in 
Europe’s advanced economies has been falling relative to that of the United 
States (and Japan). The second is that productivity in Southern Europe has been 
falling compared with that in both the advanced countries in Western Europe 
and the less well-off countries in emerging Europe. How can these gaps be 
closed?
It depends on the gap. For reducing that between the south and the north, 
the most important steps involve improving business regulations. Countries in 
the EU12 South — notably Bulgaria — and Georgia have been showing that this 
can be done even in the poorest parts of Europe. For closing the transatlantic 
productivity gap, more is necessary. Leading European economies such as 
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Germany are showing what 
works. Following their example would mean giving up the ﬁ xation on public 
R&D spending targets, and focusing instead on improving competition among 
enterprises, increasing the private funding of universities, changing the way 
research is funded so that business-university linkages become stronger, and 
making the single market work for services so that Europe’s entrepreneurs view 
the entire continent as their domestic economy.
There are reasons to be optimistic. During the last two decades, countries in 
the EFTA — Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland principally — have actually done 
better in improving productivity than the United States. Northern parts of the 
EU15 — especially Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden — have also been doing 
well. The trouble is that their economies add up to less than $1.5 trillion in 
purchasing power terms, roughly the GDP of Spain or Texas and just a tenth of 
the European Union’s economy (see the Selected Indicators tables). If the rest 
of Europe could beneﬁ t from the dynamism of northern economies — by learning 
from them or leaning on them — Europe’s innovation goals might quickly be 
reached.
Chapters 4 and 5 make it clear that preserving Europe’s global brand will be 
more difﬁ cult than restarting convergence. To stay competitive on world 
markets, Europe will have to make trade even more vigorous and ﬁ nance 
more durable so that the region eventually becomes a single economy. To help 
redress the continent’s growing productivity gaps, governments in Southern 
Europe will have to quickly improve the climate for doing business. The more 
dynamic countries in Eastern Europe will have to do all this as well as invest in 
infrastructure. To close the growing transatlantic productivity divide, continental 
countries must give their enterprises more economic freedom. Enterprises in the 
northern and EFTA economies — already among the world’s most innovative — will 
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need fuller access to markets in the rest of Europe. Europe will have to become 
the top destination for those seeking higher education and the opportunity 
to become entrepreneurs. Only then can European enterprises stay globally 
competitive, and Europe become the place of choice of entrepreneurs from 
around the world.
The lifestyle superpower
In 2008, Europe was already the place of choice for tourists: of the busiest 20 
international tourist destinations, more than half were in Europe. The United 
States had the might and China the momentum, but Europeans had the highest 
standard of living. Millions of people from around the world visited Europe 
to see and experience it ﬁ rsthand. In the 1990s, Japan’s Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa had promised he would make his country the “lifestyle superpower.” 
With average incomes still a quarter short of those in the United States, Europe 
had become one.
Superpowers tend to spend a lot to protect their interests and project inﬂ uence. 
To remain the political superpower, the United States spends almost as much on 
defense as the next 15 countries do together. To keep its status as the lifestyle 
superpower, Europe spends more on social protection than the rest of the world 
combined (ﬁ gure 12).
The decline of work
The hallmark of the European economic model is perhaps the balance between 
work and life. With prosperity, Americans buy more goods and services, 
Europeans more leisure. In the 1950s, Western Europeans worked the equivalent 
of almost a month more than Americans. By the 1970s, they worked about the 
same amount. Today, Americans work a month a year more than Dutch, French, 
Germans, and Swedes, and work notably longer than the less well-off Greeks, 
Hungarians, Poles, and Spaniards (chapter 6).
Figure 12: Outspending 
the rest of the world 
(general government spending on 
defense [United States] and social 
protection [Europe], 2004–09, share of 
total world spending)
Note: For social protection spending, due 
to the data availability, averages over 
2004–09 by country are used. Data cover general 
government but, if unavailable, refer to central 
government only. n = the number of countries 
included in the calculations.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(2011); IMF GFS; WDI; World Bank ECA Social 
Protection Database; and Weigand and Grosh 
(2008).
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Europeans have also cut the years they work during their (ever-lengthening) 
lives. Today, men in France, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey effectively retire more 
than eight years earlier than in the mid-1960s. The average European can also 
expect to live four years longer. By 2007, Frenchmen expected to draw pensions 
for 15 more years than in 1965, and Austrian, Polish, Spanish, Swiss, and Turkish 
men for more than a dozen. In Organisation for Economic Co- operation and 
Development countries, only Korean, German, and Czech men work more years 
today than they did 50 years ago (ﬁ gure 13).
American, Australian, and Canadian men also retire about four years earlier 
than they used to. But their countries have more favorable demographics than 
the typical European country (ﬁ gure 14). On current immigration and work 
participation trends, the 45 countries covered by this report will lose about 50 
million workers over the next ﬁ ve decades, and have a workforce of about 
275 million by 2060. In the 2030s alone, the labor force will fall by 15 million 
people. The decline will be most severe for the European Union (countries such 
as France, which have high fertility rates today, do better), but candidate and 
neighborhood countries will also lose workers. The exception is Turkey, where 
the labor force is projected to increase until 2060.
Only with radical changes can Europe counteract the shrinking of its labor 
force. If participation rates in all countries were to converge with those seen in 
Northern Europe, or if the retirement age were to increase by 10 years across 
the board, the European labor force would increase marginally over the next 50 
years. If female labor force participation converged with men’s, the labor force 
Figure 13: Europe’s pension systems have to 
support people for many more years
(changes in life expectancy at 60 and effective retirement age, 1965–2007)
Source: OECD (2011); updated data from OECD (2006).
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Figure 14: Europe’s labor force 
will shrink, while North America’s 
will grow by a quarter
(projected cumulative change in 
working-age population, 2010–50, 
percent)
Note: North America is Canada and the United 
States and North-East Asia includes China; 
Hong Kong SAR, China; Japan; Macao SAR, 
China; the Republic of Korea; and Taiwan, 
China.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data 
Base; see chapter 6.
Figure 15: Europeans are less mobile, 
even within their own countries
(labor mobility, share of working age 
population that has moved, 2000-05)
Source: Bonin and others (2008); OECD (2005 
and 2007); see chapter 6.
would still decrease by 5 percent. But none of these changes would completely 
offset the loss of young workers. For that, Europe will need to integrate Turks 
into the European labor market and attract talented young workers from around 
the world. In one plausible scenario, Turkey could contribute 40 percent of 
the gains in the European labor force, and almost all of the increase in young 
workers.
Fixing the European labor market will require a lot: increasing the competition 
for jobs, improving labor mobility within Europe, ﬁ xing how work and welfare 
interact, and rethinking immigration policies. These changes will not happen 
without a new social consensus, which has yet to be built.
Perhaps the best way to start is to accelerate internal labor mobility in Europe. 
Mobility in the European Union is the lowest in the developed world (ﬁ gure 15). 
There are natural barriers to greater labor mobility associated with language 
and cultural differences, but there are also policy-induced obstacles. In most of 
the older EU member states, there are restrictions on the movement of workers 
from the new member states. Housing markets in many European countries can 
be inefﬁ cient and make moving expensive: the transaction costs of buying or 
selling a house can be high. Despite measures to ensure the portability of social 
beneﬁ ts across the European Union, including pensions and unemployment 
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insurance, in practice it is limited because of cumbersome rules. Generous 
unemployment beneﬁ ts discourage workers from seeking jobs. Labor market 
signals can be muted by collective bargaining agreements that limit territorial 
wage differentiation. To make the single market work better, making labor 
more mobile should be a priority. For the countries that share the common 
currency, it is a prerequisite (box 1).
Then, Europe has to make changes in how work is regulated and social security 
provided. Many countries in Western Europe had started to reverse the decline 
in work participation during the late 1990s and early 2000s; many in Central, 
Eastern, and Southern Europe now must do the same. The main attribute of 
the European economic model that needs to be reassessed is employment 
protection legislation, which is lowering participation and reducing employment 
in many countries. In countries such as Spain, it may be responsible for 
youth unemployment rates as high as 40 percent. Paradoxically, Europe has 
impending shortages of young workers and high joblessness among its youth.
Denmark and Germany have shown how this can be remedied (Iwulska 2011). 
Other countries like Croatia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Turkey may 
have to learn quickly and carefully implement the lessons. The countries in 
emerging Europe will also have to decide — based on their cultural and political 
antecedents — whether to move toward greater job security and join countries 
such as Belgium and France, or toward greater ﬂ exibility and become more like 
the North Americans and East Asians. To have both as in Denmark, they will 
have to consider the greater ﬁ scal costs of “ﬂ exicurity.” At the moment, most 
countries have neither.
While all this is being done, Europe’s policymakers could get people to 
appreciate the need for a new approach to immigration. Europe needs an 
immigration policy that is more driven by economic need. Today the debate is 
about how to best manage migration from North Africa. Tomorrow’s debate 
should be about the policies and practices that will make Europe a global 
magnet for talent. Countries like Sweden and the United Kingdom have been 
doing this, but not quite as effectively as Canada and the United States (Iwulska 
2011).
The precipitate promise of social protection
Europe will have to make big changes in how it organizes labor and 
government. The reasons are becoming ever more obvious: the labor force 
is shrinking, societies are aging, social security is already a large part of 
government spending, and ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and public debt are often already 
onerous.
In dealing with government spending, deﬁ cits, and debt, it is sensible to start by 
asking whether European governments are too big; that is, whether they spend 
too much. They are obviously bigger than their peers. In the EU15, governments 
spent 50 percent of GDP in 2009; in much of the rest of Europe, this share was 
about 45 percent — versus less than 40 percent in the United States and Japan, 
33 percent in Latin America, and about 25 percent in emerging East Asia. A map 
of the world resized to reﬂ ect government spending instead of land area shows 
how Europe might look to outsiders (ﬁ gure 16).
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Governments in Europe spend between 7 and 10 percent of GDP more than 
their peers elsewhere — that is, countries at similar levels of per capita income. 
The difference is mostly the spending on social protection. For example, 
Western European governments spend about 10 percent of GDP more than the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. The difference in social protection 
spending is 9 percent of GDP (ﬁ gure 17).
Figure 16: Governments 
in Europe are big
(the world resized by 
government spending in 
dollars, 2009)
Source: World Bank staff, using 
IMF WEO.
There can be good reasons for having bigger governments. If governments are 
good at supplying essential social services, and if European society wants to 
redistribute more to protect the welfare of the elderly, inﬁ rm, or unfortunate, 
they should provide these amenities. If European populations are older and 
social security systems have to be bigger, that may be another good reason for 
high-spending governments. European societies have been more redistributive 
and to good effect — look at the impressive declines in poverty in Western 
Europe since World War II and in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.
But social services, social welfare, and social security have to be ﬁ nanced by 
taxes, and tax rates in Europe are the highest in the world. For example, the 
tax wedge in Korea — the amount that Korean employers pay besides wages 
when hiring workers — is about a third of what Belgian enterprises pay and half 
of the taxes paid by businesses in Greece and Turkey. The question that such 
numbers provoke: is big government a drag on growth in Europe? It appears it 
is. Over the last 15 years, a 10 percentage point increase in initial government 
spending in Europe has lowered annual growth by 0.6–0.9 percentage points. 
Countries with government spending-to-GDP ratios above 40 percent grow by 2 
percentage points of GDP less than those with lower ratios (chapter 7).
Of course, size is not the only feature that matters. What government does and 
how it ﬁ nances its activities is as important. European governments regulate the 
largest economic area in the world; encourage a vigorous exchange of goods, 
services, and capital; promote voice and accountability; provide or enable the 
provision of public goods; and redistribute wealth. Bigger governments are 
often better at doing these things, especially when social trust ensures that 
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everybody plays by the same rules. As countries like Sweden show, such big 
governments can go together with thriving, dynamic economies.
But it is not easy being like Sweden. What does it take? Make it so easy to 
register property, trade across borders, and pay taxes that the World Bank 
ranks the country one of the top 15 for doing business. Create the conditions 
that get four out of every ﬁ ve people of working age into jobs, and get almost 
everybody who works to pay taxes. Have an efﬁ cient government that provides 
high-quality social services, so taxpayers get their money’s worth. Institute 
the pension rules that make it difﬁ cult to retire before 65 and impossible until 
you reach your 60s. Cultivate the social trust that allows both a generous social 
safety net and a transparency in government so that abuse is minimal. The list 
is long. If a country can do all this, big government will not hurt growth.
Europe’s governments will have to become more efﬁ cient, or become smaller. 
Fortunately, governments that have grown prematurely big have done so for 
just one reason: social protection. Europe’s states are not big spenders on either 
health or education. The variation among countries stems from a difference 
in spending on pensions and social assistance. Europe’s countries also differ 
in how they tax these beneﬁ ts; Northern European countries tax the social 
security beneﬁ ts of people with high incomes more than others in Europe do. 
After taxes are considered, the southern periphery is the biggest social spender 
in Western Europe. But the reason why Europe spends more than its peers on 
public pensions is the same in the north, center, and south. This is not because 
Europe has the oldest population (Japan’s is much older) nor because of higher 
pension beneﬁ ts (annual subsidies per pensioner are about the same in Greece 
as in Japan). It spends more because of easier and earlier eligibility for pensions 
(ﬁ gure 18).
Fiscal consolidation should be a top priority in Europe during the next decade, 
and controlling the public expenses related to aging will remain the policy 
imperative over the next 20 years. Calculations done for this report suggest that 
Western Europe has to improve its primary balance — adjusted for the business 
cycle — by about 6 percent of GDP during this decade to reduce public debt to 60 
percent of GDP by 2030 (ﬁ gure 19). Among the countries of Western Europe, the 
need for consolidating public spending is greatest in the south and lowest in the 
north. Among Europe’s emerging economies, with a lower public debt target of 
40 percent of GDP, the adjustment needs are about 5 percent of GDP. They are 
lowest in the European Union’s new member states. Bigger adjustments will be 
needed in candidate countries and the economies of the eastern partnership, 
because many of them have not begun seriously reforming their social 
protection systems — pensions, unemployment insurance, and social assistance.
Public spending related to aging includes the ever-increasing costs of providing 
health care for the elderly. Without comprehensive reforms to pensions and 
long-term health care, these costs could add more than 3 percent of GDP to 
the governments’ ﬁ scal imbalance during the next two decades. Governments 
in Europe that spend more than 10 percent of GDP on such beneﬁ ts may be 
risking underinvestment in activities that help economic growth — education, 
infrastructure, and innovation. Countries such as Serbia and Ukraine that already 
spend 15 percent or more on social security alone may be jeopardizing the 
welfare of generations.
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Recalibrating the work–life balance
The European model of work provides income security more than any other, 
and some countries such as Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and Switzerland have 
adapted it to combine security with ﬂ exibility in hiring and ﬁ ring to foster 
both efﬁ ciency and equity in labor market outcomes. But for much of Europe, 
the imbalances between work and life need to be mitigated, as do the ﬁ scal 
imbalances that have emerged as a result of public spending to protect 
societies from the rougher facets of private enterprise.
Figure 17: Social protection explains 
the difference in government size 
between Europe and its peers
(government spending, percentage of 
GDP, 2007–08)
Note: “Social protection” includes beneﬁ ts 
related to sickness and disability, old age, 
survivors, family and children, unemployment, 
and housing. Western Europe comprises 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden (North); Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Center); 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
IMF GFS and IMF WEO.
Figure 18: Small differences in annual 
pensions per beneﬁ ciary, big in 
overall public pension spending
(public pension spending in 2007)
Note: Median values by group are shown. 
Western Europe comprises Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (North); Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom (Center); Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain (South). Anglo-Saxon comprises Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
Eurostat and the OECD Pensions Statistics; see 
chapter 7.
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Since the mid-1980s, a billion Asian workers have entered the global marketplace. 
Over the same period, Europeans have been working fewer hours per week, 
fewer weeks per year, and fewer years over their lifetimes. It is worrisome 
that their productivity is not increasing as quickly as it should. In the European 
Union’s southern states, for example, productivity during the last decade fell by 1 
percent each year, when — given productivity levels relative to those in Continental 
and Northern Europe — it should have increased by about 4 percent annually. It 
is also worrisome that in many parts of Europe, taxes bring in less than what 
governments spend. France and Germany, for example, have not had a ﬁ scal 
surplus since the 1970s; Greece expected a budget deﬁ cit of about 10 percent of 
GDP in 2011; and Hungary, Serbia, Ukraine, and many others have been struggling 
to contain budgetary imbalances.
This will have to change. The reform of pensions and disability allowances will 
have to be the highest priority now, with costs of long-term health care soon 
becoming a pressing problem. Europe already spends twice as much on social 
security as Japan and the United States. There are some countries in Europe 
that are showing how to address these problems. Some such as Sweden are 
well known; others like Iceland could be studied more (Iwulska 2011). European 
societies will also have to modernize social welfare systems so that the 
disincentives to work are minimized. Denmark, Germany, and Ireland may inspire 
others how this can be done. But what needs to be done is not hard to see: 
Europeans will have to work for more years.
From distinct to distinguished
In 2007 An East Asian Renaissance, a report by the World Bank, introduced the 
notion of the “middle-income trap” (Gill and Kharas 2007). It was about why 
countries seem to easily grow from low per capita income levels to middle income, 
but ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to become and remain high-income economies. Later research 
identiﬁ ed about two dozen countries that have grown from middle income to high 
income since 1987. Some had discovered oil, like Oman and Trinidad and Tobago. 
But this can hardly be a development model for others to emulate, because it 
is a matter more of providence than policy. Some, like Hong Kong SAR, China; 
Singapore; and Republic of Korea, had translated peace into prosperity through 
export-led strategies that involved working and saving a lot and sometimes 
postponing political liberties for later. They had to be aggressive, like tigers, 
looking out only for themselves.
But of the countries that have grown quickly from middle-income to high- income, 
half — Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia — are in Europe. If you can be 
a part of the formidable European convergence machine, you do not need to be 
extraordinarily fortunate to become prosperous nor — like the East Asian Tigers — do 
you have to be ferocious. You just have to be disciplined.
The inability of this convergence machine to continue to deliver rapid growth and 
an improved quality of life in the advanced economies of Western Europe has 
been recognized for some time. Europe’s policymakers have put together protocols 
and commitments to encourage innovation and dynamism. Policies that were a 
core component of Europe’s postwar growth model — or those that evolved from 
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it — are not giving European economies enough ﬂ exibility to take advantage 
of new technologies that have led to high productivity growth in Asia and 
North America during the last 15 years. It is not that European product market 
regulation and employment protection became more stringent over time; they 
just became more costly.
The Western European model that so effectively enabled catch-up has created 
“afterglow” institutions that are hindering growth in a different age — an era 
of greater competition abroad and big demographic shifts at home. These 
institutions now need updating. In the states aspiring to become part of 
the machine, notably the candidates, potential candidates, and the Eastern 
Neighborhood, the afterglow structures will probably not preclude the beneﬁ ts 
that come from greater economic union. In the new member states too, these 
institutions may not yet prevent productivity gains if their ties with advanced 
Europe become stronger and sophisticated. In the western economies, the 
structures must quickly be made more ﬂ exible. Convergence to a rigid core may 
soon become unappealing.
The European Union has a growth strategy, Europe 2020, which recognizes 
this imperative. Not all of the 45 countries covered by this report are in the 
European Union, but most share the aspirations of Europe 2020: economic 
development that is smart, sustainable, and inclusive. Europe’s way of life — and 
its growth ambitions — put a premium on combining economic dynamism with 
environmental sustainability and social cohesion.
Figure 19: Western Europe 
has to reduce ﬁ scal deﬁ cits 
by 6 percent of GDP, 
emerging Europe by less
(illustrative ﬁ scal 
adjustment needs, 2010–30, 
percentage of GDP)
Note: The ﬁ scal impacts of aging on pensions and health care systems are missing for EU candidate and eastern partnership countries. For this exercise, 
the sum of adjustment in health care spending is assumed to be the same as for the new member states. The adjustment in pension related spending 
is assumed to be the same as that for Southern Europe. Western Europe comprises Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (North); Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Center); Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(South). Overall Western Europe contains all the countries belonging to these three groups. Overall emerging Europe includes all countries from EU12, EU 
candidates, and eastern partnership.
Source: Calculations by staff of the Institute for Structural Research in Poland and the World Bank, based on IMF WEO; see chapter 7.
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Europe’s economic model is already more environment-friendly than most. It has 
made production cleaner than any other part of the world except Japan, and will 
become the lowest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide by 2020. But it is still 
the largest importer of emissions (embedded in imported products — ﬁ gure 20), 
polluting not as much through production as by proxy. Europeans will need to do 
more on the consumption side to be considered truly green. It is a testament to 
European ideals that Europe is willing to pay the most to avert global warming 
while it is likely to be damaged least. There is reason to believe that Europe’s 
economic model can become greener without unduly sacriﬁ cing growth: Germany, 
France, and Sweden may already be showing the way.
Social cohesion is the cornerstone of Europe’s economic model, but this aspiration 
must be realized in ways consistent with sound economic principles. It can be, 
because Europe has three priceless assets: the European Union’s single market, 
a momentum for regional integration, and the global inﬂ uence that comes 
from being the generator of one-third of the world’s annual output. Inclusive 
development will be a natural outcome of measures to deepen the single market, 
expand the scope of regional economic integration, and preserve Europe’s global 
inﬂ uence (chapter 8).
This will require adjustments in all of the European economic model’s six 
components. The rules to guide policymakers — adapted from Phelps (1966) — might 
look something like the following:
 · Extend the beneﬁ ts of freer trade to those outside the European Union. 
Enlargement has made Europe stronger, and economic integration should be 
continued toward the east. The single market can be made deeper and wider at 
the same time.
 · Borrow from abroad only for investment. In Europe, where foreign ﬁ nance has 
been used for private investment, it has fueled growth and convergence. But 
relying on foreign capital to ﬁ nance consumption makes economies everywhere 
more vulnerable than dynamic.
 · Provide enterprises with the freedom to start up, grow, and shut down. Efﬁ cient 
regulation of enterprise trusts but veriﬁ es, makes compliance easy but punishes 
violation, and assesses risks and concentrates resources where risks are highest.
 · Use public money to catalyze private innovation, not substitute for it. Effective 
innovation policy sets the table for innovators to thrive by supporting inventions, 
mobilizing ﬁ nance, and bringing the power of choice and the resources of business 
into Europe’s universities.
 · Design labor laws to treat insiders and outsiders more equally. Regulations 
should not favor either those with jobs or those without. Seeing labor as a ﬁ xed 
lump to be divided among workers leads to poor rules for 
regulating work.
 · Consider government debt mainly as a way to ﬁ nance public investment. 
With high debt levels and modest growth prospects, public ﬁ nance should be 
premised on the expectation that future generations will not be much wealthier 
than today’s. Social protection, social services, and public administration should 
be ﬁ nanced with taxes and contributions, not sovereign debt.
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European economies do not have to become North American or East Asian to 
keep to these rules. But Europe might learn a few lessons from them. From 
North Americans, Europe could learn that economic liberty and social security 
have to be balanced with care: nations that sacriﬁ ce too much economic 
freedom for social security can end up with neither, impairing both enterprise 
and government. To get this balance wrong could mean giving up Europe’s 
way of life and its place in the world. From the Japanese, the Koreans, and the 
Chinese, Europe might learn that while the gifts of prosperity and longevity 
arrive together, they have to be unbundled: being wealthier means that 
Europeans do not have to work as hard as before, but living longer means 
having to work more years, not fewer. To do otherwise unjustly burdens future 
generations, and violates growth’s golden rule.
Europeans can of course learn the easiest and most from each other. The 
countries in Europe that have instituted policies manifesting both cultural 
maturity and economic discipline have shown how a distinct growth model can 
be made distinguished (table 2).
Figure 20: Greening 
production but not 
consumption
(net CO2 emission 
transfers [territorial 
minus consumption 
emissions], 2008)
Note: MtCO2 = million tons of 
carbon dioxide.
Source: World Bank staff, using 
data from Peters and others 
(2011); see spotlight 2.
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Box 1: The unmet precondition of the common currency—labor mobility
The September 1961 volume of the American 
Economic Review might well be the most 
inﬂ uential issue of an economic journal ever. 
A dozen or so pages after the article on 
optimum growth paths by Phelps is a short 
communication from Robert Mundell that 
outlines a theory of “optimum currency areas.” 
It states the conditions that the countries in 
a monetary union had to have—or quickly 
institute—to share a single currency proﬁ tably. 
In practical terms, it meant ensuring that the 
single currency should not lead to persistently 
high unemployment rates in some parts of 
the monetary union, nor to unacceptably high 
rates of inﬂ ation in others. In 1999, Mundell 
was awarded the Nobel Prize for “his analysis 
of monetary and ﬁ scal policy under different 
exchange rate regimes and his analysis of 
optimum currency areas.”
The conditions for a successful monetary union 
identiﬁ ed in the 1961 article can be distilled 
to mobility of labor and capital among the 
member states. To understand why, imagine 
a fall in economic activity in one part of the 
union (say the south) and a rise in another (say 
the north). This would cause unemployment 
to rise in the south, and inﬂ ationary pressures 
and balance-of-payments surpluses to 
increase in the north. If the central bank 
increases the money supply, it might help the 
south but would aggravate inﬂ ation in the 
north. If it does not, high unemployment in the 
south would cause suffering. But if capital and 
labor were quick to move within the monetary 
union, the dilemma would disappear. 
For a practical application of his ideas, 
Mundell chose Western Europe, presaging 
today’s debates about the euro. “In Western 
Europe the creation of the Common Market is 
regarded by many as an important step toward 
eventual political union, and the subject of a 
common currency … has been much discussed. 
One can cite the well-known position of J. E. 
Meade, who argues that the conditions for 
a common currency in Western Europe do 
not exist, and that, especially because of the 
lack of labor mobility, a system of ﬂ exible 
exchange rates would be more effective in 
promoting balance-of-payments equilibrium 
and internal stability; and the apparently 
opposite view of Tibor Scitovsky who favors 
a common currency because he believes that 
it would induce a greater degree of capital 
mobility, but further adds that steps must 
be taken to make labor more mobile and to 
facilitate supranational employment policies.” 
The introduction of the euro undoubtedly 
increased capital mobility in the eurozone; 
one can reasonably expect a single currency 
to greatly facilitate ﬁ nancial integration. The 
single currency undoubtedly also facilitated 
the exchange of goods. But a single currency 
cannot by itself increase people’s mobility. This 
requires states to harmonize labor regulations, 
education and training arrangements, and 
social security and welfare systems. Growing 
goods trade in the eurozone may reduce the 
need for labor mobility, but trade in services—
now three-quarters of Western Europe’s 
output—itself often requires movement 
of people. So does keeping manageable 
unemployment differences among countries. 
In the decade before the global ﬁ nancial 
crisis, European economic integration showed 
impressive progress. But for many countries, 
the progress was unbalanced (box ﬁ gure 
1)—more rapid in ﬁ nancial areas (interest rates 
and inﬂ ation) than in real sectors (trade and 
incomes). It was more balanced for the new 
member states. Poland, for example, became 
more integrated in ﬁ nancial and real terms. The 
EU candidate countries (represented here by 
Croatia and Turkey) experienced just ﬁ nancial 
integration. But while integrating in monetary 
and ﬁ nancial aspects, Greece became less 
integrated within the EU15 in real terms. 
Labor mobility in Europe is the lowest in the 
developed world. Mundell’s communication 50 
years ago suggests that this will be a serious 
problem for the eurozone. Increasing labor 
mobility may be a privilege in Europe, but it is 
a prerequisite in the eurozone. Countries that 
integrate their labor markets will be able to 
share a single currency proﬁ tably. Others will 
have to deal with stressful tradeoffs between 
inﬂ ation and unemployment.
Source: Mundell 1961; Sugawara and 
Zalduendo 2010.
Box ﬁ gure 1: More monetary and ﬁ nancial than real integration in Europe during the last decade
(arrows begin in 1997 and end in 2008; the origin indicates complete nominal and real integration)
Note: The ﬁ gure shows the extent of economic 
integration, using the theory of optimum currency 
areas (Mundell 1961). The vertical axis combines 
in one index of dissimilarity three indicators of 
nominal integration—volatility of exchange rates, 
convergence in inﬂ ation rates, and convergence in 
interest rates. The horizontal axis does the same 
with three indicators of real integration—extent of 
synchronization in business cycles measured by 
indices of industrial production, trade integration, 
and per capita income. The origin in the ﬁ gure 
represents perfect economic integration, and the 
arrows show the integration path of each country 
or group of countries in 1997–2008. EU candidates 
are represented by Croatia and Turkey; the eastern 
partnership countries by Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; and the 
EU’s new member states by Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Source: Sugawara and Zalduendo 2010.
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Notes
1 Phelps, Edmund. 1961. “The 
Golden Rule of Accumulation: 
A Fable for Growthmen,” The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 
51, No. 4. (September, 1961), pp. 
638-643.
2 Among the economists were 
Maurice Allais, Tjalling Koopmans, 
Joan Robinson, John von 
Neumann, Robert Solow, and 
Trevor Swan. 
3 von Weizsäcker, Carl Christian. 
1962. Wachstum, Zins und 
optimale Investitionsquote, 
Tübingen (Mohr-Siebeck), 96 
pages.
4 The report covers 45 countries: 
the 27 member states of the 
European Union, 4 countries in the 
European Free Trade Association 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
and Switzerland), 8 candidate 
and potential candidate countries 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey), 
and 6 eastern partnership 
countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine).
Chapter 1: The European 
growth model
What makes the European 
economic model unique?
   The principal components of 
Europe’s growth model—trade, 
ﬁ nance, enterprise, innovation, 
labor, and government—are 
organized in unique ways.
Have changes in Europe and the 
rest of the world made a new 
economic model necessary?
   Sluggish productivity growth, a 
declining workforce, and growing 
ﬁ scal imbalances have revealed 
weaknesses of the European 
economic model, and the entry of a 
billion Asian workers into the global 
market is adding to the stress.
Which parts of the European 
model should be preserved, 
and which changed?
   Many changes are needed in 
how governments and labor 
markets are organized. Fewer 
changes are needed to foster 
innovation, productivity growth, 
and job creation by enterprises, 
and fewer still to improve 
ﬁ nance and trade in Europe.
Table 2: 30 questions, 30 answers
Chapter 2: Trade
Is “Factory Europe” as dynamic 
as “Factory Asia”?
   Factory Asia is growing faster, 
but goods trade in Europe 
is more sophisticated.
Is the Single Market for Services 
underachieving compared 
with the United States?
   The single market is working 
quite well for traditional services 
such as travel and transport, but 
it is underperforming in modern 
services such as insurance, 
information technology, and 
other business services.
Is the Common Agricultural 
Policy compromising Europe’s 
global leadership?
   The European Union’s agricultural 
policies hobble the extension 
of the single market to its 
neighbors, and Europe is missing 
an opportunity to improve the 
lives of 75 million people in the 
eastern partnership countries.
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Chapter 3: Finance
Why is ﬁ nance in emerging Europe 
different from other regions?
   The prospect of membership in the 
European Union exerts a powerful 
policy and institutional pull, making 
Europe unique and strengthening 
the link between foreign savings 
and economic growth.
How did some European economies 
beneﬁ t more from international 
ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows than others?
   European economies that managed 
to “boom-proof” public ﬁ nances 
and “crisis-proof” private ﬁ nancing 
without resorting to the costly self-
insurance seen in Asia beneﬁ ted 
from foreign ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows.
Is there evidence of a “debt 
overhang” in emerging Europe 
that reduces growth and justiﬁ es 
government intervention?
 In emerging Europe, treasuries, 
enterprises, and households 
do not face a debt overhang, 
but in the eurozone’s periphery 
this problem is acute, posing a 
danger for banks everywhere.
Chapter 4: Enterprise
What does Europe expect from its 
enterprises?
  Workers expect enterprises 
in Europe to create jobs, 
shareholders to generate value 
added, and governments to bring 
in sizable export earnings.
How have European ﬁ rms done 
in an enlarged Europe?
 In most parts of Europe, ﬁ rms 
have taken advantage of 
greater regional integration to 
decentralize production, attract 
foreign investment, and expand 
the markets for their products.
Why did some parts of Europe 
do better than others?
 In Western and Eastern Europe, 
industrial structures were better 
suited for a single market; Southern 
European enterprises have been 
slower to offshore activities and 
to attract foreign investors. 
Which government policies 
help enterprises do better?
 In advanced European economies, 
many governments have to 
streamline regulations to make 
doing business easier; in emerging 
Europe, most have to improve 
infrastructure and credit as well.
Chapter 5: Innovation
How much does Europe’s 
innovation deﬁ cit matter?
 Europe’s innovation deﬁ cit matters 
most for the EU15, and so it 
also matters for the economies 
of emerging Europe because 
they are closely integrated.
Why does Europe do less R&D 
than the United States, Japan, 
and the Republic of Korea?
 European enterprises do less R&D 
than American ﬁ rms because 
they tend to be in sectors that 
are not as innovation-oriented.
What are the special attributes 
of a successful European 
innovation system?
 The most innovative European 
economies such as Switzerland 
spend a lot on R&D, but also 
share key attributes with the 
United States—tight business–
university links, good management 
skills, and top universities.
What should European governments 
do to increase innovation?
 Measures to fully integrate the 
Single Market for Services will 
provide the scale, more privately 
funded universities will supply 
the skills, and regulations that 
foster competition will create 
the incentives for European 
enterprises to innovate.
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Chapter 6: Labor
Is there a European work model?
 European economies generally 
have more stringent employment 
protection and more generous 
social beneﬁ ts than their peers 
in North America and East Asia.
Given demographic changes, how 
can Europe achieve a stable and 
more productive workforce?
 Increased participation can help 
stem the decline of the workforce, 
but more competition for jobs, 
greater mobility within Europe, 
and measures to attract global 
talent will still be necessary.
Are employment and social 
protection practices inhibiting labor 
participation and efﬁ ciency?
 Employment protection gives 
too much power to those with 
jobs while banishing others to 
the fringes of the labor market, 
and generous social beneﬁ ts 
weaken the incentives to work.
Is Europe taking full advantage 
of the beneﬁ ts associated with 
internal labor mobility?
 Migration among and within 
countries in Europe is still low, and 
even intra-EU migration falls short 
of the European Union’s aspiration 
of a fully integrated labor market.
How can Europe become a 
global magnet for talent?
 Europe needs an approach to 
global talent with policies that link 
immigration to labor markets, and 
a business climate that rewards 
skills and entrepreneurship.
Chapter 7: Government
Are governments in Europe 
bigger than elsewhere?
 Governments in Europe spend 
about 10 percent of GDP more 
than their peers, and this is almost 
entirely because they spend 
more on social protection.
Is big government a drag 
on growth in Europe?
 Controlling for other differences, 
European economies with 
government spending greater 
than 40 percent of GDP have 
had much lower growth rates 
during the last 15 years.
If big government impedes 
growth, how do countries such 
as Sweden do so well?
 Countries like Sweden have big 
governments, but they deliver 
high-quality social services, make it 
easy for citizens and enterprises to 
comply with taxes and regulations, 
and have high levels of social trust.
How can governments be 
made more efﬁ cient?
 Countries where government works 
have made their bureaucracies 
leaner, ﬁ scal institutions more 
reliable, public services competitive, 
tax administration effective, and 
citizens more empowered.
Should ﬁ scal consolidation be a 
top policy priority in Europe?
 To respond to market pressures 
and aging populations, almost 
every country in Europe must make 
big ﬁ scal adjustments to reduce 
public debt to precrisis levels.
Chapter 8: Golden growth
How can Europe make the single 
market more efﬁ cient?
 Greater labor mobility and more 
uniform national regulations for 
modern business services are 
making the single market 
more efﬁ cient.
How can Europe maintain 
the momentum for regional 
economic integration?
 Sustaining economic integration 
requires making the single market 
efﬁ cient, crisis-prooﬁ ng ﬁ nancial 
ﬂ ows, and facilitating production 
networks through improved public 
services in emerging Europe.
What is needed to maintain 
Europe’s global leadership?
 To remain a global economic leader, 
Europe has to sustain regional 
integration, reduce public debt, 
reform social security, revamp 
employment protection laws, 
and institute policies to attract 
talent from around the world.
Source: Chapters 1–8. 
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The European growth model
When this report was being ﬁ nalized in late 2011, Europe was in crisis. 
The nations of Europe that had given up the most prized symbol of 
sovereignty—their currency—in exchange for the euro had the most troubled 
economies in the world. The countries that had ostensibly integrated the most 
were the ones deepest in trouble—surely a sign of a deeply ﬂ awed 
growth model. 
But if Aristotle were writing about the good life today, he could still consider 
Europe. Europeans live long and largely healthy lives. They work less than 
workers in other prosperous societies. European incomes are not as high as 
American incomes, but most European countries have high-income economies. 
They have built these economies with democratic and representative societies, 
sacriﬁ cing neither civil liberties nor basic needs. And along the way, they have 
looked after the unfortunate among them and helped poorer nations in 
the neighborhood. 
During the “Golden Age of European Growth,” the early 1950s to the mid-
1970s, Western European incomes converged toward those in the United 
States. From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the incomes of more than 
100 million people in the poorer southern periphery—Greece, southern 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain—rapidly converged on those of advanced 
Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Union absorbed 
another 100 million people in Central and Eastern Europe. Incomes in 
these countries have converged quickly. As another 100 million people 
in the Balkan states and Turkey wait to enter the world’s most powerful 
association of nations, they are already beneﬁ ting from the aspirations 
and institutions that helped almost half a billion people achieve the 
highest standard of living in the world. 
Chapter 1
What makes the European economic model unique?
Have changes in Europe and the rest of the world 
made a new economic model necessary?
Which parts of the European model should be 
preserved, and which should be changed?
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One could say without exaggeration that Europe had invented a “convergence 
machine,” taking in poor countries and helping them become high-income 
economies. In other parts of the world, middle-income countries had to be 
extraordinarily fortunate—ﬁ nding oil, for example—or unusually ferocious, such 
as the East Asian Tigers, to become wealthy. In Europe, they did not need to 
be either. 
European societies are not only among the wealthiest in the world but also 
among the most equal. Europeans beneﬁ t from near-universal access to 
social services, including universal health care and free primary, secondary, 
and in many countries, tertiary education. They are protected by an elaborate 
system of social insurance. Due to smaller wage differentials, higher and more 
progressive taxes, and more generous social transfers, income distribution 
in Europe is more equal than in the United States, Japan, and most emerging 
market economies. At the same time, Europe has become greener over the past 
two decades and—except for Japan—is more energy-efﬁ cient than other high-
income countries. 
Perhaps most important, after two continental wars in the ﬁ rst half of the 
twentieth century, Europe has found peace through economic and political 
integration. This unique achievement is at the heart of Europe’s remarkable 
economic success after 1945 and the peaceful transformation of the countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As economist 
Paul Krugman notes, “The Europeans have shown us that peace and unity 
can be brought to a region with a history of violence, and in the process they 
have created perhaps the most decent societies in human history, combining 
democracy and human rights with a level of individual economic security that 
America comes nowhere close to matching” (Krugman 2011).
The citizens of Europe appear to appreciate these achievements. According 
to the Eurobarometer, a survey of EU citizens conducted twice a year, most 
Europeans are optimistic about the future. Other surveys ﬁ nd that Europeans 
lead not only long and healthy lives, but also happy ones (Veenhoven 2011). 
All this was keenly appreciated before the latest crisis. Europe’s economic and 
social conditions in 2011 provide a stark contrast to its achievements over the 
past six decades. Since 2009, Europeans have had to accept cuts in incomes 
and social spending, sparking angry protests in some countries. Markets fret 
over high sovereign debt, and question the inconsistencies between a shared 
currency and widening differentials in ﬁ scal discipline and entrepreneurial 
abilities among the members of the eurozone. Even more seriously, they 
question the ability of the worst-afﬂ icted countries to grow their way out of 
the crisis. 
These concerns are not new. In 2002, the Lisbon Agenda had recognized 
Europe’s disadvantage in innovation and productivity growth relative to the 
United States and Asia. The global economic and ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008–09 
left scars in Europe, especially in its periphery, and strained European 
institutions. The European Commission has repeatedly pointed to long-standing 
competitiveness issues across the region. European leaders today face the hard 
task of selling tough adjustment to a reticent population, reassuring markets 
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and addressing deep-rooted competitiveness issues. There is little consensus 
on how to do this. But there is growing consensus that unless Europe learns to 
grow again, the European way of life and Europe’s place in the world are 
under threat. 
Recent developments can also be seen as a challenge to the integration at the 
center of Europe’s unique success. An increase in North African refugees after 
the Arab Spring prompted calls by French and Italian leaders to restrict the free 
movement of people between countries that are members of the Schengen 
Agreement. The fear of competition from workers from new member states 
in Eastern Europe is widespread even in countries facing acute shortages of 
qualiﬁ ed labor, such as Germany. High rates of youth unemployment in several 
European countries and persistent pockets of social exclusion stand in contrast 
with the ideals of European solidarity. Even as Europe’s new members in the 
east have rapidly caught up with their western neighbors, Europe’s southern 
economies have started to fall behind, prompting concerns that Europe’s latest 
enlargement may have been at the expense of the weaker among the EU’s 
older members. Coordinated action by banks and supervisors during 2008–09 
avoided rapid deleveraging by parent banks that had expanded into Eastern 
Europe. However, the same outcome is not guaranteed if national supervisors 
focus on shoring up the domestic capital base of their banks at the expense of 
faster deleveraging abroad. 
Not surprisingly, support for further enlargement in the European Union is 
declining, though it runs higher among new members.1 Citizens of the EU’s 
neighboring countries, too, have started to doubt the EU’s attractiveness. 
Support for EU membership is falling in Turkey.2 Ukraine has reverted to a 
foreign policy that tries to balance commitment to integration with Europe and 
reintegration with the Russian Federation. In Serbia, polls indicate only a thin 
majority in favor of EU membership. The model of European integration and 
solidarity may not be coming apart at the seams, but it is fraying at the edges.
Europeans have become less conﬁ dent that their development model can 
sustain improvements in living standards, and neighboring countries are 
cautious about joining an aging and ailing club. Although many people in the 
world admire Europe, some suspect the continent’s best days are past. After 
the achievements of the last six decades, Europe’s economy has lost some of 
its lustre. 
What makes Europe unique
Although the end of European complacency is good, a loss of conﬁ dence in the 
European model may be dangerous. In a rush to rejuvenate growth, the positive 
attributes of the European development model may be abandoned along 
with the negative. By identifying the European growth model’s strengths and 
weaknesses, this report aims to reduce the risk of policymakers inadvertently 
discarding the best parts of Europe’s economic approach. 
It is fair to ask if it is possible to rigorously identify a growth model except in 
narrow technical terms deﬁ ning the interaction of technology, capital, and labor. 
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This report takes a more practical approach by analyzing the six activities that 
are the principal components of an economic model: enterprise, labor, trade, 
ﬁ nance, innovation, and government. This approach is motivated by a broad 
concept of economic and social advancement (box 1.1). 
It is also fair to ask whether it is appropriate to assume a “European model.” 
There are differences in how Ireland and Italy regulate enterprise and labor, or 
how Germany and Greece balance ﬁ scal and social policies. There are differences 
in what Spain and Sweden export, and how they regulate trade in services. 
There are differences in how Poland and Portugal regulate their banks, and 
not just because one shares a common currency while the other has its own. 
There are differences in how Finland and France provide essential government 
services, and each approach has merits. Because of these differences, various 
subgroups of countries within Europe are analyzed and contrasted in subsequent 
chapters of this report.3 This chapter emphasizes what is common across 
different parts of Europe; the next six chapters identify what is different 
and why.
But these differences in speciﬁ cs do not rule out common principles that 
together constitute a unique approach to economic growth and social progress. 
This common approach consists of policies and institutions that govern trade 
and ﬁ nance, enterprise and innovation, and labor and government. Together 
they deﬁ ne an economic and social model that is uniquely European. This 
report is premised on the belief that all parts of Europe—EU member states, 
candidates and potential candidates, and nations in the EU eastern partnership 
countries—share the aspirations that motivate a common European model, 
sometimes summarized as “the social market economy” (box 1.2). This report 
identiﬁ es features of this model that should be preserved and those that must 
be changed, analyzes how change can occur, and presents examples from 
Europe and around the world that illustrate how countries have successfully 
made some of these changes. 
Box 1.1: Europe’s economic model and its standard of living
Jones and Klenow (2010) propose a broad 
notion of the standard of living that captures 
not just the level of national income, but also 
its distribution, how much of it is available for 
consumption, how much leisure people need 
to trade to achieve their level of consumption, 
and how long they can be expected to live. 
Calibrating such a broad, consumption-based 
concept of welfare to existing data reveals 
that many European countries approach 
levels of welfare in the United States, despite 
considerably lower levels of national income. 
By contrast, the performance of emerging 
markets in Asia and Latin America looks less 
impressive than in Europe, because growth 
there has often been associated with a 
declining share for consumption and rising 
income inequality. 
The basic idea of Jones and Klenow can be 
related to the practical approach taken in 
this report to analyze Europe’s economic and 
social model. The activities of enterprises, 
their innovation and entrepreneurship, the 
trade links between them, and their access to 
ﬁ nance and skills determine the productivity 
of an economy and its aggregate income 
level. The organization of labor determines 
how long people have to work to afford a 
particular level of consumption and whether 
such work is available for all. The activities 
of government determine how much income 
is redistributed, what skills are formed in the 
education system, and the access to and cost 
of health care and social insurance that impact 
what risks people take and how long they can 
expect to live. 
Jones and Klenow note that their measure of 
economic welfare does not capture possible 
tradeoffs between present and future 
generations. It captures only the expected 
welfare of consumers today and does 
not address environmental sustainability. 
Intertemporally optimal or “golden” growth 
paths have been analyzed by Phelps (1961), 
among others. Europeans today have to ﬁ nd 
ways to safeguard the high level of economic 
welfare achieved over the last six decades 
while ensuring that future generations do not 
have fewer opportunities. 
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The principal components of the European growth model
The organization of Europe’s main economic activities demonstrates what is 
unique about the European development model. 
 · Trade. Richer and poorer economies are more integrated than in any other 
part of the world, resulting in quicker convergence in living standards than in 
incomes, which in turn is quicker than convergence in institutional quality. 
 · Finance. Europe is the only region where private capital in all its forms—
foreign direct investment (FDI), nonﬁ nancial and ﬁ nancial FDI, and portfolio 
funds—ﬂ ows downhill from richer to poorer countries and from low-growth to 
high-growth economies. 
 · Enterprise. Private enterprise is accountable to shareholders for proﬁ t, but it 
is also held more responsible for the social and environmental consequences 
of its actions than in other parts of the world. 
 · Innovation. Research and development (R&D) and tertiary education, 
recognized around the globe for their economic spillovers, are viewed in 
Europe as primarily the responsibility of the state. 
 · Labor. Workers in Europe enjoy the most effective protection against abuse 
by employers and the most generous wage, job security, and nonwage 
beneﬁ ts—such as unemployment insurance, paid leave, and pensions—of any 
workers in the world. 
 · Government. National governments are more redistributive, and 
supranational coordination in Europe is the world’s most advanced.
Box 1.2: Europe’s postwar consensus: the social market economy
The idea of the social market economy is 
simple: combine the efﬁ ciency of markets 
with social fairness, and combine economic 
freedom with basic social security. The 
conceptual fathers of the social market 
economy, such as Walter Eucken (1940) and 
Alfred Müller-Armack (1947), were liberals 
in the European sense of the term. They 
emphasized the role of free markets in 
allocating resources and of private property 
and contract rights in organizing economic 
activity. Their positions ran counter to 
the pervasive skepticism of markets and 
private property in Europe during the Great 
Depression (Phelps 2007). But they also 
emphasized the need for government activism 
to safeguard markets through competition 
policy and to deal with externalities through 
regulatory interventions. Private businesses 
were expected to be responsible for the 
consequences of their activities—a kind of 
generalized “polluters pay” principle.
For Eucken, government intervention to 
achieve social objectives would be limited 
to progressive taxation, basic social security, 
and unemployment insurance. Müller-Armack 
saw a need for structural interventions to 
achieve distributional objectives in addition to 
measures to safeguard market competition. 
He explicitly referred to the reconciliatory role 
of the social market economy. Indeed, the 
need for social consensus after the ravages 
of the war and in the face of the communist 
alternative developing in Eastern Europe led 
to government interventions beyond those 
originally foreseen by the fathers of the social 
market economy. In the German labor market, 
centralized wage bargaining was introduced 
and large companies adopted codetermination 
in management. Across Europe, the 1950s 
saw a rapid increase in social insurance and 
transfers. Generous pay-as-you-go pension 
systems were put in place, beneﬁ ting from 
favorable postwar demographics and 
reﬂ ecting the need to provide for a generation 
that often had lost private savings and assets 
as a result of war and economic turbulence. 
For Europeans, to make the market acceptable, 
the “animal spirits” of capitalism needed to be 
tamed.
The idea of the social market economy was the 
basis for policy mainly in Austria and Germany, 
and its corporatist application extended across 
Scandinavia and the Benelux states. France 
chose a more interventionist model with the 
nationalization of strategic industries such as 
mining, transport, and ﬁ nance as well as large 
manufacturing companies such as Renault. 
Common to all continental economies was 
the emphasis on a social consensus between 
capital and labor. This was often organized 
by a state that supported high savings and 
investment rates, which in turn led to the easy 
adoption of frontier technologies from the 
United States and resulted in quick income 
convergence (DeLong 1997; Eichengreen 1996; 
see spotlight one in this report).
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One can—and should—ask whether these achievements are sustainable in 
today’s world, or whether some countries have applied some of these principles 
poorly. Before answering that question, though, it is useful to note that the 
European growth model has resulted in a deeper integration and quicker 
convergence between advanced and developing economies than in any other 
part of the world. European enterprises balance corporate mandates and social 
responsibility, and governments mobilize taxpayers to aid innovation. Despite 
considerable economic uncertainty, European workers still beneﬁ t from a high 
level of security, and no societies achieve better egalitarian outcomes in 
market economies. 
Trade and Finance: deeper integration 
and quicker convergence
European economies are more integrated than any others in the world. Trade 
ﬂ ows relative to gross domestic product (GDP) are much higher in European 
countries, especially in the new EU member states (EU12), than in other parts of 
the world (ﬁ gure 1.1).4 Among the 27 EU member states (EU27), trade openness 
is higher than in any other region, including East Asia. In the EU candidates 
and EU eastern partnership countries, openness is higher than in most other 
emerging market regions, though it is somewhat lower than in East Asia.
The large share of trade in total GDP results from low barriers to the goods 
trade in the single market and falling trade barriers for both goods and services 
in the region, as well as the relatively small size of economies in the region, 
similar to the developments in East Asia. But the integration of richer and 
poorer countries facilitates a frenetic ﬂ ow of goods and makes “Factory Europe” 
different from the much-heralded “Factory Asia.” Europe’s most developed 
economies have been outsourcing more and more sophisticated tasks to their 
eastern neighbors, beneﬁ ting both sides in the process. The success in unifying 
national markets into a single European market has made Europe ambitious 
enough to consider many services as tradable within the region. But the Single 
Market for Services can be made a more efﬁ cient, potent source of growth in 
Europe (Monti 2010).
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” 
refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: WDI.
Figure 1.1: Europe 
is the most open 
region in the world 
(trade, exports plus 
imports, as percentage of 
GDP, average of 2005–09)
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Capital ﬂ ows in Europe have been the largest—as a share of economic output—
in the history of humankind.5 Labor mobility, while low, is picking up. This 
economic integration has resulted in quicker convergence in incomes than in 
other parts of the world (ﬁ gure 1.2). Outside Europe and East Asia, there is no 
relation between GDP per capita in 1970 and its growth rate between 1970 and 
2009.6 European countries that were poorer in 1970 experienced higher growth 
than countries with higher GDP per capita in 1970. East Asia is the other region 
in the world where convergence in incomes has been observed, but the link 
between initial income per capita and subsequent growth is much less robust.7
Capital ﬂ ows are fundamental to income convergence in Europe. In Europe, 
capital ﬂ ows “downhill,” as predicted in economic theory (Lucas 1990). Outside 
Europe, capital ﬂ ows “uphill”—from poorer countries such as China to richer 
ones like the United States—a puzzling but well-established pattern (Prasad, 
Rajan, and Subramanian 2007). Outside Europe, many forms of capital go to 
low-growth countries (ﬁ gure 1.3).8 In other words, among many emerging 
markets outside Europe, high growth in incomes only happens when current 
account surpluses grow. This “allocation puzzle” is not a problem in Europe.9 
In Europe, consistent with the fundamental tenets of economic theory, capital 
ﬂ ows to high-growth countries, principally those in Central, Eastern, and 
Southeastern Europe.10 This pattern is most noticeable in the European Union 
and those aspiring to join it. The EU eastern partnership countries (Belarus, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and others) look similar to other emerging markets.
In sum, European integration has led to both a higher share of trade in output 
and to much larger ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows from richer to poorer countries. Quicker 
convergence in living standards is the unsurprising outcome. This does not 
imply that living standards everywhere in Europe have converged. Some 
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011).
Figure 1.2: Convergence in incomes 
was faster in Europe than elsewhere 
(GDP per capita levels in 1970 and 
growth from 1970 to 2009)
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regions, such as Italy’s Mezzogiorno, have persistently lagged. Europe’s 
Cohesion Funds are designed to help lagging regions catch up. This has not 
worked well everywhere, partly because national policies have differed with 
respect to using these funds. Where the focus has been on integrating leading 
and lagging regions through connective infrastructure, such as in Ireland, 
regional convergence has resulted. Where instead, funds have been spent on 
spreading out economic activity and bringing jobs to people in lagging regions 
through spatially targeted interventions, success has been rare (World Bank 
2009). Convergence in Europe appears to have come from market-based 
integration, not from nonmarket mechanisms driven by solidarity.
European integration has not, however, led to a similarly rapid convergence in 
the quality of institutions. There is considerable variance in institutional quality 
across Europe (ﬁ gure 1.4). A larger “pancake” in ﬁ gure 1.4 indicates better 
quality. The size of the pancake in the EU candidate countries or the EU eastern 
partnership countries is comparable with that in Latin America and smaller than 
in East Asia.
Note: Each dot represents a four-year average during the period 
covered: 1997-2000, 2001-04, and 2005-08.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
Figure 1.3: In much of 
Europe, capital ﬂ ows to 
high-growth countries 
(capital inﬂ ows (current 
account deﬁ cits) and per 
capita GDP growth, 
1997–2008)
Note: Indicators used are: protection of intellectual property (Fraser), property rights (WEF), 
property rights (Heritage), contract viability (ICRG), and rule of law (WGI). Each indicator 
is rescaled and then ranges from 0 to 10 showing the higher, the better quality.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from The Fraser Institute (Gwartney, 
Hall, and Lawson 2010), WEF (Schwab 2009 and 2010), The Heritage Foundation (Miller 
and Holmes 2011), ICRG, and WGI (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010).
Figure 1.4: Institutional 
quality varies a lot 
within Europe
(indicators of property 
rights and contract 
enforcement, 2008–09)
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International macroeconomics texts argue that the risks investors face in 
poorer countries depress risk-adjusted returns and discourage investment, 
preventing convergence. These risks may result from the lower quality of poor 
countries’ institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). The risks seem 
not to prevent convergence in Europe because EU membership—actual or 
prospective—may be an assurance of future institutional improvements. So far, 
this reassurance has worked to Europe’s advantage. 
The European debt crisis of 2011 is a reminder, however, that investors can 
lose conﬁ dence when the promise of institutional improvements is not kept. 
Countries in Europe do not need to be ferocious to converge. But the more 
institutionally integrated a European economy becomes, the less it can afford 
not to converge. Indeed, for the economies of the eurozone that share a 
common currency and hence are more tightly integrated than others, economic 
convergence is as much a prerequisite as it is a perk. 
Enterprise and Innovation: more responsible competition 
The social market economy model adopted in Europe after World War II relies 
upon business recognizing its social responsibilities. The extent to which this 
has happened varies across Europe. The business action component of the 
Responsible Competitiveness Index 2007 captures the efﬁ cacy of corporate 
bonds, the ethical behavior of ﬁ rms, the wage equality of workers doing similar 
work, the strength of audit and accounting standards, the extent of staff 
training, and the occupational fatalities in regions around the world (ﬁ gure 1.5). 
The highest-ranked countries are all European: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, and 
Germany are all ranked higher than the United States, Japan, and most other 
countries in the world. The average of Europe’s advanced economies (EU15) is 
above that of Japan and East Asia. To the extent that the ranking reﬂ ects the 
preferences of investors and consumers, corporate responsibility is good for 
business in Europe. However, not all European countries are equal: Eastern and 
Southern Europe rank below East Asia and on a par with Latin America.
Greater regulation makes European producers cleaner and greener than 
American producers, though Japanese producers are even greener and Eastern 
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” 
refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: MacGillivray, Begley, and Zadek 2007.
Figure 1.5: Business is 
expected to be socially 
responsible in Europe, 
especially in the EU
(Responsible Competitiveness 
Index 2007, business 
action component)
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Europe lags behind the rest of Europe. European leaders embrace green 
growth as a driver of Europe’s future development model. According to the 
most recent data from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, European countries have made the largest reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions (ﬁ gure 1.6). For the former centrally planned economies, large 
reductions reﬂ ect their inefﬁ cient starting points. But Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
and Germany have achieved emission reductions as a result of investments 
in renewables and in energy-saving technologies, often spurred by strict 
emission controls or regulatory and tax measures designed to boost investment 
in alternative energy. Sweden is a leader in the use of biogas and Denmark 
in wind, while Germany and Spain have pioneered the use of subsidies to 
encourage renewable sources of energy. Spotlight two discusses the steps 
needed to make the European growth model even greener.
Note: Averages computed using principal component analysis (see chapter 4). Liechtenstein, 
Kosovo, and Malta are not covered by Doing Business, and are not included.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Doing Business.
Note: Greenhouse gas excludes land use, land-use change, and 
forestry. The base year is, in most cases, 1990.
Source: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Figure 1.6: Emerging 
European countries are 
the best performers in 
emission reduction
(change in greenhouse gas 
emissions from the base 
year to 2009, percent)
Figure 1.7: The 
business climate varies 
substantially across Europe
(principal component 
analysis index of Doing 
Business ratings, 2011)
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While addressing social and environmental objectives, Europe’s approach to 
business regulation may make its enterprises uncompetitive. As described in 
greater detail in chapters 4 and 5, Europe’s leading economies have struggled to 
close the productivity gap with the United States, and enterprises in Southern 
Europe particularly seem to suffer from excessive and cumbersome regulation. 
A composite index of the quality of the investment climate, based on the Doing 
Business indicators developed by the World Bank Group, shows that Europe lags 
the United States and Japan (ﬁ gure 1.7). This has motivated calls for ambitious 
regulatory reform, such as in the EU’s Lisbon Agenda of 2002.
Another concern is that Europe lags the United States in innovation – and this 
explains the persistent productivity gap – as Europe’s leading economies no 
longer beneﬁ t from the technological catch-up that drove growth during the 
ﬁ rst three postwar decades (Aghion and Howitt 2006). Europe’s approach to 
innovation assigns a bigger role to government for promoting scientiﬁ c research 
and tertiary education. Worries about Europe’s innovation shortfall have led 
to Europe-wide targets for R&D spending. This approach does not seem to 
be working (ﬁ gure 1.8). The bulk of the world’s R&D takes place in the United 
States, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia, but Europe is falling behind—due 
to the smaller role of the private sector in R&D spending. EU15 governments 
spend the same share of GDP on R&D as Japan and the United States, but 
European enterprises spend only about a third of what their U.S. and Japanese 
counterparts spend. The result is the same when the new member states are 
compared with emerging East Asia.
Likewise, governments in Europe bear almost all of the expense of university 
education (ﬁ gure 1.9). Universities in many European countries are free, though 
the United Kingdom and several German states recently introduced or raised 
tuition fees. Universities are predominantly public in Europe, in contrast with the 
leading universities in the United States and, increasingly, Asia. Lower private 
ﬁ nancing of tertiary education in Europe may hinder the ﬂ ow of new ideas from 
academics to business and contribute to lower private sector R&D investment. 
Much of the rest of the world (Brazil, India, and Russia, for example) has largely 
followed the European model of state-dominated university education, but 
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: UNESCO.
Figure 1.8: Europe’s 
governments spend 
more on R&D, the private 
sector spends less
(R&D expenditure, 2000–09)
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fast-growing East Asia is moving toward the U.S. blend of private and state 
universities.
Europe must consider whether greater regulation and government participation 
in R&D will help or hurt enterprise and innovation, and widen or shrink the 
productivity gaps between the United States and the EU15, and between East 
Asia and the EU12. 
Labor and Government: greater security and equality
Work conditions in Europe are better than in other parts of the world. Europeans 
work fewer hours a week, fewer weeks a year, and fewer years during their 
lifetime than workers in other regions. 
Roxburgh and Mischke (2011) estimate that the annual hours worked per capita 
in the EU15 is 733, about a month less than in the United States. The fewer work 
a. The group is represented by Moldova only.
b. Data are available for Tunisia only.
c. Data for China are from 1999.
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” 
refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: World Bank Education Statistics (EdStats); and OECD Education Statistics.
Figure 1.9: European 
governments account 
for the bulk of tertiary 
education spending
(tertiary education 
expenditure, public 
sources, 2000–09, 
percentage of total 
expenditure on tertiary 
education)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: ILO 2010b; and Conference Board 2011.
Figure 1.10: Europeans 
work less and 
retire earlier
(labor use in Europe and 
other countries, average 
of 2005–09)
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weeks a year account for half of this difference. The remaining half is due to 
the lower incidence of women working part-time (around 20 percent); a lower 
participation rate among 55–64-year-olds as a result of early retirement (15 
percent); higher unemployment in Europe (6 percent); and other factors (around 
10 percent). In a broader regional comparison, the EU15 stands out for low 
participation rates among 55–64-year-olds (both male and female) and a low 
number of hours worked during the year (ﬁ gure 1.10). The EU12 has particularly 
low participation rates in the 55–64-year-old age bracket, but longer annual 
average working hours. This pattern is repeated in the EU candidate countries, 
which also suffer from higher unemployment among youth.
Economists believe that people prefer leisure to work if they can afford it. 
Europeans can afford time off to spend with their families, pursue hobbies, 
exercise, or simply rest, and most Europeans welcome this.11 But for some, less 
than full participation in the labor market may be involuntary. Young people and 
ethnic minorities such as the Roma are often excluded from the labor market, 
even when they are prepared to work. It is worrisome that several European 
economies, particularly those in the east and south, feature large informal 
Note: The index is based on version 2 of the indicator. “EU cand.” refers 
to EU candidate countries and “E. Asia” refers to East Asia.
Source: OECD Employment Database.
Figure 1.11: Employment 
protection is higher in Europe
(OECD employment protection 
index, 2008, and change 
since 1998)
Note: The differential is measured by decile ratios (D9/D1 = wage level of the top 10 percent of 
workers divided by the level of the bottom 10 percent). “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries 
and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries. EU candidates are represented by Albania 
only. The data for 2001–2006 are used for France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden (EU15), 
Hungary (EU12), and the Philippines (East Asia). For Albania, the period covered is 1995–2000.
Source: ILO 2010a.
Figure 1.12: Wages in Europe 
are less differentiated 
than in other regions
(earnings ratio between top 
and bottom deciles, 2007–09)
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sectors. Large shadow economies mirror inefﬁ ciencies in labor markets—for 
example, due to high marginal tax rates or rigidities due to labor regulations.12
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
calculates an employment protection legislation index that includes three 
dimensions: the protection of individuals against unjustiﬁ ed dismissal, the 
burden of requirements to justify collective dismissal, and regulations on 
temporary employment, which is less secure than permanent employment 
(OECD 1999 and 2004, and Venn 2009). Turkey ranked the highest for 
employee protection in 2008, while workers in the United States were least 
protected. Non-EU industrial countries, including Japan, generally have weaker 
employment protections than EU countries (ﬁ gure 1.11). Within Europe, there 
is signiﬁ cant variation in employment protection. In Continental Europe and 
the south, employment protection legislation is more restrictive than in 
the north and the east. Although labor market reforms across Europe have 
narrowed differences in employment protection over the past decade, regional 
differences are still large and contribute to greater labor market segmentation 
in the south and the east.13
Europeans worry that measures to increase labor force participation will lead 
to a class of working poor. In fact, according to the OECD, the incidence of low 
pay in many European countries is much lower than in the United States—the 
EU15 average is around 15 percent compared with 25 percent in the United 
States (Japan is closer to the EU15).14 By the same token, wage incomes in the 
European Union are considerably more equal than those in the United States 
(ﬁ gure 1.12). The ratio of earnings in the ninth to the ﬁ rst decile is less than 
2.5 in Scandinavia and below 3.5 in much of Continental Europe, but almost 5 
in the United States. The greater ﬂ exibility of labor markets is not necessarily 
inconsistent with maintaining greater wage equality, as the Scandinavian 
countries show. An assessment of what others can learn from this experience is 
given in chapters 6 and 7.
Europeans not only enjoy relatively high levels of employment protection, they 
also beneﬁ t from generous health services and support in their old age. Social 
spending on pensions, health, and education is relatively high in Europe (ﬁ gure 
1.13). In most European countries, pension and health systems are managed by 
government and ﬁ nanced through mandatory payroll contributions or general 
Note: Social spending is a sum of education (707), health (709), and social protection (710) 
expenditures, as classiﬁ ed in the IMF GFS.
Source: IMF GFS; and IMF WEO.
Figure 1.13: Social 
spending is higher 
in Europe
(government expenditures 
on education, health, and 
social protection, 2005–09)
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taxes. The rise in pension spending explains the bulk of the increase in the size 
of governments in Europe, with health-related spending accounting for the 
remainder.
Several European countries are implementing pension reforms, including 
increasing the retirement age, reducing early retirement beneﬁ ts, and 
reducing replacement rates. In many cases the EU’s new members and Eastern 
European neighbors spearheaded these reforms as they faced the challenge 
of rapid aging with far lower average incomes and productivity. Nonetheless, 
replacement rates in Europe tend to be considerably more generous than in 
other high-income countries, most notably Canada, Japan, and the United 
States. The comparison with Japan is particularly instructive because Japan is 
the one high-income country that shares Europe’s predicament of a labor force 
that is rapidly declining in size. In most European countries, pension reform 
remains unﬁ nished business.
The large role of government in providing basic public services and the 
generosity of the social security system comes with a higher tax burden. 
Corporate tax rates decreased over the past two decades, leading to more 
uniform effective rates in Europe and among all developed countries. Personal 
income tax rates still vary from other parts of the world and even within 
Europe, especially when the new EU member states are included. Europe’s high 
payroll taxes and marginal income taxes lead to the largest difference in the 
world between gross and net wages. One implication of this gap is that the 
post-tax distribution of earnings is more equal in Europe (ﬁ gure 1.14). Another 
implication is that work incentives are weaker.
As a share of their GDP, European countries do not have higher expenditures 
for health or education than other high-income countries. The role of the 
government in providing and ﬁ nancing these services, however, tends to be 
greater in Europe. On average, governments ﬁ nance three-quarters of all health 
a. For Australia and New Zealand, the latest available data are from 1994 and 1997, respectively.
b. Japan’s data are from 1993.
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: WDI; and OECD Income Distribution and Poverty Database.
Figure 1.14: Redistribution 
through the tax and 
transfer system is more 
pronounced in Europe
(Gini indices, 2000s)
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spending in the EU27, but only 60 percent in high-income countries, and as little 
as 45 percent in the United States. Japan also has a high share of government 
expenditures in total health spending (81 percent). In education spending, 
Europe stands apart from the rest of the world. Governments in Europe ﬁ nance 
more than four-ﬁ fths of total education spending, compared with up to three-
quarters in a few and half in most OECD countries. In most European countries, 
primary, secondary, and tertiary education is free, which explains the much 
larger government role in ﬁ nancing education.
Given the substantial role of government in providing services and social 
security, government accountability is pivotal. But there is a delicate balance 
between the accountability desired by most European societies and the moral 
hazard from the aspirations of a common European project. Europe is a unique 
experiment in shifting from national to international redistribution and to a 
deeper political integration than anywhere else in the world. 
While it is difﬁ cult to discern a clear set of characteristics shared by every 
European country, a consistent pattern distinguishes Europe’s development 
model.15 Even if there were no such thing as a common European growth model, 
Europe would face common challenges that set it apart. There are variations 
in the severity of these challenges among European countries, but they are 
small relative to the differences with the Americas and Asia. It is these common 
challenges that motivate a study on restoring the lustre of the European 
growth model. 
The need for change
External and internal developments are putting pressures on Europe—as 
exhibited in stalling productivity, shrinking workforces, and widening ﬁ scal 
imbalances. But the remedies lie in three interrelated challenges: making the 
most of modern services, both ﬁ nancial and nonﬁ nancial; closing productivity 
gaps, such as the one between the EU15 and the United States, and the 
growing divergence in productivity growth between Southern Europe and the 
rest; and dealing with an increasingly serious demographic drag, caused by 
a combination of aging and shrinking populations in many parts of Europe, 
including its emerging markets. 
Unexploited potential in modern services 
In developed economies, about three-quarters of national income is generated 
in the services sector. Europe’s internal trade in services is the largest 
worldwide at around US$4 trillion. And yet the Single Market for Services 
remains fragmented. The most integrated in Europe is the market for ﬁ nancial 
services, and this has brought ample beneﬁ ts (chapter 3). But even here, 
coordination among national regulators to oversee the activities of ﬁ nancial 
institutions operating across national borders may have been exposed as 
deﬁ cient during the recent crisis. The uncoordinated deleveraging of bank 
balance sheets in Europe’s emerging markets as a result of capital calls by 
national regulators could impose signiﬁ cant collateral damage on host countries’ 
economies. This would exacerbate downward economic pressures across 
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the continent. To avoid costly disintegration, further regulatory integration is 
called for. 
In other services, regulatory barriers prevent the beneﬁ ts of trade and 
integration from being fully realized (chapter 2). Digital services, such as 
Internet sales and IT support, are far less developed in Europe. For example, 
the United States accounts for around 80 percent of global e-book sales, but 
Europe for only 10 percent, mostly in the United Kingdom. The online music 
storage and sharing service Spotify is available in only 7 European countries, 
and iTunes is accessible in only 15 states. National regulations make it difﬁ cult 
for companies to operate Europe-wide, preventing efﬁ ciency and cost gains 
from being realized. After years of negotiations, Europe still does not have 
a single European patent, which increases the cost to innovators. Telecom 
services, biotechnologies, and pharmaceuticals are nationally regulated, 
leading to signiﬁ cant price divergence across Europe and reduced incentives for 
business to invest in R&D. In professional services, the mutual recognition of 
qualiﬁ cations remains incomplete, while contract law and professional liability 
and insurance requirements differ and create risks for cross-border sales, 
particularly by small and medium enterprises. 
The regulatory barriers hampering the development of services trade across 
Europe are  economically signiﬁ cant. Some estimates put the gains from 
strengthening the Single Market for Services at 4 percent of the EU’s aggregate 
GDP (Monti 2010). About 70 percent of the productivity gap with the United 
States in the “old” members of the European Union is in the productivity of 
services (Roxburgh and others 2010). Lower productivity growth in distribution 
(retail, wholesale, transport, and logistics) accounts for a large share of Europe’s 
divergence in productivity from the United States and Japan since the mid-1990s 
(Jorgenson and Timmer 2011). Europe lags the United States in highly innovative 
industries such as biotech, the Internet, and medical services (chapter 5). Europe 
Note: The chart shows productivity levels in the core EU15 rather than the wider EU27. The EU’s new 
members (EU12) have been converging to the United States but are too small to fundamentally affect 
the picture for Europe as a whole. Note also the declining gap with Japan even during the recent 
decades, when Japan grew slowly. Once demographic “drag” is subtracted, labor productivity growth 
in Japan compares well with Europe and is on a par with the United States between 1995 and 2005.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the OECD Productivity Database.
Figure 1.15: Europe’s 
productivity leaders 
are lagging behind 
the United States
(EU15 labor productivity, 
indexed to the United States 
and Japan)
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has gotten less out of the information technology revolution and risks missing 
out on biotech, the next important wave of business opportunities in the 
“New Economy.” 
Widening productivity gaps 
Growth in labor productivity in Europe’s advanced economies has fallen 
behind that in the United States (ﬁ gure 1.15). This growing gap with the 
world’s technology leader is in sharp contrast with the rapid convergence in 
labor productivity Europe experienced in the ﬁ ve decades after World War 
II. It prompted several European policy initiatives, starting with the Lisbon 
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the OECD Productivity Database.
Figure 1.16: Southern 
Europe lags the EU15 
North, and Eastern Europe 
is catching up to it
(EU15 South labor 
productivity, indexed to 
EU15 North and EU12)
Note: “EU15 S.” refers to countries in EU15 South, which are also included in the EU15 aggregates. “EU 
cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base.
Figure 1.17: Europe’s 
population could 
shrink by a third over 
the next 40 years
(population projections, 
2010–50)
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Agenda of 2002 and reinforced in Europe’s 2020 Agenda of 2010, all aimed 
at strengthening Europe’s competitiveness and productivity performance, 
while ensuring that economic growth in Europe remains socially inclusive and 
environmentally sustainable. The results of these efforts have been modest. 
Subsequent chapters in this report analyze what needs to be done.
The growing gap with the United States is not the only productivity gap Europe 
needs to worry about. Within Europe, labor productivity growth until the 
mid-1990s tended to be faster in the relatively poorer countries. But over the 
past decade, the pattern has become more complex. While the new member 
states of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe have grown fast and 
made good progress in closing the large initial productivity gap with the EU15, 
among the “old” members of the EU, productivity has diverged since the end 
of the 1990s (ﬁ gure 1.16). In particular, productivity growth in Europe’s southern 
economies—Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—has been slower than in Europe’s 
north. These trends worsened in the ﬁ ve years leading up to the economic and 
ﬁ nancial crisis of 2007–08. But incomes have not matched labor productivity. 
The result has been a sharp divergence in unit labor costs within the eurozone 
and a corresponding increase in internal imbalances among its member states.
Growing “Demographic Drag”
Over the next 50 years, with current policies, Europe’s labor force will decline 
by 50 million, with the largest part of the decrease happening between 2020 
and 2040. The numbers are quite daunting, because there will be changes at 
both ends of the population pyramid. Due to low fertility rates, the labor force 
will decline by around 15 percent in the EU15 and by more than 30 percent in 
the EU12 and the EU eastern partnership countries, but it is likely to increase by 
15 percent in the potential candidate countries. At the same time, the share of 
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: IMF WEO; European Commission’s annual macro-economic database (AMECO); and Abbas 
and others 2011.
Figure 1.18: European 
governments are the 
biggest in the world, and 
often heavily indebted
(government balance, 
government spending and 
public debt, percentage of 
GDP, 1970–2010)
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European ages 65 and older is projected to increase from less than 20 percent 
today to around 30 percent by 2050 (ﬁ gure 1.17). 
This contrasts markedly with predicted developments in the United States, 
India, and emerging markets in Latin America and North Africa. Although 
China and Japan also face a declining labor force, there are vast opportunities 
in China for productivity gains from capital deepening and from the structural 
transformation of the economy. Japan is most comparable with Europe in its 
demographic patterns, but it has managed the ﬁ scal implications of aging more 
prudently and has sustained higher rates of productivity growth than Europe. 
Europe will need to boost labor force participation and adjust its institutions to 
cope with the need for greater immigration if it is to achieve sustainable GDP 
growth (chapter 6).
Demographic changes are straining Europe’s welfare systems. European 
countries have larger governments than countries in other regions, regardless 
of per capita income level (ﬁ gure 1.18). The differential is about 10 percent of 
GDP, and the main reason is that European governments spend more on social 
security, mostly on pensions (chapter 7). This is not because European societies 
are already much older than others at similar income levels. Rather, Europe 
has more pensioners because workers retire earlier. Europe’s social spending is 
large, though the continent is still relatively young. As Europeans live longer and 
populations age, this will need to change.
The burden of implicit pension liabilities has been recognized for some 
time. Until recently, however, the large size of Europe’s governments and 
the increasing levels of public debt did not attract much attention. This has 
changed in the wake of the crisis, as European governments struggle to 
convince investors that they can and will redeem their debts. The need for 
ﬁ scal adjustments and debt reduction is now widely acknowledged. How to do 
this in a socially balanced way is perhaps the key challenge facing European 
policymakers over the coming decade. How to sequence and coordinate the 
adjustment in the context of large internal imbalances within Europe and the 
looming risk of a renewed recession is a key challenge over the 
coming months.16
An underdeveloped services market, a persistent gap to the world’s productivity 
frontier, an aging society, and the immediate need for ﬁ scal adjustment—
together these conditions make economic growth the greatest imperative for 
Europe. The issue is not just higher material output. Intergenerational equity, 
sustainability, and global relevance are also at issue. Only a growing Europe 
will be able to maintain its attractive blend of ever-better living standards, 
individual rights and social security, and regional solidarity. 
Mending the model
It is understandable that given half a century of success, many Europeans 
are inclined to preserve and defend their economic model rather than 
change and adapt. But it is clear that changes are necessary. Changes are 
needed for the European single market to deepen, for Europe to become 
an even bigger economic union, and for Europe to retain or regain its global 
economic leadership. 
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The rest of this chapter introduces the key policy debates that frame the case 
for changing the various components of the growth model. The policy debates 
concern all of Europe, but the implications are often quite different across 
countries. Some parts of the model will require less adjustment than others. 
The structure of this report reﬂ ects these differences. A few salient points:
 · The structure of this report mirrors its main messages. Trade and ﬁ nance 
come ﬁ rst: they are the parts of the economic model that are the strongest 
and—except for the single market for some services—require the least 
change. Enterprise and innovation come second: they work well in some 
parts of Europe and poorly in others. Some countries need to change their 
policies just a little, others a lot. Labor and government come next: they 
require the most change in many countries. 
 · The organization of the chapters also reﬂ ects their geographic focus. The 
debates about enlargement are best informed by discussing the experience 
of emerging Europe—the new member states of the European Union, the 
EU candidate countries in the Balkans, and the EU eastern partnership 
countries. The discussions of trade and ﬁ nance emphasize the economic 
relations between emerging Europe and the advanced EU15 economies. 
The debates about European competitiveness are centered on the European 
Union, with growing concerns about the competitiveness of enterprise in 
the southern states and weaknesses in the innovation fundamentals of the 
European Union. The discussion of enterprise and innovation is focused on 
the 31 countries in the European Union and European Free Trade Association. 
The debates about labor and government span all 45 countries in Europe: 
the European Free Trade Association, the European Union, the EU candidate 
states, and the EU eastern partnership countries. 
 · This report tries to provide answers to the questions that are most pertinent 
for policymakers. The number of questions in each chapter increases as the 
report progresses from the strong points of the European economic model to 
its weaker aspects. But the debates addressed in chapters 2–7 span questions 
related to three of Europe’s biggest assets: the single market, the consensus 
for economic enlargement, and Europe’s global economic importance. 
Highlighting the priorities, chapter 8 notes countries in and outside Europe 
whose performance can be used as a benchmark by others. 
Trade: taking advantage of enlargement
There are many who question whether enlarging the European Union to 
the east has beneﬁ ted Europe’s “old” member states, especially the ones in 
the south; there is not much debate about whether the new members have 
beneﬁ ted—they clearly have. A corollary of this concern is skepticism about the 
beneﬁ ts to current members of the European Union from further enlargement 
to include the western Balkans, Turkey, and Europe’s eastern neighbors, 
especially Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. 
The fears about trade integration with the east are centered on the relocation 
of production facilities to beneﬁ t from a qualiﬁ ed but cheaper labor force. 
The argument is often made that this leads to a loss of jobs in the west—that 
competition has harmed economies in “old” Europe. This report documents 
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the spread of industrial networks as a result of EU enlargement and shows 
how the EU’s old members have indeed been increasingly offshoring activities 
to the newer ones. This has helped companies in Western Europe—in Austria, 
Germany, and others—become or stay competitive. Western Europe’s most 
successful economies have increasingly relied on suppliers in the east. And the 
new member states have been given increasingly sophisticated tasks in the 
process, which has turned them into global exporters in their own right. 
The same phenomena can be observed with a lag in the western Balkans and 
Turkey, where trade in industrial intermediates is catalyzing changes in the 
structure of exports. The conclusion of deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreements with the eastern neighbors would likely bring many of the beneﬁ ts 
that the customs union, concluded in 1995 between the European Union and 
Turkey, has brought to Europe’s second most populous country. 
But while enlargement has been a success for most, Europe’s southern 
economies have missed out on the beneﬁ ts of deepening integration. FDI that 
used to go southward has increasingly headed east. Neither has the south 
substantially increased its trade linkages with the new member states or the 
accession countries, with the notable exception of Greek and Italian banks 
expanding into the western Balkans. Enterprises in Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
and—to less extent—Spain tend to be too small to internationalize. The family 
business model needs updating as the European family grows ever bigger. 
If trade in manufacturing has been a motor of European integration, trade 
in services is less developed and more regulated in Europe, even inside 
the European Union. Services trade has grown signiﬁ cantly, as has the 
sophistication of services exports of both old and new EU member states. But 
services trade in the European Union is estimated to be only about half what 
it could be if the Single Market for Services were fully developed. Moreover, 
services trade in non-EU members is less impressive and remains primarily for 
traditional services, pointing to sizable gains from further liberalization of trade 
in services with non-EU members. Tapping this potential requires strengthening 
the capacity of EU candidate countries to adhere to European regulations in 
areas such as intellectual property rights and ﬁ nancial services. It will also 
require the European Union to accept the greater labor mobility required for 
trade in traditional services such as construction, transportation, and tourism.
Europe’s global trade relations are characterized by the increasing proliferation 
of bilateral trade deals, custom-made for the particular sensitivities involved. 
For Europe, agriculture remains a policy area dominated more by politics 
than economics. The weakest part of Europe’s approach to trade is the high 
protection afforded by the Common Agricultural Policy, which distorts farming 
decisions and—unlike the rest of the components of the European economic 
model—helps neither poorer farmers nor poorer countries. (See chapter 2 for an 
argument that Europe would do well to reconsider its agricultural trade policies 
toward the economies of the EU eastern partnership, where many people are 
still farmers.) 
Trade is one of Europe’s strong points. European integration is a unique political 
and economic achievement, and enlargement represents opportunities for both 
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old and new member states of the European Union. Making fuller use of these 
opportunities requires strengthening as well as extending the single market. 
Finance: managing quick capital fl ows
Banks and ﬁ nanciers are not popular these days. There are questions about 
whether ﬁ nancial integration in Europe has gone too far. This report argues 
that ﬁ nancial integration has been at the core of one of Europe’s biggest 
achievements—the rapid convergence of incomes and living standards across the 
continent. These ﬂ ows should not be slowed; Europe should just get better at 
managing them.
Critics of ﬁ nancial integration in Europe point to the risk that excessive debt 
levels may slow down growth in the future, because new credit is not available 
while banks reduce exposure to repair their balance sheets. Easy ﬁ nance may 
have obscured structural weaknesses of economies and enterprises and led to a 
misallocation and waste of capital at the cost of European taxpayers, who now 
have to bail out the banks. And critics point to the shortcomings of Europe’s 
ﬁ nancial and regulatory architecture, with ﬁ nancial institutions that operate freely 
across borders while remaining under the supervision of national authorities. 
The criticism points to areas that need ﬁ xing. But this report argues that on the 
whole, ﬁ nance has been a boon to Europe despite some excesses. In supporting 
this conclusion, the report distinguishes between the emerging markets in 
Eastern Europe and the countries that joined the European Union during the 1970s 
and 1980s—the erstwhile “cohesion countries”—Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain. The private sector credit boom in emerging Europe has not created a debt 
overhang. Corporate and household balance sheets are not excessively leveraged, 
and credit has gone to stronger companies and wealthier households. By and 
large, ﬁ nance has helped real convergence in Eastern Europe. Going forward, while 
commercial banks struggle with a large share of nonperforming loans, and credit 
growth may be subdued for some time, exchange rate ﬂ exibility in countries such 
as the Czech Republic or Poland and the political will to carry through an internal 
devaluation in places like the three Baltic states should mitigate the risks of a 
credit-less recovery.17 By contrast, debt levels in the cohesion countries are near or 
above the thresholds of sustainability and growth-friendliness. The debt overhang 
compounds the challenge of restoring competitiveness and growth, without which 
in turn debt sustainability is questionable. External borrowing in Europe’s south 
has typically gone hand in hand with a decline in domestic private savings. Except 
Ireland, where productivity growth was high throughout the boom, ﬁ nance in the 
cohesion countries has not promoted real convergence but instead has fueled the 
convergence of nominal incomes. Europe’s underlying productivity gap between 
north and south, more than its ﬁ nancial system, needs ﬁ xing.
A peculiar feature of ﬁ nancial integration in Europe (both within the European 
Union and in some EU eastern partnership countries, such as Ukraine) is the 
predominance of ﬁ nancial FDI, most obviously manifest as foreign banks in 
emerging Europe. This has made ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows more durable during the crisis, 
with rollover rates close to 100 percent compared with 60–65 percent during 
the East Asia crisis of 1997–98. This success was in part achieved thanks to 
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spontaneous coordination among home and host regulators, banks themselves, 
and international ﬁ nancial institutions under the so-called “Vienna Initiative.” 
As the sovereign debt crisis in Europe has put renewed pressure on European 
banks, however, Europe needs to consider moving beyond coordination toward 
building a Europe-wide regulatory architecture that provides enforcement 
powers to supranational institutions such as the European Banking Authority. 
Managing quick capital ﬂ ows successfully is likely to require national regulators 
to transfer some authority to the European level.
At the national level, countercyclical ﬁ scal policy and macroprudential ﬁ nancial 
sector regulations would have helped economies in emerging Europe get the 
best out of western ﬁ nance. A lesson of the crisis is the need for European 
policymakers to act more forcefully to cool excessive domestic demand. There 
is a moral in the coincidence of the success of ﬁ nancial integration and an 
improved investment climate: where domestic competition was weak, ﬁ nance 
ﬂ owed into real estate and retail lending in the absence of a sufﬁ cient supply 
of creditworthy corporate borrowers. Financial integration can catalyze real 
economic integration when the right structural policies are in place—but it 
cannot substitute for them. In the meantime, the macroprudential architecture 
in Europe has also been strengthened in the course of the crisis, with the 
creation of the European Systemic Risk Board. Whether this is sufﬁ cient to 
prevent future excesses can be debated. Market signals in the course of 2011 
were clear: yields came down for sovereigns in countries like Ireland and Latvia 
where macroeconomic policies have sharply unwound the excesses of the 
past; they did not where measures remained halfhearted or where political 
commitment to stay the course of adjustment was in doubt. 
The comparison of south and east provides lessons in how ﬁ nancial integration 
can foster convergence when managed well, and how it can destabilize all 
of Europe when the capital ﬂ ows into unproductive activities. But this report 
concludes that closer ﬁ nancial integration between wealthier and less advanced 
economies in Europe is unique, and a strength of the European economic model. 
Enterprise: making structures better 
suited for an enlarged Europe
Advocates of free, unregulated markets point to Europe’s modest growth 
performance over the past two decades, compared with those of the United 
States and East Asia, as an example of the stiﬂ ing effects of excessive 
regulation. While the attempted regulatory harmonization in the 120,000 pages 
of the Acquis Communitaire is an admirable ambition, Europe is not considered 
an easy place to do business. Unless this changes, it is argued, Europe’s growth 
prospects look dim. 
In reality, there is considerable variation in the extent of government 
regulation of private enterprise across Europe. Regulation remains pervasive 
despite a decade-long process of gradual liberalization in the south and some 
Continental European countries, but is now lighter in the north and in some 
new EU members in the east. This report examines how these differences lead 
to differences in the health of Europe’s economies, taking a microeconomic 
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approach to the assessment of enterprise performance. In particular, it 
examines how enterprises have done in achieving three objectives: adding 
value, creating jobs, and increasing exports. 
European enterprises do not do worse than their competitors in the United 
States and East Asia in these three dimensions. There are, however, big 
differences across Europe that result from how countries regulate enterprise. In 
the European Union, the north exceeds the performance of the United States 
in all three dimensions, Continental Europe does well in exports but less so in 
value added and employment growth, and the south has added jobs, but not 
value and exports. Productivity growth within the EU15 has begun to diverge 
in recent years. By contrast with the south, the EU’s eastern members and 
neighbors have done well in increasing productivity and exports, but less in 
creating jobs. 
The differences in the business environment and the performance of 
enterprises are linked. Cumbersome regulations, high tax rates, compliance 
costs, and weaknesses in contract enforcement keep enterprises small in the 
south. Smaller ﬁ rms often stay below the radar screen of inspectors or beneﬁ t 
from simpliﬁ ed requirements. Staying small often means staying nimble and 
limiting risks. But smaller ﬁ rms are also less attractive for foreign investors 
and face signiﬁ cant risks themselves in trading and investing internationally. 
And smaller ﬁ rms can ill afford the wages demanded by a highly educated 
workforce. These are all reasons why the south has experienced slower 
productivity and export growth than other regions in Europe, and they explain 
how fast job creation has coexisted with signiﬁ cant youth unemployment, often 
of university graduates. 
By contrast, enterprises in the north and in Europe’s continental economies 
have faced fewer obstacles in growing bigger. They have internationalized 
and have been able to attract and retain skilled labor. They have done so 
although regulations and taxes in Northern and Continental Europe remain more 
burdensome than in other high-income OECD countries. But compliance 
costs have been reduced, and predictability and evenhanded enforcement 
have helped ﬁ rms adjust. The recent success of enterprises in countries such 
as Finland, Germany, and Sweden indicates that the European economic and 
social model is not incompatible with competitive enterprise. 
In the east, deregulation and simpliﬁ ed tax systems have helped attract 
FDI from Estonia to Georgia. Good infrastructure, as in the Czech Republic, 
and a large domestic market, such as in Poland, have also helped. By 
internationalizing and becoming part of Austrian, German, and Swedish 
multinational production chains, Eastern European enterprises have beneﬁ ted 
from enlargement and have been rewarded with gains in productivity and world 
record export performance. 
Innovation: improving the structures 
that bring ideas to market
Researchers who are worried that European enterprises are becoming less 
competitive relative to North American and East Asian ﬁ rms point to Europe’s 
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weaker innovation fundamentals: competition, universities, and R&D funding. 
Policymakers in Europe have been focused on innovation for several years 
as reﬂ ected, for instance, in the Lisbon Strategy of 2002. This set a target for 
Europe to reach a level of R&D spending of at least 3 percent of GDP. Today, 
Europe as a whole remains quite distant from this objective and also lags the 
United States, the world’s innovation leader, in a number of aspects related 
to innovation. This report assesses what the main components of a European 
“innovation ecosystem” might be. 
A composite indicator developed by the European Union covers public and 
private R&D investments, the quality of universities, linkages between research 
and business, access to ﬁ nance, protection of intellectual property rights, and 
access to a large market. The measure highlights the innovation gap between 
Europe and the United States. Among Europe’s major competitors (the United 
States, Japan, Brazil, Russia, India, and China), only Russia is falling behind in 
relative terms. The United States and Japan score better than the European 
Union and are widening the gap. 
Close up, the picture looks different. Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
and Germany perform close to U.S. levels, but much of Southern and Eastern 
Europe lags well behind. The poor performance of some advanced European 
countries such as Italy, Spain, and—to less extent—France in various dimensions 
of innovation is of particular concern. Poorer economies can often grow fast 
even without much innovation by adopting frontier technologies. Europe’s own 
history up to the mid-1970s, and East Asia’s “ﬂ ying geese” pattern of structural 
change and technological advance, are examples of catch-up growth. But closer 
to the technological frontier, institutions have to change to promote innovation. 
Studies suggest that competition, the quality of tertiary education, and the 
availability of venture capital ﬁ nance are the main ingredients of success at 
the frontier (for example, Aghion and Howitt 2006). Europe as a whole lags the 
United States in these dimensions, and Europe’s low-innovation economies lag 
behind its leaders in every one of them. 
One sign of Europe’s innovation gap is that it has too few young, leading 
innovators—ﬁ rms that have grown quickly to become large. Young ﬁ rms form 
the majority of leading innovators in the United States, and a substantial 
share of R&D in leading sectors. Europe does not specialize in R&D-intensive 
sectors such as aerospace, biotech, information technology, health care, 
pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. Even in countries with strong 
national innovation systems such as Germany or Sweden, there are few young, 
fast-growing companies, and innovation-based sectors are poorly represented. 
Europe, like Japan, carries out the bulk of its R&D in traditional, old ﬁ rms. While 
this works for some—such as the well-known “export champions” like ABB, 
Erikson, BMW, Mercedes Benz, BASF, or Siemens—Europe has few companies 
that match the dynamism of Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook, or Microsoft. 
This report links this back to the fragmentation in the single market for digital 
services, which makes it more difﬁ cult for young innovators in Europe to grow 
to global scale. 
Europe did not get the same productivity kick as the United States out of the 
wave of improvements in information communications and technology over the 
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last decade and a half. It will have to harness the power of the single market to 
do better when the next technological revolution comes along. 
Labor: getting more from work
Europeans sometimes fear that Europe is running out of work. But it is workers 
that Europe is running out of. Addressing this misconception may be one of the 
most important tasks for European policymakers.
Labor markets have long been recognized as one of Europe’s weaker points. 
Persistent unemployment during the 1980s and 1990s was perhaps the most 
widely discussed aspect of what some called “Eurosclerosis”—the inability of 
Europe’s postwar institutions to adjust to a changing global economy (Giersch 
1985). Motivated in part by the view that work in Europe was a pie of ﬁ xed size, 
policymakers made it easier for Europeans to retire earlier and to work fewer 
hours. Workers in Europe have responded to these incentives, not least because 
they enjoy social security. The generosity of social welfare and the high degree 
of protection afforded to workers in Europe are a distinguishing characteristic of 
the European economic and social model, setting the continent apart from other 
high-income economies. 
This report assesses the costs of this generosity, highlighting inconsistencies 
in the way work and welfare are organized in Europe. As part of ﬁ nancing 
generous social beneﬁ ts, the burden of payroll taxes has grown while the 
workforce that pays these taxes has declined. The laws make workers, once 
hired, feel secure. The same laws make employers think twice before hiring. 
High taxes and burdensome employment protection rules discourage job 
creation with the consequence that some Europeans—often the young—remain 
excluded from the labor market. Europe’s policies regulating work can be linked 
to the inefﬁ ciencies in the labor market, which in turn contribute to a loss of 
competitiveness and reduced ability of enterprises to innovate.
The strains in Europe’s insider-outsider labor market have grown since 
economists ﬁ rst pointed out its inefﬁ ciencies in the 1980s. Youth unemployment 
rates of 40 percent such as in Spain are hardly compatible with the objective of 
social inclusion. At the same time, many Europeans fear that with globalization 
and European enlargement, their jobs are competed away through outsourcing 
and immigration. When the amount of work available is seen as a ﬁ xed pie, the 
inclination is to limit the number of eaters. The tension between insiders and 
outsiders has correspondingly grown. 
It need not be like this. Compared with the 1970s and 1980s, Europe has become 
better at creating jobs. Excluding some from the labor market is an anachronism 
in a continent facing a rapid decline in its labor force over the coming decades. 
If current patterns persist, Europe will have 30 million fewer young workers 
(ages 19–39) by 2060. Europe’s youth have to be brought into the economic 
mainstream. And even then, shortages of skilled labor remain likely. 
Encouragingly, a growing number of European countries have been changing 
their labor market policies. It will be reassuring for many Europeans that 
labor markets in Denmark and Germany have succeeded in combining high 
levels of income security for workers with stronger incentives to look for new 
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opportunities, and with measures to lower the payroll tax and thus encourage 
employers to create jobs. It should also be reassuring that governments in 
Northern Europe have been successful in matching younger workers and jobs, 
though such policies are difﬁ cult to get right and can be expensive. 
Some parts of Europe are poised to do a lot better than others when it emerges 
from the current economic turbulence. These differences in prospects have 
consequences for workers. Europe’s single market is premised on the aspiration 
that labor can move freely in response to economic opportunities. In reality, 
Europeans move little both inside countries and across national borders. 
High regional unemployment rates motivate costly regional development 
policies that attempt to bring jobs to people, rather than encourage people to 
move to where the jobs are. Low levels of mobility are associated with high 
unemployment. 
Language barriers, family ties, and attachment to local culture make Europeans 
reluctant to move, yet these are not unique to Europe. Younger, educated, 
and ambitious Europeans would beneﬁ t from stronger signals from the labor 
market, better-functioning housing markets, and more easily portable health 
and social protection beneﬁ ts. In Europe’s economic powerhouses like Germany, 
enterprises are often short of skilled labor. In Spain and Italy, many university 
graduates are struggling to enter the labor market. Europe as a whole will 
beneﬁ t from higher labor mobility.18 Indeed, for countries that share a single 
currency, labor mobility may be the most important missing ingredient—one 
that could help make the eurozone an “optimum currency area.” 
Europe will also have to learn to compete for global talent. Europe offers much 
in the way of cultural richness and economic opportunity, yet talent from 
around the world is more likely to go to the United States because of better 
universities, more-accommodating labor markets, and institutions that are more 
welcoming (The Economist 2009). Europe has much to change in its approach 
to immigration.
Government: making a representative state more effi cient 
Seen from Asia or America, Europe is a region with big government. For 
many, big government is associated with bloated bureaucracies, high taxes, 
and wasteful government spending. Little wonder, it is said, that European 
economies have trouble growing. The recent ﬁ nancial turbulence in Europe, 
prompted by concerns over large public debts and persistent ﬁ scal deﬁ cits, 
has added weight to the arguments of those skeptical of large government. 
This report asks whether large governments are indeed harmful for growth. 
In Europe, this seems to be the case; countries with larger governments grow 
more slowly. And in Europe, governments are larger. This is primarily because of 
higher spending on social protection—most important, public pension systems. 
Population aging lies behind growing social security spending in all high-income 
and many middle-income countries, but the impact is highly variable. 
Rethinking the design and size of social security systems in Europe can 
draw on existing good practice, such as in Iceland or Japan, to deal with the 
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demographic drag on economic growth. Many countries in Europe have already 
started to increase the retirement age and tighten eligibility criteria for public 
pensions. Others have introduced mandatory “second pillars,” which accumulate 
contributions in individual pension accounts, to encourage domestic savings and 
reduce the burden on public pay-as-you-go systems. Sweden and Switzerland 
are often seen as models in this regard, but as the experience of several Eastern 
European countries during the past three years demonstrates, sustaining these 
reforms can be politically difﬁ cult. Whatever route is chosen, those countries in 
Europe that have not done so yet must ﬁ nd ways to restrain spending on social 
security or risk growing ﬁ scal challenges.
There are economies in Europe with large governments that do well. Sweden, 
for instance, hardly ﬁ ts the stereotype of a rigid, bureaucratized Leviathan, 
though government spending in 2010 was more than half of GDP. One reason 
that Scandinavian countries with large governments do so well is that public 
services are of high quality. This report considers their reforms to draw lessons 
for the rest of Europe and the world. But one asset that Northern European 
countries have that may be tough to replicate is a higher degree of social trust. 
Where the rule of law is weak and social trust is low, large government is likely 
to be harmful. So Southern Europe might have done better to keep government 
small, since it is difﬁ cult to make it efﬁ cient without the preconditions for 
compliance with taxes and regulations, high levels of work participation, and 
frugal use of social welfare. This is a lesson that emerging market economies in 
Europe with large public sectors, such as Ukraine’s, should learn. 
Whether or not large government is bad for growth and ﬁ scal austerity is seen 
as harming the short-term prospects of growth in Europe, for countries with 
large public debts ﬁ scal consolidation is a necessity. Neither higher taxes nor 
productivity increases are likely to keep the public ﬁ nances of these countries 
aﬂ oat at current spending levels. High-quality ﬁ scal consolidation strategies to 
reach sustainable paths for public debt are analyzed in chapter 7. There is ample 
room in Europe to cut spending without affecting social outcomes. Nonetheless, 
the political challenge of maintaining primary surpluses for several years is 
daunting. Some countries have room to adjust more gradually than others. And 
given the close economic links between European countries, those with ﬁ scal 
space could perhaps use it.
Restoring Europe’s lustre
In November 2008, as the consequences of the ﬁ nancial collapse gripped 
markets and policymakers worldwide, a senior U.S. government ofﬁ cial 
remarked: “You never want to let a serious crisis go to waste.”19 It is not clear 
whether the United States has used the crisis well. But three years later, the 
epicenter of economic turbulence lay not there but in Europe. The attention 
was focused on restoring the conﬁ dence of markets in European governments. 
But behind the market nervousness were doubts about the sustainability of 
Europe’s economic and social model. The European sovereign debt crisis could 
be seen as an opportunity to address these concerns quickly. 
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This report was written with more deliberate adjustments in mind. That will 
indeed be the course of reform in the many countries that have responsibly 
applied the principles of the European growth model. But the countries that 
have strayed furthest from them will be forced to adjust abruptly. It should be 
a warning to the others. There have been changes in the world that necessitate 
a reexamination of the basic economic model. Since 2005, the contribution of 
developing countries to global growth has been greater than that of advanced 
economies, even though their share in global GDP is half that of the developed 
world. All advanced economies should reﬂ ect upon these shifts. 
This report is such a reﬂ ection for 45 countries in Europe. An unprecedented 
combination of enterprise, labor, trade, ﬁ nance, innovation, and government 
attributes makes the European growth model unique. The close economic 
ties between richer and poorer countries; the balance between proﬁ t and 
public interest in enterprise; the social contract that protects the poor, elderly, 
and unemployed; and the representativeness of government at continental, 
national, and local levels are unique and admirable. Europeans cherish these 
features and much of the world admires and tries to emulate them. This report 
concludes that the European economic model needs to be adjusted, 
not abandoned. 
The changes that have made it necessary for Europe to craft a new economic 
model are demographic, entrepreneurial, and ﬁ scal. Europe’s working 
population is expected to decline by about 15 percent by 2050, while that of 
the United States will grow by more than 25 percent. Asia’s productivity and 
competitiveness will allow its enterprises to outstrip all but the most innovative 
ones in the United States. It will especially pressure Europe, where productivity 
growth has been slowing since the mid-1990s and the service economy has 
been held back by fragmented regulation. The growing costs of social security 
and slowing economic productivity will squeeze Europe from two sides in the 
coming decade. The pressures may rise quickly. Debt burdens that seemed 
manageable at the borrowing costs of 2008 may be unbearable in the market 
conditions of 2012. Europe needs to change. 
The order of chapters in this report reﬂ ects the changes required in ascending 
order. Europe’s strong points are in trade and ﬁ nance. In the areas of enterprise 
and innovation, Europe has countries that do well in the world. But many 
European countries are struggling to generate and support entrepreneurial 
high achievers and innovators. The biggest need for change is in the areas of 
labor and government. Labor policies must be reoriented toward greater labor 
mobility, incentives to work, and more competitiveness and job creation in 
sectors where Europe lags behind. Almost everywhere, European governments 
are too big and inefﬁ cient in delivering services. They will have to become 
smaller or more efﬁ cient, whichever is quicker. Their weaknesses and strengths 
are summarized in table 1.1. 
The necessary changes will not be easy, but many European countries have 
already made progress, and others can learn from their experiences. Other 
parts of the world are dealing, or have dealt with, similar pressures, and Europe 
may learn from them too. Using more than 16 pairs of benchmarking briefs 
prepared for this report, chapter 8 provides accounts of successful experiences.
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Strengths Shortcomings
Trade
Highest share of trade in GDP of all regions in the world.
Lowest barriers to trade in goods.
Growing size and sophistication of production networks connecting emerging and 
advanced Europe.
High degree of trade integration in traditional services.
Fastest convergence in incomes and living standards in the world.
Single Market for Services remains incomplete.
Common Agricultural Policy reduces the benefits of 
trade integration for Europe’s eastern neighbors.
Finance
Capital flows downhill from countries with high incomes and low 
growth rates to countries with low incomes and high growth rates.
Financial foreign direct investment has brought western know-how 
and finance to emerging Europe.
Dependence on western banks to date has mitigated the effect of the 
crisis on emerging Europe.
Boom-time excesses point to the need to ensure crisis-proof financial 
integration and strengthen supranational regulation.
Cheap finance made Southern and Eastern Europe complacent about 
external imbalances.
Enterprise
Business bears more responsibility for social and 
environmental consequences of its activities than in any 
other part of the world.
European enterprises have—by and large—generated 
employment, productivity, and exports.
Variations in business regulation across Europe do not 
confirm a “race to the bottom.”
Countries with more onerous business regulations have lagged in productivity 
growth and exports.
Growing gap in economic competitiveness between the southern states and the rest 
is a source of instability in the eurozone.
European production has become greener but not its consumption.
Innovation
Some European countries figure among the 
top global innovators and exporters.
Established tradition of strong public support 
to universities and R&D institutes.
Europe has a proud tradition of innovation 
in engineering, pharmaceuticals, and clean 
energy that could be harnessed for future 
innovation.
Europe’s private R&D spending is much less than in U.S. and Asia’s developed economies.
Linkages between research institutes and business are weak because of overdependence on 
public funding.
Europe is not specialized in fast-growing high-technology sectors such as ICT and biotech.
Europe has fewer leading innovating companies and few top universities globally.
Bank-dominated finance is ill suited for innovation.
Labor
Greater post-tax earnings equality.
Strong income protection and 
unemployment insurance systems.
Good aggregate job creation 
performance over past decade.
Labor participation rates below those in U.S. and East Asian advanced economies. 
Rapid aging will result in workforce falling by a sixth over the next 50 years.
Generous eligibility raises concerns over the sustainability of social security.
Large informal sectors in some European countries and high youth unemployment point to problems of 
labor market exclusion.
Low labor mobility despite formally free movement of labor within Europe.
Unfriendly immigration policies may keep global talent away.
Government
Most representative 
and decentralized of all 
regions.
Broad coverage of 
public services and 
social security.
Low post-tax income 
inequality.
Government size is 10 percent of GDP greater than in other parts of the world, and public spending to GDP has risen 
by about 5 percentage points during the crisis.
Pension burdens are high for a relatively young (but quickly aging) region.
Generosity of social welfare programs weakens incentives to work.
High marginal tax rates promote evasion and make Europe less attractive for enterprises and skilled workers.
Variation in quality of public services unrelated to government spending.
Unsustainable public debt in some countries, fiscal imbalances in many.
Table 1.1: Strengths and shortcomings of Europe’s growth model
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The principal components of Europe’s growth 
model—trade, ﬁ nance, enterprise, innovation, labor, 
and government—are organized in unique ways.
Sluggish productivity growth, a declining workforce, 
and growing ﬁ scal imbalances have revealed 
weaknesses of the European economic model, and 
the entry of a billion Asian workers into the global 
market is adding to the stress.
Many changes are needed in how governments and 
labor markets are organized. Fewer changes are 
needed to foster innovation, productivity growth, 
and job creation by enterprises, and fewer still to 
improve ﬁ nance and trade in Europe.
Answers to questions on page 35
To sustain its success in the twenty-ﬁ rst century, Europe will need to draw 
on the strength of its integrating institutions, especially the Single Market 
for Services. It will need to stimulate greater competition to push laggard 
enterprises to catch up with Europe’s best, and to free Europe’s high achievers 
to innovate and grow. It will need to reorganize work and government to deal 
with the imperatives of regional integration and global competition, while 
maintaining domestic cohesion. This will require greater ﬂ exibility and mobility 
of labor, efﬁ cient management of capital mobility, and a new balance between 
economic freedom and social security. 
All this is hard work. But the policymakers who address these imperatives will 
create a growing Europe. It will be a Europe that keeps its way of life and its 
place in the world, that radiates hope and again becomes an inspiration for 
others. It will be a Europe that has restored its lustre.
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Chapter 1: Annexes
Annex 1.1: List of countries and regions
EU15 EU candidate states Latin America (LAC)
Austria AUT Albania ALB Argentina ARG
Belgium BEL Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH Brazil BRA
Denmark DNK Croatia HRV Chile CHL
Finland FIN Kosovo KSV Colombia COL
France FRA Macedonia, FYR MKD Mexico MEX
Germany DEU Montenegro MNE Peru PER
Greece GRC Serbia SRB Uruguay URY
Ireland IRL Turkey TUR Venezuela, RB VEN
Italy ITA
Luxembourg LUX Eastern partnership states North America and Oceania
Netherlands NLD Armenia ARM Australia AUS
Portugal PRT Azerbaijan AZE Canada CAN
Spain ESP Belarus BLR New Zealand NZL
Sweden SWE Georgia GEO United States USA
United Kingdom GBR Moldova MDA
Ukraine UKR Africa
EU15 southern states Algeria DZA
Greece GRC European Free Trade Association Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY
Italy ITA Iceland ISL Morocco MAR
Portugal PRT Liechtenstein LIE South Africa ZAF
Spain ESP Norway NOR Tunisia TUN
Switzerland CHE
EU12 Other
Bulgaria BGR East Asia India IND
Cyprus CYP China CHN Russian Federation RUS
Czech Republic CZE Indonesia IDN
Estonia EST Japan JPN
Hungary HUN Korea, Rep. KOR
Latvia LVA Malaysia MYS
Lithuania LTU Philippines PHL
Malta MLT Singapore SGP
Poland POL Taiwan, China TWN
Romania ROM Thailand THA
Slovak Republic SVK Vietnam VNM
Slovenia SVN
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1  In 2004, around 50 percent of EU15 citizens 
supported the accession of additional 
members to the European Union. In 2008, 
47 percent of citizens in the EU27 supported 
the accession of additional members, but 
support in all new member states except 
Latvia was above 60 percent, whereas the 
four biggest EU15 countries all had support 
levels of about 40 percent or less.
2  According to Eurobarometer, it has fallen 
from 66 percent in 2004 to just 52 percent in 
2008.
3  Speciﬁ cally, this report distinguishes 
between the EU15 (often called the “old 
member states”) and the EU12 (the new 
members) and within these groups between 
subgroups of “Northern,” “Continental” 
or “Central,” and “Southern” European 
countries. Among the EU’s neighbors, 
the report distinguishes countries that 
are advanced economies (the European 
Free Trade Association members: Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) and 
those that are emerging markets. The report 
also distinguishes between candidates for 
future membership in the European Union 
(Turkey and the western Balkans) and 
countries that are part of the EU eastern 
partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). 
4  See annex 1.1 for a list of country 
abbreviations.
5  By far the largest capital ﬂ ows, a substantial 
share of which in ofﬁ cial transfers, occurred 
between East and West Germany. But 
this is a special case of integration and 
convergence within one nation with 
little relevance for regional integration 
experiences, perhaps except for the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and 
the Republic of Korea.
6  The lack of convergence globally is not what 
economists would expect. Neoclassical 
models of economic growth predict income 
convergence across countries. In Solow 
(1956), the long-run growth rates of per 
capita income are purely driven by technical 
progress, while the level of per capita 
income is determined by the “steady state” 
savings rate. Allowing for differences in 
savings rates across countries, one obtains 
the less demanding prediction of conditional 
convergence, which holds across a large 
range of countries (for example, see 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992). Europe has 
seen unconditional convergence.
7  Europe uniquely has also experienced 
faster convergence in consumption than 
in income. This to some extent reﬂ ects 
nonsustainable borrowing for consumption 
purposes, predicated on the assumption of 
almost “automatic” income convergence 
in Europe. As the experience in Europe’s 
southern countries demonstrates, such an 
assumption is risky. Europe’s institutions 
make it easier for poorer economies to catch 
up. But persistent high income levels must 
be earned in Europe as elsewhere.
8  Note that in this chart, Azerbaijan is 
excluded from the trend line for Europe 
because as an oil producer it runs 
huge current account surpluses. Poorer 
developing countries are excluded from 
the “rest of the world” trend line because 
ofﬁ cial ﬂ ows play a much greater role and 
the determinants of these ﬂ ows are quite 
different.
9  This puzzle was ﬁ rst formally noted by 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007).
10  EBRD (2009) reached a similar conclusion.
11  Gordon (2004) estimates that around 
one-third of the gap in incomes per capita 
between the EU15 and the United States 
may be due to voluntary reductions in labor 
supply in Europe. However, the remainder 
reﬂ ects regulations that reduce labor supply 
and should be seen as a welfare loss. In 
Europe, this claim is considered debatable.
12 They also mirror low tax morale and low 
conﬁ dence in public institutions (World 
Bank 2011). While labor market regulations 
and payroll tax rates do matter, general 
institutional weaknesses are likely to 
be at least as important in perpetuating 
informality.
13 Most European countries also provide 
more protection against unemployment 
than other OECD countries. Of the 15 OECD 
countries with replacement rates during 
the ﬁ rst year of unemployment above the 
average (66 percent), 14 are EU member 
states. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Greece stand out for low replacement rates.
14 The incidence of low pay is deﬁ ned by the 
OECD as the share of full-time workers 
earning less than two-thirds of median 
earnings. Low pay is thus a relative rather 
than absolute concept and closely related to 
measures of the dispersion of earnings.
15 Other analyses suggest that instead of a 
European model, there are several regional 
models within Europe. Roxburgh and 
Mischke (2011) identify a northern model, 
which includes Ireland, the Nordic nations, 
and the United Kingdom; a continental 
model, including Austria, the Benelux states, 
France, and Germany; and a southern 
model, including Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain. Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) 
distinguish an English-speaking group 
of countries in the evolution of income 
distribution from Continental Europe. 
Eastern Europe is in many respects unique 
given the persistent legacies of central 
planning. This chapter emphasizes the 
common aspects; the next six chapters 
identify cross-country differences in the 
principal components of the growth model. 
16 Although public debt levels are high in most 
European countries, the sustainable level 
of public debt differs signiﬁ cantly between 
countries like Germany that is running 
current account surpluses and countries like 
Greece with a large current account deﬁ cit. 
von Weizsäcker (2011) argues that for 
countries like Germany, the optimal public 
debt level has increased as demographic 
changes have led to a downward shift in 
the natural rate of interest. In a “closed 
economy” setting with public debt 
held domestically, this implies a higher 
sustainable public debt level. Japan falls into 
the same category. 
17  Darvas (2011) examines recoveries following 
banking crises and shows that in countries 
with ﬂ exible exchange rates, postcrisis 
growth was higher, even when credit was 
subdued, than in countries facing the need 
to adjust with ﬁ xed exchange rates. 
18 This argument assumes that the skills 
provided by Spanish and Italian universities 
are the skills required by German 
employers. Increasing labor mobility in 
Europe also requires improved recognition 
of professional qualiﬁ cations and arguably 
greater attention to quality in Europe’s 
education systems.
19 Rahm Emmanuel, the White House chief of 
staff, in an interview with The Wall Street 
Journal, November 19, 2008. 
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Spotlight One
1950 to 1973
Western Europe converges toward 
the living standards of the United 
States
1974 to 1993
Northern and Southern Europe converge 
toward the income levels of Continental 
Europe
1994 to 2010
Eastern Europe converges toward the 
incomes and institutions of Western 
Europe
Growth rate
Annual average growth of GDP per capita, percent
< 0.9 2 – 2.91 – 1.9 3 – 3.9 > 4
Europe—convergence machine
Economic growth has helped Europe rise from 
the devastation and misery of World War II to 
unprecedented wealth, technological sophistication, 
and the world’s best quality of life. Since the war, 
Western Europe’s output has tripled and Eastern 
Europe’s doubled. The European Union, itself an 
unprecedented achievement, is in many ways the 
world’s largest economy. European societies have 
developed market-based systems combining high 
levels of economic activity with equity and 
social inclusion.
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These developments are all the more remarkable when considering the 
poor conditions—social, political, and economic—that prevailed at the end of 
what has been called Europe’s second Thirty Years’ War. From 1913 to 1950, 
the continent’s growth rate was half its long-run trend. Europe entered the 
twentieth century as the richest region in the world, but by mid-century, 
retaining this distinction was anything but assured. Fewer than six decades 
later, however, an American economist would write:
In the second half of the twentieth century, the lives of Europeans were 
transformed beyond recognition. In 1950, many of the continent’s residents 
heated their homes with coal, cooled their food with ice, and lacked even 
rudimentary forms of indoor plumbing. Today, their lives are eased and 
enriched by natural-gas furnaces, electric refrigerators, and an array of 
electronic gadgets that boggles the mind. Gross domestic product per 
capita, what the income of a typical resident of Europe will buy, tripled in 
the second half of the twentieth century. The quality of life improved even 
more than suggested by this simple measure. Hours worked declined by 
one-third, providing an enormous increase in leisure time. Life expectancy 
lengthened as a result of improved nutrition and advances in medical 
science (Eichengreen 2007, p. 1).
By 2008, on the eve of the ﬁ nancial crisis, Europe was the envy of the world. 
The United States had the might and China the momentum, but Europe had the 
highest living standards. Even with average incomes about a quarter short of 
the United States’s, Europe had become the “lifestyle superpower” that in 1992 
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa had promised to make Japan. Millions of people 
from around the world ﬂ ocked to Europe to see this economic miracle and taste 
European life (ﬁ gure S1.1).
This six-decade run of prosperity breaks neatly into three periods—each about 
two decades long—of changing economic growth patterns:
 · From 1950 until 1973, Europe exhibited historically high rates of economic 
growth, nearly full employment, and convergence to the United States. This 
period of accelerated growth—a “Golden Age” in Western Europe and a “Silver 
Age” in centrally planned Eastern Europe—ended for most of the continent in 
the early 1970s (Crafts and Toniolo 1996).
 · From 1974 until 1993, Northern and Southern Europe continued to converge 
to the levels of living in Europe’s core. Yet despite continued growth, Europe’s 
largest economies stopped catching up to the United States, the world’s 
technology leader. Meanwhile in the east, growth ﬁ rst slowed and then 
collapsed along with the Berlin Wall and central planning during the 
early 1990s.
 · With the signing of the ﬁ rst EU Association Agreements by countries in 
Eastern Europe in 1994, growth accelerated quickly in the east until the 
economic crisis in 2008. Convergence proceeded across the continent. This 
period saw more than a decade of convergence in living standards in the 12 
new EU member states and the 8 Balkan economies aspiring to join them. In 
the south, convergence was reignited during this period, though at a slower 
pace than in the east.
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These patterns evolved alongside, and were inﬂ uenced by, growing economic 
cooperation across Europe. Beginning with the 1949 Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance in the east and the 1950 European Payments Union in 
the west, the continent pursued near-constant—if not always linear—economic 
integration. Political integration eventually followed, resulting in a European 
Union that merged east and west. The impetus for these regional agreements 
was geopolitical, but the outcome was regimes that facilitated economic 
integration and growth, particularly in Western Europe.
Figure S1.1: Europe—the 
lifestyle superpower
(top 20 international destinations 
for tourists, 2007)
Source: World Bank staff, using data from the UN 
World Tourism Organization.
1950 to 1973: golden, with a silver fringe
Europe’s growth from the ﬁ rst few years of postwar reconstruction until the oil 
crisis of 1973 was its fastest ever recorded. Growth in real GDP per person was 
over 3.5 percent in Western and Eastern Europe and 4.5 percent in Southern 
Europe during this period (table S1.1). The average growth rate for all of Europe 
had not exceeded 1.5 percent in the previous 130 years. The expansion was even 
more remarkable because it came after four decades of subtrend growth below 1 
percent caused by destruction and depression.
For the ﬁ rst time in the twentieth century, Europe outperformed the United 
States (which grew at 2.3 percent) and every other major economy except Japan. 
Growth in every European country save the United Kingdom exceeded U.S. 
growth. Labor productivity growth was 2 percentage points higher a year in the 
west and 8 points higher in the south. The top performers in Western Europe 
(Austria, Germany, and Italy), Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), and 
Eastern Europe (Bulgaria and Romania) had growth rates that exceeded U.S. rates 
by 2 percentage points or more. The gap in GDP per capita between Western 
Europe and the United States closed from 48 percent in 1950 to 28 percent in 
1973. A similar pattern of convergence occurred in Southern Europe, with the 
gap closing from 79 percent to 65 percent over the same period. Slightly slower 
growth in Eastern Europe resulted in a slower pace of convergence with the 
United States, with the gap falling from 78 percent to 70 percent.
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At the beginning of World War II in 1939, per capita GDP was about $5,000 in 
Western Europe and $2,000 in Eastern and Southern Europe. By contrast, per 
capita GDP in the United States was more than $6,500. By the end of the war 
in 1945, per capita GDP had fallen to $4,000 in Western Europe and to under 
$2,000 in Eastern and Southern Europe. But by the ﬁ rst oil price shock in 1973, 
per capita income was more than $12,000 in Western Europe, just under $6,000 
in Southern Europe, and around $5,000 in Eastern Europe. Per capita income in 
the United States also grew, from $11,700 after the war to around $16,500 
in 1973.
Europe’s productivity surge was multifaceted. From an accounting perspective, 
much of the surge in the 1950s reﬂ ected higher labor productivity, originating 
in capital deepening and heightened total factor productivity. Factors of 
production destroyed or misallocated as a result of the war were allocated more 
efﬁ ciently, incorporating new technologies and improved scale economies.1 
Eichengreen and Vazquez (2000) describe a period of “extensive growth,” 
driven by additions to the stock of labor and capital and helped by stable 
returns to capital and labor. By imitating U.S. production practices and importing 
American technology, European countries experienced further 
productivity growth.
Growth accounting reveals that in the 1960s labor productivity in most countries 
grew from both applying more capital (“capital deepening”) and improving 
total factor productivity (largely “technical progress”; ﬁ gure S1.2, panel A).2 
These patterns held across Western Europe and were even stronger in Southern 
Europe. By contrast, higher total factor productivity and (to a lesser degree) 
Table S1.1: Relentless growth in the United States, a miracle 
in Europe, and resurgence in Asia, 1820–2008
(average annual compound growth rates, GDP per capita, US$ 1990 
Geary-Khamis PPP estimates)
Note: Regional aggregates are population-weighted. Western Europe refers to Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom. Eastern Europe refers to Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia. Southern Europe refers to Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Turkey. After 1989, 
West Germany becomes Germany, and the data reﬂ ect the newly independent countries in Eastern 
Europe that emerge from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
Source: Maddison 1996; Conference Board 2011.
Period Western Europe
Southern 
Europe
Eastern 
Europe
Former Soviet 
Union United States Japan East Asia
Latin 
America
1820–1870 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.3 0.2 –0.1 0.0
1870–1913 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.4 0.8 1.8
1913–1950 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.7 1.6 0.9 –0.2 1.4
1950–1973 3.8 4.5 3.6 3.2 2.3 7.7 2.3 2.5
1973–1994 1.7 1.9 –0.2 –1.6 1.7 2.5 0.3 0.9
1994–2008 1.6 2.7 4.0 4.2 1.7 1.0 3.9 1.6
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more work drove the United States’s comparatively slower growth. Europe, 
unlike the United States, had countries to rebuild after the war and reallocated 
labor accordingly. This was a time of “classical catch-up.” Countries improved 
productivity by bringing un exploited technology into use rather than through 
innovation. Europe realized productivity gains by rebuilding destroyed capital 
and importing technology from the United States (Abramovitz 1986). After 20 
years of war and economic depression, there was ﬁ nally room for large 
productivity gains.
European countries also integrated into a relatively stable global economy. 
After World War II, policymakers tried to understand the sources of the global 
economic disorder of the 1930s and apply its lessons.3 A relatively liberal regime 
of international trade underpinned by ﬁ xed but adjustable exchange rates 
was one result. The Marshall Plan, which acted as a “structural adjustment” 
program and anchored postwar trade liberalization, may have initiated Europe’s 
commitment to trade. The Marshall Plan may have even helped create the 
early formal mechanisms of European integration (De Long and Eichengreen 
1993). Beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the 
European Economic Community in 1958, formal agreements led to signiﬁ cantly 
expanding intra-European trade.
Europe’s trade openness may have both triggered more efﬁ cient allocation 
of investment and accelerated technology transfer from the United States. 
International integration’s importance is evident from growth patterns in 
Portugal and Spain, which were less closely integrated with other Western 
European countries until the mid-1950s and early 1960s. Spain saw no major 
acceleration until it entered technological aid arrangements with the United 
States in the early 1950s, and Portugal’s growth rate doubled after it joined the 
Bretton Woods system in 1960.
In many countries, an “ever closer union” went hand in hand with a domestic 
political economy of growth that permitted high investment in those catch-up 
years (Eichengreen 1994). The social market economy led to moderated wage 
demands in exchange for commitments from ﬁ rms to reinvest proﬁ ts. The high 
postwar investment rates are derived from a complex network that bound 
labor’s participation in ﬁ rms’ production and investment decisions with relatively 
generous unemployment beneﬁ ts and limited industrial policy supports. Growth 
rates were lower in countries that did not strike these labor-ﬁ rm bargains—such 
as the United Kingdom.
Despite a different economic philosophy, international integration proceeded 
apace in Eastern Europe. From a growth accounting perspective, the former 
Soviet Union’s pattern was similar to that of other parts of Europe, with 
productivity growth driving much of the postwar boom. The high rate of capital 
accumulation in the former Soviet Union’s postwar program did result in a large 
capital-deepening effect, though (Crafts and Toniolo 1996). Eastern Europe grew 
by different means: communism fueled an “extensive growth” driven by more 
labor and capital instead of improved technology or efﬁ ciency. But multifactor 
productivity—crudely estimated since the data are deceptive—was lower in 
the communist countries than in any economy in Western Europe, even when 
compared with countries with similar per capita income levels, such as Ireland or 
Italy (Crafts and Toniolo 2008).
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1974 to 1993: convergence in the north and 
south, collapse in the east
Rapid postwar growth ground to a halt in the early 1970s. The slowdown was 
widespread and affected market and socialist economies alike. Growth rates 
across developed and developing economies were at least 2 percentage points 
lower from 1973 to 1990 than from 1950 to 1973 (table S1.1). The collapse of 
the Bretton Woods international monetary system and the ﬁ rst oil price shocks 
A. Big postwar increases in productivity, especially in the 
south, percent, 1960–70
B. Productivity growth weakens across Europe, but outstrips 
the United States, percent, 1970–90
C. Productivity growth drops below the United States, 
except in Northern Europe, percent, 1990–2003
* Data on human capital deepening are not available.
Source: Crafts and Toniolo 1996 and 2008.
Figure S1.3: Europeans work fewer hours 
while Americans work more
(annual hours per worker, 1950–2009)
Source: Conference Board 2011.
Figure S1.2: Decomposing the growth in worker productivity
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were associated with the interruption of the rapid trajectory of total factor 
productivity growth across Europe. Growth in the west fell from almost 5 
percent in 1973 to 1.5 percent in 1974, and has yet to surpass 3.5 percent. The 
driver of the postwar boom—improved factor productivity—weakened across 
the region, along with capital accumulation and improvements in workers’ 
skills (ﬁ gure S1.2, panel B). Every country experienced declines in total factor 
productivity growth.
Even so, from a longer historical perspective, growth in Western Europe was 
reasonably impressive, averaging 1.7 percent over a 20-year stretch. But 
convergence to U.S. income levels stopped. In 1982, Western Europe’s per capita 
income was about 77 percent of the United States’s. By 1990, it was 72 percent 
and by 1999, 69 percent. Although the United States also saw an interruption 
in growth that slowed productivity increases, it continued to accumulate capital 
and improve skills. Once again, Western Europe was falling behind the United 
States. The prospective cohesion countries were a bright spot. Since 1945, 
Southern Europe—the poorest part of noncommunist Europe—has consistently 
grown faster than the rest of Western Europe. The prospect of membership in 
the European Community generated incentives for structural reform. Southern 
Europe grew at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent, compared with less 
than 2 percent in Western Europe. Yet, even in the cohesion countries, growth 
dropped off steeply.
Figure S1.4: Convergence until the 
1980s, divergence since
(coefﬁ cient of variation of GDP per capita in Europe, 
1950–2010, US$ 1990, Geary Khamis PPP estimates)
Note: The aggregates illustrate the EC or EU membership for the identiﬁ ed 
period regardless of whether that unit has been created or not. For example, 
the EU27 reﬂ ects data for Eastern European countries for 1950, though these 
countries did not join the European Union until 2004 or 2007. The aggregates 
reﬂ ect West Germany until 1988 when a uniﬁ ed Germany is added in its 
place.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Conference Board (2011).
Figure S1.5: Big increases in productivity during the 
transition, especially in the former Soviet Union
(decomposition of labor productivity growth, 
percent a year, 1990–2006) 
Source: Iradian 2007.
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The decline in Eastern European performance over this period was even 
steeper. Growth averaged just 0.8 percent in Eastern Europe and 0.9 percent 
in the former Soviet Union from 1974 until the end of central planning in 1990. 
During this period, the Soviet economy experienced an enormous decline in 
labor productivity, and total factor productivity growth may have even been 
negative over this period. Central planners ploughed back the earnings of large 
enterprises: investment-to-GDP ratio doubled from 1950 to 1970 while the capital 
stock grew 8.5 times. But the inefﬁ ciencies of heavy industrialization and forced 
capital accumulation became apparent by the 1970s (Crafts and Toniolo 2008). 
The collapse of central planning resulted in a free fall in output, and annual 
average compound growth from 1990 to 1993 was –3.5 percent in Eastern Europe 
and –6.5 percent in the former Soviet Union.
Perhaps the simplest explanation for this decline across Europe is that the 
inputs for catch-up growth had been exhausted. As the technology gap 
between the United States and countries such as France and Germany 
narrowed, the low-hanging fruit of imported productivity gains was plucked. 
Southern and Northern European countries that were slower to integrate into 
the European economic system beneﬁ ted from productivity growth somewhat 
longer; they still had room to catch up to advanced Europe and the United 
States. It is also possible that the domestic and international institutions that 
so successfully supported rapid growth in Western and Southern Europe locked 
in a growth model that became progressively less suited to a changed global 
economy. The institutions that had underpinned extensive growth based on 
capital accumulation and imported American know-how were less suited to the 
intensive growth requirements of the period after the early 1970s (Eichengreen 
and Vazquez 2000).
Figure S1.6: Productivity got a 
big boost from ICT in the United 
States, not so much in Europe
(contributions to labor productivity 
growth, 1980–2005, percent per year)
Source: van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 2008.
A. Labor productivity went up in the United 
States in the mid-1990s—and stayed high
B. Labor productivity fell in the EU15, 
and ICT’s boost was small
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Among these outdated institutions were the mechanisms that facilitated a wage 
restraint and reinvestment consensus. As the potential for catch-up growth 
was exhausted, the demands for higher wages increased amid heightened 
union activity. And investment slumped. Whether this regime could sustain 
the existing rate of productivity, much less develop into a dynamic innovation 
engine, was questioned. The United Kingdom’s relatively good performance 
during the 1970s and 1980s is sometimes attributed to the fact that it had not 
developed the same corporatist arrangements. The social market economy had 
started to show its weaknesses. It was good for countries catching up, but not 
for countries in the lead. It could take advantage of benign global conditions, 
but it would not adjust well to big changes in the world economy.
A range of labor market practices that may have dampened growth 
accompanied the postwar settlement. Two seemingly contradictory 
developments are particularly noteworthy. The gap in per capita incomes 
between the United States and Europe increased, but Europe continued to 
close the gap in labor productivity. The combination of a persistent gap in GDP 
per capita and increasing output per hour worked reﬂ ected a decline in work: 
lower labor force participation rates and a drop in working hours. Over time, 
Europeans have worked fewer and fewer hours than Americans (ﬁ gure S1.3). In 
the 1950s, Western Europeans worked the equivalent of almost a month more 
than Americans. By the 1970s, they worked about the same amount. Today, 
Americans work an extra month compared with the Dutch, French, Germans, 
and Swedes, and work noticeably longer than less well-off Greeks, Hungarians, 
Poles, and Spaniards.
Put differently, the ratio of hours worked per capita fell from 127 percent in 
the west and 131 percent in the south in 1950–73 to 91 percent and 97 percent 
by 1990–2009. The lower opportunity costs of unemployment in a social 
market economy, longer holidays, and lower female labor market participation 
may explain this. Or it may simply be that Europeans value leisure more than 
Americans—chapter 6 further investigates this (Blanchard 2004). But the effects 
of Europe’s declining work hours are clear: capital intensity increased as the 
slowing growth of labor led to a rise in real wages and a general substitution 
of capital for labor (van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 2008). By the mid-1990s, 
many Western European countries had capital stocks per hour worked that were 
10 percent higher than in the United States. When taken with the lower levels 
of multifactor productivity in Europe during this period, Europe’s seemingly 
superior labor productivity performance is worrying. Its cause may lie not in 
innovative enterprises but in labor market rigidities resulting from the postwar 
consensus (van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 2008).
1994 to 2009: convergence in the east
The general decline in performance from the 1970s gave way to considerable 
diversity by the 1990s. Output in Europe began to vary from the early 1980s 
and continued to do so through the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly in the 
west and south (ﬁ gure S1.4). Between 1990 and 2009, Greece, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands experienced growth at or above 1989–2010 levels. By contrast, 
Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland experienced growth under 1.5 percent.
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For most of Western Europe, catch-up with the United States continued to slow 
between 1990 and 2009. The average gap in per capita output was almost 
unchanged from 1973 to 2008 and closed at a diminishing rate in Southern 
Europe. In most European countries, labor productivity was below the United 
States’s. Similarly, total factor productivity rates were lower in about three-
quarters of European countries as European productivity continued to fall while 
the United States recovered. But again, the picture is varied. Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had relatively rapid 
productivity growth during this period (ﬁ gure S1.2, panel C).
In the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, catch-up growth was 
based mainly on reallocating factors. After the massive collapse in output 
immediately after the end of central planning, Eastern Europe recorded faster 
GDP per capita growth than the rest of Europe and the United States. With the 
signing of the ﬁ rst EU Association Agreements in 1994 by Hungary and Poland, 
Eastern Europe began to integrate with the rest of Europe. This integration of 
markets and institutions propelled the convergence of east with west as Eastern 
Europe grew more than 4 percent from 1994 to 2008. Productivity growth 
reﬂ ected patterns from the Western and Southern European high-growth era 
and was driven by large total factor productivity gains, particularly in the Baltic 
Figure S1.7: Policy affects the pace and 
composition of productivity growth
(sectoral contributions to labor productivity growth and 
regulatory burden, 1995–2004, percent per year)
Note: The “Reallocation” identity reﬂ ects the effects of reallocations of 
labor among sectors. The underlying Employment Protection Index was 
transformed so that it ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values reﬂ ect 
higher levels of protection. The Product Market Regulation Index ranges 
from 0 to 10, where lower values reﬂ ect higher levels of regulation.
Source: Timmer, O’Mahony, and van Ark 2007 (for productivity data); Crafts 
2006 (for Employment Protection Index); and Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti 
2005 (for Product Market Regulation Index).
Figure S1.8: Information technology played 
a bigger role in Eastern Europe
(contribution of ICT to labor productivity growth, 
1995–2004, percent per year)
Source: Alam and others 2008; Timmer, O’Mahony, and van Ark 
2007.
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economies (ﬁ gure S1.5). The overindustrialization of the centrally planned 
economies had led to massive misallocations of labor, particularly in industry. 
The posttransition shift in workers from manufacturing to market services, 
small in the Soviet era, was major. From 1990 to 2005, the share of services in 
employment grew 16 percentage points in Eastern Europe and 9 percentage 
points in the former Soviet Union (Alam and others 2008). Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union also beneﬁ ted from some of the same gains from 
integration as Western Europe. Expanded trade and ﬁ nancial links between 
east and west anchored reforms at home, provided access to service and 
merchandise trade markets, and loosened the link between domestic savings 
and investment through capital ﬂ ows.
The United States’s ability to again outpace Europe in productivity growth 
reﬂ ected Europe’s inability to adapt to structural changes in the global economy. 
Productivity growth in services and industry required information technology. In 
the mid-1990s, innovations in information and communication technology (ICT) 
produced a highly productive and capital-deepening sector with large positive 
externalities for improving productivity across the economy. Labor productivity 
growth shot up in the United States from 1980–95 to 1995–2000. Productivity 
enhancements in the ICT sectors and large gains in capital deepening were 
not the only beneﬁ t—multifactor productivity in other sectors also grew. These 
spillover effects continued to drive total factor productivity growth in the United 
States during the early 2000s when the initial burst of ICT-speciﬁ c contributions 
to labor productivity began to diminish. By contrast, Western Europe’s labor 
productivity fell steadily during this period, with considerably smaller share 
contributions from ICT. By the early 2000s, Western Europe faced almost no 
measured productivity growth (ﬁ gure S1.6).
What explains the reemergence of the productivity gap between the United 
States and Europe? And why did new information technologies’ power 
grow in North America but not in Europe? The components of the postwar 
Figure S1.9: Growth has been greater 
in Europe’s southern states
(growth in real GDP per capita, 
1945–2008, 1945=100)
Note: Western European aggregate reﬂ ects a 
population-weighted average.
Source: Maddison 1996; Conference Board 2011.
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European model that led to higher employment protection probably prevented 
the development and exploitation of new technology. Higher employment 
protection correlates with lower overall productivity growth and ICT deepening 
(ﬁ gure S1.7).4 Employment protections may deter investment in ICT equipment 
because practices central to developing this technology—such as ﬂ exible 
working and hiring practices—are more expensive (Gust and Marquez 2004).
The higher- performing Western European economies that regulated their 
labor markets more lightly (Finland and the United Kingdom) generated large 
ICT-related productivity gains. In Finland, these effects were even larger than 
those in the United States. Likewise, heavy-handed general product regulation 
may deter ICT capital investment, either directly or through a more general 
increase in costs.5 Some of the Eastern European countries without the legacy 
of the Western European model were able to start from scratch and better 
exploit ICT (ﬁ gure S1.8). Prospective EU member states should take note.
Afterglow
The nexus of political institutions and market practices that developed in 
Europe after World War II lifted the continent to the heights of global prosperity. 
European integration not only headed off conﬂ ict, but also anchored trade and 
factor liberalization that bound Europe and brought the world together. Modern 
Europe’s most attractive feature may be the prospects it offers poorer countries. 
The European economic model has served as a “convergence machine,” taking 
in low- and middle-income countries and helping them become high-income 
countries. The machine can even count the currently troubled EU15 southern 
states among its successes (ﬁ gure S1.9).
The European convergence machine continues to anchor productivity-enhancing 
reforms and policy integration across Europe and even into Central Asia. But 
this machine cannot continue to deliver rapid growth and improved quality 
of life in the advanced economies of Western Europe. European policymakers 
have assembled protocols and commitments to encourage more innovation and 
dynamism. Yet, the policies at the center of Europe’s postwar growth model are 
not ﬂ exible enough for European economies to beneﬁ t from the technologies 
that supported high productivity growth in the rest of the world over the last 
15 years. As Crafts and Toniolo (2008) note, the problem is not that European 
product market regulation and employment protections became more stringent, 
they just became more costly. The Western European model so effective in 
supporting catch-up has created “afterglow” institutions that are hindering 
growth in a new era.6
In areas aspiring to become part of the machine—notably the Balkan states 
and the eastern partnership countries—Europe’s afterglow structures will 
probably not preclude the many beneﬁ ts of greater economic union. And as ties 
to advanced Europe become stronger and more sophisticated, the afterglow 
structures may not prevent productivity gains in the new member states. By 
contrast, these legacy structures must quickly become more ﬂ exible in Western 
Europe. Convergence to a rigid core will soon lose its appeal.
Bryce Quillin contributed this spotlight.
Notes
1 There are numerous studies 
that employ growth accounting 
approaches to understanding 
the components of economic 
growth in post war Europe. Some 
landmark studies include Denison 
(1967) and Maddison (1987).
2 In this picture, human capital 
formation plays only a small role 
and it is not clear whether this 
reﬂ ects the tendency of growth 
accounting to underestimate 
human capital or whether the 
already high-quality human 
capital that persisted in Europe at 
the start of this period left little 
room for further contribution 
to productivity. See Crafts and 
Toniolo (1996). 
3 Eichengreen (1994) makes 
the case for the domestic 
and international institutional 
underpinning of postwar growth. 
4 In a model ﬁ t with ordinary least 
squares: OVERALL PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH = 3.1 – 2.6 EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION INDEX (t = –2.0), 
where higher values on the 
employment protection index 
reﬂ ect higher levels of protection. 
5 In a model ﬁ t with ordinary least 
squares: OVERALL PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH = 4.7 – 1.2 PRODUCT 
MARKET REGULATION INDEX 
(t = –2.4), where higher values on 
the regulation index reﬂ ect more 
stringent regulation.  
6 The term “afterglow” is here 
adapted from some political 
science literature to refer to 
institutions and obligations that 
governments continue to support 
even after such policies may no 
longer appear rational. For other 
applications of the term and 
concept see Lake (1993).
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Trade and Finance
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the recent experience of the European Union’s 12 
new member states, the 8 candidate countries, and the 6 economies of the 
eastern partnership. Focusing on the 26 economies of Central, Southeastern, 
and Eastern Europe while assessing the trade and ﬁ nance components of the 
European growth model is a deliberate choice: trade and ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows are 
the main conduits for convergence. Advanced and developing countries are 
now connected through trade and capital ﬂ ows everywhere in the world, 
but nowhere as closely as in Europe. Their experiences illustrate the model’s 
strongest aspects: just as people who become Americans can attain the 
highest incomes in the world, countries that become European quickly reach 
the highest standards of living.
Trade is the principal channel through which prosperity is transmitted from the 
developed economies of Europe to the nearby emerging markets. Chapter 2 
looks in turn at the trade in industrial goods, services, and agricultural goods 
and assesses how Europe has done. It identiﬁ es the policy reforms that can 
facilitate wider and deeper integration. As a region that generated almost half 
of global trade in 2008, Europe should be seen as the world’s trade hub, and 
admired for its openness. But Europeans are dissatisﬁ ed with the slow growth 
of trade in modern services such as Internet sales, and perhaps justiﬁ ably so.
Actually, in one modern service—cross-border banking—Europe does rather 
well. Financial ﬂ ows are often faulted for being too large, not too small. They 
are also seen as adding too much to economic vulnerabilities and not enough 
to economic growth. But chapter 3 shows that during the decade leading up 
to the global ﬁ nancial crisis, capital ﬂ ows from Western Europe to the east 
helped more countries than they hurt. Analysts who expected during the crisis 
that foreign banks would head for the exits found that they were wrong—in 
Europe, capital does not behave as it has in the emerging markets of Latin 
America and East Asia. Western banks have neither ﬂ ed, nor left the ﬁ rms and 
households in emerging Europe mired in debt. But the variety of experiences—
captured in written contributions by central bankers from Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, and Turkey—has left behind valuable lessons for how private 
ﬁ nance might be “bust-proofed” and public ﬁ nance “boom-proofed.” Chapter 
3 concludes that if these capital ﬂ ows are managed well, Europe’s emerging 
economies do not have to “become Asian,” in terms of having to stockpile 
foreign reserves as the price of proﬁ tably participating in global 
ﬁ nancial markets.
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Trade
Škoda Auto used to be the butt of jokes in the 1980s: Why do Škodas have rear-
window heating? So your hands do not freeze while pushing them. In 1989, the 
company sold about 150,000 cars in the former Czechoslovakia, despite having 
a monopoly. In 1991, Volkswagen AG bought a 30 percent stake in Škoda Auto, 
and by 2000 it had taken over the company. The subsidiary initially made the 
simpler parts that VW required for its cheaper cars. Škoda now makes more 
complicated transmissions and even engines for its parent. But it still makes its 
own cars—more than 750,000 of them in 2010—in plants at home in the Czech 
Republic and in the Slovak Republic, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and India. 
Škoda tops consumer satisfaction surveys in the United Kingdom and India, 
beating Ford, Honda, and Toyota and inspiring loyalty instead of derision. And 
the company made almost $2 billion in proﬁ ts for Volkswagen last year.
Škoda’s success is symbolic of the progress in the manufacturing trade in 
Central and Southeastern Europe. German, Swedish, Swiss, French, and 
other manufacturers have been offshoring production, increasing the 
productivity of subsidiaries in emerging Europe and the proﬁ tability of 
their parents. Romania’s Dacia is doing the same for Renault. Italy’s Fiat 
has found it proﬁ table to look east too: it now owns two-thirds of Serbia’s 
Zastava Automobiles—known for producing the joked-about Yugo—and 
produces bestselling minivans in collaboration with TOFAS in Turkey. Asea 
Brown Boveri, the Swiss-Swedish engineering giant, produces electrical 
equipment in many plants in emerging Europe stretching from the Czech 
Republic to Russia, from Latvia to Croatia. Back-and-forth trade in parts 
and components is part of an increasingly sophisticated “Factory Europe” 
that extends beyond the enlarged European Union to include Turkey, the 
former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. 
Chapter 2
Is “Factory Europe” as dynamic as “Factory Asia”?
Is the Single Market for Services underachieving 
compared with the United States?
Is the Common Agricultural Policy compromising 
Europe’s global leadership?
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But manufactured goods are no more than a quarter of Europe’s $16 trillion 
economic output. More than 70 percent of GDP—or almost $11.5 trillion—consists 
of services: wholesale and retail trade, tourism, construction, transport, 
communications, modern business services, and ﬁ nance. Europe’s annual 
trade in services—counting both cross-border services trade and foreign 
sales of afﬁ liates of multinational companies—is about $4 trillion. European 
policymakers view the vibrant U.S. market for services—coincidentally also 
valued at about $11.5 trillion—as the benchmark, and perceive the single market 
as falling short. 
Many of these services are inputs to the production of other goods and 
services. Some reduce the distance and time between producers and 
consumers and between suppliers and buyers; think of transportation, ﬁ nance, 
and communication. Others are direct inputs required for production and 
marketing—such as accounting, legal, and engineering services. Their quality 
affects productivity economywide. So trade and liberalization of services 
increase overall productivity. By allowing foreigners into communications, 
transportation, and banking, for example, the Czech Republic made these 
services more reliable, and improved the performance of “downstream” 
manufacturing sectors. European policymakers expect their economies to 
gain a lot through integration in services.
Some of these services are traditional and difﬁ cult to trade without face-to-
face contact; think of hotels, restaurants, and supermarkets. Europe actually 
does a brisk trade in these services. France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany are among the top destinations for tourists, for example, and 
Sweden’s Ikea and the French Carrefour are global brands. Air transport has 
improved, and so have passenger trains, but international road and rail freight is 
inefﬁ cient. What vexes Europeans most, though, are what Baumol (1986) called 
“modern, progressive, and impersonal” services—those that can be traded over 
longer distances—in which the Americans and Asians are doing so well. Asia 
and North America are seeing a burgeoning trade in “digital services” such as 
Internet sales and IT support, and Europe is lagging. 
But in one part of the modern services trade—cross-border banking services—
Europe may be doing better than any other part of the world. Banking is quickly 
becoming integrated into a single market in the European Union and even in the 
candidate countries. European banks have branches or subsidiaries overseas, 
and many are doing such a busy retail and wholesale trade in emerging Europe 
that some observers are worried about capital ﬂ ows being excessive. This 
report is optimistic about banking in Europe, and chapter 3 elaborates. In other 
modern services—especially those that involve new information technologies 
such as the Internet—Europe is underachieving. A recent HM Government (2011) 
document notes: 
“Only 12 per cent of EU online trade is cross-border. Consumers in one part 
of the EU are often prevented from buying digital content from another. EU 
citizens can only access iTunes in 15 Member States and Spotify in seven. 
The beneﬁ ts [EU citizens] have shared by freeing up the airline industry have 
yet to be realised on the railways or in other forms of transport. These are 
just a few examples—there are many more” (p. 4). 
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Another example is the rapidly growing e-book trade. Almost a third of all book 
sales—by value, not volume—are now electronic, and are increasingly read on 
media tablets such as Apple’s iPad and Amazon’s Kindle. Sales of media tablets 
are projected to exceed $50 million in 2011. In the United States, e-books are 
now outselling hardcover publications. But e-book sales are anemic in Europe, 
because regulations make it difﬁ cult to sell books Europe-wide. The story 
is often similar in other services. In transportation and communications, in 
engineering and accounting, in architectural and legal services, and in health 
and education, Europe’s services trade is segmented. To compare multicultural 
and multilingual Europe with the U.S. single market is unreasonable, but 
regulatory heterogeneity in Europe is excessive. ITunes users would think it is 
unreasonable. 
The third aspect of Europe’s trade that is often viewed by economists as less 
than satisfactory is that of agricultural goods. The sizable subsidies and other 
aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy have been criticized as helping 
neither equity nor efﬁ ciency in European and international agricultural markets. 
This chapter asks and answers the question: Is Europe taking advantage of 
economic enlargement? The short answer is that it is for manufacturing, 
somewhat less for services, and least for agriculture. Europe’s biggest success 
is the increasingly more sophisticated trade in goods spurred by a relocation of 
economic activity toward the new member states and EU candidate countries. 
In assessing trade as a principal component of Europe’s growth model, this 
chapter tries to answer three questions:
 · Is Factory Asia outcompeting Factory Europe? While Factory Asia is 
growing more quickly in size, the goods trade in Europe is becoming more 
sophisticated than in East Asia. Western Europe is not just giving the new 
member states of the European Union and other neighbors such as Serbia and 
Turkey a bigger share of its tasks, it is also giving them tougher things to do. 
The eastward expansion of Factory Europe is straining logistics—especially 
information and communications infrastructure—and it could grow even faster 
and further if this were ﬁ xed. 
 · Does the Single Market for Services work as well as it should? While it is 
impossible to generalize for activities that add up to two-thirds of European 
GDP, the short answer is that it does not. Travel is well developed but 
transportation is not; the market for ﬁ nancial services is quite efﬁ cient, but 
other business services—especially those involving modern information 
technologies like the Internet—are not. For trade in nonﬁ nancial modern 
services, the solution lies not in trade facilitation but in better and more 
harmonized regulation of enterprises and improved labor mobility, issues 
taken up again in chapters 4 and 6, respectively. 
 · Is the Common Agricultural Policy harming Europe? The brief answer is 
that it is, but not in ways commonly talked about. At about 33 eurocents 
per person a day, the ﬁ nancial cost of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
is small. But the subsidies go mostly to well-off farmers in richer France, 
Italy, and Germany. Despite Europe’s position as the largest importer of 
agricultural goods from the poor countries in Africa, the CAP may also result 
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in Europe ceding the moral high ground to emerging economies in global 
trade talks. But Europe mostly pays for its agricultural trade policies not 
with the approximately $75 billion a year distributed for agriculture and rural 
development by the European Commission, but through missed opportunities 
for closer regional integration with eastern partnership countries, where more 
than a third of all workers still depend on agriculture for a living. 
These weaknesses notwithstanding, the overall assessment of European trade 
has to be a positive one. In 2009, Europe’s merchandise trade was worth 
$4.5 trillion, more than Asia’s and North America’s combined. Based on balance 
of payments accounts, its cross-border trade in services was worth $2.25 trillion, 
more than for the rest of the world combined. Trade between advanced and 
emerging Europe is growing bigger and noticeably more sophisticated every 
year, aiding quick convergence in productive capacity and living standards, and 
helping to create a bigger and stronger economic union. Trade is the mainstay 
of the European economic model, and its most attractive attribute. 
Europe: the world’s trade center
With increasing frequency, Europe is portrayed in the press as a sluggish part of 
the world. When it comes to international trade, it is actually the busiest. 
In 2005, and even in 2009, Europe’s merchandise trade dwarfed North 
America’s and Asia’s. Nearly 45 percent of the world’s $10 trillion merchandise 
trade begins or ends up in Europe (ﬁ gure 2.1). Two-thirds of this trade is among 
European economies, making its regional trade the biggest in the world. This 
has not come at the cost of global trade relations. Europe also has thick trade 
ties with every other part of the world, importing more manufactured goods 
from Asia than the United States, and trading more with Africa than Asia or 
North America. Europe also imports and exports more farm products from poor 
countries than any other developed region. 
For services, Europe is again the global leader in trade. The data are difﬁ cult 
to come by and the magnitudes differ a lot depending on whether balance 
of payments information only is used, or the services trade is also imputed 
from reports by foreign afﬁ liates of companies. Based on balance of payments 
statistics, the value of cross-border services exports of the European Union and 
candidate countries was just under $2 trillion in 2007, and about $2.25 trillion 
in 2009. The value of the services trade rises further if the sales of services 
by foreign afﬁ liates of multinational ﬁ rms are added. For the European Union, 
the value of these sales was more than $2 trillion in 2008. So, total European 
services trade is worth around $4 trillion. According to the Trade in Services 
database, the EU15 accounted for one-third of global cross-border exports; the 
U.S. share was 13 percent (Francois, Pindyuk and Woerz 2009). The EU15 was 
also the biggest importer of cross-border services, with more than one-third of 
global trade. 
Europe’s services trade is more than half of the global trade in services, and 
more than half of this trade in services is within the European Union’s single 
market. But it is also clear that there is a lot less regional trade in services than 
in goods—the ratio between intra-EU and extra-EU exports for services was 1.3 
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while the ratio for goods trade was 2.1 in 2008 (ﬁ gure 2.2). Western Europe is 
the largest contributor to the European Union’s exports in services, with more 
than 70 percent of total cross-border exports and some 95 percent of total sales 
by foreign afﬁ liates. Western Europe trades relatively more with economies 
outside the European Union, while Southern Europe and the new member 
states trade more within. 
Through the goods trade and direct investment, enterprises in the EU15 
countries have become globally competitive. Although Asia is catching up, 
Europe is the world’s trade leader in industrial merchandise. Trade facilitation 
measures can increase the size and sophistication of this trade and increase 
the productivity in manufacturing in both advanced and emerging Europe. But 
Europe has yet to exploit such synergies in modern services. More trade in 
services will help increase productivity in an even bigger part of the European 
economy. Regulatory reform could increase services trade in the single market 
by multiples of the current $4 trillion. And the European Union could do a lot 
more to encourage the regional trade in agricultural produce with the eastern 
partnership. The next three sections of this chapter take up each of these three 
components of trade in turn. 
Figure 2.1: Europe has the world’s busiest goods trade
(world merchandise trade, US$ billions, 2008)
Source: World Bank staff using WTO 2009a.
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Factory Europe—a little bigger, a lot smarter
A few years ago, Baldwin (2008) noted the rise of “Factory Asia”: “Like some 
gigantic, impossibly complex and wonderfully efﬁ cient factory, the region 
churns out millions of different products … by sourcing billions of different parts 
and components from plants spread across a dozen nations.” The Barbie doll, 
which is assembled in China and consists of pieces from many Asian countries, 
has been used to highlight the large and increasing fragmentation of production 
across borders in the region (Tempest 1996). Other products include cars, 
computers, and mobile phones (Gill and Kharas 2007). 
Such examples are no longer unique to Asia, if they ever were. Siemens has 
organized its activities in a global value chain, which includes engineering in 
Western Europe and assembly in Eastern Europe (Marin 2010b). Škoda in the 
Czech Republic makes high-tech components—including transmissions and 
engines—for Volkswagen (box 2.1). The production line for the Porsche Cayenne 
ends in Leipzig, Germany, but stretches out to the Slovak Republic (Watson 
2010). 
This fragmentation is indicative of greater efﬁ ciency in production and trade, 
and is a source of productivity growth in both advanced and emerging Europe. 
Intermediates trade is likely to be especially helpful. Productivity growth in 
ﬁ rms is facilitated by access to cheaper or greater varieties of inputs. Being a 
part of a production chain catalyzes cooperation in technology and knowledge-
transfer more than might be the case for trade in ﬁ nal products (Grossman and 
Helpman 1991; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Romer 1990; Frankel and Romer 1999). 
And the expansion of the European Union may affect patterns of intermediates 
trade to a greater extent than standard trade. 
This section takes the reader on a brief tour of Factory Europe. First, it looks 
at trade in ﬁ nished products. The European Union’s new member states have 
rapidly increased their trade both with the European Union and with the rest of 
the world. Indeed, while the EU15’s share of total trade with the new member 
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 2.2: The European Union 
does a brisk trade in services
(cross-border service exports and 
sales of foreign afﬁ liates, current 
$ trillions, 2004 and 2008)
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states has increased, trade of the new members outside the EU15 grew even 
faster than their trade with the EU15, and so the relative importance of the 
EU15 has declined. The EU candidate countries seem to be following the same 
pattern with a lag of a few years. A typical example is the trade in motor 
vehicles, accounting for almost one-ﬁ fth of all exports by new member states. 
EU enlargement has created new markets for advanced economies in Europe 
and helped emerging Europe become more competitive, not just in Europe 
but worldwide. Germany is not the ﬁ nal assembly point for inputs imported 
from the east—in fact, both German (and Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, French, 
and Scandinavian) companies and their eastern subsidiaries are exporting 
successfully along a differentiated product range. This pattern is distinct from 
the role Japan and now China play in Asia (box 2.2). 
Second, an examination of intermediates trade shows that Factory Europe is 
not as large as Factory Asia, but it is becoming smarter more quickly. Trade in 
intermediates is a smaller proportion of total trade within Europe than within 
Asia. EU enlargement has led to a rapid increase in intermediates trade with 
the new member states, although once again, new members have increased 
their trade with non-EU partners even faster. Most important, however, 
intermediates trade within the enlarged European Union has become a lot 
more sophisticated and complex, at the same time as the sophistication and 
complexity of the EU15’s trade with the rest of the world has stagnated. EU 
enlargement has had a limited effect on the size of Factory Europe, but it has 
inﬂ uenced its complexity. Factory Europe is becoming a bit bigger, but a lot 
more brainy. 
Box 2.1: Volkswagen and Škoda
Intra-ﬁ rm trade with Eastern European 
afﬁ liates is estimated to have helped German 
ﬁ rms increase productivity by more than 
20 percent, and German offshoring within 
Europe has raised the productivity of the 
subsidiaries almost threefold compared with 
that of local ﬁ rms. More imported inputs have 
raised ﬁ rm productivity in Hungary, driven to 
a large extent by access to increased variety 
or complexity of inputs—not just volumes. 
Reductions in intra-ﬁ rm tariffs and input 
tariffs associated with EU enlargement has 
helped the offshoring relationship between 
German or Austrian ﬁ rms and their Eastern 
European afﬁ liates by raising their total factor 
productivity. 
The relationship between Germany’s 
Volkswagen and the Czech Republic’s Škoda 
provides an inspiring example. Volkswagen 
(VW) acquired Škoda in 1991, and took over 
its management 10 years later. In 1990, Škoda 
sold 170,000 cars despite having enjoyed a 
monopoly in communist Czechoslovakia. The 
cars inspired jokes and derision. By 2007, its 
annual sales were up to 630,000, with plants 
in places as far away as India, and cars that 
had started to inspire loyalty. Before the global 
crisis, its plans were to increase sales to more 
than a million. Its rapid growth had made it an 
important part of VW’s strategy to outdo GM 
and Toyota for global market share.
Škoda has its own cars but also makes 
components for VW. Starting with the basics, 
VW helped Škoda transition into a market 
economy. VW allowed Škoda to benchmark 
its production practices against those of 
plants in Germany. The quality of Škoda’s own 
cars has improved, overcoming a reputation 
for bad quality, and some components are 
now shared in Škoda and VW cars. Škoda 
now makes high-tech components for VW 
automobiles, including transmissions and 
engines. One example is the Mlada Boleslav 
engine plant. In 2009, the plant started making 
a cutting-edge 1.2TSI petrol forced-induction 
engine, the product of collaborative R&D, that 
could produce 77 KW. VW used to fear the loss 
of intellectual property, limiting willingness 
to share technology and know-how. But the 
1.2TSI is an example of how this has clearly 
changed.
The Czech auto industry includes a broad and 
complex supplier network within its borders. 
The simple parts of the production process 
shifted east 10 years ago and have continued 
to move further east. The Czech Republic 
and the Slovak Republic have increased their 
presence in higher value-added activities that 
are more complex technically. 
Source: Marin 2010a; Hansen 2010; Halpern, 
Koren, and Szeidl 2011; Ledgard 2005; Škoda 
Auto 2010; Watson 2010; Volkswagen 2009. 
For a discussion of the car industry in Europe, 
see Rhys 2004.
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The goods trade has grown most in the East
Trade-to-GDP ratios have increased worldwide and Europe is no exception. 
For the EU15, the ratio rose from 45 to 54 percent from the late 1990s to the 
late 2000s. For the 2004 members, the ratio rose from 63 to 94 percent. For 
the 2007 entrants and potential members, the change was smaller, rising from 
43 to 52 percent (box 2.3 explains the regional grouping used in this section). 
Trade within the EU27 also rose: the export-to-GDP ratio increased from 15 to 19 
percent. But this masks an asymmetry within the union. Exports from the EU15 
to the new member states as a share of total exports doubled over the period, 
reﬂ ecting how the 2004 members became increasingly important for advanced 
Europe (ﬁ gure 2.3). By contrast, the importance of Western Europe for the new 
members declined. The large and proximate markets to their west are still 
important destinations and sources of goods but—due in part to relatively slow 
GDP growth—the importance of those markets has been falling since 2000. 
The composition of the goods trade has changed too. For the 2004 members, 
machinery and transport equipment comprise more than a third of imports and 
almost half of exports (ﬁ gure 2.4). The proportion has risen, but the data indicate 
a shift away from the EU15 as a source of this product category. The patterns of 
Box 2.2: Germany is not Europe’s China
Gill and Kharas (2007) and others have 
documented an interesting asymmetry 
in intra-Asian trade. They show that 
intermediates tend to be imported by 
China from the rest of the region—from 
Southeast Asia and from Japan and the newly 
industrialized economies in Northeast Asia—so 
that China runs a sizable trade deﬁ cit within 
the region. In turn, China exports ﬁ nished 
goods to the rest of the world, including the 
European Union and United States, running a 
trade surplus with the rest of the world. The 
question naturally arises whether the world’s 
second-largest trader—Germany—has a similar 
relationship in Europe. 
Information on trade balances (including 
intermediates) was analyzed in search of a 
European analog. The new members have 
trade deﬁ cits with the region and the rest of 
the world while Germany has trade surpluses 
with both the region and the rest of the world. 
Prima facie, there is no evidence of a large 
economy in Europe playing the role that Japan 
once played in Asia, and that China is now 
playing.
Source: Gill and Kharas 2007.
Note: The EU10 includes new member states joined the EU in 2004, except Cyprus and Malta.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade.
Figure 2.3: The European 
Union’s new members 
are more important 
partners for the EU15, the 
EU15 less for the new
(shares of regional trade for 
EU15 and EU10, 1996–2008)
95
CHAPTER 2
trade in machinery and transport are thus illustrative of the general pattern: EU15 
trade has shifted eastward, while the new members’ trade has become global.
Interestingly, the pattern seems to repeat itself in the EU candidate countries. 
The share of machinery and transport equipment in exports from the 2004 
entrants rose from 30 to 50 percent between 1995 and 2002, and then stopped 
growing. But these exports are still growing fast in Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, 
and the other countries in the Balkans—from a share in total exports of about 10 
percent in 1995 to 30 percent by 2008. 
The fastest-growing subcomponent of machinery and transport equipment 
trade includes cars and other road vehicles. For the new members who joined 
in 2004, the proportion of motor vehicles in total exports continued rising 
even after overall machinery export growth ﬂ attened out and reached almost 
Box 2.3: Scope of the goods trade data
This chapter considers trade in the European 
Union’s 27 member states and the accession 
countries, broadly deﬁ ned to include Ukraine. 
Of the European Union’s new members, the 
data are best suited for 8 of the 10 countries 
that joined the European Union in 2004. These 
countries are Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia. This is mainly because 
the data coincide with their accession years 
(since the mid-1990s) and formal membership. 
The group is called “EU10,” “new members,” 
“2004 members,” or the “new member states.”
The group known as the “potential members” 
or accession countries includes Bulgaria and 
Romania because they joined only in 2007, 
close to the end of the period of available 
data; the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia—all at 
various stages of accession); Turkey (which has 
a customs union with the European Union and 
is an ofﬁ cial accession candidate); and Ukraine 
(even though it has neither). This is a diverse 
group, so it is sometimes necessary to look 
at subgroups or individual countries within 
this category. Data going back to 1996 are 
used when available for the 2004 members 
or potential members, except for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which started reporting in 2003. 
For comparison, the nine Asian countries in 
Kimura, Takahashi, and Hayakawa (2007) 
are considered to be China, Hong Kong SAR 
(China), Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, 
the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Thailand. 
BEC nomenclature is used unless stated 
otherwise, grouping products into 
consumption, capital, and intermediate goods 
(Miroudot, Lanz, and Ragoussis 2009). Goods 
are classiﬁ ed according to “expert judgment” 
and may not fall neatly into one category. 
For example, it is not obvious whether fruits 
should be classiﬁ ed as consumption or 
intermediate goods. But this approach has 
the advantage of covering a wide spectrum 
of goods trade. In contrast, studies identifying 
parts or components can only reliably do so 
for a subset of sectors (for example, Kaminski 
and Ng 2005; and Kimura, Takahashi, and 
Hayakawa 2007). 
Source: Behar and Freund 2011. 
Note: The category of agriculture and raw materials includes products with codes 0–4 in Standard 
International Trade Classiﬁ cation (SITC), Revision 2. Period averages for the years 1996–98 and 
2006–08 are shown.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade.
Figure 2.4: Machinery 
and transport equipment 
are half of the exports of 
new member states
(sector shares of 2004 
entrants’ trade, 1996–98 and 
2006–08)
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20 percent, the highest ratio in the world. For the 2007 members and the EU 
candidate countries, the increase in the share of motor vehicle exports is even 
faster (ﬁ gure 2.5). Candidate countries have seen a large rise in both exports 
and imports, mainly because of Turkey.1 EU enlargement and integration may be 
helping Europe’s carmakers maintain global competitiveness in the same way 
as Factory Asia helped Japan’s and the Republic of Korea’s.
The parallel patterns in the new member states and EU candidate countries 
illustrate a more general point: enlargement is a process and its economic 
impact is felt long before the ﬁ nal accession act is signed (box 2.4). Trade 
liberalization is usually a precursor to enlargement. Turkey even joined a 
customs union with the European Union in 2005. For the eastern partnership 
countries, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements are negotiated 
as a key step toward closer integration. In the new member states and in 
the candidate countries, the prospect of membership has often catalyzed a 
ﬁ rst round of deep structural reforms, which in turn have attracted foreign 
investment and facilitated deeper trade integration.
Trade in intermediate goods has grown more
One way to compare Factory Europe with Factory Asia is to look at regional 
trade in intermediates. This matters because intermediates trade may be a 
particularly potent source of economic growth. Productivity within a ﬁ rm is 
increased by improved access to inputs that are cheaper or more plentiful, of 
higher quality, and greater in variety, as well as through the technology and 
knowledge they embody (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; 
Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile 1992). International trade can provide more 
or cheaper inputs, or these inputs may embody a higher level of technology 
than locally available ones. When they are part of a supply chain, relationships 
between producers and consumers of intermediates are likely to be closer. 
So there are more opportunities for transfers of better production methods 
and other know-how than is the case for consumption goods. One should 
expect a link between fragmentation—manifest in trade in intermediates—and 
productivity growth. 
Note: Passenger cars (code 51 in Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classiﬁ cation) are shown. In the 
right panel, data for “potential members” are linearly interpolated between 1999 and 2005.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade.
Figure 2.5: Automobiles 
are a big part of the 
goods trade in Europe
(share of road vehicles in exports 
of emerging Europe, 1996–2008)
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The proportion of the EU27’s output traded across borders as intermediates 
increased, but Asia overtook it in 2004 (ﬁ gure 2.6, left panel).2 Emerging Europe 
experienced a rapid increase, including with non-EU trade partners. For the 
2004 members, for example, the share of intermediates trade in GDP rose 
from 15 to almost 25 percent. At 21 percent, Asia’s ratio is lower despite having 
doubled since 1995. Factory Asia has been growing fast. In Factory Europe, 
mostly the eastern wing has been growing.
The share of intermediates in total trade in Europe is no higher than in the late 
1990s. Asia has seen a steady increase (ﬁ gure 2.6, right panel). This is true for 
trade within the region as well as trade with the rest of the world. The share of 
intermediates within EU27 exports to the world has stayed at about 50 percent, 
while import shares have risen marginally from 55 to 57 percent. Asia’s share 
in worldwide intermediates exports fell marginally to 50 percent, but its import 
shares rose from 64 to 73 percent. In Europe, the shares of intermediates inputs 
in exports and imports have been roughly constant, at about 50–55 percent 
for the EU15, 55–60 percent for the 2004 entrants to the European Union, and 
60–65 percent for the 2007 entrants and the EU candidate countries. These 
numbers suggest that—outside Asia—the increases in fragmentation may be 
more modest than popularly believed.3 
The aggregate patterns presented mask asymmetries and geographical shifts. 
The new members form an increasingly important market for EU15 intermediate 
products (ﬁ gure 2.7). The EU15 is sourcing more of its intermediates from 
the new members, but there was a slowdown since the early 2000s. The 
importance of the EU15 as a source of imports for the new members is falling: 
the new members now import less than half of their intermediates from 
the EU15. 
Box 2.4: EU integration is a process
The recent expansion of the European Union 
eastward is formally marked by the addition 
of 10 members in 2004 and the further 
addition of 2 members in 2007. But formal 
enlargement comes toward the end of a longer 
integration and harmonization process. Many 
concrete measures are taken well before the 
accession year. These come through two main 
mechanisms, which are often negotiated and 
implemented in parallel:
Trade agreements. While the European 
Union has many different kinds of motivations 
for agreements, one form is especially 
designed for countries applying to join it, and 
this intention is made explicit. These introduce 
free trade in almost all industrial products 
but not agriculture. As part of the process, 
countries must relinquish all other bilateral 
trade agreements. 
Association agreements. Trade 
agreements are nested in association 
agreements, which are typically aimed at 
aligning legislation with the European Union 
and recognizing intellectual property rights. 
For the Balkans, for example, this comes as 
part of a stabilization and association process. 
Tellingly, an objective is “to encourage the 
countries of the region to behave towards each 
other and work with each other in a manner 
comparable to the relationships that now 
exist between EU Member States” (European 
Commission 2010). It includes integration into 
regional infrastructure networks. 
In the mid- to late 1990s, countries that 
eventually became part of the EU27 signed 
Association Agreements with EU (for example, 
Hungary in 1994, Romania and Bulgaria in 
1995, and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia in the late 1990s). In 1995, Turkey 
signed an association agreement, and formed 
a customs union on December 31, 1995. 
In 1998, the Ukraine–European Union 
partnership and cooperation agreement 
was signed, though association agreement 
negotiations are still under way. In 2000, 
the prospects of joining the European Union 
were mooted for Balkan countries in Zagreb, 
including any intention to sign stabilization 
and association agreements. In 2004, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia signed 
a stabilization and association agreement, 
becoming the ﬁ rst (West) Balkan country to 
do so. Others soon followed: Croatia in 2005, 
Albania in 2006, Montenegro in 2008, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008. 
Integration with the European Union should 
not be viewed as a discrete change upon 
membership. The process of actual reforms 
precedes formal entry, sometimes by more 
than a decade.
Source: Behar and Freund 2011.
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More variety in the intermediate goods trade
The trade between Fiat and its afﬁ liates in Serbia and Turkey, or between Škoda 
and Volkswagen, is classiﬁ ed as intermediates intra-industry trade, which has 
been growing substantially in and near the European Union. The intra-industry 
trade in intermediates between the new member states and the EU15 is higher 
than between average trade partners in the rest of the world. The Grubel-Lloyd 
index for intermediates has risen by 22 percent, higher than for all products 
(ﬁ gure 2.8). The Grubel-Lloyd index for intra-industry trade in intermediates 
between the new member states and the EU15 rose by about 30 percent; 
by contrast, the index for trade between the EU15 and the rest of the world 
actually fell. 
The growing intra-industry trade is best understood as driven by increased 
“horizontal differentiation,” which is manifest in greater variety (Jones and 
Kierzkowski 2005). An alternative interpretation of growing intra-industry 
trade is the fragmentation of production. But as seen above, the evidence for 
increased fragmentation within Factory Europe is ambiguous. By contrast, 9 of 
13 EU15 countries—Belgium and Luxembourg excluded—increased the variety of 
Note: Trade in intermediates is deﬁ ned by the BEC nomenclature.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade; and WDI.
Figure 2.6: Intermediates are 
about half of the European 
Union’s trade, but two-
thirds of the trade in Asia
(share of intermediates trade in 
GDP and total trade, 1996–2008)
Note: Trade in intermediates is deﬁ ned by the BEC nomenclature.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade.
Figure 2.7: New EU members 
are more important for 
the EU15 for trade in 
intermediate goods
(intermediate goods trade 
shares, EU15 and EU10, 
1996–2008)
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intermediates that they sourced from the new members. Similarly, 7 of 10 new 
members increased the variety of goods sent to the EU15 from 1482 to 1591. 
So, while the picture for the European Union as a whole is mixed, more EU15 
countries are receiving more varieties from more 2004 members (table 2.1).
By contrast, the variety of goods shipped by the new members to the world as 
a whole fell. The variety of goods imported by the EU15 from the world also fell. 
In other words, a bigger share of EU15 intermediate varieties is coming from the 
new members, and a larger share of new members’ intermediate varieties is 
destined for the EU15. The rise in variety is not conﬁ ned to intermediates. The 
variety of consumption goods exported by the new members to the EU15 rose 
as much as that of intermediates. But the variety of consumer goods sent to the 
world as a whole also rose, so the relatively greater variety in the trade with 
the EU15 (compared with trade with the rest of the world) is a development in 
the intermediate goods trade, not the trade in ﬁ nal goods.4
Figure 2.8: Growing 
intra-industry ties in the 
east, but faster within 
the European Union
(intermediate intra-industry 
trade index, 1996–2008)
1996–98 2006–08
Average EU15 imports 1718 1807
Average new member state exports 1482 1591
Aggregate EU15 imports 2997 2942
Aggregate new member state exports 2914 2924
Table 2.1: A greater variety of intermediate goods are being traded
(variety of intermediate goods sent from 2004 members to the EU15)
Note: The ﬁ rst two rows (“average”) show simple averages across corresponding groups and the third 
and last rows (“aggregate”) do region-wide values, using either EU15 import data or 2004 members’ 
export data. Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) 1996 six-digit trade data are 
used, and from them, intermediate products are chosen using the HS–BEC concordance information. 
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade.
Note: Intermediate intra-industry trade is measured with SITC (Revision 2) four-digit trade data, and 
the SITC–BEC concordance information is used to select the SITC products that are classiﬁ ed by the 
BEC as intermediates.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade.
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Emerging Europe’s goods trade is getting sophisticated
In addition to greater horizontal differentiation, is there also evidence for 
increased vertical differentiation, which would imply improved quality of inputs 
traded? Yes. Both the measure of export sophistication and the measure 
of relationship-speciﬁ city show that trade within Europe is becoming more 
complex, while trade with non-European partners seems to be declining in 
complexity (box 2.5).
The sophistication of intermediates exports from the new member states to 
the EU15 rose by about 15 percent from 1996 to 2005 but has remained ﬂ at 
since then (ﬁ gure 2.9). The sophistication of EU10 intermediates exports to the 
EU15 rose faster than to the world. For EU15 intermediates exports to the world, 
sophistication follows an inverted U-curve and the measure in 2008 is roughly 
the same as in 1996. By contrast, the sophistication of EU15 exports to the 
2004 members has risen by 7 percent over the period despite a slight decline 
since 2004. Echoing the earlier pattern shown for the trade in ﬁ nished products, 
changes in the nature of intermediates received by the new members are 
similar regardless of whether they come from the EU15 or the rest of the world. 
By contrast, from the perspective of the EU15, the new members are becoming 
an increasingly sophisticated source and market relative to other regions. And 
this seems to be the case for both the 2004 members and the EU candidate 
countries. This is largely because of Turkey: both the size and sophistication in 
its trade are at the highest levels and have shown the clearest upward trend. 
The other countries in this group—including Bulgaria and Romania—have not 
seen an increase in the sophistication of trade.
Box 2.5: Measuring the sophistication of exports of goods
The ﬁ rst measure of trade complexity is the 
sophistication of intermediate products, 
constructed by adapting the method in 
Hausman, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). The 
sophistication of each product is estimated by 
using the GDP per capita of those countries 
that export it. Every product’s share in 
each country’s total exports is calculated. 
This share for the country is standardized 
by dividing it by the average share of this 
product for all countries. The key step is that 
this is multiplied by the GDP per capita of 
that country. Summing across all countries 
gives the sophistication of that product, or 
its “PRODY.” The sophistication of a country’s 
export basket, or its “EXPY,” is calculated by 
multiplying the sophistication of each product 
by the share of that product in the country’s 
exports and summing across all products. The 
averages of GDP per capita and exports over 
2001–03 are used, and the sophistication of 
products is held ﬁ xed so that any changes over 
time are due to changes in the export basket 
from year to year. 
The main adaptation of this measure for this 
report restricts this to only the four-digit 
Standard International Trade Classiﬁ cation 
Revision 2 goods classiﬁ ed by the Broad 
Economic Categories as intermediates. To 
distinguish these measures of intermediates 
sophistication from those for all goods, we 
use the terms I_Prody and I_Expy. We also 
produce an analog for imports and refer to it as 
I_Impy. Mishra, Lundstrom, and Anand (2011) 
develop a similar procedure for services trade, 
which is used in the next section. 
The second measure of trade complexity is 
the relationship-speciﬁ city of products. This 
measure was developed by Nunn (2007), 
who constructed the fraction of each product 
exported by a country that was itself made 
with differentiated inputs within the country. 
The higher the fraction, the less regulated the 
process by which the good was put together. 
Because this requires more relationships, 
this gives the relationship-speciﬁ city of the 
product. Nunn’s measures use input-output 
data to construct the share of each product that 
uses differentiated inputs as deﬁ ned by Rauch 
(1999). 
The measures for three-digit International 
Standard of Industrial Classiﬁ cation data 
are taken from Nunn’s Harvard University 
website add the website (www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/data_nunn) 
and mapped to four-digit data using the 
appropriate concordance information. Of most 
interest is the fraction of intermediates using 
differentiated inputs; the technique makes use 
of a further concordance to Broad Economic 
Categories–deﬁ ned intermediates categories to 
construct the index of relationship-speciﬁ city 
of intermediates (RSI). 
The two measures provide alternative 
accounts of the complexity of the products 
being traded. The RSI, which is affected by 
the rule of law and other behind-the-border 
factors, accounts for the complexity of 
production chains within a country. It therefore 
does not matter whether these chains are 
complete (exports of ﬁ nal goods) or part of 
a broader chain (intermediates). Therefore, 
even if cross-border trade in all goods is 
considered, the RSI still provides information 
about the complexity of the steps needed to 
make those goods. The sophistication measure 
incorporates the complexity of trade across 
countries. 
Source: Behar and Freund 2011. 
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The second measure of complexity is based on the relationship-speciﬁ city of 
intermediates (RSI): the fraction of differentiated inputs embodied in exports. 
The RSI for the world’s exports fell while that of the new members rose by 7 
percentage points to 70 percent for all goods and by 6 percentage points to 
67 percent for intermediates. For intermediates exports in particular, the new 
members’ exports have a higher RSI than do those of the world as a whole. 
EU candidates and the 2007 entrants have less complex exports, but Bulgaria 
and Romania have experienced a large increase.5 Joining the European Union 
has allowed the 2004 and 2007 members to produce more relationship-speciﬁ c 
goods, and the EU15 can now source more relationship-speciﬁ c products from 
them. Figure 2.10 shows a rise in the RSI of 6 percentage points to 69 percent 
for intermediates and by 5 percentage points to 72 percent for all goods, but a 
decline in the relationship-speciﬁ city of imports from other countries.
Trade within Europe is becoming more sophisticated, while Europe’s trade with 
the rest of the world is becoming less complex. Enterprises in advanced Europe 
are giving emerging Europe more difﬁ cult things to do. Factory Europe is more 
spread out and much smarter today than it was two decades ago. 
Note: Trade in intermediates is deﬁ ned by the BEC nomenclature.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade; and WDI.
Note: Intermediates export is deﬁ ned by the BEC nomenclature. 
See box 2.5 for the construction of the index.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade and Nunn 2007.
Figure 2.9: Advanced and 
emerging Europe are 
trading more sophisticated 
intermediate goods
(EXPY for intermediate goods, 
US$ thousands, 1996–2008)
Figure 2.10: Emerging 
Europe’s exports have 
become more complex
(relationship-speciﬁ city index of 
exports, 1996–98 and 2006–08)
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A growing backlog in trade facilities
The new member states and candidate countries are doing well to become part 
of the production networks centered in Germany and other EU15 economies. 
But many of them have now developed a sizable backlog in trade facilities: 
in particular, the airports and ports, customs regimes, regulations, and IT 
infrastructure needed to make the goods trade hassle-free. Except for a 
few countries, most emerging European countries do not do well, especially 
in port efﬁ ciency and in IT technology (ﬁ gure 2.11). The ﬁ rst round of gains 
in size and sophistication of merchandise trade seems to have come from 
lowered divisions between emerging Europe and the big (and growing) 
market in Western Europe. With eurozone growth prospects uncertain and the 
composition of trade changing to become increasingly sensitive to transport 
costs, the next round of gains will depend on how much economic distance is 
shortened. 
Sizable trade gains—more from greater exports than an increase in imports—
can be had if the port efﬁ ciency, regulatory regimes, and IT infrastructures in 
the new and candidate member countries are improved by even just half the 
distance to the EU15 average. The greatest absolute trade gains come from 
cutting the gaps in port efﬁ ciency and IT infrastructure. Most of these trade 
gains result from greater exports. 
Note: The x-axis in each panel shows per capita GDP, PPP, in logs.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the latest available data (Dutta and Mia 2011; 
IMD 2010; Schwab 2011; and WDI) to update estimates in Wilson, Luo, and Broadman 2010.
Figure 2.11: Emerging Europe 
has developed sizable 
backlogs in trade facilities
(ports efﬁ ciency, customs 
regimes, regulatory efﬁ ciency, 
and IT infrastructure, 2009–10)
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Priorities for investments in improving trade facilitation infrastructure are not 
the same for the new member states and the EU candidates. Among the four 
most important trade facilitators, IT infrastructure improvements will lead to 
the largest gains in both groups of countries (Wilson, Luo, and Broadman 2010). 
Simulations suggest that about 40 percent of the trade gains across the region 
will come from improved information and communication technology (ICT). For 
the new members of the European Union, another 35 percent improvement will 
come from investments in air and maritime port efﬁ ciency. The results for the 
candidate members suggest more widely dispersed gains with investments in 
port efﬁ ciency, customs regimes, and regulatory policy of similar importance. 
Improvements in each dimension result in about 20 percent of the total trade 
gains.
Public investment programs and EU development programs should consider 
these results. Improvements in port facilities and IT infrastructures are likely 
to be more costly than reforms of customs regimes and regulatory policy. For 
EU candidate countries, the latter should continue to have high priority, given 
ﬁ nancing constraints. The eligibility for additional EU ﬁ nancing after accession 
increases the scope for ambitious investments in transport and IT infrastructure. 
In all countries, the private sector has a role to play in the funding and operation 
of infrastructure facilities.
Service Europe—not yet a single market
The Internal Market Strategy for Services expects eventually “to make the 
provision of services between member states as easy as within a member 
state” (OECD 2007, p. 75). For a multilingual, multicultural region with diverse 
political and legal precedents, this is a tall order. Indeed, while in assessing 
its performance in the goods trade Europe measures itself against East Asia, 
a developing region, its benchmark for trade in services is the United States, 
a developed country. For more than half a century, European policymakers 
have been trying to reduce the costs of cross-border transactions and foster 
the integration of the internal market. For the goods trade, they have largely 
succeeded. For services, the single market is still a work in progress and—given 
the nature of regulatory reforms needed to make it work efﬁ ciently—it is likely 
to remain one for a while. 
Too much attention to export performance risks neglect of efforts to make 
service markets more open, which may well be the wider channel for 
productivity improvement. Most services are still not tradable through digitized 
means, so foreign direct investment (FDI) and the movement of people is the 
biggest part of internationalization, and the channel through which productivity 
growth is induced, both in services themselves and in “downstream” industries. 
Productivity is what’s key, not trade. Given that the lion’s share of output 
and employment is in services, many of which will remain nontradable, the 
focus should be on improving markets for services, hence raising the average 
productivity of enterprises. Indeed, the performance of business services can 
explain a good part of aggregate productivity differentials among advanced 
economies (Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark 2007). 
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This is discussed in detail in chapter 4. This chapter discusses the progress in 
the services trade. Until recently, economists treated “nontradables” as almost 
synonymous with services, recognizing the special difﬁ culties in crossing 
borders to provide services: “Because, by deﬁ nition, services are a ﬂ ow and so 
are not storable, their exchange frequently requires the proximity of supplier 
and consumer” (Francois and Hoekman 2010, p. 648). The requirement of 
proximity entails additional costs—the “proximity burden” of the services trade. 
The questions to be answered are: Has technology reduced this proximity 
burden? How much has the single market program helped? These questions are 
taken up in turn. 
The services trade in the European Union is growing
The internal market of the European Union is more important than third 
countries for trade in services. But the internal market for trade in services 
has been less integrated than for goods. Services exports within the European 
Union have grown slower than exports to third countries in recent years 
despite the implementation of the Services Directive and other initiatives 
to push forward regional integration in services. The European Commission 
passed the Services Directive in 2005, aiming to eliminate regulatory barriers 
to a Single Market for Services. But from 2004 to 2008, intra-EU exports grew 
at 13 percent, while extra-EU exports grew at 14 percent. Nonetheless, the 
EU10 and the candidate countries integrated faster within the internal market 
than with the rest of the world. Services exports from the EU10 members to 
other EU member countries achieved an annual growth rate of 24 percent, 6 
percentage points higher than the rate of their exports to third countries. For 
the candidates, the difference was 10 percentage points. The prospect of joining 
the European Union seems to facilitate market entry in services.
Trade in services through establishment-based transactions or sales by 
foreign afﬁ liates is a big part of the services trade. As in the United States, 
establishment-based transactions are the most important channel for Western 
European companies to sell services, while cross-border trade remains the 
dominant channel for other members (table 2.2, top panel). The sales by 
afﬁ liates of the Western European members were some 46 percent higher 
than cross-border services exports (table 2.2, bottom panel). For their intra-EU 
exports, the value of establishment-based transactions was also about 45 
percent higher than that of cross-border exports. By contrast, the sales by the 
afﬁ liates of companies in both Southern EU members and the EU10 were less 
than one-third of their cross-border exports. But there was little additional 
integration of Western Europe with other members through establishment-
based transactions. Between 2004 and 2008, the sales by afﬁ liates in EU 
members grew at a meager 0.4 percent while the sales by afﬁ liates located in 
third countries increased by 3 percent. 
Transportation and travel remain dominant in the European Union’s services 
exports. While services were traditionally regarded as nontradable, 
transportation and travel had always been the exceptions. Western Europe 
accounts for 70 percent of total exports in transportation and over half of total 
exports in travel. For the members of Southern Europe, travel is the most 
important services export. In 2008, the value of exports in travel accounted 
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for 40 percent of total services exports by Southern Europe and almost 
one-third of total exports in travel by the European Union. For the EU10 
members and candidate countries, the two also stand out as the leading 
services export sectors. 
Financial and other business services are now becoming the drivers of EU 
service exports. Financial services cover ﬁ nancial intermediation and auxiliary 
services, except those of insurance enterprises and pension schemes. Other 
business services consist of professional and management consulting services; 
research and development services; and technical, trade-related, and other 
business services (UN 2011). These services were traditionally not tradable, 
partly due to the “proximity burden” and partly due to heavy regulations. 
The rapid advance of information and computer technology over the past 
decades has spurred trade in these sectors by reducing the “proximity burden.” 
Regulatory simpliﬁ cation and harmonization with international standards have 
also helped. 
Services are becoming more tradable—
especially modern services 
Services exports by Europe and developing countries almost tripled between 
1997 and 2007. Services exports have changed qualitatively. They have 
increasingly become a ﬁ nal export that is directly consumed. Because many 
services can now be stored and traded digitally, they are not subject to many 
of the traditional trade barriers (such as transport costs, border delays, physical 
inspections, and so on) that physical exports have to overcome. Services not 
only have become more tradable, but they can also be increasingly unbundled: 
a single service activity in the global supply chain can now be fragmented and 
done separately at different geographic locations.
The new member states have been especially successful in growing services 
exports since the mid-2000s—not quite star performers like India or China, but 
high performers compared with the rest of the world (ﬁ gure 2.12, left panel). 
Figure 2.12 (right panel) graphs the tradability of services between 1986 and 
2008. In Europe, there are three developments of note. First, the share of 
service value added that is traded rose from 10 to 15 percent. Second, the 
share of services traded in the new member states has increased erratically, 
but now is almost double its share at the beginning of the transition. Third, 
the EU candidate countries have seen a drop in the share of services traded 
since the late 1990s, likely due to rapid expansion of domestic services such 
as construction, transport, travel, retail trade, and government services, 
rather than a drop in services exports. What is also clear from international 
comparisons is that aside from India, trade is a bigger part of the services 
economy in Europe than in any other part of the world. 
The increased tradability is mainly due to new technologies that have changed 
the nature of many services from “traditional” to “modern.” Traditional services 
require face-to-face contact, while modern services can be delivered over 
longer distances. Modern services, such as banking and ﬁ nancial services, 
telecom support, and technical support, are now more “impersonal” and 
tradable across borders. But technological progress has also helped such 
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traditional services as tourism, retail trade, education, and health care take 
advantage of new information and communication technologies, exploit the 
potential for fragmentation and scale economies, and become more productive. 
Table 2.2: Western Europe drives much of the services trade
(cross-border exports, 2008)
(sales by foreign afﬁ liates, 2008)
Note: The top reports numbers from balance of payments data, and the 
bottom from establishment accounts. EU candidate countries include EU 
members that joined in 2007 (that is, Bulgaria and Romania).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
EU members
Candidate countries
Western Europe Southern Europe EU10
Value of exports (current $, billions)
EU members
   Western Europe 560 97 41 16
   Southern Europe 189 26 7 5
   EU10 57 6 13 3
EU candidate countries 33 8 5 3
Share in total exports (percent)
EU members
   Western Europe 42 7 3 1
   Southern Europe 56 8 2 1
   EU10 52 6 12 3
EU candidate countries 45 11 7 4
EU members
Candidate 
countries
Other countries
Western 
Europe
Southern 
Europe EU10
High and 
upper middle 
income
Middle 
income
Value of exports (current $, billions)
EU members
   Western Europe 514 271 226 34 839 42
   Southern Europe 55 8 11 5 13 4
   EU10 2 0 7 3 1 1
Share in total exports (percent)
EU members
   Western Europe 26 14 12 2 43 2
   Southern Europe 56 8 11 5 13 4
   EU10 13 1 54 19 9 5
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Cross-border trade in modern services has been growing faster (ﬁ gure 2.13). In 
the EU15, the rate of growth of trade in modern services is 15 percent, higher 
than that in the United States. The growth in the new member states is even 
higher at 25 percent. But EU candidate countries saw a contraction in modern 
services trade, and rapid growth in traditional services. 
The share of service value added as a percentage of GDP is high in the EU15, 
followed by EU new member states and EU candidate countries.6 This is 
normal, given their per capita incomes. But in most European economies total 
productivity growth is faster than predicted by growth in output of services. 
In other words, services output growth contributes less to overall growth in GDP 
per capita than might be expected given the share of services in GDP. This is 
consistent with the ﬁ nding reported in chapter 1 that a gap in services accounts 
for the largest part of the difference in overall productivity between Europe 
and the United States. It also explains the focus of European policymakers on 
deepening the market in services as a core element of Europe’s future growth 
strategy (for example, Monti 2010). 
(services exports, 1998–2009, 1998 = 100) (exports as percent of service value added, 
1986–2008)
Source: IMF BOPS; and WDI. 
Figure 2.12: Services 
exports are growing fast 
in the new member states
Note: Modern services include communication, insurance, ﬁ nance, computers and information, 
royalties and license fees, and other business services. Traditional services are transport, travel, 
construction, and personal, cultural, and recreational services.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF BOPS.
Figure 2.13: Modern—
more tradable—services 
are growing faster 
almost everywhere
(annual growth in 
modern and traditional 
services trade, 2000–08)
108
GOLDEN GROWTH
The single market is delivering—but not for modern services
The services trade in the European Union is now a $4 trillion business, and more 
than half of this is in the internal market (ﬁ gure 2.14). For the smaller economies 
in the east and south, the internal trade is actually more than two-thirds of the 
total. There has been progress toward deeper integration of services in the 
European Union (European Commission 2002). 
Not surprisingly, Western Europe accounts for almost 80 percent of the internal 
services trade (ﬁ gure 2.15), and more than half of the sales within the internal 
market by foreign afﬁ liates took place in Western Europe.7
But the EU10 and the EU candidate countries appeared to integrate faster 
into the single market. Exports of the EU10 to the internal market grew at 24 
percent annually, 6 percentage points higher than their exports to the rest of 
the world. For the accession countries, the difference was 10 percentage points. 
As discussed in the previous section for goods trade, integration is a gradual 
process and precedes actual accession—the prospect of joining the European 
Union seems to facilitate market entry by the accession countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 2.14: Internal trade 
tendencies in the European 
Union vary across countries
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 2.15: Western Europe 
does most of the internal 
trade in services, 2008
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The single market program has promoted deeper integration of services. 
Straathof and others (2008) and Fink (2009) both show that the single market 
program reduces trade costs and leads to more bilateral trade between 
members, both as cross-border trade and foreign direct investment.8 Services 
trade ﬂ ows and FDI within the European Union are 10–30 percent higher 
compared with their trade with third countries and trade by the rest of the world 
(table 2.3).9  Enlargement, especially in 2004, has promoted deeper integration 
of new members with the European Union, and most of the increase in services 
trade does not seem to have come at the expense of third countries.
But the single market works a lot better for trade in traditional than in modern 
services. Transportation and travel, two traditional sectors, dominate the 
European Union’s cross-border services trade. Their levels of integration—or 
the working of the single market—differ a lot. For travel, more than two-thirds 
of exports were transactions within the European Union; for transportation, 
only half of total exports were oriented toward the internal market (ﬁ gure 2.16). 
For business services—which include the ICT-facilitated digital trade that is so 
fragmented in the European Union—the internal market accounts for just 
two-ﬁ fths of the trade. Financial services integration is taken up in chapter 3; this 
chapter looks more closely at transportation, information and communications 
technology, and other business services to see how the single market can be 
made to work better.
Europeans are dissatisfi ed with the Single Market for Services
While the internal trade in services has been growing, the progress is considered 
unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, services are a large fraction of the 
economy but a small share of trade. In the EU15, services are more than two-
thirds of total value added and about three-quarters of employment. In the new 
member states that joined in 2004, services are more than 60 percent of value 
added and employment. More than half of labor productivity growth between 
Source Data Time Methodology Effect (percent)
Fink (2009)
Cross-border trade 1999–2002 Gravity model without country-pair fixed effects 32
Cross-border trade 1999–2006 Gravity model withcountry-pair fixed effects 33
Outward FDI 1992–2005 Gravity model without country-pair fixed effects 30
Outward FDI 1999–2005 Gravity model withcountry-pair fixed effects 18
Straathof and others 
(2008)
Cross-border trade 2002–05 Gravity model without country-pair fixed effects 11
Outward FDI 1994–2004 Gravity model withcountry-pair fixed effects 22
Table 2.3: The single market has increased services trade and 
FDI by about 25 percent
(estimates of the effect of the Single Market for Services on trade and FDI, 1992–2006)
Source: World Bank staff.
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2000 and 2006 in EU15 countries was in services, but services are just one-ﬁ fth 
of total intra-EU trade. Even after accounting for the sales by foreign afﬁ liates, 
services were just one-third of total intra-EU trade in 2008. Services are an 
ever larger slice of the European economy, and a still larger part of its economic 
growth (ﬁ gure 2.17). New developments in information and communication 
technology have increased both the tradability of and productivity growth in 
services, traditionally considered less tradable and a productivity laggard. So 
trade in services appears underdeveloped—less than 10 percent of service value 
added is currently exported, compared with 90 percent of goods value added. 
The second reason is that services trade within the European Union has not 
grown as quickly as the internal trade in goods. In terms of simple statistics, 
the exports of goods within the internal market are more than double the 
exports of members to third countries. By contrast, the exports of services 
within the internal market are only 20–40 percent higher than the exports to 
third countries, depending on the measure used. The evidence suggests that 
Source: WDI.
Figure 2.17: Services are 
contributing even more 
to growth in Europe
(sector shares in economic 
output, 1995–99 and 2000–08)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 2.16: The single market works 
better for traditional services
(Intra-EU Share of service exports, 
percent, by type of service, 2008)
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the effect of the single market is greater for goods than services, when it might 
be expected to be the other way around.10 New technologies have resulted in 
rapid growth of “modern impersonal services,” such as information technology, 
business-related services, medical records transcription, call center operations, 
education services, and entertainment production services. More and more 
Box 2.6: How big should the Single Market for Services be? Clues from Canada
Regional trade in goods in East Asia is a 
common benchmark for Europe. But when it 
comes to trade in services, policymakers in the 
European Union compare their progress to that 
of countries like the United States or Canada, 
not to continents or regions such as North 
America or East Asia. If there were a Single 
Market for Services in Europe as in the United 
States or Canada, how much would trade in 
services go up—would it increase 20 percent, 
twofold, or twentyfold? And how much would 
this increase productivity?
Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden (2007) provide 
answers to the ﬁ rst question by analyzing 
the services trade among Canadian provinces 
between 1997 and 1999, and among OECD 
countries between 1999 and 2001 (box 
ﬁ gure 1). It was impossible to do something 
analogous for the United States: reliable data 
for trade in services among U.S. states are 
simply not available. Sizewise, comparisons 
with the United States are more apt: in 2011, 
the value added in services in the European 
Union was $11.4 trillion (70 percent of its GDP 
of $16.2 trillion), almost exactly the same 
as that in the United States (77 percent of 
its GDP of $14.8 trillion). In other respects, 
Canada is a better benchmark. Linguistic, 
legal, and cultural divisions hamper trade in 
most services more than does distance. So for 
Europe, it may be instructive to see how much 
the French- and English-speaking provinces of 
Canada trade despite the divisions. 
In 2000, services trade as a share of GDP in 
Canada was almost 9 percent of GDP, more 
than twice the ratio for the EU. Given the fact 
that size matters for goods and services trade 
(larger countries and provinces trade more), 
and the European Union’s GDP was about 10 
times that of Canada in 2000, the share of 
services trade in the European Union should 
be greater, not smaller. Smaller distances in 
Europe relative to Canada would make this 
ratio even bigger for the European Union, 
while linguistic differences would make it 
smaller. 
Looking more closely, GDP size matters 
roughly the same amount for trade in travel, 
transport, commercial, and government 
services. Distance matters more for 
commercial and transport services, and least 
for travel-related services. When differences 
in regulations are accounted for, language 
matters only for travel and commercial 
services. The strictness of product market 
regulations in the origin country reduces trade 
in commercial services, while destination 
country regulations affect travel and trade in 
government services. 
There is considerable unexploited potential for 
both goods and services trade in the European 
Union. If the EU market functioned like that of 
Canada, intra-EU goods trade would be three 
times as high as it was in 2000, and services 
trade between three and ﬁ ve times as much. 
Given that not all differences in language and 
legislation can be eliminated, a reasonable 
objective over the next few years might be 
a doubling of intra-EU cross-border trade in 
services by 2020. Using 2007 statistics, this 
would mean an increase in intra-EU services 
trade of about €660 billion, or around $1 
trillion (roughly $100 billion a year). A threefold 
increase would mean that services exports 
within the European Union would rise by €1.3 
trillion, or about $2 trillion. 
Source: Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden 2007.
Box ﬁ gure 1: Language differences hamper services trade more
(effects on trade between Canadian provinces, 1997–99)
Source: Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden 2007.
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services can now be stored and traded digitally, and they have become similar 
to manufactured goods in that they beneﬁ t from technological advancement 
and their costs depend on economies of scale, agglomeration, and division of 
labor. More important, these sophisticated services provide an opportunity for 
innovative, high-tech jobs. 
The third reason is that trade in services within the European Union has not 
been growing faster than services trade to third countries. Cross-border exports 
in the internal market grew at 13 percent annually between 2004 and 2008, 
while the exports to third countries grew at 14 percent. The difference led to a 
3 percentage point decline in the ratio between intra-EU and extra-EU exports. 
Foreign afﬁ liate sales within the European Union have been more volatile than 
sales to third countries, and the ratio between intra-EU and extra-EU sales 
dropped by 9 percentage points over the same period.
A useful thought experiment to gauge the potential gains of deeper integration 
is to estimate the extra scope for intra-EU trade if the internal market were to 
function like the interstate trade in services in some benchmark countries. As 
federal countries, Canada and the United States are the obvious benchmarks. 
The level of income and role played by the services sector in both economies 
are comparable to those of the European Union. Their interprovince/interstate 
market could be taken as having the maximum possible integration. Regulatory 
barriers are low in both countries. According to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Canada’s regulatory regime was rated 
0.95 and the United States’ at 0.84 in 2008, compared with the most restrictive 
regime in Europe rated at 2.60 and the most liberal one at 0.84. Although 
provinces/states have their own rules and organizational legacies, the federal 
government in both countries provides a framework for regulating services. The 
Box 2.7: Can liberalization of services contribute to productivity growth? Evidence from the Czech Republic 
The debate on the welfare effects of trade 
and investment liberalization has traditionally 
centered on goods. The literature conﬁ rms 
productivity gains in many cases. Services 
liberalization is another potential source of 
productivity gains—working through the 
same channels. The evidence, however, has 
been scarce—even more so when it comes 
to plant- or ﬁ rm-level evidence. But a recent 
study by Arnold, Javorcik, and Mattoo (2011) 
on the Czech Republic’s services liberalization 
in the late 1990s helps to shed some light on 
the issue.
In 1998, the Czech Republic adopted a more 
friendly approach to foreign direct investment, 
including services. In telecommunications, 
for example, a third mobile operator entered 
the market in 2000 with 100 percent foreign 
ownership, and one existing mobile company 
attracted a controlling stake by a foreign 
investor. In banking, 90 percent of assets were 
in foreign hands by 2001. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that services 
seem to have become more reliable after 
allowing foreign entry. Moreover, these 
foreign providers were at the forefront of 
introducing innovations. For example, Ceska 
Sporitelna, an Austrian-owned bank, installed 
1,080 ATMs across the country. It was also 
the ﬁ rst bank to offer transaction ATMs and 
became the market leader in remote banking. 
Cash ﬂ ow management tools, multimodal 
transport services, and digital services in 
telecommunications were also introduced by 
foreign companies. 
Results of a World Bank survey of 350 Czech 
ﬁ rms provide more systematic support. The 
share of positive perceptions ranged from 
55 percent of the respondents when asked 
about the quality of accounting and auditing 
services to 82 percent for telecommunications. 
With regard to the variety of products offered, 
the positive views of liberalization varied 
between 56 percent of respondents who 
evaluated accounting and auditing services 
to 87 percent of respondents asked about 
telecommunications. 
Analysis of data from a panel of manufacturing 
ﬁ rms over 1998–2003 conﬁ rms that allowing 
foreign entry into services industries is the key 
channel through which services liberalization 
contributes to better performance of 
“downstream” manufacturing sectors. 
Liberalization is captured in four ways: an 
index of policy reforms, the share of foreign-
owned ﬁ rms in services output, the share of 
private ﬁ rms in services output, and the extent 
of competition. There is a strong correlation 
between services sector reform and the 
productivity of local producers relying on 
services as intermediate inputs.
Source: Arnold, Javorcik, and Mattoo 2011.
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best guess is that intra-EU cross-border services trade could double or triple if 
the internal market functioned as well as the Canadian market for services 
(box 2.6). 
Allowing greater foreign competition in services has helped to increase 
productivity in downstream manufacturing, that is, activities that rely on 
efﬁ cient provision of services. The experience of the Czech Republic illustrates 
these beneﬁ ts (box 2.7).
Could trade in modern services drive growth?
As Europe looks for new ways to increase incomes and productivity, it could 
better facilitate both the goods and services trade. The potential is believed 
to be greater for services trade. Whereas increasing trade volumes in niche 
products or services fuels economic growth, growth can also be achieved by 
improving the sophistication of goods and services exports. Export “quality” 
in goods and services helps economic growth or at least is associated with 
growth—what you export matters. While growth in manufacturing is still an 
important track for many countries, services exports may be an additional or 
even alternative channel. For the services-dominated economies in Europe, it 
may even be a big part of the solution to the search for an “export-oriented 
growth model.”11
This raises the question of how far the specialization in services can go in 
Europe, given the globalization of services and the competition from Asia. 
That is, does Europe have a comparative advantage in services? The revealed 
comparative advantage in goods and services—deﬁ ned as the shares of the 
goods and services category in a country’s export basket compared to their 
shares in the global export basket—are informative in assessing this. The EU15 
has a revealed comparative advantage in services, and the gap between goods 
and services is increasing (ﬁ gure 2.18). The new member states also appear to 
have a comparative advantage in services; the gap with goods was sizable in 
the 1990s but is now at the same level as in the EU15 economies. EU candidate 
countries had a comparative advantage in services until the early 2000s; now 
they have a comparative disadvantage.12 
Note: The index greater than one means the country has a comparative advantage in the activity.
Source: Lundstrom Gable and Mishra 2011.
Figure 2.18: The European 
Union has a comparative 
advantage in services
(revealed comparative 
advantage, services and 
goods, 1990–2009)
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Trends in productivity seem to back this assessment. Service productivity is 
many times higher in the EU15 than in emerging Europe. This can be explained 
by a more efﬁ cient service sstructure and workforce in the EU15 and by the 
type of services produced there. Services productivity has increased globally 
over the last decade, even for already high-productivity service economies 
such as those in the EU15. The growth in services productivity in the European 
Union’s new member states has been highest, while EU candidate countries are 
catching up with higher-income countries more slowly.13
However, the services exports of the European Union are less sophisticated 
than those of India or the United States. Applying the technique used to 
measure the sophistication of goods production and exports is not easily 
extended to services, because data are much less disaggregated for services 
(box 2.8). But with services accounting for such a large proportion of GDP and 
hence of aggregate productivity growth, it is useful to analyze whether there is 
a link between the sophistication of services exports and GDP growth.
On average, the PRODYs for modern services are higher and their growth has 
been greater, despite higher initial levels. The EU15 has 43 percent of its export 
basket in modern services, the EU12 has 26 percent, and the EU candidate 
countries 11 percent. The world average is 21 percent. Due to the high PRODYs 
for modern services, EU15 EXPY is to a large extent explained by the high share 
of modern services, especially ﬁ nancial services. For the new member states 
and the EU candidates, the EXPY is still determined more by traditional services 
(table 2.4).
Box 2.8: Measuring the sophistication of services exports is much more difﬁ cult than for goods
It is not straightforward to apply the 
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) 
methodology, developed for measuring the 
sophistication of exported goods, to measure 
how sophisticated services exports are.
Service PRODYs, reﬂ ecting the income 
level associated with each category of 
services produced in a country, must ﬁ rst be 
calculated. In technical terms, PRODYj is the 
income associated with the service j, and is 
constructed by using the service export share 
of a country i in world’s export of service j, 
divided by the sum of shares of j in world 
exports of j across all countries exporting 
that service. The ratios are multiplied by the 
exporting countries’ per capita income (Y) 
and the result is summed for all countries. In 
effect, the PRODY is the weighted average of 
per capita GDPs, where the weights represent 
the revealed comparative advantage in service 
j for each country.  PRODYs are constructed for 
each service category and are by construction 
the same for all countries. EXPY is then the 
weighted income value of services exported 
by a country, computed as the weighted 
sum of PRODYs; the weights are the share of 
the particular service in the country’s total 
services export basket. 
Trade data come from the IMF Balance of 
Payments statistics, available for more than 
190 countries from 1990 to 2007. Due to data 
availability, the sample has just 100 countries. 
GDP data are from the World Development 
Indicators. 
There are two differences for the services 
EXPY compared with the measure for goods 
exports: a high level of aggregation and the 
need for dynamic PRODYs. First, services 
export data are less detailed than for goods. 
There are only ten categories of services 
exports, compared with several hundred for 
goods. If a country—within a broad services 
export category—moves from a low PRODY 
subcategory of services to one with a higher 
PRODY, this does not show up in the static 
EXPY. So while constructing the Services EXPY, 
PRODY values of a service export are allowed 
to vary from year to year. Hence, an increase in 
dynamic EXPY can be due to either an increase 
in the PRODY of a service or an increase in the 
share of high PRODY products in the export 
basket. 
The second reason is that countries are 
exporting higher-value services, but the 
services exports themselves are increasing 
in sophistication due to information and 
communication technology. Many richer 
countries are exporting services, boosting the 
PRODYs of some service export categories.  
Since the data are much less disaggregated 
for services, using static PRODY would not 
capture the higher PRODY service exports that 
are subcategories of the broader groups in 
Balance of Payments data. The dynamic EXPY 
incorporates this because it allows the PRODYs 
to change over time. 
Source: Lundstrom Gable and Mishra 2011.
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Services exports in the European Union are becoming more sophisticated. 
Figure 2.19 shows the evolution of Services EXPY. All groups start out with 
more or less the same level of sophistication in the beginning of the 1990s, 
and diverge in the late 1990s. The EU15 made the largest jump in the late 
1990s, while the new member states continued an already strong trend though 
at a lower level than the EU15. The EU candidate countries and the eastern 
partnership countries dropped in Services EXPY in the late 1990s and have not 
been able to catch up since. 
Compared to non-European peers, however, the EU15 has fallen behind. The 
services PRODY of the United States has been higher than that of the EU15 
since the early 2000s. This is consistent with the growing productivity gap in 
services with the United States highlighted in chapter 1 as one of Europe’s key 
challenges. India has seen a big increase in PRODY, and China has been closing 
the gap as well. 
In general, countries with a high Services EXPY also have a high goods EXPY. 
European economies have more sophisticated exports than the median country, 
somewhat more so for goods exports than for services. To what extent has 
higher services trade sophistication been reﬂ ected in faster economic growth? 
Lundstrom Gable and Mishra (2011) ﬁ nd evidence of an association between 
growth and services trade sophistication for a global sample. In Europe, the 
correlation is especially strong for the European Union’s new member states. 
Table 2.4: EU services exports are more sophisticated than those of the rest of the world
(PRODYs, 1990–95, 1996–99, and 2000–07, and PRODY values and shares by service and country group)
World 2007 services export share (percent) 2007 EXPY share
1990–95 1996–99 2000–07 World EU15
New 
member 
states
EU candi-
dates World EU15
New 
member 
states
EU candi-
dates
Traditional services
   Transportation 8,161 9,629 11,990 21 19 32 18 8 5 10 8
   Travel 7,433 7,851 8,999 41 22 30 58 6 3 5 15
   Construction 14,510 10,534 10,464 2 2 3 3 8 7 12 20
   Personal, cultural, and 
   recreational 14,510 10,534 10,464 1 1 3 2 10 5 30 26
Modern services
   Communications 6,261 6,320 7,584 4 2 3 4 5 3 5 9
   Insurance 8,167 11,306 13,630 2 2 0 1 9 9 2 5
   Financial 18,590 23,063 25,743 3 9 3 1 20 33 10 4
   Computer and information 14,916 20,092 18,797 2 5 3 1 12 16 10 6
   Royalties and license fees 10,263 13,293 14,707 1 3 1 0 12 10 6 2
   Other business services 7,883 9,437 13,162 15 26 19 9 10 9 9 5
Note: Government services are not included.
Source: Lundstrom Gable and Mishra 2011.
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Making the single market work for services
Services are where most economic regulations are concentrated (Conway and 
Nicoletti 2006). Mainly, this is due to the difﬁ culty in evaluating the quality of 
services. The consumer cannot be certain about the quality of services until 
after they have been consumed, and sometimes not even then. The production 
and consumption of services also cannot easily be separated in place and time, 
making it difﬁ cult to standardize services products. In the case of complex 
services (such as professional services), the consumer may not have the 
knowledge to make a judgment about the services even after consumption. 
Regulations are necessary to address this problem of “asymmetric information.” 
They may also be needed because of the externalities associated with some 
services (for example, in the ﬁ nancial sector) and the need to provide equal 
access to essential services such as transportation and utilities. 
Homogenize regulations
Because of cumbersome regulations, services providers have to overcome 
many barriers to be able to export: outright legal discrimination (as with 
exclusive rights to domestic providers), implicit restrictive regulations (for 
example, licensing based on domestic qualiﬁ cations), and lack of transparency 
and nonlegal barriers like language and culture. Some countries require services 
providers to meet an “economic needs test” to show that—even if they will 
provide better choice and value for consumers—they will not undercut or 
destabilize local competitors. These tests leave room for arbitrary enforcement. 
Businesses ﬁ nd it costly just to ﬁ nd out what the legal and administrative 
formalities are. For example, an engineering company may end up spending 3 
percent of annual turnover on researching the differing legal requirements in 
just two other member states of the European Union where it wanted to supply 
services (World Trade Organization 2009b). These hurdles discourage services 
exports. Nicoletti and others (2003), among others, ﬁ nd that high regulation 
intensity between OECD countries depresses trade in services. Moreover, they 
ﬁ nd that the impact is greater than for trade in goods.
A unique character of services further compounds the issue. Services are often 
partly produced where they are consumed. The production process uses inputs 
Figure 2.19: India and 
the United States have 
more sophisticated 
services exports than 
the European Union
(service EXPY, 1990-2007 
(left), and shares in service 
EXPY, 2007 (right))
Source: Lundstrom Gable and 
Mishra 2011.
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from both exporting and importing countries, which does not apply to goods. 
As a result, providers who want to export are subject to the regulations of both 
countries. Mirza and Nicoletti (2004), for example, ﬁ nd evidence that policy 
factors affecting the use of inputs in the exporting and importing country both 
have impact on the same ﬂ ow of traded services between the two countries, 
and the effects are of similar scale. Nicoletti and others (2003) ﬁ nd similar 
problems using regulations in exporting and importing countries to evaluate 
regulation intensity.
The differences between trading partners’ regulatory regimes hinder the 
growth of the single market. Each member has its own qualiﬁ cation criteria, 
implying additional compliance costs every time a ﬁ rm wants to expand to a 
new country. The importance of regulatory harmonization has been supported 
by recent studies. Kox and Lejour (2005) show that high heterogeneity in 
domestic regulations, together with the level of regulatory intensity, depresses 
cross-border trade in services. Kox and Lejour (2007) show that harmonization 
or mutual recognition by countries could lead to a 13–30 percent increase in 
trade. Notably, both studies suggest that eliminating explicit legal barriers is not 
sufﬁ cient either to promote either cross-border trade or to attract foreign direct 
investment in services.
Remove regulatory barriers
Much like tariffs on trade in goods, stringent regulations also shield domestic 
ﬁ rms from foreign pressure and reduce the competitiveness of domestic 
providers in regional and world markets. Firms also have little incentive to 
innovate. Existing studies consistently illustrate that a high level of regulation 
in exporting countries is also associated with low bilateral trade ﬂ ows in 
services (for example, Mirza and Nicoletti 2004; Kox and Lejour 2005). Services 
Box 2.9: Reviving the reform agenda for the European single market
Enlargement and creation of the single market 
has proved beneﬁ cial for all EU members. 
European enterprises found it easier to trade 
goods and services across borders. Yet, the 
single market is far from efﬁ cient. Small and 
medium enterprises face difﬁ culties when 
recovering foreign liabilities. EU citizens have 
to re-register a car and pay taxes every time 
they move to a different country. 
Although the services sector in Europe 
contributes substantially to GDP growth and 
job creation, the reform agenda for creating 
a Single Market for Services is far from 
complete. Technological transformation has 
left Europe’s market for modern services 
well behind that of its global peers. At the 
same time, political and social support 
for it seems to have lost momentum. The 
attention given to policies for strengthening 
a European single market differs considerably 
across the European Union’s member states. 
Paradoxically, overall enthusiasm for a single 
market declined even more during the recent 
ﬁ nancial crisis, while in fact Europe needs a 
strong internal market now more than ever 
before. 
A recent report by Mario Monti (2010, p.37) for 
the European Commission points out that the 
“single market is Europe’s original idea and 
unﬁ nished business”. It lists the completion 
of the single market as a prerequisite for 
economic growth in Europe. For the common 
digital market, the report recommends an 
introduction of a pan-European licensing 
market, EU copyright law, and European 
Union–wide online broadcasting as well as 
improvement of the business environment 
for cross-border e-commerce. Development 
of the European digital market by 2020 could 
yield around 4 percent of the European Union’s 
GDP. EU customers would beneﬁ t from greater 
integration of retail banking. Workers would 
beneﬁ t from greater mobility due to better 
information about amenities in other member 
states. 
The report recognizes the discrepancies in how 
different countries imagine a fully functioning 
single market. New strategies proposed in 
the report seek a common ground between 
the Anglo-Saxon preference for competition, 
the variety of experiences among Nordic 
countries, the ambitions of emerging Europe, 
and the concerns of social market economies. 
But before new strategies are drafted and 
implemented, Europe would beneﬁ t from 
fully reinforcing laws already passed. On 
average more than half of EU directives are 
not implemented on time by the member 
states. The full implementation of the Services 
Directive alone could yield between €60 and 
€140 billion.
Source: Monti 2010.
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liberalization tends to foster productivity growth in the broader economy 
(Francois and Hoekman 2010).  
The European Commission (2002) did a comprehensive inventory of the internal 
regulatory barriers that hinder cross-border trade and prevent the commercial 
presence of foreign services providers. Services providers hit internal barriers 
at every stage of the business process. The report also discovered that many 
barriers are “horizontal”—that is, they affect a wide range of activities. It 
identiﬁ ed a wide range of barriers to services providers at every stage of 
business operation: from distributing services, selling services, and dealing 
with after-sales issues for cross-border trade, to establishing a business, using 
inputs, and promoting business for exporting through commercial presence. 
The distribution of services is affected by residency or nationality requirements, 
which prevent provision from home countries. Small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) are hit the hardest. A recent report done for the European Commission 
reported that the gains from implementing the Services Directive are close to 
€500 billion (box 2.9). 
There are many examples of companies that ﬁ nd it almost impossible to set 
up subsidiaries in other EU member states. Some actually ﬁ nd it harder to 
get established in the EU15 than in the new member states. This report also 
documents that all services providers encounter, at least, barriers at one stage 
of the business process; often they encounter them at several or even at all 
stages. Many barriers are horizontal. One common feature is a “single regime,” 
in which the national government applies the same regulations to both cross-
border services trade and sales through commercial presence. A single regime 
may lead to duplication of requirements and disproportionate burdens for the 
second category because it already complies with home regulations. Legal 
uncertainty is another problem. 
SMEs often do not have sufﬁ cient resources to meet these requirements or 
to afford the extra legal assistance costs. Monti (2010) provides the example 
of cross-border enforcement of judicial awards, which can cost as much as 
€2,000 even for pure formalities. As a result, SMEs are either dissuaded from 
cross-border activities or are at a clear competitive disadvantage compared to 
domestic operators. Those from less developed EU members are particularly 
disadvantaged. SMEs often do not consider expanding to other member states, 
even if their services are not market-speciﬁ c and have export potential. There 
is a lack of trust and a natural resistance to deal with services providers from 
other member states. 
The OECD product market regulation indicators help to measure regulatory 
barriers (OECD 2011). They quantify the barriers to several services sectors and 
network industries, offering a good basis to compare regulation of services. 
According to the latest (2008) indicators, the EU member and candidate 
countries have removed many of the obvious restrictions to trade and foreign 
investment. But they have been slow to improve domestic regulations, which 
affect the services trade and investment more. Administrative hurdles, barriers 
to entry, and restrictions to competition in domestic markets remain a concern 
of many European countries, especially Turkey, Poland, and Greece. 
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Note: The indicators range from 0 to 6, with 6 the most restrictive.
Source: Conway and Nicoletti 2006; and OECD 2011.
Note: A negative number indicates liberalization.
Source: Conway and Nicoletti 2006; and OECD 2011.
Note: The indicators range from 0 to 6, with 6 the most restrictive. In panels 
for changes, negative numbers indicate liberalization.
Source: OECD 2011.
Figure 2.20: European 
economies have 
made trade easier
Figure 2.21: Professional 
services remain 
tightly regulated
(product market 
regulation indicators 
for regulations in 
professional services, 
2008)
Figure 2.22: Not all 
countries are making 
trade in business 
services easier
(changes in product 
market regulation 
indicators for regulations 
in professional services, 
2003–08)
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The majority of the EU members were rated as having a fairly open regime 
toward foreign business (ﬁ gure 2.20). But regulatory regimes for services tend 
to be more restrictive. Professional services remain tightly regulated, with 
legal services the most restrictive (ﬁ gure 2.21). Exclusive rights are reserved 
for lawyers in a majority of the countries. In addition to a law degree, practical 
experiences and professional examinations are also widely demanded. 
Concerning conduct regulation, only 2 countries of 22 allowed sole practitioners. 
Advertising by legal professionals is prohibited or regulated in most countries. 
There are six types of regimes to govern prices, ranging from minimum prices 
on some to all legal services, to maximum prices on some to all services. Some 
countries such as Luxembourg have actually tightened controls on professional 
services since 2003 (ﬁ gure 2.22).
Implement the services directive
The European Parliament and the Council adopted a directive on services in the 
internal market in 2006 (generally referred to as the “Services Directive”) to 
eliminate barriers to the “freedom to provide services within the community” 
and the “freedom of establishment.” It was designed to serve as a new 
legislative impetus for deeper integration. It has a relatively wide coverage.14  
When the draft was proposed by the European Commission in January 2004, 
the Services Directive was regarded as ambitious and far-reaching.15 
Box 2.10: Facilitating the services trade in the Western Balkans
The share of services in the economy has been 
increasing in the Western Balkans (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Serbia). It now accounts for about 70–75 
percent of GDP in every country except Serbia, 
where services are still less than 60 percent. 
Travel, transport, construction, real estate, 
and wholesale and retail trade are the largest 
service sectors. 
Trade in services has been increasing too. 
Services exports averaged €16 billion a year 
in 2007–09 and were 10 percent of GDP in the 
landlocked countries but about 20 percent or 
more in Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro. 
Tourism receipts are three-quarters of services 
exports in Croatia and Montenegro. The 
average ratio of services imports to GDP is 
about 10 percent, with Albania (18 percent) at 
the high end and Bosnia and Herzegovina (5 
percent) at the low end. 
While the size of services exports in the 
Balkans is similar to those of the EU15 and 
the new member state economies, the 
sophistication of exports differs. Traditional 
services dominate: travel accounts for two-
thirds of total services exports—concentrated 
in the coastal countries—followed by 
transport at 14 percent and construction at 
less than 5 percent. From modern services, 
communications service exports are the 
largest, but they are still less than 5 percent 
of services exports. Exports of computer and 
information and communication technology 
(ICT) services have been on the rise, but 
concentrated in Croatia, Serbia, and FYR 
Macedonia. Business services are 8 percent of 
total services exports, but poor statistics make 
it difﬁ cult to analyze their composition and 
direction.
Western Balkan countries are disadvantaged 
vis-à-vis the EU15 and the new member states 
because they do not have full access to the 
European Union’s markets. In fact, companies 
face problems even when trying to export to 
other signatories of the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which replaced 32 
bilateral agreements in 2007, and eliminated 
most barriers to trade in manufactures and 
farm products. 
In assessing what can help trade in services 
between the six CEFTA countries, a recent 
World Bank study looked at ﬁ ve areas: market 
access, commercial presence, performance 
requirements, protection of rights, and 
movement of people. The region has made 
progress in all aspects except the movement 
of natural persons. Tedious work authorization 
procedures and nonrecognition of professional 
qualiﬁ cation mean that none of the CEFTA 
countries offers “freedom of employment.” 
Other problems:
• In construction, the main problem is 
that companies have to establish a local 
presence; only Bosnia and Herzegovina 
allows cross-border provision. 
• In road transport (three-quarters of the 
transport business), bilateral relations still 
affect trade. 
• ICT services are the most open of all the 
traded services; the biggest problem may 
be enforcing intellectual property rights. 
Aside from these barriers, service exporters 
now face the hassles that all entrepreneurs 
have to deal with: enforcing contracts 
and dealing with product, labor, and land 
regulations. But perhaps the biggest 
impediment to the development of the 
services trade in the Western Balkans now is 
getting the same access to the large EU market 
that Bulgaria, Romania, and the other new 
member states enjoy. 
Source: Handjiski and Sestovic 2011.
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Its expected beneﬁ ts were subjected to a number of assessments. Because 
of the wide scope of the Directive, particularly in its draft (not the ﬁ nal) form, 
these assessments serve as illustrative estimates of the potential gains of 
deeper integration of services. 
How big are the likely gains from homogenizing regulations and reducing 
regulatory barriers? Researchers have used two approaches to answering this 
question: evaluate the effects of proposed legislative reforms, and compare the 
single market with the internal market of benchmark countries. Both suggest 
that deeper integration through dismantling the regulatory barriers can yield 
signiﬁ cant trade gains. 
Kox and Lejour (2006) focus on other commercial services, excluding 
transportation and travel, to be close to the scope of the Services Directive. 
The assumption is that the Services Directive will be fully implemented. 
Explicit barriers to trade and direct investment are expected to be reduced 
substantially, while barriers to competition are only moderately reduced. Their 
results indicate that cross-border trade in commercial services in the European 
Union could increase by 30–60 percent, while the foreign direct investment 
stock in services might rise by 20–35 percent. 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) evaluates the effects of the Services Directive 
on trade in regulated professional and business services and distributive trade. 
The analysis indicates that the Services Directive will reduce the existing 
barriers to service provision by more than 50 percent. The direct policy 
impact—intra-EU trade enhancement—is between 1.0 and 9.4 percent for 
cross-border trade and between 1.3 and 2.7 percent for foreign direct 
investment, for the three sectors included. The analysis also predicts gains in 
employment and well-being. As highlighted by Monti (2010), however, poor 
implementation and poor enforcement of EU directives regulating the single 
market continue to hamper the realization of these gains. 
Improve the services trade among candidate and partner countries
For the non-EU economies in Europe, the problems are more severe. Services 
exporters have trouble accessing the EU markets. They also have difﬁ culties 
accessing other nearby markets, as a recent World Bank report documents 
(box 2.10). Even the services traders in the former Yugoslavia—who have 
shared language and legislation for decades—now have trouble accessing 
regional markets. The typical barriers that exporters face relate to movement 
of natural persons (such as work permits for professionals and unskilled labor), 
licensing procedures (licenses issued in the home country are not recognized 
by the importing country), and recognition of professional skills and diplomas 
(qualiﬁ cations obtained in the home country are not recognized). The difﬁ culty 
of such barriers differs by activity: they present a signiﬁ cant obstacle to ﬁ rms 
and individuals in construction, transport, legal, and health sectors, but not 
for ICT ﬁ rms, banks, or telecommunications companies. For them, the agenda 
includes facilitation of trade in traditional services (construction, transportation, 
and travel) as well as attempts to revive trade in modern services with the 
economies of the European Union. 
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The Common Agricultural Policy—cheap, 
but not worth it
The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been subject 
to a lot of criticism for its wastefulness (it absorbs around one-third of the 
European Commission’s annual budget, costing about €50 billion annually), 
poor targeting of beneﬁ ts (larger farms in richer EU countries beneﬁ t more than 
small farms and poorer EU countries), and weakening of Europe’s position in 
international trade talks. Moreover, EU agricultural subsidies are contributing 
to maintaining the European Union’s position as a global net exporter of food, 
thereby discouraging the expansion of production in locations with much lower 
production costs and potentially contributing to higher global food prices 
as a result.
The criticism is well founded but probably a little exaggerated. At least 
in money terms, the CAP is relatively cheap, and the policies have been 
improved over time to become less distortional. It has progressively focused on 
supporting rural development or ecological objectives, such as organic farming, 
and helping the European Union’s new members to comply with elaborate food 
safety regulations. And the European Union is the world’s largest importer of 
agricultural commodities from the world’s poorest countries, though this is 
because of special trade preference—despite the CAP, not because of it. But 
perhaps the biggest cost of the CAP to Europe is that it limits the opportunities 
resulting from economic integration with its eastern neighbors, which have 
among the largest underused land resources in the world. 
Ukraine has about 42 million hectares of land suited for agriculture, of which 
only 30 million hectares are actually used; by comparison, the United Kingdom, 
one of the world’s top 20 agricultural exporters in 2010, has a total of 12 million 
hectares. Between 1990 and 2000, the land under cultivation in Ukraine actually 
fell by about 2 million hectares as agricultural production decreased. About 30 
percent of Ukraine’s workers are on farms that are quite efﬁ cient, other than 
Box 2.11: Ukraine would gain a lot if it could get freer access to the European Union’s agricultural market
Ukraine’s exports in 2008 were about $70 
billion—about 36 percent of its GDP. The 
European Union is Ukraine’s largest export 
market, but its share has dropped from 40 
percent in 2002 to 29 percent in 2008. The 
Russian Federation is the second-largest 
export market, with a share constant at about 
24 percent. The combined share of Turkey, the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, India, and Kazakhstan 
has gone up from 7 percent to 17 percent. 
Ukraine is just 1 percent of the European 
Union’s (third party) imports. 
Barley, wheat, maize, and sunﬂ ower seeds are 
Ukraine’s main agricultural exports. In the ﬁ ve 
years leading up to World Trade Organization 
accession in April 2008, Ukraine reduced 
import tariffs on most goods from 15–66 
percent to 5–15 percent, with the exception 
of sugar, for which the tariff was 80 percent 
but has been reduced to 50 percent. Ukraine’s 
wheat exports to the European Union face a 
tariff of 10.5 percent, and its barley and maize 
exports a tariff of about 6.5 percent. Sunﬂ ower 
seeds are not subject to a tax, but sunﬂ ower 
oil faces a 6.5 percent tariff. However, the 
nature of EU import tariff calculations and 
exemptions means that ad valorem tariff rates 
ﬂ uctuate a lot. Again, observed tariffs on 
barley imports from Ukraine were 16 percent 
between 2003 and 2007, but have fallen to 
zero since.
A “deep and comprehensive” free trade 
agreement between Ukraine and the European 
Union will help Ukraine a lot more than it will 
the European Union. A full liberalization of 
cereals and processed food imports will give 
Ukraine immediate beneﬁ ts of more than $350 
million annually, or about 0.6 percent of GDP. 
Agricultural output and land use would rise by 
about 6 percent, mainly to grow more wheat, 
maize, and oilseeds. Ukrainian sunﬂ ower- and 
beet-processing industries would face more 
competition from EU producers, but even 
considering this, Ukraine would gain $200 
million each year. This is not a large amount, 
but the agricultural reforms that the trade 
might encourage would also bring Ukraine 
institutionally and economically closer to the 
European Union. 
Source: Chauffour and others 2010.
123
CHAPTER 2
for beet sugar. The European Union is still Ukraine’s largest export market, but 
just barely. Its share has been falling during the last decade, as Central European 
countries that have joined the European Union replace Ukrainian farm products 
in the common market (box 2.11). 
The European Union, Russia, and Ukraine have accounted for more than 80 
percent of Belarus’s exports over the last decade, and about 90 percent of 
imports. Russia’s share in Belarus’s exports has been declining—from 65 
percent in 1998 to 32 percent in 2008—but its share in imports has been stable. 
During this time, the European Union’s share in overall exports has increased 
from 16 to 43 percent. Agricultural exports are a different story. While Russia’s 
share in agricultural exports has stayed between 83 and 93 percent during 
the last decade, the European Union’s share has fallen. For dairy products, 
one of Belarus’s main farm exports, the decline was from 48 percent in 2000 
to almost zero in 2008 (World Bank 2009). Much of this decline may be the 
result of Belarus’s own sanitary and safety policies rather than the European 
Union’s demands, but the result is the same: the prospects for the 30 percent of 
Belarussians who depend on agriculture for a living remain poor. 
The European Union’s approach to Moldova shows how it can be done. 
Moldova is the most rural and agricultural economy in Europe. More than half 
of its population is rural, a third of its labor force is in farming, and agriculture 
accounts for about a ﬁ fth of GDP. Agricultural output is still about a third 
below its pretransition level. Perhaps helped by its small size—its trade is 
just 0.1 percent of the European Union’s trade—Moldova is doing better than 
Belarus and Ukraine in accessing the European Union’s single market for farm 
products. But the European Union’s share in its agricultural exports is just 
Box 2.12: (Not) extending the single market to the European Union’s eastern partners—the case of Georgia
Messerlin and others (2011) argue that the 
European Commission’s current approach 
to trade with Georgia serves neither the 
European Union nor Georgia well. According to 
the analysis in the report, it is: 
 · Bad development policy for Georgia. It 
requires Georgia to adopt and implement 
many imprecisely identiﬁ ed EU internal 
market regulations that go beyond trade-
related matters, many of which do not 
make sense for Georgia and other eastern 
partners. The regulatory changes imposed 
on Georgia are equivalent to taxing 
producers—endangering its growth and the 
sustainability of its ﬁ ght against corruption, 
which is crucial for economic growth. The 
preconditions in sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures may double the price of many 
food products purchased by the third of 
Georgians who live in poverty. A better set 
of conditions would focus on infrastructure, 
which is probably the binding constraint for 
growth in Georgia.
 · Bad commercial policy for the European 
Union and Georgia. It would lead to an 
expansion of the trade between Georgia 
and non-EU countries. Georgian consumers 
would be induced to import what Georgian 
producers could no longer sell because of 
EU norms; and their low incomes would 
induce them to turn to imports from 
non-EU sources that are less expensive 
than those from the European Union. To 
survive, producers who would not be able 
to sell their products any more on Georgian 
markets under EU norms would sell them 
to foreign markets not observing EU norms, 
thereby artiﬁ cially boosting Georgia’s 
exports to non-EU countries.
 · Bad foreign policy for the European Union. 
Preconditions are being imposed on a 
country that is granted no EU membership 
perspective. They would make the EU deep 
and comprehensive free trade agreement 
(DCFTA) partners appear like EU member 
states but without full access to the EU 
markets in agriculture and services and 
without EU aid.
The study’s conclusion: The European Union 
should not inadvertently discourage Georgia 
from continuing its successful domestic 
reforms. It should open negotiations with 
Georgia without further delay since it has 
more than satisﬁ ed the relevant subset of 
preconditions. More broadly, a pro-growth 
DCFTA process would mean asking Georgia 
to do things as and when its income reaches 
sensible thresholds. In general, the European 
Commission’s DCFTA doctrine should be made 
clearer, coordinated better among EU agencies 
(since DCFTAs involve a lot more than trade), 
and adapted to the circumstances of the 
partner.
Source: Messerlin and others 2011. 
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about 36 percent, about half of this due to the European Union’s enlargement 
and Moldova’s long-established trade with Romania and Poland. Moldova has 
one of the most liberal trade regimes among developing countries, but trade 
is hampered by a poor domestic environment for doing business and capacity 
shortfalls in meeting the European Union’s sanitary and quality standards. 
Moldova needs the European Union’s assistance, and will get it through a deep 
and comprehensive free trade agreement. 
If Moldova shows how the European Union’s trade policies should be designed, 
Georgia’s experience may well illustrate the opposite. Agriculture accounts for 
about half of Georgia’s labor force, and about a third of Georgians live below the 
poverty line. Farm exports could be a potent source of growth for Georgia, and 
the country is negotiating a deeper economic partnership with the European 
Union, with agricultural trade as a special focus. Messerlin and others (2011) 
point out that “Georgia’s own trade policy is more open towards the EU than 
vice versa, and Georgia has achieved governance reforms on a par with some 
of the old and new EU member states” (p. i). The European Commission is 
viewed as insisting on a difﬁ cult set of preconditions before negotiating, which 
it has not done for either Ukraine or neighbors in the southern Mediterranean. 
These may hurt Georgia’s poor, and not really improve Georgia’s growth 
prospects (box 2.12). 
Trade—the mainstay of the European model
This chapter asks whether Europe is taking advantage of enlargement through 
trade in manufactures, services, and agricultural products. The short answer is 
that it is doing so for industrial goods and traditional services, but it could do 
a lot better for modern services and agricultural produce. Trade in industrial 
goods has spread most quickly, not just to the European Union’s new members 
but also to European Free Trade Association economies such as Switzerland, 
candidate countries such as Turkey, eastern partnership nations such as Ukraine, 
and even nations further aﬁ eld such as Russia. Trade in agricultural goods has 
grown in the European Union and with the candidate countries, but it has not 
grown as much with the eastern partnership. The trade in modern services has 
increased mostly just within the European Union. In reaching this conclusion, 
this chapter tried to answer three questions. 
First, is “Factory Europe” as dynamic as “Factory Asia”? Yes, but in ways 
that are quite different. Factory Europe is growing bigger, but more noticeably 
it is getting smarter. Spurred by the need to compete globally, industrialists in 
Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, and other advanced countries are offshoring 
activities to their cheaper, less developed neighbors. These activities—and the 
goods trade between emerging and developed Europe—have been becoming 
more sophisticated, as Western Europe transfers progressively tougher tasks to 
countries in Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe. The beneﬁ ts extend not just 
to the new member states of the European Union such as the Czech Republic 
and Estonia, but also to the EU candidates such as Serbia and Turkey, and even 
the eastern partners such as Georgia and Ukraine. 
EU enlargement has had a limited effect on the size of Factory Europe, but it 
has changed its conﬁ guration. Enlargement has led to an increase in Factory 
125
CHAPTER 2
Europe’s complexity. The European Union’s internal trade in intermediate goods 
has become more sophisticated and has been using more relationship-speciﬁ c 
inputs. Factory Europe has become brainier. 
New members’ exports embody more complex and more time-sensitive 
relationships. As this trade has become bigger and more sophisticated, their 
trade facilities—ports, airports, customs regimes, and ICT infrastructure—have 
become strained. In particular, reducing infrastructural deﬁ cits in ICT is likely to 
result in sizable trade gains. 
Second, is the Single Market for Services underachieving compared with 
North America? The answer is that for traditional services, such as travel and 
construction, it is not. But it is for modern services such as communication, 
insurance, ﬁ nance, computers and information, royalties and license fees, and 
other business services—with the notable exception of banking. Technology has 
made them more productive and tradable. As in the rest of the world, European 
economic growth is increasingly composed of services. Services dominate 
growth in EU15 countries and, to less extent, in the new member states and 
candidate and partner countries. Within the European Union, trade in modern 
services is growing. But outside—in the Balkans and the eastern 
partnership—trade in modern services has stagnated. 
An educated estimate is that with the right policy measures, the trade in 
services can double in value within the decade, and possibly even triple. But 
for this to happen, the trade in modern services must be greatly facilitated. 
Ideally, services exporters should have to satisfy product market regulations 
in just one (current or aspiring) member state. Ideally, the qualiﬁ cations of 
professionals should be certiﬁ ed in just one country. Ideally, at least within the 
European Union, the movement of natural persons should be unfettered. For all 
these reasons, the single market is not likely to become as uniﬁ ed a market for 
services as those in the United States or Canada in the foreseeable future. But 
with appropriate changes in product market regulations, vendors of digitally 
tradable services might soon be able to treat Europe as a single market. 
Third, is the Common Agricultural Policy compromising Europe’s credibility in 
global trade talks? The European Union has followed increasingly enlightened 
trade policies toward the least developed countries of the world. But the 
European Union’s agricultural policies are hobbling its efforts to extend the 
beneﬁ ts of the single market closer to home—especially to eastern partners 
such as Georgia and Ukraine. The Common Agricultural Policy is popular among 
EU citizens, who appear to believe that 33 eurocents a day is a small price to 
pay for maintaining the livelihoods of the 15 million farmers and farmworkers in 
the European Union. In the eastern partnership countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—this number may be even more, 
because more than a third of their people depend on agriculture. The European 
Union is missing the opportunity to improve their lives, and win the hearts and 
minds of 75 million eastern partners. 
Increasing the trade in modern services is not easy because it requires 
improving and harmonizing regulations, in both exporting and importing 
countries. Addressing these barriers will require a consensus and measures 
to reassure skeptical consumers and workers (Monti 2010). Large gains may 
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Factory Asia is growing faster, but goods trade in 
Europe is more sophisticated.
The single market is working quite well for 
traditional services such as travel and transport, 
but it is underperforming in modern services such 
as insurance, information technology, and other 
business services.
The European Union’s agricultural policies hobble 
the extension of the single market to its neighbors, 
and Europe is missing an opportunity to improve the 
lives of 75 million people in the eastern 
partnership countries.
Answers to questions on page 87
be had in noncontroversial areas such as digital trade. Between 1998 and 
2003, many countries in Europe showed that product markets can be made 
more competitive. The momentum for market regulation was lost during the 
boom years between 2004 and 2008. Now it should be regained. As chapter 3 
discusses, Europe has shown that trade in one modern service—banking—can 
grow quickly and contribute to economic growth.
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1  By this measure, Turkey’s exports are more 
than ten times those of the next biggest 
exporter in this category (Romania), which 
in turn are much bigger than the third-
biggest. Turkey’s car exports more than 
tripled, and its share went from 0.7 to 6.7 
percent. Entry into the customs unions in 
1996 may have had a lot to do with this. For 
the other countries, cars are a small part of 
exports and unimportant for the region’s car 
trade.
2  This measure divides by GDP to control 
for total output (supply capacity), but 
within-region calculations arguably should 
be divided by the square of GDP to account 
for total demand as well. Doing so does not 
affect the main conclusions. 
3  Data issues preclude ﬁ rm conclusions, 
however. Numerous studies, using different 
time periods, and with different sectoral and 
different country focuses, come to varying 
conclusions. Hummels, Ishii, and Li (2001) 
report a declining share in intermediates 
trade in OECD countries between 1970 and 
1992, while Yeats (2001) reports an increase. 
Miroudot, Lanz, and Ragoussis (2009), and 
Curran and Zignago (2009) ﬁ nd constant 
shares of intermediates in total trade in 
OECD countries and Europe respectively 
since 1995. Baldwin and Venables (2011) 
question the reliability of trade data and 
prefer ﬁ rm-based analyses. Firm-level 
data show increasing fragmentation of 
production among German and Austrian 
companies as they outsource production 
toward the new member states, but micro 
studies for other Western European ﬁ rms 
are few. Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2011) 
show that Hungarian ﬁ rms have increased 
the import of intermediates, but the source 
of these imports cannot be ascertained in 
their analysis. 
4  Martínez-Zarzoso, Voicu, and Vidovic 
(2011) also ﬁ nd a rise in the variety of 
intermediates exported from six Central 
and Eastern European countries to the 
European Union at the same time as a fall 
in the varieties exported to non-EU OECD 
countries. But for imports, the results are 
not the same. They ﬁ nd a rise in the variety 
of imports in these six countries from the 
European Union at the same time as there is 
a fall in the variety of imports from non-EU 
OECD countries.
5  Romania (28 percent) and Bulgaria (13 
percent) had the biggest rises. The RSI 
measure appears to capture the effects of 
deeper integration beyond a customs union. 
6  The sample consists of Albania, Croatia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Turkey.
7  Other factors compound the estimation 
problems. Characteristics of third countries 
may determine bilateral trade ﬂ ows, similar 
to the trade in goods (Anderson 1979). 
The formation of a Free Trade Agreement 
may target existing policy issues between 
countries that are hard to observe (Baier 
and Bergstrand 2007). Taking advantage 
of panel data, recent studies are able to 
mitigate the inﬂ uence of these and other 
unobserved factors.
8  Previous studies are based on shorter 
time series, which restricts the choices 
of methodology, and the results are less 
consistent. See, for example, Ceglowski 
(2006) and Walsh (2006 and 2008).
9  The wide range of the estimate is mainly 
due to the poor quality of data for services 
trade. Data availability changes over the 
years, and the match between credit and 
debit data is poor.
10  Straathof and others (2008) study the effect 
for goods and for services and ﬁ nd a single 
market effect of some 30 percent for trade 
in goods, but only 10 percent for cross-
border trade in services. Trade in goods 
within the European Union is about 30–60 
percent higher than trade with or between 
third countries (see Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 
2003, Lejour, Solanic, and Tang 2006, 
Baldwin and Rieder 2007).
11  Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) have 
proposed that it is not just specialization but 
also the sophistication of exports of goods 
that matters for growth. To examine this 
phenomenon for service exports, Mishra, 
Lundstrom, and Anand (2011) propose an 
analogous index for studying service export 
sophistication. In a background paper for 
this report, Lundstrom Gable and Mishra 
(2011) show how different parts of Europe 
are faring in the services trade. 
12 Kandilov and Grennes (2010) argue that for 
some types of services and destinations, 
Central and Eastern Europe are effective 
competitors for Asia. 
13 Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) propose 
that countries in Eastern and Central Europe 
that undertook productivity-enhancing 
service reforms, such as reforms of ﬁ nancial 
and infrastructure services, have attracted 
more FDI and had higher economic growth. 
Fernandes (2009) conﬁ rms this, and shows 
that the large service productivity gap 
between the EU15 and the new member 
states is shrinking as the latter catch up. 
Moreover, this effect is stronger the further 
an activity is from the technological frontier, 
suggesting that liberalization of services can 
speed catch-up. 
14 The Services Directive excludes ﬁ nancial 
services, electronic communications 
services, most transport services, health 
care, services provided by temporary 
work agencies, private security services, 
audiovisual services, gambling, certain 
social services provided by the state, and 
services provided by notaries and bailiffs.
15 The draft was more ambitious than the 
Directive that was ﬁ nally issued. Most 
important, the draft proposed the “country 
of origin” principle, which was dropped from 
the ﬁ nal directive.
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Finance
In the boom years leading up to the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008–09, Western 
European banks moved aggressively into emerging Europe.1 Austrian, Italian, 
and Swedish banks were especially active; Belgian, French, and Greek banks 
a little less. Almost 80 percent of the banking sector in some countries that 
looked to Europe for trade and ﬁ nance—such as Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, and FYR Macedonia—were foreign-owned. It was big business. 
In 2007, Austria’s Raiffeisen and Erste banks had, directly or through their 
subsidiaries, about $300 billion in assets in emerging Europe, equivalent to 
almost 80 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). A ﬁ fth of the 
loans of Sweden’s biggest bank, Swedbank, were to customers in the Baltics. 
Italy’s massive Unicredit Group had the biggest stake in the banking systems 
of Central and Southeastern Europe, spanning 17 countries. Belgium’s KBC and 
France’s Société Générale were also active. Greek banks came a bit late but, 
on the eve of the crisis, Alpha, National Bank of Greece, and Piraeus Bank held 
sizable stakes in the Balkans. 
By mid-2009, many economists viewed this eastern expansion as a 
big mistake. Analysts who had covered crises in East Asia and Latin 
America saw emerging European economies as bubbles. Fears were rife 
that Western Europe’s banks would walk away from these subsidiaries, 
leaving inexperienced regulators to clean up the mess. Experts put out 
assessments viewing the close ties with foreign ﬁ nance as the result 
of policies that were inadequate to offset the misfortune of being too 
close to Western Europe. Few pundits felt that this ﬁ nancial integration 
might have been good for growth or to Eastern Europe’s advantage to be 
near—physically and ﬁ nancially—a developed system of banks, or even 
that some of these savings-starved countries had instituted policies good 
enough to get the best from Western European ﬁ nance. A massive pullout 
was expected. 
Chapter 3
Why is ﬁ nance in emerging Europe different from 
other regions?
How did some European economies beneﬁ t more 
from international ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows than others?
Is there evidence of a “debt overhang” in 
emerging Europe that reduces growth and justiﬁ es 
government intervention?
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It did not happen. These banks have all stayed, tolerating big losses in 2009 
as incomes fell and bad debts mounted. Swedbank’s Baltic Banking Unit 
cut its staff by a third and reported losses of about $200 million in the ﬁ rst 
quarter of 2010. Unicredit and Raiffeisen also suffered big losses. But by late 
2010, Raiffeisen’s quarterly proﬁ ts in the region had risen to $500 million and 
Swedbank was generating proﬁ ts from its Baltic business. Today, Eastern Europe 
accounts for about a tenth of the portfolios and proﬁ ts of Unicredit, Raiffeisen, 
Erste, Swedbank, and SEB. The head of Raiffeisen Bank International expects 
Western European banks to stay and grow in Eastern Europe: “The region still 
has a lot of catching up to do to reach the economic level of Western Europe. 
We will continue to beneﬁ t from this process at least in the next one and a half 
to two generations” (Hansen 2010).
This chapter asks and answers the question: Has ﬁ nancial integration in 
Europe happened too fast? The answer is a qualiﬁ ed no. The chapter shows 
that ﬁ nance in Europe has an enviable and unique feature—that capital ﬂ ows 
downhill, as economic textbooks argue it should. Financial ﬂ ows of all types 
go from richer, slower-growth countries to less developed fast growers. This 
close integration of the wealthy and the dynamic is an underappreciated 
attribute of the European economic model. The answer is qualiﬁ ed because 
emerging Europe, by being integrated, is now vulnerable to the consequences 
of prolonged uncertainty and potential ﬁ nancial deleveraging in the eurozone, 
and because ﬁ nancial integration in a few countries led to excesses and 
misallocation of resources. The chapter discusses how the risks can be better 
managed going forward. 
Three questions follow. 
 · Why is emerging Europe different from other regions such as East Asia 
and Latin America? The answer lies in the powerful pull of accession to 
the European Union. The implication is that the closer a country gets to the 
European Union in its policies and institutions, the more it stands to beneﬁ t 
from ﬁ nancial integration. Perhaps the expectation of stronger institutions 
sufﬁ ces to spur economic growth.
 · What helped some European economies—such as the Czech Republic, FYR 
Macedonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey—get more out of the 
largest international fi nancial fl ows in history than others during the years 
preceding the crisis? The main lesson is that external imbalances have 
to be managed, not eliminated. A blend of conservative economic 
policies—including cyclically sensitive ﬁ scal and macroprudential policies for 
managing systemic risk—will help to keep growth sustainable. Policymakers 
should do what they can to “boom-proof” public ﬁ nance and “crisis-proof” 
private ﬁ nance.
 · In other countries that did not manage these fl ows as well, is there 
evidence of a “debt overhang” that justifi es government intervention? 
Evidence in this chapter should persuade the reader that, for the most 
part, economies in emerging Europe are both liquid and solvent, and that 
treasuries, enterprises, and households are not facing a debt overhang that 
could become a drag on activity. Some banking sectors in emerging Europe 
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might well face challenging times ahead. But the dependence on foreign 
banks has so far been a blessing as banking ﬂ ows to the region have been 
remarkably stable. There are risks, but these originate primarily in the 
dependence on Western European banks that have large exposures in some 
EU cohesion countries, such as Greece, from where trouble could easily spill 
over into emerging Europe. 
Thus, the chapter concludes, foreign capital is an enviable development 
opportunity integral to Europe’s income-convergence engine. This strong 
conclusion comes with three caveats. First, it is based on an analysis of 
emerging Europe’s experience over the past decade. The chapter contrasts 
the experience of the “EU cohesion countries” (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Spain) with developments in emerging Europe. It does not analyze the 
experience of the cohesion countries in detail. However, as later chapters 
show, heavy regulatory barriers and an overextended public sector are more 
likely candidates to account for the woes of Europe’s south today. Second, the 
chapter suggests that the closeness to Western European ﬁ nance led in some 
cases to excesses. Therefore, external imbalances need to be managed to avoid 
a buildup of vulnerabilities, and the chapter provides some guidance on how 
to do so. To recover quickly and manage the next boom, policymakers must 
clearheadedly assess what led to the misuse of proximity to Western European 
ﬁ nance—and strengthen their preemptive and prudential arsenal. But managing 
external imbalances is not the same as self-insurance. Indeed, the latter is not 
the lesson policymakers in Europe should take away from the crises: Europe’s 
emerging economies should not “become Asian.” Third, the balance sheets of 
banks in Western Europe are strained by the sovereign debt problems faced in 
the eurozone. Since many of these banks are active in emerging Europe, they 
could be forced to deleverage from noncore markets; addressing the problems 
in the eurozone is thus crucial for all of Europe.
Europe is unique
Worldwide, ﬁ nancial integration progressed rapidly from the late 1990s. The 
sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a share of GDP—the ﬁ nancial equivalent 
of trade openness indicators—increased greatly. But the rise was not uniform. 
There is sharp widening of the interquartile range (the gap between the top 
and bottom 25 percent of the distribution) in some of the country groups (ﬁ gure 
3.1). Europe stands out as a region that experienced a deepening in ﬁ nancial 
integration, in particular the EU cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Spain) and the EU12 and EU candidate countries. Among emerging markets 
and the EU eastern partnership the increase is less steep. 
Financial fl ows in Europe are different
The types of capital that emerging Europe received are different. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was higher than in other emerging markets (ﬁ gure 3.2). 
Banking and other ﬂ ows, which recorded a sharp increase in the EU12 and EU 
candidate countries in 2005–08 relative to the preceding four-year period, also 
played a key role. To a lesser degree, this is also the case in the EU eastern 
partnership. Intracompany debt-creating ﬂ ows from parent corporations and 
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banks in Western Europe to their subsidiaries in emerging Europe have FDI-like 
features: this type of capital ﬂ ow (referred to in this chapter as ﬁ nancial FDI) 
combines the risk-sharing features of FDI and the lower costs of debt ﬁ nancing.
Another feature of emerging Europe is the role of foreign banks in corporate 
governance. Western European banks increasingly dominated credit in emerging 
European countries and weakened the link between governments and the 
enterprise sector. Failure to do so earlier had resulted in a history of quasi-ﬁ scal 
bailouts during the 1990s. In the new member states of the European Union, the 
share of foreign ownership in banking system assets (through both branches 
and subsidiaries) increased early in the decade and today accounts for over 80 
percent of total banking system assets (ﬁ gure 3.3). The EU candidate countries 
Note: Financial integration is measured as foreign assets plus liabilities. The interquartile range 
reﬂ ects the region between the top and bottom 25 percent of the distribution among the countries in 
the group.
Source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007.
Figure 3.1: Fifteen years of 
ﬁ nancial integration show that 
Europe is different 
(percentage of GDP)
Note: “EU coh.” refers to the EU cohesion countries, “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries, “E. 
prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries, “LAC” refers to the Latin America and the Caribbean 
region. CA stands for current account and FX is foreign exchange.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
Figure 3.2: Capital ﬂ ows 
in emerging Europe are 
particularly large
(percentage of GDP; 
period average of group 
median values)
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followed the same path with some delay, but today foreign banks hold close 
to 80 percent of total banking system assets. Foreign banks are less dominant 
among the EU eastern partnership countries.2
Capital fl ows in the right direction in Europe
Economic theory posits that because poor countries have low capital-labor 
ratios they should also have high expected rates of return to capital, making 
investment more attractive. Poor countries also typically save less. This 
mix—high investment, low savings—should lead to large current account 
deﬁ cits (capital inﬂ ows from abroad are just their mirror image). Yet, for most 
of the developing world, the evidence that capital ﬂ ows downhill is limited 
(Lucas 1990). 
Three explanations are possible for this lack of absorption of foreign capital. 
First, the policy framework of recipient countries does not always support the 
absorption of foreign savings. Countries like China, for instance, accumulate 
foreign exchange reserves to prevent an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate.3 Second, the experience of some emerging markets with capital account 
crises and sharp reversals in external imbalances and growth might lead to 
more cautious economic policies, such as the self-insurance policies of some 
East Asian and Latin American countries after the crises of the late 1990s. Third, 
differences in risk-adjusted returns to capital and low total factor productivity 
might also constrain the absorption of foreign capital. In other words, the 
quality of economic policies and institutions might affect the returns to capital. 
Whatever the reason, just being poor or rich is not enough to explain the 
direction of capital ﬂ ows. Surprisingly, capital does not ﬂ ow to high-growth 
countries either.4 High growth reﬂ ects actual marginal productivity and should 
therefore lead to an increase in capital ﬂ ows to those countries that have higher 
Source: Claessens and van Horen 2012.
1997
EU12
0
20
40
60
80
2001 2005 2009
1997
Eastern partnership
0
20
40
60
80
2001 2005 2009
1997
EU candidates
2001 2005 2009
1997
East Asia and Latin America
2001 2005 2009
Figure 3.3: Foreign banks are 
emerging Europe’s unique feature
(percentage of banking system assets, 
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growth rates—and thus higher productivity. But this is not the case in most 
developing regions. 
The exception is Europe, where foreign capital appears to ﬂ ow toward poorer 
countries (ﬁ gure 3.4)5 and those with higher growth rates (ﬁ gure 3.5, left 
panel).6 But classifying countries in line with their political proximity to the 
European Union (EU12, EU candidates, and EU eastern partnership) suggests 
that there is also signiﬁ cant heterogeneity among those countries. Capital 
has ﬂ owed to high-growth countries in the ﬁ rst two groups, but in the less 
integrated EU eastern partnership countries, the pattern is similar to that of 
other emerging markets (ﬁ gure 3.5, right panel).
In Europe, fi nance supports growth—and more 
so the closer countries get to the EU
It is then worth asking: Why is Europe different? The answer lies in the model 
of economic convergence—how poorer countries are provided with the 
instruments for catching up to their richer neighbors. Classifying countries in 
line with their political proximity to the EU (EU12, EU candidates, EU eastern 
partnership countries) proves to be instructive.7
Figure 3.4: In Europe, capital ﬂ ows 
to countries with lower incomes
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
Note: Average values calculated using 3 four-year periods in 1997-2008 are shown.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
Figure 3.5: In Europe, capital also 
ﬂ ows to high-growth countries
(current account deﬁ cits and per 
capita income growth, 1997–2008)
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To draw lessons from emerging Europe’s ﬁ nancial integration experience and its 
links to growth, it is necessary to understand the role of foreign savings, which 
provide a composite measure of net foreign capital ﬂ owing into a country. The 
empirical work in this section draws on Stojkov and Zalduendo (2011) which 
shows that foreign savings support growth in many—but not all—emerging 
European countries (table A3.1). The varying strength in the relationship 
between the EU12 countries and EU candidate countries reﬂ ects a combination 
of early EU accession and faster transition to a market economy. And, countries 
where EU membership prospects are still distant—the EU eastern partnership—
behave much like emerging markets outside Europe. So far, foreign savings 
have not supported their growth.
How can the foreign savings-growth link be explained? The evidence shows 
that foreign savings in the EU12 and EU candidate countries seem to have 
enabled the pursuit of investment opportunities that would otherwise have 
remained unfunded. Emerging Europe experienced a notable rise in investment 
as external imbalances increased in the decade before the crisis (ﬁ gure 3.6). 
Adding investment as an explanatory variable makes the EU-speciﬁ c foreign 
savings and growth link no longer important. Including savings, however, 
does not have such an effect among the EU12 and EU candidate countries. In 
contrast with results from a range of other developing economies (for example, 
Figure 3.6: Investments rose 
strongly in Europe as external 
balances improved
(saving-investment balances, 
unweighted averages as percentage 
of GDP, 1993–2008)
Note: The averages are not presented for some years in the early 1990s because at least one 
observation is missing.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO; and WDI.
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Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill 2007), foreign savings do not seem to substitute 
for domestic savings in some of the countries in emerging Europe. For countries 
in or close to the European Union, investment is no longer resource-constrained. 
The European Union as a “Tractor Beam”
There is no doubt that ﬁ nancial intermediation is crucial for foreign savings 
to support growth. Households borrow from future income streams for 
consumption smoothing and ﬁ rms borrow to pursue investment opportunities. 
In either case, the ﬁ nancial system needs to intermediate the foreign ﬁ nancing 
that makes consumption smoothing and investment possible. 
Two alternative explanations exist as to what makes ﬁ nancial intermediation 
effective. One relates to “thresholds in ﬁ nancial development” that improve the 
ﬂ ow and quality of information and enhance a country’s absorptive capacity 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). Another relates to “ﬁ nancial frictions” and how 
they affect intermediation. These frictions are, in turn, linked to the institutional 
development of individual countries. Both insufﬁ cient ﬁ nancial development 
and weak institutions can reduce absorption and cause capital inﬂ ows to boost 
unsustainable private and public consumption or asset-price bubbles that 
weaken the link to growth.8
To examine why the EU12 and the candidate countries have largely avoided 
these drawbacks, indicators of ﬁ nancial and institutional development are 
added by Stojkov and Zalduendo (2011) to a growth equation to explore their 
impact on the underlying foreign savings–growth link among EU-speciﬁ c 
country groups.9 The results suggest that there are EU-speciﬁ c factors at play. 
The importance and magnitude of the EU-speciﬁ c foreign savings interaction 
remain unchanged when ﬁ nancial development is used to construct a threshold 
variable on ﬁ nancial development, suggesting that it is not the driver of the 
foreign savings–growth link (table A3.2). Slightly different is the conclusion 
reached using measures of institutional development. The impact of the 
EU-speciﬁ c foreign savings interactions weakens as institutional development 
increases, suggesting that institutional development features might be 
operating. But the weakening is limited, and the EU-speciﬁ c foreign savings 
interactions remain important. That institutional development indicators do not 
eliminate these EU-speciﬁ c effects might reﬂ ect that EU membership (actual or 
potential) acts as an anchor for expectations of improved institutional quality, 
even if actual improvements materialize slowly. 
The European Union behaves much like a space station, with its rules of 
accession acting as a “tractor beam” as it exerts a powerful institutional pull, 
while countries like Germany may have the pulling power of big spaceships.10 
Disentangling these pull factors is a subject for future research. Even so, 
European integration appears to be a determinant of growth for countries in and 
near Europe when they begin their transition toward the European Union.
Benefi ts for many, excesses for some
With the beneﬁ t of hindsight, excess ﬁ nancing was a problem before the global 
crisis, and it hurt some emerging European countries. The abrupt declines in real 
GDP must be recognized and included in any assessment of the effectiveness of 
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ﬁ nancial integration. These declines raise the question of whether the positive 
dynamics described above are inherently unsustainable. 
Reassuringly, even when episodes of “excessive growth” are excluded from 
the analysis, the association between foreign savings and growth remains 
(see Stojkov and Zalduendo 2011).11 The results are not linked to the unusually 
high growth rates—or to the unsustainable external imbalances—of the 
precrisis period. A key challenge for policymakers is thus not to avoid ﬁ nancial 
integration, but to understand which policy mix contributes to turning this 
opportunity into a sustained growth dynamic and how the tail risks can be 
effectively mitigated. This is the focus of the next section. Because the lessons 
of prudence apply to all countries, the next section covers not only emerging 
Europe but also, albeit less thoroughly, the EU cohesion countries.
Prudence when fi nance is plentiful
Macroeconomic outcomes in emerging Europe improved in the late 1990s. 
After many years with large ﬁ scal imbalances and high and volatile inﬂ ation, 
economic stability was reestablished.12 In turn, ﬁ nancial integration in the 
early 2000s increased economic interdependence and raised the credibility 
of policymakers by anchoring institutional development to structures known 
in Western Europe. In the eurozone, the elimination of currency risks led to a 
sharp fall in borrowing costs for the EU cohesion countries and a corresponding 
acceleration of foreign borrowing by private and public sectors. In some 
emerging European countries, there was also an acceleration in credit growth to 
the private sector, albeit from low initial levels.
Emerging Europe is not the same everywhere
Against this general background, important differences emerged across 
countries in the region. To examine these differences, emerging European 
countries can be classiﬁ ed along two dimensions. The ﬁ rst is institutional: EU12, 
EU candidates, and the EU eastern partnership. The EU cohesion countries are 
identiﬁ ed separately, because they are the subject of current interest. The 
second dimension is monetary, using the exchange rate regime of each country 
(based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions [AREAER] classiﬁ cation): ﬂ exible (group 1), intermediate (group 2), 
and ﬁ xed (group 3).13 The analysis distinguishes two four-year periods prior to 
the crisis: 2001–04 and 2005–08 (table 3.1, bottom panel, shows the changes in 
savings-investment balances between these two periods and includes a sample 
of emerging markets outside Europe).
Three broad conclusions emerge from this comparison:
 · External imbalances in emerging Europe were largely private. Public 
sector imbalances declined in most countries. This is also the case among 
EU cohesion countries with the notable exception of Greece and Ireland. 
However, the improvement in public savings–investment balances is also 
misleading, as it also reﬂ ects buoyant tax revenues during the boom. 
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 · Countries in emerging Europe with ﬁ xed exchange rates recorded a sharper 
decline in their current account and private savings–investment balances, due 
to lower private savings and a rapid increase in public and private investment. 
 · Institutional characteristics, as argued in the previous section, inﬂ uence the 
observed evolution of public and private sector balances. The EU cohesion 
countries are distinguished by a decline in national savings, much lower 
increases (or in the case of Portugal and Greece, declines) in national 
investment, and, with the exception of Portugal, substantial deterioration 
of their current accounts. EU12 and EU candidate countries by contrast show 
stable or moderately increasing national savings and increases in investment. 
EU eastern partnership countries display increases in both savings and 
Table 3.1: Private imbalances in the East, a more complicated story in the South
(saving–investment balances, average of median values, 2001–04 versus 2005–08)
Note: The exchange rate classiﬁ cation is based on three groups of countries: group 1 (ﬂ exible or 
independent ﬂ oating; Albania, Armenia, Czech Republic, Moldova, Poland, and Turkey); group 2 
(intermediate, including basket, peg within bands, crawling peg, crawling band, and managed 
ﬂ oating; Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, and Ukraine); and group 3 (ﬁ xed, which includes countries with no legal tender, currency 
boards, and conventional pegs; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Montenegro, and Slovenia). LAC stands for the Latin American and the Caribbean region.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF 2010; and IMF WEO.
Emerging Europe EU Cohesion
East
Asia LAC
Regional classifi cation Exchange rate regime classifi cation
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
EU12 EU candidates
EU eastern 
partnership
Flexible 
(group 1)
Intermediate 
(group 2)
Fixed 
(group 3)
2005-08
National savings (S)
   Public
   Private
20.1
3.0
17.1
15.4
3.3
12.1
30.5
7.1
23.4
21.1
4.3
16.7
21.1
3.0
18.2
18.2
3.7
14.5
9.4
-2.6
12.0
21.4
1.4
20.0
15.4
12.5
2.9
21.1
4.0
17.1
29.0
6.3
22.8
18.0
4.9
13.1
National 
investment (I)
   Public
   Private
28.5
4.3
24.2
24.7
3.8
20.9
32.9
4.8
28.1
27.2
4.5
22.7
26.1
3.7
22.4
31.8
4.6
27.2
21.3
2.9
18.3
26.2
4.4
21.8
21.6
2.4
19.2
30.2
3.8
26.4
28.8
6.9
21.9
22.9
5.3
17.6
(S-I) public -1.2 -0.5 2.3 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9 -5.5 -3.0 10.1 0.2 -0.6 -0.4
(S-I) private -7.2 -8.9 -4.7 -6.0 -4.2 -12.7 -6.3 -1.8 -16.3 -9.3 0.9 -4.5
Current account -8.4 -9.4 -2.4 -6.1 -4.9 -13.6 -11.9 -4.8 -6.2 -9.1 0.3 -4.8
∆ (2005-08 minus 2001-04)
National savings (S)
   Public
   Private
0.6
1.9
-1.3
-0.6
2.6
-3.2
10.0
2.8
7.2
2.3
3.0
-0.6
1.7
1.9
-0.2
-1.2
0.6
-1.8
-7.3
-1.3
-6.0
-2.0
-3.1
1.1
-1.4
1.0
-2.3
-2.1
0.9
-3.0
2.0
1.1
1.0
2.5
2.8
-0.4
National 
investment (I)
   Public
   Private
3.2
0.9
2.3
3.6
-0.2
3.7
9.5
0.5
9.0
5.2
0.1
5.1
1.9
0.1
1.8
8.6
1.6
7.0
-1.9
-0.6
-1.3
3.0
0.5
2.5
-2.2
-0.9
-1.2
3.0
0.3
2.7
3.9
0.2
3.6
3.6
0.4
3.3
(S-I) public 1.0 2.7 2.3 2.9 1.7 -1.0 -0.6 -3.6 1.9 0.6 0.8 2.5
(S-I) private -3.6 -6.9 -1.9 -5.8 -2.0 -8.8 -4.8 -1.4 -1.1 -5.7 -2.7 -3.6
Current account -2.6 -4.2 0.5 -2.9 -0.3 -9.8 -5.4 -5.0 0.8 -5.1 -1.8 -1.2
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investment, and improvements in their current account positions despite a 
small deterioration in private savings–investment balances. These differences 
have consequences for assessments of solvency and liquidity as discussed in 
the next section.
Did rapid capital inﬂ ows cause excessive exchange rate appreciation in 
emerging Europe, as many skeptics feared? Real exchange rates appreciated 
gradually in most emerging European economies, consistent with the 
“Balassa-Samuelson” effect in developing countries (ﬁ gure 3.7).14 But, as noted 
by Bakker and Gulde (2010), in several European countries wage inﬂ ation 
exceeded productivity gains. The loss of competitiveness led to further capital 
inﬂ ows to cover resulting current account imbalances. Where this happened, 
sustainability was at risk.
Some have blamed ﬁ xed exchange rate policies for the loss in competitiveness 
precrisis and the sharply differentiated impact of the crisis on growth. On 
closer inspection, the inconsistency of ﬁ xed exchange rate regimes with 
other policies—ﬁ scal policy in particular and generally complacent policies in 
the presence of massive external imbalances—are more important drivers of 
the boom-bust cycle that some emerging European countries experienced. 
Figure 3.7: Emerging Europe’s 
real effective exchange 
rates appreciated
(2007=100)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF 2010; and IMF IFS.
Figure 3.8: Emerging Europe 
showed rapid economic 
adjustment but slow 
economic recovery
Domestic demand and current accounts Foreign ﬁ nancing and credit
Note: The label colors reﬂ ect the EU12, EU candidate, and EU eastern partnership country groups. Also 
included for reference are EU cohesion countries. Data on credit include the domestic banking system 
only, and for most countries, are for May 2011.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF IFS; and IMF WEO.
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Unusually liquid global markets during the precrisis period certainly would have 
strained the toolkit of any government authority. But the presumption that a 
convergence-driven “new Europe” was at hand resulted in complacency on the 
part of bankers and bureaucrats in some emerging European countries.
There are also differences in private credit developments—the engine fueling 
large private imbalances—and the corresponding external imbalances. The 
countries most affected by the crisis in terms of declines in domestic demand 
were also those with the largest precrisis external imbalances (ﬁ gure 3.8, 
left panel). In addition, countries that heavily depended on foreign funding to 
extend credit (for example, those with high loan-to-deposit ratios) are also 
those where private sector credit growth was slowest during the recovery 
(ﬁ gure 3.8, right panel). This suggests that excesses left unmanaged caused the 
crisis to have a deeper and potentially more lasting impact.
Against this background, three small European economies faced similarities 
before the crisis, but policy responses were dictated by differences in initial 
conditions, such as the choice of exchange rate regime, the feasibility of 
introducing capital controls (for example, Ireland is precluded from doing so as 
an EU member), and the existence of a lender of last resort (box 3.1).
So indeed some of the precrisis developments increased vulnerabilities, in 
particular in the years immediately preceding the crisis. At the same time, bank 
ownership structures in emerging Europe proved to be a source of stability. 
While some foreign banks took too many risks in the precrisis period, the crisis 
did not lead to a sharp reversal in cross-border ﬂ ows; in fact, banking ﬂ ows 
linked to Western European banks have been more stable than during the East 
Asia crisis (ﬁ gure 3.9). More precisely, cross-border ﬂ ows came to an abrupt 
stop, but did not go into reverse as in Asia in 1997–98. The one exception is 
the EU eastern partnership (driven by developments in Ukraine), where foreign 
banks had a less dominant position and short-term wholesale funding sources, 
mostly delinked from ownership structures, were not renewed.15
Figure 3.9: The closer 
a country gets to the 
European Union, the more 
stable its bank ﬁ nancing
(banking ﬂ ow stocks to 
emerging markets, quarterly 
data; t = 100)
Note: The ﬁ gures are based on quarterly data released on July 2011. Values are exchange rate 
adjusted. Crisis timing date is deﬁ ned in parentheses. Asian crisis countries are Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The group index is based on aggregate 
group values, and the country index is the median value of the values of individual countries within 
the group.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on BIS Locational Banking Statistics.
Group index (median values) Country index (median values)
143
CHAPTER 3
Box 3.1: Economic adjustment in three small European economies 
Iceland, Ireland, and Latvia, with populations 
of 0.3 million, 4.4 million, and 2.3 million, 
respectively, got into trouble during the global 
crisis as a result of rapid growth in credit and 
other banking activities ﬁ nanced by precrisis 
international borrowing. Credit booms led to 
property price booms, peaking in 2006 or 2007 
(box ﬁ gure 1). The construction sector was 
slightly over 10 percent of GDP in each of these 
countries. During the crisis, property prices 
collapsed. All three countries had to turn to the 
IMF and their European partners for help.
Fiscal austerity programs coupled with 
structural reforms were central to these 
countries’ economic adjustments. Although 
saving–investment imbalances in the high-
growth years were largely of a private origin, 
public spending kept up with the revenue 
overperformance, but it had to be clawed back 
(more so in Latvia than the other countries). 
The three countries also faced banking 
problems (over half of bank assets were 
foreign-owned in Latvia, but domestic owners 
dominated in Iceland and Ireland). Such 
differences meant that the policy responses 
and economic outcomes varied. 
Policy responses
Exchange rates. Adjustments in real exchange 
rates form the clearest difference across these 
countries. Ireland is a member of the euro area, 
so changing the exchange rate was not an 
option. Latvia had pegged its exchange rate to 
the euro, and chose not to devalue. For Iceland 
devaluation was the only option given the 
size of the country’s obligations and available 
ﬁ nancing. Accordingly, the krona fell by about 
50 percent and the country introduced capital 
controls to limit further depreciation. While 
the depreciation-induced inﬂ ation eroded 
some of the competitiveness gain, the krona 
is still weaker by about a third relative to its 
precrisis level in real terms. Ireland and Latvia 
have seen small declines in their real effective 
exchange rates, but Latvia’s is still well above 
its precrisis value (box ﬁ gure 2). 
Lender of last resort. In Iceland, with 
obligations exceeding the country’s GDP 
several times over, the central bank could not 
fulﬁ ll this role. It had no choice but to let the 
banks default. Domestic deposits were fully 
guaranteed, but foreign creditors of Icelandic 
banks faced a €47 billion loss in 2007—three 
times Iceland’s precrisis GDP (Benediktsdottir, 
Danielsson, and Zoega 2011). The central 
bank suffered losses because of the liquidity 
support it provided to banks. 
Irish banks’ balance sheets reached eight times 
GDP. The Eurosystem and the central bank 
provided liquidity (Buiter, Michels, and Rahbari 
2011a and 2011b). The Irish government 
guaranteed all liabilities of Irish banks and 
covered banks’ losses with taxpayers’ money. 
In Latvia, about two-thirds of bank assets 
were held by foreign (mostly Scandinavian) 
banks, which assumed most of the losses. The 
exception was the domestically owned Parex 
Bank, which was nationalized. Total bank 
losses in 2009 and 2010 were 9 percent of GDP. 
Financial support from ofﬁ cial sources helped 
stem the risk of a run on deposits.
Capital controls. Only Iceland applied capital 
controls—and only Iceland could. This had a 
lock-in effect on nonresident deposits; it also 
locked out krona assets outside the country. 
The IMF (2011) estimates that offshore krona 
holdings imply a high spread between onshore 
and offshore exchange rates. Capital controls 
have so far been effective. 
Economic outcomes
Precrisis vulnerabilities shaped these 
outcomes. Both Latvia and Iceland had 
unusually large current account deﬁ cits of over 
20 percent of GDP. Ireland’s deﬁ cit was more 
moderate, at 5 percent. The improvements in 
the external accounts had knock-on effects on 
all components of demand, employment, and 
public ﬁ nance:
 · From peak to trough, Latvian GDP collapsed 
by 25 percent—twice as much as in Iceland 
(11 percent) and Ireland (13 percent). 
 · All three countries saw a comparable 
collapse in investment. Private consumption 
went into free fall in Iceland and Latvia (the 
adjustment in Ireland was smaller). 
 · Public consumption fell furthest in Latvia 
(20 percent), in line with reliance on internal 
devaluation, and the onus on clawing back 
public spending.
 · In Iceland, export growth fostered the 
massive adjustment of the current account. 
Exports of goods and services rose by 7 
percent in 2009, against an average fall of 
12 percent in the European Union. 
 · Imports collapsed by about 40 percent in 
Iceland and Latvia, in line with the fall in 
investment and private consumption, while 
the Irish import decline (14 percent) was 
similar to the EU average.
 · Iceland experienced a modest (6 percent) 
fall in employment from 2007 to 2010. The 
labor market impact was sharper in Latvia 
(17 percent) and Ireland (13 percent). 
 · The differences in output and employment 
between Iceland and Latvia are likely 
due to real exchange rate developments. 
Less clear is why Ireland’s employment 
contracted more than Iceland’s, given the 
similar GDP developments and a similar fall 
in construction. 
 · Precrisis gross government debt was 40 
percent of GDP or less in all three countries. 
But the fall in output, the large budget 
deﬁ cits accumulated during the crisis, and 
banking sector support—about 40 percent of 
GDP in Ireland, and 20 percent in Iceland—all 
contributed to sharp increases in public 
debt. Despite similar public debt-to-GDP 
ratios, in the summer of 2011, 5-year credit 
default swaps on sovereign debt were high 
(above 1,000 basis points) in Ireland, but 
had fallen to a moderate level (around 250 
basis points) in Iceland and Latvia.
The moral 
Although similar before the crisis, the 
economic recovery of each country is 
proceeding at a different pace. 
 · Latvia suffered a sharper decline in GDP 
(and thus incomes) than Iceland and Ireland. 
It has stabilized its public ﬁ nances, returned 
to growth, and tapped international bond 
markets again, but will take a long time to 
catch up with Iceland in employment and 
output recovery. 
 · Iceland emerged from the crisis with the 
smallest fall in employment and a fast 
expansion of tradable production despite 
the largest shock to the ﬁ nancial system 
and a collapse of the exchange rate. Yet it 
will have to lift capital controls (Gylfason 
2011; IMF 2011).
 · Ireland did not have the option of devaluing 
its currency nor of introducing capital 
controls. But the external imbalance was 
the smallest and the tradable sector was 
competitive (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry, and Sapir 
2011). Ireland’s problem was its banks, 
whose losses were largely charged to Irish 
taxpayers. 
One main lesson from the crisis is that when 
debts are commercially held, the state should 
avoid loading itself with debts to save the 
ﬁ nancial system. The costs to Ireland are 
clear: public debt exploded, necessitating a 
sharp ﬁ scal adjustment that has hampered 
conﬁ dence and recovery. 
The other main lesson is that a sharp 
adjustment in the real exchange rate 
through nominal devaluations comes about 
more rapidly and thus is helpful when the 
saving-investment balance needs a drastic 
improvement. Iceland did much better than 
Latvia in this regard. However, domestic 
borrowers also suffered heavily from the 
collapse of the exchange rate.
Source: Darvas (2011).
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That foreign ownership could have been a source of stability is somewhat 
perplexing. Cross-border ﬂ ows are supposed to protect countries from domestic 
shocks and exacerbate exogenous shocks. Several factors might explain this, 
including the moral suasion role of international ﬁ nancial institutions through 
the Vienna Initiative and the provision of liquidity and public ﬁ nancial support 
in Western Europe to parent banks at the peak of the crisis.16 But the “lock-
in” of resources in banks’ subsidiaries due to the long-term nature of their 
loan portfolio must be remembered.17 Deleveraging is likely to be limited and 
gradual. However, downside risks remain high and originate in the problems 
faced by the EU cohesion countries and their impact on Europe’s economic 
outlook; indeed, the overall balance sheet strength of Western European banks 
that are active in emerging Europe is being challenged by the exposures to 
sovereign debts within the eurozone. This is a risk that could have spillover 
effects on emerging Europe.
The experience described points to heterogeneity in the regional buildup of 
external and domestic vulnerabilities. Some countries sustained high growth 
rates without growing imbalances, while others experienced growth with 
increasing vulnerabilities. But what deﬁ nes a high-reward, low-risk outcome? 
Research since the crisis highlights some of the economic characteristics and 
policies that would strengthen Europe’s ﬁ nancial integration model. Ghosh, 
Sugawara, and Zalduendo (2011b) identify some drivers of the tradeoff between 
growth and vulnerability (box 3.2). The main policy conclusion for emerging 
Europe is to manage external imbalances,18 which requires boom-prooﬁ ng public 
ﬁ nance and crisis-prooﬁ ng private ﬁ nance.
Boom-proofi ng public fi nance
How policymakers boom-proof public ﬁ nance is critical. Fiscal deﬁ cits were not 
the cause of the saving-investment imbalances in emerging Europe (nor of the 
resulting boom-bust cycles these countries experienced). But a distinction has 
Box ﬁ gure 1: Real housing prices (2007=100) Box ﬁ gure 2: Real effective exchange 
rates (CPI-based, 2007=100)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data collected by the Global Property Guide; and IMF IFS.
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to be drawn between the cause of these imbalances and the policy stance that 
should be put in place in their presence. There was a shift toward a procyclical 
ﬁ scal stance across emerging Europe from 2004 to 2008 (ﬁ gure 3.10). More 
precisely, the difference between ﬁ scal balances and cyclically adjusted ﬁ scal 
balances shifted from negative (countercyclical) to positive (procyclical) 
territory for many countries, and in some countries the shift was quite marked. 
This implies that countries entered the crisis with weakening ﬁ scal positions. 
Other developing regions experienced less ﬁ scal deterioration. 
The explanation for this ﬁ scal deterioration is simple. As noted by Bakker and 
Gulde (2010) and Islam (2010), real expenditures rose sharply in the decade 
before the crisis, especially after 2004. While ﬁ scal deﬁ cits for the most part 
did not deteriorate, the revenue overperformance before the crisis masks 
actual developments in public ﬁ nances. In Latvia, for example, additional 
budget allocations were authorized in the middle of every ﬁ scal year after 2005 
(Åslund and Dombrovskis 2011). Also, some countries (such as Latvia and Serbia) 
approved wage and pension increases, as well as new capital spending, just a 
few months before the crisis broke.
How should integrating countries boom-proof public ﬁ nances? For some 
economies, following an acyclical ﬁ scal policy might sufﬁ ce; if economic growth 
leads to revenue overperformance, these resources should be saved. The ﬁ scal 
policies of Bulgaria and Estonia in the precrisis period were, with hindsight, 
enlightened (ﬁ gure 3.11). But even there ﬁ scal positions were excessively 
procyclical.19 In fact, a more determined countercyclical ﬁ scal policy stance—
using both revenue and spending measures—would have been needed in many 
countries to counterbalance private behavior. The unusually large size of private 
sector imbalances in some countries could not (and should not) have been 
fully matched by ﬁ scal surpluses, but  many authorities shied away from the 
signaling that was required by the overheating that was apparent even then.
Figure 3.10: Fiscal positions 
became procyclical in 2004–08
(difference between unadjusted and 
cyclically adjusted ﬁ scal balances)
Note: The ﬁ gure depicts the difference between ﬁ scal balances and cyclically adjusted ﬁ scal 
balances. Arrows begin in 2004 and end in 2008. Group median values are presented for EU12, 
candidate countries (EU cand.), and eastern partnership countries (E. prtn.).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
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Crisis-proofi ng private fi nance 
Financial integration has beneﬁ ts and risks. De Larosière (2009, p72) puts it 
well: “Integration increases contagion risks, and thereby jeopardises ﬁ nancial 
stability; integration makes it more difﬁ cult to ensure a level playing ﬁ eld if 
rules and supervisory practices differ; integration means the development 
of large cross-border groups, which will require more streamlined and cost-
effective supervisory organisation.”
The global crisis also revealed weaknesses in ﬁ nancial architectures. The 
emerging market countries in Europe were hit hard, but few experienced a 
collapse of their banking system. By contrast, in Ireland, the banking crisis 
became a sovereign debt crisis, in turn revealing weaknesses in the European 
Union and euro area precrisis economic policy and regulatory frameworks, 
surveillance arrangements, and governance mechanisms. 
Financial developments in Europe highlight the difﬁ culties of concurrently 
pursuing ﬁ nancial integration, ﬁ nancial stability, and national sovereignty. 
Typically, only two of these objectives can be attained concurrently (Allen and 
others 2011). Just as the precrisis experience showed that ﬁ nancial integration is 
key to Europe’s income convergence, the ﬁ nancial crisis showed the importance 
of ﬁ nancial stability. To some degree, sovereignty appears to be the casualty 
of an integrated world. Yet, countries will always need to tailor their policy 
responses to country-speciﬁ c developments. At a national level, macroprudential 
policies play a useful role, and will have to be tailored to a country’s initial 
conditions and, in particular, to cyclical developments that might differ across 
Europe. And of course supranational approaches are also needed. Policy 
coordination is paramount in such a context to achieve the correct balance 
between sovereignty and country speciﬁ city. The alternative, not worth pursuing, 
is to give up on ﬁ nancial integration, a big part of what fuels Europe’s redoubtable 
convergence machine. Nor should ﬁ nancial stability be compromised. 
Figure 3.11: Revenues lost to 
the Great Recession, 2009
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
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Macroprudential policies
Prudential regulations are traditionally used to mitigate risks in individual 
institutions. But they are also central to strengthening ﬁ nancial system 
stability, particularly against the systemic risks that arise from the externalities 
associated with individual institutions’ actions. In this context, macroprudential 
policies are those that are adjusted to turns in the economic cycle.
Examples of macroprudential regulations include policies that increase buffers, 
contain credit growth, and directly improve individual credit quality during 
good times. Some traditional prudential policies, such as capital-adequacy 
ratios for banks, may be intended to hedge risks by creating buffers or slowing 
credit growth (or both). But they become macroprudential only when adjusted 
in response to macroeconomic developments. Ratios may, for example, be 
increased when credit growth is high—either for the whole ﬁ nancial system or 
for systemic banks―or may include larger capital buffers for certain types of 
lending, such as changing risk weights on mortgage loans.20 
Liquidity-related regulations are intended to curtail (or promote) credit growth 
by increasing the cost of extending credit without using (or in addition to) 
monetary policy instruments. These measures can be targeted to all or 
to speciﬁ c business lines. For example, Croatia applied additional liquidity 
requirements that increased the cost of credit across all business lines. By 
contrast, FYR Macedonia targeted credit card and consumer loans. Quantitative 
Box 3.2: Understanding the growth–vulnerability tradeoff 
Ghosh, Sugawara, and Zalduendo (2011b) 
analyze economic policies and other conditions 
that are favorable for countries to achieve 
growth without building macroeconomic 
vulnerability, using data for countries in the 
World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia region. 
What are their main conclusions from? First, 
trade supports growth, but could also lead to 
vulnerability. Vulnerability is less likely to occur, 
however, if a dynamic export sector is part of 
the equation. Second, the type of capital coming 
into a country matters. Financial openness 
might support growth, but also contributes 
to vulnerability. As this chapter argues, 
foreign capital is an enviable development 
opportunity with tail risks. However, if FDI 
(and to a degree this must also apply to 
ﬁ nancial FDI) is one of the elements of the 
capital ﬂ owing into the country, then it is less 
likely to increase a country’s vulnerability and 
more likely to support its growth. Third, ﬁ scal 
policy is a key element in the toolkit to reduce 
vulnerability. It might slow down economic 
activity, but it also shifts countries into a less 
vulnerable development path when risks are 
mounting. In this regard, when private ﬁ nance 
is the engine of growth—but also of growing 
vulnerabilities—ﬁ scal policy can play a signaling 
role on the need to avoid excesses. In such a 
case, governments should not shy away from 
signaling their concerns with private behavior. 
Fourth, capital account openness appears to 
increase vulnerability. However, given the many 
beneﬁ ts that have been derived from foreign 
capital in parts of emerging Europe, the correct 
lesson is to manage external imbalances more 
proactively.
What was the policy stance of countries in 
emerging Europe in the years preceding the 
global crisis? A snapshot of policy stances for 
2004 and 2008 offers lessons on what countries 
could have done differently. 
• Fiscal policy did not play enough of a 
countercyclical role. It is well known that 
public imbalances were limited in much 
of emerging Europe, and they were not 
the drivers of external imbalances. Fiscal 
policy, however, became looser before the 
crisis—the opposite of what was advisable 
for overheating economies. Also, countries 
with ﬁ xed exchange rate regimes had, 
on average, looser ﬁ scal policies than 
other emerging European countries, 
contrary to what was expected given the 
exchange rate regime of these countries. 
In conclusion, the revenue windfalls of high 
growth were spent, not saved, in most 
countries in emerging Europe.
• Monetary policies should have played a 
counter-credit role. Countries in emerging 
Europe had loose monetary conditions 
at the outset of the credit boom in 2004. 
Monetary conditions were tightening by 
2008, but credit growth rates suggest 
that monetary policy should have been 
tightened further.
• Capital controls may play a role in the 
future. Measures of capital account 
openness changed little between 2004 and 
2008 (right panel), but the Chinn-Ito index 
(Chinn and Ito 2006 and 2008) suggests 
that emerging Europe’s capital account was 
more open than that in other emerging 
markets. Work by the IMF suggests that 
capital controls may have a role under 
certain conditions (Ostry and others 2010). 
For EU members the options are limited 
(that is, capital controls can be against the 
freedom of capital movement), but others 
in Europe could consider such measures. 
Alternatively, these results could suggest 
that there is room to develop policies that 
might affect capital inﬂ ows, for example 
macroprudential policies.
Source: Ghosh, Sugawara, and Zalduendo (2011b).
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Figure 3.12: Countries showed 
varying experiences with 
credit growth and asset prices 
Note: The exchange rate classiﬁ cation follows the description in table 3.1.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data collected by the Global Property Guide; 
Bloomberg; IMF 2010; IMF IFS.
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restrictions or direct credit controls (sectoral or aggregate) are also possible, 
but it should be noted that acting through quantity-based measures rather than 
price-based measures potentially has more severe distortionary effects. 
Regulations to improve the quality of new loans take the form of more stringent 
eligibility requirements on certain types of lending and may be viewed as 
reducing systemwide ﬁ nancial risks one transaction at a time. Polgár and 
Zdzienicka (2010) classify these regulations into “hard” and “soft” restrictions. 
The ﬁ rst includes tighter loan-to-value ratios and debt service-to-income 
ratios. The second refers to qualiﬁ cation requirements, such as a checklist of 
requirements that household borrowers must meet in order to borrow in foreign 
currency.21
What, then, was the experience with macroprudential policies in emerging 
Europe before the crisis? For Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR 
Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Turkey this report asked for written 
accounts from staffs at the central bank or ﬁ nancial supervision agencies of 
these countries. It is worth noting that ﬁ nancial sector developments in the run-
up to the crisis differed substantially in these eight countries (ﬁ gure 3.12). This 
inﬂ uenced both the type of and scope for macroprudential tools.
These eight countries had varied experiences with macroprudential policies 
before the crisis (table 3.2 and box 3.3), but many are deploying these policies 
more proactively during the recovery. A range of factors affected policymakers’ 
choices, including the monetary policy and exchange rate regime in place, the 
historical context of ﬁ nancial sector development (such as the convergence 
process and the presence of foreign banks), the distributional implications 
of various policies, the legal implications of policies (such as whether the 
authorities were legally permitted to vary regulations according to the size of 
the institution), and the ability of regulated entities to circumvent regulations. 
External factors also played a role. Countries that adopted these policies had to 
adapt them as agents changed their economic behavior, loopholes emerged, 
and side effects became more apparent.
Overall, the impact of macroprudential policies had the intended effect 
though sometimes only a transitory one. The ﬁ rst lesson is that policymakers 
need to consider the implications of prudential regulation across all ﬁ nancial 
intermediaries. They should be aware, for instance, that tightening regulation 
might not always be effective because it could encourage a shift to less 
regulated institutions or countries, such as through direct cross-border lending 
to corporations by parent banks with subsidiary operations. Second, the 
macroprudential toolkit deployed emphasized creating buffers and slowing 
credit growth, but few countries introduced measures to strengthen credit 
quality before the crisis, an area deserving greater attention going forward.22 
Third, even if the effect of these policies might at times be transitory, 
supervisory authorities should assess what works and aim to adjust these 
policies when undesired developments take place or loopholes emerge in the 
macroprudential toolkit. A wait-and-see strategy is too costly, as the 2008 crisis 
has shown.
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Supranational policies
Financial system frameworks before the crisis let market discipline and ofﬁ cial 
oversight work in tandem to provide checks and balances to prevent systemic 
threats to ﬁ nancial stability.23 The global crisis revealed that this approach was 
wrong. Neither market discipline nor ofﬁ cial oversight performed their functions 
as envisaged. The strategy tilted too heavily toward allowing the market to 
discipline itself, which proved to be elusive until it was too late—at which point 
market-disciplining behavior led to widespread uncertainty and severe market 
dysfunctions. Too little ofﬁ cial oversight—the corollary—failed to spot the 
buildup of systemic weaknesses. 
Similar to other advanced economies, the European Union introduced on 
January 1, 2011, a new architecture for safeguarding ﬁ nancial stability, 
collectively referred to as the European System of Financial Supervision. 
It includes three new microprudential European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) and a new macroprudential body—the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB).24 The goals are to improve the microprudential supervision 
of ﬁ nancial institutions and the regulation of capital markets at national 
and supranational levels, assess systemic risks, and recommend risk-
mitigation measures. This is complemented by changes still being introduced 
in the role and mandate of the European Financial Stability Facility and 
its programmed successor to be introduced later in this decade.
Even if used as envisaged, these reforms have limitations (box 3.4). The ESAs 
are more than a group of coordinating mechanisms in “crisis” situations, but 
they must defer to national authorities. Similarly, although the ESRB can 
identify countries that pose systemic risks and make recommendations, it has 
Table 3.2: Precrisis use of macroprudential policies in eight emerging 
European countries
Note: The table reﬂ ects changes during 2004-08.
Source: Background papers prepared by country ofﬁ cials for this report.
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no authority other than moral suasion. Looking ahead, three challenges are 
important for emerging European countries: regulatory requirements, a large 
foreign presence, and liquidity management during a crisis.
 · Regulatory requirements for capital, liquidity, and leverage. The crisis 
showed that microprudential regulations for ensuring the safety and 
soundness of individual ﬁ nancial institutions were inadequate. Many aspects 
contributed to the buildup of risks, such as misunderstood management of 
Box 3.3: Country experiences with macroprudential policies 
Classifying countries into four groups serves 
to represent these experiences: countries that 
were proactive in the use of macroprudential 
policies, countries that relied somewhat on 
macroprudential policies, countries that relied 
on moral suasion, and countries that did not 
use these policies.
Proactive use of macroprudential policies 
FYR Macedonia, Croatia, and Romania were 
perhaps the most proactive in applying 
macroprudential tools before the crisis. FYR 
Macedonia introduced regulations to limit the 
growth of lending in foreign currency and in 
household lending in early 2008. In the view 
of Celeska, Gligorova, and Krstevska (2011), the 
regulations were beginning to have an impact 
when the crisis hit. This partly reﬂ ected FYR 
Macedonia’s late exposure to the process of 
high credit growth that characterized emerging 
Europe, and it is unclear how much the crisis 
slowed credit growth.
In Croatia, the authorities adopted various 
prudential measures to limit credit growth and 
to safeguard the ﬁ nancial system against an 
accumulation of systemic risks, particularly 
from lending in foreign currency. They 
introduced the new regulations relatively 
early, in 2003. Because banks attempted to 
circumvent the new regulations, they were 
improved simply through “trial and error.” 
A combination of prudential regulations 
and complementary monetary policies 
reduced credit growth, though the tools were 
sometimes circumvented by direct cross-
border lending by parent banks (Kraft and 
Galac 2011). 
Romania is a case of proactive monetary policy 
and prudential tools aimed not only at securing 
a low inﬂ ationary environment, but also at 
strengthening ﬁ nancial stability (Popa 2011). 
Although monetary authorities were proactive 
in the use of policy rates, their approach was 
accompanied by a large set of administrative 
and prudential measures, including differential 
reserve requirements on domestic and foreign 
currency liabilities, changes to risk weights in 
some business lines, and adjustments over 
time to the level and coverage of debt service-
to-income ratios.
Limited macroprudential action 
Turkey experienced a more gradual credit 
boom cycle in the precrisis period. Perhaps for 
this reason the authorities acted in a limited 
fashion on the macroprudential front, with 
the most visible intervention related to higher 
capital-adequacy ratios for banks that wished 
to expand (measured by authorizations for 
opening new branches). Turkey did not allow 
foreign currency lending to households before 
the crisis. Since witnessing a rapid pickup in 
credit in late 2009, the authorities have ﬁ rmly 
applied macroprudential policies, including 
measures to improve credit quality (such as 
lower loan-to-value ratios) and to preclude 
lending in lira indexed to the exchange rate 
(Kenc, Turhan, and Yildirim 2011). These 
policies’ success remains to be seen.
Moral suasion 
In Estonia and Poland much of the initial 
intervention centered on moral suasion efforts 
(Sutt, Korju, and Siibak 2011). Only a few policy 
actions were taken as credit booms emerged. 
In Estonia, the initial policy response was 
to reduce the tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments; it was reduced by half 
in 2004. This move was followed in 2005 
with changes to risk weights on mortgage 
lending. Capital buffers were maintained at 
higher levels than in advanced economies and 
accompanied by high reserve requirements. 
Poland applied stricter rules on capital-
adequacy ratios for new banks and used 
moral suasion to build capital buffers through 
retained earnings. It also increased the 
emphasis on credit eligibility criteria. Until 
the crisis, its prudential toolkit took the form 
of recommendations. Recommendation S, 
for example, sets guidelines on mortgage 
loans, ranging from rules for evaluating 
creditworthiness in foreign currency loans 
to standards for disclosing information to 
customers on exchange rate risks. These 
recommendations led to some action in 
the banking sector before the crisis (by all 
accounts, supervisory authorities emphasized 
compliance with what legally were only 
recommendations), but they became stricter 
after the crisis (Kruszka and Kowalczyk 2011). 
They now include quantitative standards to 
evaluate creditworthiness (Recommendation 
T) and more speciﬁ c loan-to-value and 
debt service-to-income ratios (in a revised 
Recommendation S, scheduled to come into 
effect in December 2011).
No use of macroprudential policies 
Hungary and the Czech Republic did not 
take any macroprudential steps before the 
crisis. In Hungary, the authorities deemed 
fast credit growth to be sustainable given 
the country’s convergence to EU incomes. 
Although they had some concerns over 
foreign currency lending and fast growth 
in mortgage loans, they did not impose 
restrictions for political and social reasons. 
The banking authorities have recently 
imposed several lending restrictions to 
reduce systemwide risks in household 
lending (Banai, Király, and Nagy 2011). Since 
late 2010, for example, mortgages may 
not be denominated in foreign currency, 
and tight loan-to-value limits have been 
adopted.
Judicious macroeconomic policy with a ﬂ exible 
exchange rate helped the Czech ﬁ nancial 
system avoid some of the pitfalls of other 
countries. Although credit growth, especially 
household credit, was high in some years, the 
authorities for the most part viewed it to be in 
line with the country’s convergence process 
(Frait, Geršl, and Seidler 2011). What makes 
the Czech banking system special is that it did 
not accumulate lending in foreign currency. 
Perhaps because the country had established 
macroeconomic management credibility well 
before high global liquidity emerged, and thus 
had low inﬂ ation and interest rates, carry-trade 
opportunities that fueled foreign currency 
lending elsewhere were simply nonexistent 
(Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2010).
Source: Background papers prepared by 
country ofﬁ cials for this report.
152
GOLDEN GROWTH
liquidity risks, inadequate and unbinding leverage limits, and a ﬂ awed Basel 
framework for determining capital requirements for on- and off-balance 
sheet credit exposures. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the Financial Stability Board—each with European leadership and 
representation—are considering reforms to tackle these weaknesses, which 
will be phased in over time. As discussed in Ghosh, Sugawara, and Zalduendo 
(2011a), emerging Europe is the region most likely to be negatively affected 
Box 3.4: The new European architecture for ﬁ nancial stability
The precrisis EU architecture for ﬁ nancial 
stability evolved into an institutional 
framework with three characteristics that the 
crisis revealed needed to be strengthened: 
• Decentralization. Before the crisis, 
ﬁ nancial stability functions were 
decentralized, based on the exercise 
of national responsibilities by banking 
supervisors, central banks, treasuries, and 
deposit insurance schemes (despite the 
integration of European ﬁ nance). 
• Segmentation. Precrisis ﬁ nancial stability 
functions were segmented across sectors 
and countries; for example, supervision 
of banks and ﬁ nancial conglomerates was 
conducted separately by the supervisors 
that licensed each entity.
• Cooperation. Voluntary cooperation 
structures were relied on to bridge the 
gaps between national responsibilities. 
These structures ranged from legal 
provisions (for example, consolidated 
supervision) to voluntary memorandums 
of understanding. 
Since the crisis, the European Union has 
undertaken institutional reforms aimed at 
enhancing the effectiveness of economic, 
ﬁ nancial, and ﬁ nancial sector policymaking and 
policy coordination. The two elements of the 
response are:
• The creation on January 1, 2011, of 
the European System of Financial 
Supervision, a framework for coordination 
of microprudential supervision and 
for a macroprudential organization for 
assessing Europe-wide systemic ﬁ nancial 
risks.
• The creation of a new—and still evolving—
sovereign crisis resolution and European 
economic surveillance mechanism 
comprising the European Stability 
Mechanism, a permanent crisis resolution 
tool, to replace in July 2013 the European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism in EU 
member states and the European Financial 
Stability Facility in euro area countries 
facing sovereign debt problems; the Euro 
Plus Pact, to strengthen the economic 
pillar of the euro area; a strengthened 
economic surveillance framework; and the 
European Semester, an integrated annual 
surveillance cycle.
The new microprudential framework
Three microprudential supervisory authorities 
(ESAs) were created: the European Banking 
Authority, the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority. 
The ESAs should be seen as the next step 
in the evolution of effective cooperation 
between national authorities rather than 
as a centralization of power. Each of the 
ESAs has the following responsibilities in 
their respective competencies: establishing 
a single set of harmonized rules; ensuring 
consistent application of EU rules; managing 
disagreements between national supervisors; 
making recommendations if there is a manifest 
breach of Community law; creating a common 
supervisory culture as well as supervisory 
practices; having full supervisory powers for 
some entities; ensuring a coordinated response 
during crises; and collecting microprudential 
data.
The three new authorities are responsible 
in these areas for coordinating with the 
respective national supervisory or regulatory 
authorities. But the legal and regulatory 
authority for conducting everyday supervision 
remains with national authorities. The 
mandates of the new ESAs therefore do not 
provide much scope beyond an enhanced 
coordination role. An important part of the 
legislation is a safeguard clause specifying that 
no decision by the ESAs may impinge on the 
ﬁ scal responsibilities of member states. 
The new macroprudential supervisor
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
is the European Union’s coordinating 
organization to monitor and assess Europe-
wide systemic risks and vulnerabilities. 
One of the shortcomings of the precrisis 
architecture was an overemphasis on 
supervising individual ﬁ nancial institutions 
and a lack of attention to systemwide risks. 
The ESRB will assess and prioritize sources 
of systemic ﬁ nancial risks and vulnerabilities 
and will make recommendations for change. 
To achieve its objectives, the ESRB will collect 
and analyze relevant information; identify 
and prioritize systemic risks; issue warnings 
where risks are signiﬁ cant and make those 
warnings public; issue recommendations 
for remedial action and, where appropriate, 
make those recommendations public; 
issue conﬁ dential warnings of emergency 
situations to the Council and provide the 
Council with an assessment of the situation; 
monitor the follow-up to warnings and 
recommendations; and cooperate closely with 
all the other parties to the European System 
of Financial Supervision, providing the ESAs 
with information on systemic risks that is 
required for the performance of their tasks, 
and developing in collaboration with the ESAs 
a common set of indicators to identify and 
measure systemic risk.
The decisionmaking body of the ESRB, the 
General Board, will have voting members 
who are also top-level policymakers: the 
governors of the 27 EU national central 
banks, the president and vice president of 
the European Central Bank, a member of the 
European Commission, and the chairpersons 
of the three ESAs. There are also nonvoting 
members. But there is uncertainty about 
whether this decisionmaking structure is 
sufﬁ ciently empowered and independent. 
First, because of the size and composition 
of the board, it will be difﬁ cult to reach 
consensus on risks and mitigation response. 
Second, the ESRB’s recommendations are 
nonbinding and subject to inﬂ uence. National 
authorities are responsible for taking action, 
but are not obliged to do so. Although the 
ESRB does have the authority to follow up on 
its recommendations, its only recourse is to 
go public. Third, the board is constrained in 
assessing risks and making recommendations 
because it does not have uninhibited access 
or independent authority for obtaining 
information on ﬁ nancial institutions. 
Source: Schinasi (2011).
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by the capital requirements proposed in Basel III. Yet these effects are 
still manageable, and the beneﬁ ts of greater ﬁ nancial stability are likely to 
outweigh transitional costs.
One possible area of disagreement between EU members relates to the 
discussions on capital, liquidity, and leverage regulations. The source of 
conﬂ ict is whether these requirements should be viewed as a minimum 
standard or as a target to be applied equally by all countries. Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom recently argued that EU member states should be allowed to apply 
more stringent regulations.25 Given that countries in the European Union 
might face different initial conditions and different economic cycles, it would 
seem sensible to allow for differential practices as long as these are not 
discriminatory and meet the agreed minimum standards. This approach is 
further supported by the fact that the ﬁ scal implications of bank resolution 
remain in the purview of national ﬁ scal authorities. 
 · Dealing with a large foreign presence: the home and host challenge. 
Despite ﬁ nancial integration and the emergence of pan-European ﬁ nancial 
institutions, supervision of EU groups remains segmented. Where cross-
border groups have set up subsidiaries under local host country laws, 
these subsidiaries are subject to host country supervision and regulation. 
By contrast, where cross-border branches have been set up, these are 
supervised by home country authorities. EU laws provide safeguards for 
the host country supervisors to act only under certain conditions (for 
example, to protect depositors in emergencies). Moreover, these supervisors 
retain control of liquidity even in branches (as is the case with domestic 
institutions, be these domestically owned or subsidiary operations from other 
countries), and are entitled to being informed by home authorities of relevant 
information on the whole group.
But this supervision structure, largely unchanged from before the crisis, is 
complex, with multiple lines of reporting between home and host country 
supervisors. Nor does it address the misaligned incentive structures of 
cross-border supervision: it creates supervisory gaps, especially in emerging 
Europe, and has been associated with a level of mistrust that does not 
encourage effective cooperation. Host country supervisors depend heavily on 
the effectiveness of home country supervisors. 
Problems to be addressed include:
 · Host country supervisors do not have comprehensive means to challenge the 
home state supervision of a group with branches in its territory. Home state 
supervisors tend to protect their own domestic banking system, not the host 
country’s.
 · There is no binding mediation mechanism arbitrating between home and host 
supervisors. If a national supervisor fails to take a necessary step, no quick 
mechanism allows for a collaborative decision on the liquidity or solvency of 
a group. 
 · Effective cross-border crisis-management arrangements are lacking. 
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 · There are no mechanisms to facilitate sharing the costs of liquidity support 
between home and host country authorities, or the costs of recapitalizing or 
winding down an institution in the host country. 
Unless Europe deals with this policy failure on cooperation between home and 
host supervisors, emerging Europe will continue to struggle in managing the 
ﬁ nancial implications of foreign banks’ operations as their activities ebb and 
ﬂ ow with economic and credit cycles. 
 · Managing liquidity during a crisis. A sudden restriction of access to euro 
and dollar liquidity hurt emerging Europe. Prior to the crisis, domestic and 
foreign banks in the European Union (but outside the eurozone) relied heavily 
on the pan-European money markets for managing liquidity. These markets 
work through a hub-and-spoke system in which large (or money center) 
institutions gather liquidity at European Central Bank (ECB) auctions and 
then act as conduits to provide and gather liquidity from small and medium 
European banks engaged in retail ﬁ nance.
During the repeated bouts of liquidity crisis since late 2007 and until late 
2009, large money center banks became risk-averse and curtailed their 
lending to what they viewed as higher-risk countries and banks. This lending 
“triage” led to severe euro liquidity shortages in emerging Europe. While 
some parent banks of dominant foreign branches and subsidiaries operating 
in the EU12 provided liquidity, the subsidiaries operating there did not 
have direct access to ECB liquidity facilities because of the ECB’s collateral 
arrangements and policies. The ECB relaxed its collateral requirements during 
the crisis, but it did not expand eligibility to securities denominated in non-
euro currencies (other than a handful of reserve currencies), though it should 
also be said that the ECB did support non-euro area countries indirectly by 
providing liquidity to parent banks in the euro area. Developments since 
mid-2011 are once again threatening the liquidity needs in Europe’s banking 
system, though central banks are also showing signs of being better prepared 
to intervene swiftly to address liquidity problems as they arise.
Because of these liquidity problems, IMF-supported programs (in some cases 
with European Commission and World Bank support) became necessary. 
Although recent reforms to IMF facilities are likely to help by providing 
precautionary liquidity to eligible countries through ﬂ exible credit lines, the 
sovereign debt crises in the euro area suggest that no amount of funding 
can resolve economic and ﬁ nancial stability challenges when the policy 
environment itself produces indecision and uncertainty. Perhaps the ECB 
could take on this responsibility in the future; for instance, it could extend 
swap lines to central banks of noneuro countries in the European Union, akin 
to what the U.S. Federal Reserve did with Brazil, Korea, and Mexico at the 
peak of the 2008–09 crisis.
Manage external imbalances, don’t eliminate them
Europe’s ﬁ nancial integration represents an enviable development opportunity 
but with large tail risks. While there is no doubt that unusually liquid global 
markets during the precrisis period would have strained the toolkit of any 
government authority (Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2010), policymakers 
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across emerging Europe often did not use all the tools at their disposal. The 
presumption that a convergence-driven “new Europe” was at hand led to 
complacency among bankers and bureaucrats. In several countries, deep output 
falls and a slow climb to recovery are the result. What lessons can be learned?
First, ﬁ scal policy should have done more to counterbalance private sector 
behavior, even though it was not the source of the imbalances across emerging 
Europe. To this end, boom-prooﬁ ng public ﬁ nance will require more determined 
action going forward, ranging from the discipline to save the revenue over-
performance of boom cycles to, in some cases, a more deliberate effort to 
counterbalance private sector behavior—if not one-to-one, at least as a signaling 
device to avoid a buildup of vulnerabilities.
Second, private ﬁ nance has to be crisis-proofed. Macroprudential tools must play 
a greater role in the future, and nationally, they should be deployed to limit the 
buildup of vulnerabilities (even though the experience of countries that used these 
policies suggests that their effects are transitory, and thus might require frequent 
modiﬁ cations). For example, many countries are now taking steps to improve 
credit quality, an area in which most countries did little in the years preceding the 
global crisis. In addition, at a supranational level, countries that are less ﬁ nancially 
and institutionally developed must have recourse to measures that could require 
special treatment within the single market―and still in conformity with the single 
market principles. The newer elements of the European ﬁ nancial architecture 
are, as a result of the current sovereign debt crises, likely to strengthen ﬁ nancial 
stability. But the initial conditions in the small, open economies at income 
levels much below the EU average may occasionally call for more proactive 
interventions. This remains an area for further discussion among EU members.
Helping markets deal with overindebtedness
The debt challenges faced by Eastern Europe are different from those in the EU 
cohesion countries, yet the future of these countries is interconnected. Indeed, 
while at the time of writing the center of gravity has shifted toward Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain, spillover effects could still reach east given the interlinkages 
in Europe’s ﬁ nancial system. It is against this background that policymakers in 
emerging Europe have to assess whether a debt overhang threatens the recovery. 
This requires assessing how widespread the use of debt is, in particular among 
ﬁ rms and households.
It is worth noting that a debt overhang does not necessarily mean that 
governments should take over this debt. Removing institutional and structural 
bottlenecks that act as a disincentive to private debt restructuring efforts is the 
logical ﬁ rst step (even with no debt overhang). But in extreme cases, debt relief 
with public resources might be needed to strengthen coordination between 
debtors and creditors.26 These public actions, however, are not costless. By 
intervening, the public sector internalizes the economic implications of default 
that, in turn, could eventually weaken growth prospects.27 Moreover, just the hint 
of a debt relief intervention could lead to a lack of payment discipline (“debtor 
moral hazard”) or excessive risk-taking (“creditor moral hazard”; box 3.5). 
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How can one assess if a debt overhang exists? The ﬁ rst step is to carry out 
what can be viewed as a macroeconomic analysis of balance sheets. This 
involves both an assessment of external solvency and liquidity indicators, as 
well as an examination of domestic public and private aggregate exposures.28 
Two questions need answers: Is the country solvent or illiquid? Do the debt 
overhang risks originate in public or private balance sheets? As a benchmark 
against which to compare developments in emerging Europe, this chapter uses 
aggregate external and domestic indicators from emerging markets in East Asia, 
Latin America, and the EU cohesion countries.29
In doing so, one must keep in mind a number of factors that impact debt 
sustainability. For example, countries with better institutions can sustainably 
accommodate higher debt levels. In addition, underlying debt dynamics 
depend closely on growth and interest rates. Thus, the aggregate assessment 
of debt levels that follows should be looked at as a ﬁ rst approximation, not 
least because the uncertain economic outlook in the eurozone and the global 
economy make debt sustainability across emerging Europe more challenging.
But aggregate balance sheets can only take you so far, as they provide no 
more than a general idea of debt risks. As argued by Albacete and Fessler 
(2010, p89), “macrodata is of limited use in the analysis of the risks to ﬁ nancial 
stability … as it is neither possible to differentiate between households that hold 
debt and those that do not, nor is it possible to combine data on … debt with 
data on … assets.” The same applies to ﬁ rms. In this regard, data originating 
in surveys of ﬁ rms and households provide a fuller picture of the debt risks 
faced by a country. What is novel about this chapter is that it also looks at the 
microeconomic dimensions of debt in emerging Europe: ﬁ rst, by examining the 
debt incidence among ﬁ rms and households, as well as the characteristics of 
those with debt; second, by assessing the combination of risk and shock factors 
to which ﬁ rms and households with debt have been exposed during the crisis; 
and third, by stress-testing the resilience of households’ balance sheets to 
economic shocks.
This section concludes that much of emerging Europe is different from the 
worst-off among the EU cohesion countries. At a macroeconomic level, external 
and domestic public and private balance sheets seem manageable, although a 
prolonged economic downturn in the European Union and a lagging recovery of 
the global economy could have signiﬁ cant negative spillover effects. 
At a microeconomic level, indebted ﬁ rms and households are a small share 
of all ﬁ rms and households, so direct effects on aggregate consumption and 
investment are likely to be small. This does not mean that the ﬁ rms and 
households that borrowed heavily and the banks that lent them money will 
not face ﬁ nancial distress. (They might.) But the aggregate direct effect on 
economic activity is unlikely to be large. 
This conclusion, sanguine at ﬁ rst sight, must be qualiﬁ ed due to developments 
in the banking sector. Ratios of nonperforming loans to total lending in the 
range of 10–20 percent are a serious concern, and the need to husband 
resources back home could force some foreign banks to retrench their 
operations in emerging Europe. So far this has not happened, and foreign bank 
ownership has been a source of stability in emerging Europe in contrast to 
previous crisis episodes in emerging markets. Since emerging Europe has debt 
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concentrated in few ﬁ rms and households, there is at least the potential for 
other actors (that is, new banks) to consider entering the ﬁ nancial sector. Given 
the challenges faced by Europe as a whole, however, there is no question that 
downside risks remain unusually high. Deleveraging has so far been limited and 
orderly, but in large measure because growth prospects in emerging Europe 
remained strong. The challenges within the eurozone are calling into question 
this assessment and could force parent banks to retrench in noncore markets.
Economies—solvent and liquid
Several studies have recently analyzed the level of external indebtedness 
beyond which a country is likely to suffer slower growth and sustainability 
risks (Reinhardt and Rogoff 2010; Imbs and Rancière 2007). They point to a 
gross external debt-to-GDP ratio above 60 percent as a vulnerability threshold, 
although this varies with a country’s level of ﬁ nancial development and 
Box 3.5: The pros and cons of debt-relief interventions
Macroeconomic 
A debt overhang affects growth through 
multiple channels. If the debtor is the public 
sector, the overhang could require higher taxes 
to service these debts, which in turn would 
weaken economic incentives and undermine 
growth prospects (Sachs 1989). It might also 
turn funding markets more fragile. Speciﬁ cally, 
if rollover risks increase, creditors might want 
to limit their exposure, concerned that liquidity 
problems may generate market disruptions. 
Further, when the debts are external, the 
ﬁ nancial integration process that created these 
obligations might also alter the economic 
adjustment process. Large external obligations 
require trade surpluses that are more easily 
achieved with exchange rate depreciations, 
but while depreciations help to bring in the 
necessary foreign exchange, they also have 
valuation effects. Import compression might 
generate the necessary foreign exchange 
resources, but at the expense of limiting 
domestic demand and deepening a recession. 
Thus the resulting social and economic costs 
might require either a debt restructuring or 
increased access to ofﬁ cial ﬁ nancial assistance 
to mitigate the economic adjustment. 
The positive aspect of ﬁ nancial integration, 
as in Europe, is that it allows countries to 
spread the adjustment across borders. Foreign 
investors, for instance, see a decline in proﬁ ts 
on their equity holdings. Another feature of 
emerging Europe is that the foreign ﬁ nancing, 
which enabled high credit growth, is also the 
main source of external account adjustment 
(that is, no change in relative prices through 
nominal exchange rate changes is needed). 
Microeconomic 
Evaluating whether there is a debt overhang 
requires balance sheets to be assessed. Myers 
(1977) argued that a link exists between 
debt levels and ﬁ rms’ decisions: if proﬁ ts 
from new investments are likely to be used 
to pay existing creditors, shareholders might 
choose to pass up what would otherwise be 
proﬁ table investment opportunities. Similar 
arguments apply to household investment in 
home improvement (Melzer 2010), reduced 
labor supply owing to the wedge imposed on 
incomes by debt-service obligations (Mulligan 
2008), and limited consumption (Olney 1999). 
Equally, banks that have overleveraged 
balance sheets and are facing losses might 
limit new lending. In sum, balance sheet 
factors might become a drag on banks’ ability 
to restore credit and support the recovery. 
The extent to which the balance sheets of 
ﬁ rms, households, and banks undermine 
economic activity also relates to their 
aggregate impact on the economy. Other 
ﬁ rms, households, and banks might pursue 
investment, consumption, and lending 
opportunities that economic agents with 
overleveraged balance sheets cannot. But as 
seen, debt incidence in emerging Europe is not 
widespread and thus unlikely to become a drag 
on economic activity.
Given that the public sector in emerging 
Europe is not highly leveraged, it is often 
argued that governments can share the 
burden imposed by existing debts on ﬁ rms 
and households. For several reasons, such 
decisions should not be taken in haste. 
First, it is important to assess if a debt 
overhang actually exists and that, absent 
public ﬁ nancial support, social welfare will 
decline. In emerging Europe, the case for such 
debt relief does not appear to be compelling. 
Even in the countries most at risk, market-
based approaches appear adequate to address 
the borderline debt-overhang cases discussed 
in this chapter. Also, although the strength 
of banks’ balance sheets in emerging Europe 
is uncertain, these banks depend heavily on 
their Western European parent institutions’ 
strength. The provision of public money by 
emerging Europe’s governments is not easy 
to justify.
Second, the debtor and creditor moral hazard 
risks need to be gauged. From a borrower 
perspective, just talk of debt relief weakens 
payment discipline. From a lender perspective, 
bailouts might encourage excessive risk-
taking. Debt-relief interventions also risk 
creating opportunities for politicization and 
capture by special interest groups on a matter 
that, so far, remains a largely private affair in 
much of emerging Europe.
Third, the premise that households should be 
compensated for an increase in debt-service 
burden due to external economic shocks is not 
easily justiﬁ ed given the distribution of debt 
across income quintiles. The analysis suggests 
that most households have room to tackle 
economic shocks. If, for political reasons, it is 
necessary to introduce such programs, it would 
seem sensible to target scarce public resources 
by loan size and household income.
158
GOLDEN GROWTH
institutional strength. For emerging Europe, and in particular new EU members, 
the sustainable threshold is likely to be above that for a typical developing 
country. Moreover, it may be more appropriate to look at net external liabilities 
than at gross external debt as an indicator for a country’s external solvency, 
explicitly taking a country’s foreign assets as well as the structure of its 
liabilities (debt or equity) into account. As noted, any assessment of underlying 
debt dynamics depends closely on growth and interest rates, all of which 
currently face high degrees of uncertainty.
Against this background, and compared with emerging markets in past crises 
that had average net foreign asset positions of –36 percent of GDP, equivalent 
group positions in 2009 of the EU12 (–70 percent), EU candidates (–57 percent), 
and EU eastern partnership countries (–62 percent) were weaker (ﬁ gure 3.13, 
left panel; these have changed only marginally since 2009). But they compare 
favorably with EU cohesion countries (–99 percent of GDP). Countries vary of 
course: net foreign asset positions were –129 percent of GDP in Hungary and 
–87 percent of GDP in Latvia, but less than –50 percent of GDP in the Czech 
Republic and Turkey. 
While overall external liabilities seem large, net debt positions are not too weak 
in emerging Europe. With one exception, such positions are better than –60 
percent of GDP, reﬂ ecting the substantial FDI inﬂ ows that characterize emerging 
Europe (ﬁ gure 3.13, right panel). Net equity positions decline much more than 
net debt positions between 2002 and 2009 (ﬁ gure 3.14). By contrast, net debt 
positions are the sole source of increase in external obligations among EU 
cohesion countries. The same is true for Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and, to a 
lesser extent, Latvia and Hungary, though their net debt positions are not as 
large as those of EU cohesion countries.
Why is the distinction between net debt and net equity positions important? The 
distinction matters because different types of liabilities have different burden-
sharing features. In good times, the upside from growth accrues to foreign 
investors (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). Conversely, the value of equity liabilities 
falls as the economic performance of capital-recipient countries weakens. 
Emerging Europe has another unique feature: a large share of its net debt 
positions originate in parent banks and ﬁ rms extending credit lines to their 
subsidiary operations, due to the tax and regulatory advantages of such credit 
lines. When subsidiaries in emerging Europe are confronted with ﬁ nancial 
difﬁ culties, however, not only is the capital base of their subsidiaries able to 
provide a buffer against negative shocks, but also parent banks and ﬁ rms 
have been willing to convert these credit lines into capital. This is, for instance, 
the experience of banks in the Baltic countries. In sum, support by parent 
institutions to their subsidiaries in emerging Europe is a long-term strategic 
decision that depends on the European Union’s growth outlook; thus, an 
integrated region where foreign ownership structures are important cannot be 
looked at through the metric used in other emerging markets.30
What about external liquidity positions? Emerging Europe has large foreign 
exchange positions that should serve to cushion the risks of external shocks.31 
Apart from the Baltic states, most countries have a ratio of total gross debt 
liabilities to foreign exchange assets of 3.5 or less—a sizable buffer. Countries 
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that suffered capital account crises in the past had weaker foreign exchange 
liquidity positions a year before such crises (ﬁ gure 3.15). On this metric, the 
countries most at risk are the Baltic states (though Estonia must now be 
excluded as it joined the euro in January 2011), but their dependence on one 
country for most of their foreign exchange liquidity needs (Swedish banks 
dominate their banking sectors) likely lessens these risks because such 
concentration facilitates debtor and creditor coordination.
In sum, emerging Europe’s external solvency and liquidity positions are in some 
respects stronger than those of emerging markets that suffered balance of 
payments or debt crises in the past, particularly taking into account the strength 
of parent bank support, the particular role of FDI, and the sizable foreign 
exchange reserves many of these countries have. Institutional developments in 
Figure 3.13: Emerging Europe
is solvent, the EU cohesion 
countries less so 
(net foreign assets and 
net debt, percentage 
of GDP, 2009)
Note: The right panel reports net debt, which is international debt assets plus foreign exchange 
reserves minus international debt liabilities as a percentage of GDP. Ireland is excluded from the right 
panel as its data are distorted because international mutual funds hosted by Ireland are recorded as 
positive net debt, even though these resources are not related to the domestic economy. The light 
blue columns in both panels represent the EU cohesion countries. Similarly, the dark green columns 
are capital account crises countries in East Asia and LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) regions 
in the 1990s and 2000s as well as Turkey in 2000. The light green columns are the 2009 regional 
averages for East Asia and LAC.
Source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007.
Net foreign assets (percentage of GDP) Net debt (percentage of GDP)
Figure 3.14: Greater debt 
exposure in Southern 
Europe, more equity 
exposure in the east 
(aggregate external net 
equity and net debt 
exposures, percentage of 
GDP, 2002–09)
Note: Arrows begin in 2002 and end in 2009. The arrows for each region are median values. The dots 
are the median values for the reference groups. Ireland is excluded from net debt position (see note 
for ﬁ gure 3.13).
Source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007.
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emerging Europe are also a positive aspect of their integration experience. This 
does not make emerging Europe immune to potential spillovers from troubles 
in the eurozone (such as a deleveraging on the part of parent banks), but the 
countries in the east and southeast of Europe would appear to be in more 
robust external health than their more advanced peers in Europe’s south. Still, 
concerns remain and debt dynamics are worrying given the lack of growth in 
the region and the many uncertainties that still affect the recovery of the global 
economy; in other words, downside risks remain high.
Governments—largely solvent
High public debts can adversely affect capital accumulation and growth by 
raising inﬂ ation, distortionary taxes, long-term interest rates, and policy 
uncertainty. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) ﬁ nd that differences in median growth 
rates of GDP between low-debt countries (less than 30 percent) and high-debt 
countries (above 90 percent) amount to 2–3 percentage points a year. Kumar 
and Woo (2010) ﬁ nd that a 10 percentage point increase in public debt ratios 
is linked to a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth ranging from 
0.15 in advanced economies to 0.25 in emerging markets. They argue that this 
difference might reﬂ ect less developed ﬁ nancial markets or fragile access to 
international markets. Emerging Europe is likely to be better off on both counts. 
By these criteria, countries in emerging Europe are not generally at risk of a 
public debt overhang. Many have public debt levels only slightly above the 
lower threshold of 30 percent: the regional average was 37 percent of GDP at 
end-2009. Emerging Europe’s public debt ratios are, in most cases, lower than 
in Western Europe, EU cohesion countries, and countries that suffered economic 
crises in the recent past (ﬁ gure 3.16, vertical axis). The one risk country is 
Hungary, where public debt ratios reached 78 percent of GDP at end-2009. 
While smaller than those observed among EU cohesion countries (the median 
Figure 3.15: Most economies in 
emerging Europe are liquid
(ratio of gross liabilities to foreign 
exchange holdings, 2009)
Note: Higher columns indicate greater risk of suffering foreign exchange liquidity problems. The 
dark green columns are capital account crises countries in East Asia and LAC (Latin America and the 
Caribbean) regions in the 1990s and 2000s as well as Russia in 1998 and Turkey in 2000. The data for 
capital account crises countries reﬂ ect liquidity ratios a year before the crisis. The light green columns 
are the 2009 regional median values for East Asia and LAC.
Source: Brown and Lane 2011.
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value of public debt among this latter group rose to 95 percent of GDP by 
end-2010), it remains too high for comfort. Albania and Poland also have 
borderline high levels of public debt.
In conclusion, even though very few countries are a concern, the capacity to 
add debt on public balance sheets is limited across most emerging European 
countries—and perhaps more so given the uncertain outlook for the global 
economic recovery. Most countries have accumulated debt since the crisis 
erupted, and a few already have to adopt debt-reducing policies. Fiscal 
prudence will thus need to be maintained and potentially even strengthened 
(see also chapter 7).
Private aggregate debt—mostly manageable
Private sector credit developments reveal the growing ﬁ nancial depth of 
emerging Europe as it integrated with Western Europe, greater dependence on 
direct cross-border loans, and the dominant role of relationship-based ﬁ nancing 
that characterizes Continental Europe. Speciﬁ cally, the private debt obligations 
of emerging Europe’s countries—as credit through the domestic banking system 
and direct cross-border loans to the nonﬁ nancial sector—are in some cases 
larger than in other emerging markets (ﬁ gure 3.16, horizontal axis). Private 
sector debt in, for instance, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia 
is higher than in East Asia, though lower than in the EU cohesion countries 
and other countries in Western Europe. The high credit growth between 2004 
and 2009 stems mainly from growing credit to ﬁ rms (ﬁ gure 3.17, vertical axis). 
The countries with the most rapid increase in ﬁ rm credit are Albania, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine.
Total household debt in emerging Europe is below the EU15 average (ﬁ gure 
3.18). At 25–30 percent, the ratios correspond to those in the United States 
when this country had similar incomes per capita (in real purchasing power 
parity terms).32 Overleveraged households are a potential risk, but only in a 
handful of countries: Croatia, Estonia, and Latvia, and perhaps also in Bosnia 
Figure 3.16: EU cohesion 
countries have higher levels 
of public and private debt 
than emerging 
European countries
(aggregate exposure of the 
public and private sectors, 
percentage of GDP, 2004–09)
Note: Arrows begin in 2004 and end in 2009. The exception is the EU cohesion countries where the 
data for public debt corresponds to end-2010. The arrows for each region are median values. The 
dots are the median values for the reference groups. Total private sector credit is the combination of 
credit through the domestic banking system and credit through direct cross-border ﬂ ows.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Abbas and others 2011; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine 2000 and 2010; BIS Locational Banking Statistics; European Commission 2011; and IMF WEO.
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and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Ukraine (these three countries on account of 
their lower income levels). Still, margins for additional private debt accumulation 
are more limited than in the early 2000s.
To conclude, even though emerging Europe’s countries have high aggregate 
private debt exposures, benchmarking ﬁ nancial sector development shows that 
only a handful have private sector credit-to-GDP ratios above what corresponds 
to countries at similar levels of economic development.33 More important, 
they have much less developed stock and bond markets. This suggests that 
emerging Europe’s experience with high credit-to-GDP ratios might partly 
reﬂ ect the relationship-based ﬁ nancing features of Continental Europe (Wolf 
2011). In this context, examining the debt features at the level of ﬁ rms, 
households, and banks using microeconomic level data (surveys) can provide 
useful insights.
Firms—the stressed are sophisticated
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 
conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the World Bank every three years, can be used to assess potential debt 
overhang among ﬁ rms. The 2008–09 BEEPS was carried out at the onset of the 
crisis, and provides data on a representative sample of 9,098 ﬁ rms in emerging 
Europe.34 The survey deﬁ nes use of bank credit as ﬁ rms that have loans or 
overdraft facilities.35 
The survey offers several ﬁ ndings. First, the ﬁ rms that are most indebted are 
also more likely to be ﬁ nancially sophisticated. Speciﬁ cally, in line with the 
evidence on information asymmetries and credit access (for example, Brown, 
Jappelli, and Pagano 2009), large ﬁ rms (with more than 50 employees), ﬁ rms 
with audited ﬁ nancial statements, and ﬁ rms with an export orientation are 
more likely to use bank credit (table 3.3). The difference is also economically 
important: about 60 percent of large, audited, and exporting ﬁ rms rely on bank 
credit, while only about 40 percent of small, nonaudited, and nonexporting 
ﬁ rms do. Also, old and manufacturing ﬁ rms are more likely to use bank credit, 
but the difference relative to ﬁ rms with the opposite characteristics is not large.
Figure 3.17: Credit to ﬁ rms 
grew faster than to households 
in most emerging 
European countries
(change in aggregate exposure 
of ﬁ rms and households, 
percentage of GDP, 2004–09)
Note: Arrows begin in 2004 and end in 2009. The arrows for each region are median values.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on EBRD Structural Change Indicators; and Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000 and 2010.
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Second, emerging Europe’s ﬁ rms still rely heavily on internal ﬁ nancing or 
retained earnings. The share of ﬁ xed investment ﬁ nanced by bank credit 
during 2007 is small (table 3.3). Seventy-four percent did not rely on debt, 
either because they did not invest (40 percent) or because they ﬁ nanced their 
investments without use of bank credit (34 percent). Among the ﬁ rms that use 
external ﬁ nancing for investment, the amount of ﬁ nancing (that is the amount 
of “leverage”) increases as ﬁ rms get more sophisticated. Leverage is moderate 
to high (meaning that more than 34 percent of investments are externally 
ﬁ nanced) in large (25 percent), audited (24 percent), and exporting (26 percent) 
ﬁ rms. Other characteristics also matter (for example, age and ownership), but 
Figure 3.18: Household 
indebtedness rose in 
emerging Europe, but 
remains below EU15 levels
(total household debt, 
percentage of GDP, 2000–09)
Note: All types of household debt are included.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from the European Credit Research Institute 
(Lending to Households in Europe, 1995-2010); and EBRD Transition Indicators.
Share of firms 
(percent)
Bank loan (share of firms within 
category)
Overdraft (share of firms within 
category)
Small firm yesno
74
26
0.40
0.60 ***
0.44
0.61 ***
Young firm yesno
62
38
0.42
0.48 ***
0.47
0.52 ***
Audited yesno
44
56
0.55
0.38 ***
0.55
0.43 ***
Manufacturing yesno
34
66
0.49
0.42 ***
0.45
0.53 ***
Exporter yesno
26
74
0.58
0.41 ***
0.60
0.44 ***
State-owned yesno
5
95
0.47
0.44
0.49
0.47
Foreign-owned yesno
1
99
0.40
0.44
0.64
0.47 *
Table 3.3: Firm characteristics and use of bank credit in emerging Europe
Note: The sample tests report the results of linear independent tests that examine whether 
credit incidence differs for ﬁ rms with and without each ﬁ rm characteristic. ***, **, and * denote 
signiﬁ cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Brown and Lane 2011.
164
GOLDEN GROWTH
the differences are not as important economically. With this as background, 
two approaches assess the existence of a debt overhang among ﬁ rms: a level 
approach and a risk-shock approach. 
The level approach relies on the ﬁ ndings of the literature on aggregate leverage. 
Coricelli and others (2009) examine balance sheets and income statements 
for 8,000 manufacturing ﬁ rms in emerging Europe and establish a leverage 
threshold—40 percent—above which debt reduces ﬁ rm productivity.36 They 
ﬁ nd that the share of ﬁ rms with leverage exceeding this threshold is higher 
in Bulgaria, Latvia, and the Russian Federation (15 percent of all ﬁ rms in these 
countries). Taking this threshold as given, the BEEPS data suggest that the share 
of ﬁ rms with excessive leverage (moderate to high leverage ratios) has, at about 
19 percent, increased only marginally from the Coricelli and others sample (table 
3.4).37 Even among the larger ﬁ rms, only one in four had either large or moderate 
leverage, and these ﬁ rms are more likely to withstand economic shocks. 
The level approach thus presents a largely reassuring picture: debt incidence 
among ﬁ rms is a limited phenomenon and is unlikely to be important in limiting 
economic activity.38
 Noinvestment
Investment share financed by loan (percent)
0 1 - 33 34 - 67 67 - 100 Chi2 test
All firms 40 34 7 8 11
Small firm yesno
48
28
32
38
5
9
6
11
10
14 ***
Young firm yesno
42
36
34
35
6
8
7
8
11
12 ***
Audited yesno
32
46
36
34
8
6
10
5
14
9 ***
Manufacturing yesno
40
40
34
35
7
7
7
8
11
11
Exporter yesno
30
45
36
34
8
6
11
6
15
10 ***
State-owned yesno
27
41
49
33
6
7
8
8
10
11 ***
Foreign-owned yesno
42
40
35
34
8
7
8
8
8
11
Table 3.4: Firm debt is held by the ﬁ nancially sophisticated in emerging Europe
Note: The table reports the distribution of the variable investment loan for subsamples of ﬁ rms that 
have and do not have a speciﬁ c ﬁ rm characteristic. Chi-square tests report whether the distribution 
is signiﬁ cantly different for ﬁ rms with and without each ﬁ rm characteristic. ***, **, and * denote 
signiﬁ cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Brown and Lane 2011. 
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Combining risk and shock factors augments the level approach. High debt 
affects future operations and investment if ﬁ rms are hit by a shock. Whether 
highly leveraged ﬁ rms are at risk depends also on the macroeconomic 
environment in which they operate. Three sources of macroeconomic shocks 
and their potential impact on the balance sheets of ﬁ rms are explored: a 
decline in GDP, a decline in exports, and a rise in exchange rates (which affects 
unhedged ﬁ rms with foreign currency loans). 
The main conclusion is that ﬁ nancial distress owing to these risk–shock 
combinations is limited in emerging Europe. Figure 3.19 plots the outcome of all 
three economic shocks.39 The ﬁ gure helps to identify endangered countries that 
face high risks (due to a large proportion of relatively highly leveraged ﬁ rms or 
a large proportion of foreign currency loans) and suffer large macroshocks:
 · The top-left panel shows the share of ﬁ rms with moderate to high leverage 
ratios (the risk factor) and declines in real GDP in 2009 (the shock factor). 
The risk region is the upper left corner of the panel: countries that have 
a large share of overleveraged ﬁ rms and face a sharp decline in real GDP. 
By this measure, only ﬁ rms in the three Baltic states are likely to face 
ﬁ nancial distress. Firms in Croatia and Slovenia might face ﬁ nancial distress 
as well, though the income shock they experienced was not as large. As a 
counterexample, FYR Macedonia is a high-risk country on account of its high 
leverage levels, but ﬁ nancial distress is unlikely because this economy did not 
suffer a sharp GDP contraction. 
 · The top-right panel plots the share of unhedged foreign currency loans 
(the risk factor) against the depreciation (the shock factor) experienced by 
each country: the cumulative exchange rate change in 2007–09.40 The debt 
overhang zone is at the upper-center and upper-right corner of the panel, 
showing countries that have a large share of unhedged ﬁ rms and face a 
sharp depreciation. Albania seems to be the country most at risk, with a 
depreciation of more than 15 percent and more than 30 percent of all loans 
unhedged. Firms in Ukraine, which experienced the sharpest depreciation 
during the crisis (55 percent), are less likely to be affected due to the low 
shares of unhedged foreign currency loans.
 · The bottom left panel shows the share of exporting ﬁ rms with moderate 
to high leverage ratios (the risk factor) and declines in exports (the shock 
factor). The countries in the upper left corner of the panel are those most at 
risk, with a large share of overleveraged ﬁ rms and a sharp decline in exports. 
Firms in Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia are the most 
likely to be experiencing ﬁ nancial distress. In each of these countries about 
a third of the exporting ﬁ rms are moderately to highly leveraged, and the 
decline in exports is pronounced. But ﬁ nancial distress in the tradable sector 
affects a broader set of countries. For example, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Serbia, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey had a quarter of their export-oriented 
ﬁ rms moderately to highly leveraged and faced export declines of about 20 
percent of GDP. The speed with which export markets recover will be critical 
in determining the impact of these trade shocks. Developments in 2010 and 
2011 (at least until July) are, in terms of export recovery, encouraging (ﬁ gure 
3.19, bottom right panel).
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Households—few indebted and often wealthy
The 2010 EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition survey (LITS), which provides 
information on 23,525 households for the 21 emerging European countries 
examined in this chapter, is used to assess the extent of debt overhang among 
households.41 This survey includes information on expenditures, household 
composition, current and past economic activity of respondents, and the 
incidence and type of bank debt held. Households that own the dwelling 
they inhabit are asked whether they have a mortgage and, if so, whether it is 
denominated in local or foreign currency. Households are also asked whether 
any member has a debit or credit card, and how they responded to the crisis, 
whether through cuts in consumption and investment or the sale of assets. 
As with ﬁ rms, debt incidence among households is limited. Just 6 percent of 
households living in a dwelling they own have a mortgage (table 3.5), and only 
a third of all mortgages are in foreign currency—that is, just 2 percent of the 
owner-occupied dwellings in the region have a foreign currency mortgage. By 
contrast, credit cards are used by a quarter of the population. This contrasts 
with around 40 percent of households in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and 
Figure 3.19: A few ﬁ rms 
in a few countries are at 
risk in emerging Europe
Note: Error bands (95 percent conﬁ dence intervals) are depicted with dashed lines. The shaded 
countries denote varying degrees of risk. Also, in Estonia’s case, the adoption of the euro eliminates 
the exchange rate risk in euro-denominated loans.
Source: Brown and Lane 2011; and IMF WEO.
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the United Kingdom who have a mortgage, and 53 percent who have a 
credit card.
The countries naturally have differences. In the EU12 countries, 9 percent of 
all households have a mortgage compared with 4 percent in EU candidate and 
2 percent in EU eastern partnership countries. Credit card use is less frequent 
in EU eastern partnership countries (10 percent) than in either the EU12 (31 
percent) or EU candidate countries (30 percent). Even the EU12 countries reveal 
large differences in household use of credit. In Hungary, for example, 16 percent 
of households in owner-occupied dwellings have a mortgage and 55 percent of 
all households have a credit card. In Lithuania, the corresponding shares are 6 
percent and 12 percent.42 
Although household debt is limited to few households, it is still useful to ask 
how much they have been affected by the crisis. To answer this, two aspects 
of household vulnerability can be examined: how debt affects a household’s 
consumption and investment (the level approach), and whether household 
debt is more prevalent in countries severely hit by the crisis (the risk-shock 
approach). 
The 2010 LITS survey allows an assessment of household vulnerability by 
examining the impact of household debt on consumption and investment 
during the crisis (the level approach). The results of the econometric work 
carried out (Brown and Lane 2011) suggest that households with mortgage 
debt are more likely to reduce consumption and investment than households 
without mortgages. Speciﬁ cally, households with mortgage debt were 3 percent 
more likely to reduce their consumption, 8 percent more likely to cut the use 
of services, and 2 percent more likely to sell assets. Interestingly, the impact of 
mortgage debt is comparable to a loss of income (job loss). Thus the impact of 
mortgage debt is economically relevant. But, as already noted, the incidence of 
debt is limited. By contrast, there is no impact of credit card use on consumption 
or investment, suggesting that credit cards are not used extensively for 
ﬁ nancing.43 
When the risk-shock approach presented earlier for ﬁ rms is applied to 
households with mortgage debts, the ﬁ rst conclusion is that mortgage debt 
does not appear to be much of a risk for economic activity (ﬁ gure 3.20, left 
panel). Estonia is the only country that experienced a sharp contraction in GDP 
and has a high incidence of mortgages. But, at 17 percent of all households, 
even Estonia’s debt incidence is low and unlikely to become a drag on 
aggregate household consumption and investment. Another endangered 
country is Hungary, but here too mortgage debt is limited (16 percent of all 
households), and the income shock has not been as sharp. Latvia, the Czech 
Republic, and the Slovak Republic are also moderately at risk. 
The second conclusion is that for countries that experienced exchange rate 
depreciation, the use of foreign currency mortgages is limited (ﬁ gure 3.20, 
right panel).44 Countries that face a large depreciation and have a large share 
of households with foreign currency loans are at risk. This includes Ukraine, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Serbia, although only Hungary has a large share 
of households with foreign currency mortgages (9 percent).
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These conclusions hold even when a broader range of household debt (that is, 
not only mortgage debt) and economic shocks are considered. As in previous 
World Bank reports (for example, Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2010; 
Sugawara and Zalduendo 2009; Tiongson and others 2010), the vulnerability 
of indebted households is assessed by stress-testing individual household 
balance sheets using economic shocks similar to the worst shocks that these 
countries experienced from 2007 to 2010. Using household budget surveys, 
households are tagged as vulnerable if they have to spend more than 30 
percent of disposable income on debt service. This is done before subjecting 
these households to economic shocks. Speciﬁ cally, the darker shaded areas in 
the columns represent households that are vulnerable in each income quintile 
Table 3.5: Few households in emerging Europe have debt
Note: Observations are weighted to account for the varying size of the 
sampling units within countries. A household is said to have a mortgage 
if the household owns the dwelling in which it lives.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Brown and Lane 2011.
Percentage of Households with o/w FX Mortgage-
Holder (percent)Credit Card Mortgage
Bulgaria 14.9 3.7 30
Czech Republic 41.4 11.1 0
Estonia 31.0 16.9 50
Hungary 55.4 16.3 56
Latvia 33.6 9.2 80
Lithuania 12.4 5.6 41
Poland 19.0 4.5 37
Romania 12.9 4.8 73
Slovak Republic 40.5 12.8 0
Slovenia 46.9 3.9 19
EU12 30.8 8.9 39
Albania 17.8 2.4 39
Bosnia and Herzegovina 14.9 3.9 16
Croatia 37.5 7.0 85
Macedonia, FYR 33.1 1.7 11
Serbia 21.2 3.5 75
Turkey 57.6 3.2 6
EU candidates 30.3 3.6 39
Armenia 8.6 3.8 23
Georgia 6.7 1.7 58
Moldova 2.4 0.5 0
Ukraine 20.9 1.1 47
Eastern partnership 9.6 1.8 32
Average 26.4 5.9 37
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before a household is subjected to an economic shock simulation (ﬁ gure 
3.21).45 The median debt service is the lower dotted line in the ﬁ gure. Across all 
indebted Estonian households, for example, median debt service is 17 percent of 
income and only 4 percent of all households (or about 15 percent of households 
with debt) are vulnerable before an economic shock takes place. 
Two ﬁ ndings stand out. First, debt service is concentrated in upper-income 
households. Second, few households have debt. In Estonia, for instance, about 
30 percent of all households have some type of debt (the last column in ﬁ gure 
3.21). In other words, debt is not as widespread as it is in Western Europe and 
the United States.
Next, two shock combinations are introduced.46 First, the effects of a 
simultaneous increase in interest rates and a depreciation of the local currency 
are examined (ﬁ gure 3.21, top panel). The size of these shocks is based on the 
highest increase in interest rates together with the largest depreciation in each 
country over the four-year period from January 2007 through December 2010. 
Implicitly, countries with ﬁ xed exchange rates would not have such a shock 
(and, in addition, in Estonia’s case the adoption of the euro eliminates this risk in 
euro-denominated loans). Second, the implications of unemployment 
are estimated by randomly selecting household members who become 
unemployed (ﬁ gure 3.21, bottom panel).
The conclusion from these stress-testing scenarios is that households are 
affected by the shocks, but that debt burden remains manageable. For 
example, while 4 percent of all households were vulnerable in Estonia before an 
economic shock is applied, this increases to about 8 percent of all households 
after the shock. This represents 20–25 percent of all loans to households. 
Although this is not a ﬁ gure to be dismissed lightly, the shocks affect only one 
in every 13 households. In short, this low frequency suggests that household 
debt is unlikely to become a drag on aggregate economic activity in emerging 
Figure 3.20: Only few 
households in few emerging 
European countries are 
excessively indebted
Note: Error bands (95 percent conﬁ dence intervals) are depicted with dashed lines. Relevant 
foreign currency refers to the dominant currency in which household debt seems to be 
denominated. For all countries it is the euro, except the Swiss franc for Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovenia; and the U.S. dollar for Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Also, in 
Estonia’s case, the adoption of the euro eliminates the risk in all euro-denominated loans.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Brown and Lane 2011.
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Europe. And the number of additional households at risk as a result of economic 
shocks does not appear to be particularly high, suggesting households are quite 
resilient to the economic shocks being modeled.
Banks—some troubled, most of them foreign
Even though the previous analysis concludes that debt distress affects only a 
small proportion of ﬁ rms and households, for some banks even this fraction can 
represent a sizable share of their loan portfolio. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) 
have increased throughout emerging Europe. Thus there may be a temporary 
drag on credit to the private sector as banks repair their balance sheets.47 
The health of banks’ balance sheets reﬂ ects how well they can cope with the 
credit losses they accumulated during the crisis, an ability that depends on 
their proﬁ t potential. NPLs climbed sharply during 2008–09, rising by over 40 
percentage points in Ukraine, for example, and 20 percentage points in Georgia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova (ﬁ gure 3.22, left panel).48 In Georgia, Lithuania, 
Figure 3.21: Households 
in emerging Europe can 
withstand economic shocks
Note: A country-speciﬁ c shock means the magnitude of the shock varies by country and 
depends on the historical development in each country. For example, the unemployment 
shock in Estonia amounts to a 12 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
while, in Hungary, the increase is only 3 percentage points. The roman numerals refer to 
income quintiles in each country with “I” referring to households in the poorest quintile.
Source: World Bank staff calculation, based on household budget surveys of respective countries.
171
CHAPTER 3
Latvia, and Ukraine the increases in NPLs to precrisis (2005–07) average 
returns on assets were 1–2 percent—not high, but higher than in most advanced 
economies (about 1.5 percent in the United States, and 0.5 percent in the United 
Kingdom and Germany; ﬁ gure 3.22, right panel).
The ratio of change in NPLs during a crisis relative to precrisis returns on assets 
provides an indication of a debt overhang affecting postcrisis credit growth.49 
This indicator exceeds 30 for Ukraine, is between 10 and 20 for Lithuania, 
Hungary, and Georgia, and is just below 10 for Albania and Latvia. In other 
words, banks in Ukraine will require more than 30 years of precrisis proﬁ ts to 
cover the loan losses incurred during the crisis. By contrast, banks in Estonia 
or Turkey could cover the increase in NPLs with 1 or 2 years of precrisis proﬁ ts. 
These calculations do not include recovery rates on NPLs, which are likely to 
be high; indeed, real estate is the most common collateral used in emerging 
Europe and such collateral has high rates of recovery (Sveriges Riksbank 2009; 
Piątkowski and Zalduendo 2010).50 Sugawara and Zalduendo (2011) describe 
the case of economic shocks on household debt and the impact of ﬁ nancial 
stability; while it is not negligible, emerging Europe’s well-capitalized banks 
provide some comfort.
So will banks’ problems become a drag on economic activity? Repairing their 
balance sheets might lead to a slowdown in credit growth. Such a deceleration 
is needed to a degree, given the unsustainably high credit growth rates seen 
before the crisis. Because many ﬁ rms and households have no debt, there is 
at least the potential for further expansion in banking activities. Therefore, if 
existing banks have difﬁ culties in mending their balance sheets (for example, 
Greek banks involved in the Balkans), then it is possible that new banks might 
enter these markets, helping to lessen credit constraints. This depends on the 
ability and willingness of new investors to exploit these market opportunities. 
In the end, the economic outlook for Europe as a whole is likely to be the 
key determinant of the rate at which bank lending in emerging Europe 
recovers—and, as noted throughout this chapter, current downside risks 
are particularly high. 
Figure 3.22: Some banks in 
some emerging European 
countries are at risk
(nonperforming loans 
and proﬁ tability)
Note: Error bands (95 percent conﬁ dence intervals) are depicted with dashed lines.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Brown and Lane 2011; 
and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000 and 2010.
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Moral suasion instead of public resources
Even though the evidence presented so far suggests that aggregate debt distress 
risks are manageable, and governments, ﬁ rms, and households are for the most 
part not facing ﬁ nancial distress, those that are could potentially impact the 
balance sheets of the banking system. Therefore, avoiding the emergence of 
“zombie banks” remains the challenge going forward. To ensure this does not 
hamper economic recovery, countries should remove impediments for banks to 
clean up their balance sheets themselves and continue to use moral suasion to 
lower NPL stocks (box 3.6). 
So far ofﬁ cial bailouts in emerging Europe have been limited to domestically 
owned banks (as in Latvia and Ukraine). The large share of foreign ownership 
of the banking system has meant that parent institutions (for which emerging 
Europe still represents a small share of their asset portfolio) have carried out 
recapitalizations when needed—and as opposed to Western Europe, many 
banks in emerging Europe are already well-capitalized. Moral suasion may have 
played a role in parent banks’ willingness to support their subsidiaries. But these 
foreign-owned banks seem also to have recognized the long-term nature of their 
investments in the region and its importance as a proﬁ t center. In sum, foreign 
ownership has been a blessing so far, and banking ﬂ ows in the emerging Europe 
region are more stable (see ﬁ gure 3.9, and Ghosh, Sugawara, and Zalduendo 
2011a). 
If a debt overhang is unlikely, what explains the slow recovery of domestic 
demand and credit in emerging Europe? First, uncertainty regarding sovereign 
debts in the EU cohesion countries acts as a disincentive for investment across 
Europe. Second, the health of parent banks’ balance sheets is unknown as 
developments in Western Europe’s sovereign debt crises evolve, leading to more 
cautious credit decisions and a rebalancing of balance sheets. Third, exchange rate 
regime choices might have contributed to a lower reduction in cross-border ﬂ ows 
than in earlier crises in other emerging market regions—an overshooting of the 
exchange rate has not taken place. But these regimes have also resulted in sharper 
output adjustment and corresponding income shocks on individual economic 
actors. Fourth, the recovery of the global economy remains challenged. Fifth, 
unemployment remains high and remittance ﬂ ows are still lower than before the 
crisis, further limiting the recovery of regional domestic demand.
In conclusion, some deleveraging of balance sheets in emerging Europe is to 
be expected. For the most part, the decline in outstanding credit envisaged in 
some sectors is unlikely to become a stumbling block to economic recovery. (One 
exception is the possible retrenchment of the real estate sector in some countries.) 
Therefore, it follows that the case for debt relief interventions with public ﬁ nancial 
support is not compelling as ﬁ scal space is limited; the social considerations for 
such interventions, funded with scarce public resources, are not obvious; and the 
moral hazard risks are signiﬁ cant and likely to have large distortionary effects. 
For instance, countries like Hungary—as well as Albania and Poland—already have 
high public debt ratios, and other countries have entered high-risk zones (public 
debt ratios of at least 40 percent of GDP). However, a more permanent solution 
to Western Europe’s public debt problems through sensible write-downs and 
comprehensive structural reforms is essential for the growth outlook of Europe—
and thus emerging Europe—to improve.
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Box 3.6: Facilitating private debt resolution without public resources
Public involvement in resolving debt overhangs 
should be limited to regulatory measures 
that facilitate debt restructuring and ensure 
that an effective institutional framework for 
debt resolution is in place. Although countries 
typically have insolvency frameworks capable 
of dealing with reorganization, bankruptcy, 
and liquidation, judicial systems can become 
overwhelmed when, for example, NPLs are 
high. In such cases, out-of-court voluntary 
workouts have been effective. And there 
might be strong disincentives in the regulatory 
regime for pursuing debt-restructuring efforts. 
Action on both the regulatory and institutional 
fronts is needed. 
Regulatory action includes:
Eliminating tax impediments to debt 
restructuring. Tax laws are designed to curb 
tax evasion, frequently leading to undue 
impediments to debt workouts. Whereas 
appropriate provisions created for NPLs are 
generally tax deductible, the deductions 
may have to be reversed, generating a tax 
cost after certain actions associated with 
problem loan resolution. Examples include 
debt forgiveness that is not tax deductible 
(particularly when it is not part of a court-
supervised restructuring); losses in debt-to-
equity swaps that might not be tax deductible 
when the face value of the debt exceeds the 
value of the equity; and losses when selling 
a loan below its face value (for example, to 
a company specializing in distressed asset 
management) that are not tax deductible. 
Changes to tax treatment might thus be 
necessary to expedite debt resolution.
Ensuring loss recognition by lenders through 
supervision and fair regulatory treatment of 
restructured loans. Problem loans may be 
provisioned inadequately, in particular at 
weakly capitalized banks fearing regulatory 
actions, and in these instances supervisory 
vigilance on asset classiﬁ cation is essential. 
Otherwise, lenders will avoid debt resolution, 
which would force them to recognize their 
losses. Regulations will rightly require 
provisioning against restructured loans, 
given that such loans are riskier than normal 
loans, though unduly strict post-restructuring 
classiﬁ cations may impede debt resolution.
Two areas of action may be considered 
for institutional arrangements:
Out-of-court corporate restructuring. The 
out-of-court “London approach,” which 
was developed in the 1970s, has led to 
what is known as the INSOL (International 
Association of Restructuring, Insolvency 
and Bankruptcy Professionals) principles as 
guidance for multi-creditor workouts. Three 
of these principles are at the center of these 
restructuring efforts: minimizing losses to 
creditors from unavoidable company failures; 
avoiding unnecessary liquidation through the 
preservation of employment and productive 
capacity while the ﬁ rm is restructured; and 
seeking ways to provide ﬁ nancial support to 
companies deemed viable as the workout is 
concluded. These out-of-court efforts are not 
a substitute for a well-functioning in-court 
system; they are a necessary complement. 
The threat of a court-imposed loss under a 
country’s insolvency laws is needed to create 
the incentive for debtors to agree to measures 
such as asset sales, the dilution of equity, and 
reduction of management control (Laryea 
2010). As examples, authorities in Latvia and 
Romania have recently introduced reforms to 
remove obstacles to out-of-court corporate 
restructuring, allowing “prepackaged” 
recovery and settlement agreements between 
debtors and creditors, and introducing 
ﬂ exibility to insolvency proceedings.
Out-of-court mortgage restructuring. A 
similar set of principles can be developed 
for mortgage debt. The aim is to establish 
trust between the lender and the borrower 
and facilitate loan restructuring, rather 
than foreclosure. A model applied in many 
advanced economies is the United Kingdom’s 
preforeclosure protocol. Its goal is to 
encourage negotiations between creditors 
and debtors by setting options on how to 
restructure loans, such as extending the 
term of the mortgage, changing the type of 
mortgage, deferring payment on interest, or 
capitalizing arrears. Banks are better suited to 
judge the loan’s long-term viability, and this 
decision should remain their responsibility, 
with an independent authority ensuring that 
proper and fair steps are followed. A particular 
concern with mortgage restructurings is that 
they might not involve enough of a reduction 
in net present value terms. Thus the protocol 
should set out minimum requirements for 
restructuring loans, deﬁ ne which restructuring 
methods should not be pursued (such as 
long grace periods for insolvent borrowers), 
and provide guidelines for the regulatory 
treatment of restructured mortgage loans. 
Latvia has recently developed guidelines for 
restructuring mortgage loans (see Erbenova, 
Liu, and Saxegaard 2011, for a discussion of 
current developments in Latvia’s mortgage 
debt restructuring efforts), and Romania 
has developed consumer debt restructuring 
guidelines.
Do these out-of-court frameworks work? As 
already suggested, the success of an out-of-
court system of voluntary workouts depends 
on the ability of creditors to impose losses 
on debtors. Without the threat of a court-
imposed loss under a country’s insolvency 
laws, debtors have little incentive to agree to 
asset sales, dilution of equity, and reduction of 
management control. Indeed, a requirement 
for an out-of-court process is a credible threat 
of seizure of assets and liquidation under 
a normal insolvency or bankruptcy regime. 
Creditors cannot otherwise force debtors to 
take part in good faith. 
Box contributed by Steen Byskov.
An enviable development opportunity 
with tail risks
In the late 1990s, emerging Europe embraced economic integration with 
Western Europe through the ﬂ ow of capital, labor, and goods and services. 
Integration also had a deeper dimension: full membership of the European 
Union and then entry into a common currency area. Financial integration took 
place through all types of capital. FDI played a more important role than in 
other parts of the world, as did banking ﬂ ows. Abundant global liquidity aided 
ﬁ nancial deepening as emerging Europe received large ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows from 
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richer countries. Given their dependence on Western European capital, it is 
unsurprising that these economies were hurt by the crisis. As external ﬁ nance 
dried up, the resulting income declines and job losses were bigger than in other 
developing regions. Financial integration contributed to the transmission of a 
crisis that did not originate in local economic conditions. 
So it is sensible to ask: Has ﬁ nancial integration in Europe happened too fast, 
and has it made economies in emerging Europe more vulnerable instead of 
vibrant? There is no doubt that gains in incomes and jobs over the two or three 
years prior to 2008–09 were rapidly lost during the crisis in countries such as 
Latvia and Ukraine. But a longer view provides a more encouraging assessment. 
Indeed, even after taking into account the impact of the crisis in the region, 
convergence in per capita incomes (in purchasing power parity terms) remains 
impressive. Latvia’s real GDP at end-2010 was 22 percent below the peak level 
reached in 2007, but this country still ranks 24th of 184 countries in terms 
of convergence to EU15 average incomes since 2000. So, although ﬁ nancial 
integration led to easy access to foreign funding and overborrowing by ﬁ rms 
and households in some countries, it also supported income convergence. In 
short, Western European savings helped Eastern European growth. 
Why is emerging Europe different from other regions such as East Asia and 
Latin America? The evidence presented in this chapter points to institutional 
anchoring as the unique strength of the European model of ﬁ nance for countries 
that begin their entry into this club. This is related to the European Union. The 
expectation that institutions will converge to the structures that can already 
be seen in Western Europe appears to be enough to spur growth. This link 
between foreign savings and growth has been found to be weak in other parts 
of the world—it has been difﬁ cult to prosper with someone else’s money. But 
emerging Europe is for the most part different. Foreign savings have made 
possible the pursuit of investment opportunities. 
What helped some European economies get more out of such large 
international ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows than other countries in the region? The crisis shows 
that this convergence is an opportunity, not a guarantee. As noted throughout 
this chapter, excesses and resource misallocation also took place. Thus, to 
beneﬁ t from the institutional-anchoring aspects of EU membership, structural 
reforms are needed to persuade markets that the vision will become a reality. 
The right balance between growth and vulnerability has to be found, and 
bankers and bureaucrats need to show less complacency toward large external 
imbalances. The ﬁ rst area of action relates to the need to boom-proof public 
ﬁ nances. When economic growth leads to government coffers overﬂ owing, this 
money should be saved, not spent. In some cases, countercyclical ﬁ scal policies 
have to offset the vulnerabilities that the closeness to big capital markets 
inevitably implies. The second area of action concerns the need to crisis-proof 
private ﬁ nance. Nationally, this requires greater reliance on macroprudential 
policies. As seen in the experiences of central bankers and bank supervisors in 
eight countries of emerging Europe, the effectiveness of such policies may at 
times be transitory, and regulators have to constantly play catch-up with the 
eagerness of ﬁ nancial intermediaries to ﬁ nd loopholes in existing prudential 
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regulations. Also, to be fair, this policy toolkit was not always deployed; for 
instance, policies to improve credit quality had not been applied until recently. 
A ﬁ nal question: In the countries that did not manage capital inﬂ ows as well, or 
where these could be viewed as excessive, is there a debt overhang—a level of 
indebtedness that risks becoming a drag on investment and economic activity? 
At a macroeconomic level, the evidence for much of emerging Europe suggests 
not. Although countries in the region have negative foreign asset positions, their 
liability structure points to reliance on equity ﬁ nancing that has useful burden-
sharing features. Net debt liabilities are in most cases manageable, and some 
have burden-sharing features given their links to ownership structures. Foreign 
exchange liquidity also remains, with few exceptions, comfortable. Where 
this is not the case, the dependence on one Western European economy for 
funding—for example, Sweden for the Baltic countries—helps to facilitate policy 
coordination between debtors and creditors. Among emerging Europe’s peers, 
however, some EU cohesion countries look particularly vulnerable, and this 
could have spillover effects on emerging Europe.
At a microeconomic level, few ﬁ rms and few households have high debt. This 
limits the risk of a debt overhang. Most ﬁ rms and households with debt appear 
able to withstand severe negative shocks. Government balance sheets are 
quite healthy. Still, ﬁ scal space is limited. Therefore, at least for now, there is no 
good justiﬁ cation for using scarce public money to reduce the debt of ﬁ rms and 
households. 
Nor is there a need to bail out banks at this time. Emerging Europe has many 
well-capitalized banks that could once again become proﬁ t centers for Western 
European parents. Foreign ownership of the banking system isolated emerging 
Europe’s governments from the ﬁ nancial sector bailouts that were necessary in 
Western Europe and the United States during the crisis. In fact, foreign banks in 
emerging Europe took upon themselves the recapitalization of banks that were 
needed. This is a virtue that should be preserved. 
In conclusion, whether European ﬁ nance is unique should not be debated. 
Nor should it be deplored, and the attributes that make it unique should be 
preserved. Capital in Europe ﬂ ows downhill—from richer to poorer countries. 
It also ﬂ ows to higher-growth countries. Financial integration is a principal 
component of Europe’s economic convergence engine. Capital inﬂ ows have 
contributed to economic growth and made the host countries in emerging 
Europe richer—a conclusion that remains valid even after the recent recession. 
In and near the European Union, investment projects have been ﬁ nanced that 
would not have been otherwise. 
Why Europe is different can be debated, but ﬁ nancial development is not the 
reason. More likely, the expectations of improvements in institutional quality 
are the crucial element in the foreign savings–growth link—and EU membership 
serves as an anchor for these expectations. But this positive assessment 
should not distract from the risks faced by countries at different stages of 
development and integration. Indeed, there are lessons to be drawn from 
the diverse experiences of emerging Europe and the EU cohesion countries: 
excesses are possible and countries must remain vigilant to avoid a buildup of 
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The prospect of membership in the European Union 
exerts a powerful policy and institutional pull, 
making Europe unique and strengthening the link 
between foreign savings and economic growth.
European economies that managed to “boom-proof” 
public ﬁ nances and “crisis-proof” private ﬁ nancing 
without resorting to the costly self-insurance seen in 
Asia beneﬁ ted from foreign ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows.
In emerging Europe, treasuries, enterprises, and 
households do not face a debt overhang, but in the 
eurozone’s periphery this problem is acute, posing a 
danger for banks everywhere.
Answers to questions on page 131
vulnerabilities. To keep up with the speed of income convergence facilitated 
by the extraordinary trade and ﬁ nancial integration, and to avoid Southern 
Europe’s current challenges, new and future members of the European 
Union should pay more attention to the policies and institutions that govern 
enterprise, innovation, work, and public service. These are the issues examined 
in the rest of the report.
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Chapter 3: Annexes
Table A3.1: Foreign savings and growth—EU12 and EU candidate countries are different
(testing the role of EU proximity and investment-driven versus savings-substitutions effects)
Dependent variable is growth in GDP per 
capita (PPP terms)
EU proximity
Is it investment or savings
substitution? Mostly investment!
3 emerging
Europe groups
2 emerging
Europe groups
3 emerging
Europe groups
2 emerging
Europe groups
Current account balance (CAB) 0.044 0.047 0.079 -0.107
 0.053 0.053 0.061 0.071
EU12 x CAB -0.245**    
 0.101    
EU candidates x CAB -0.124**    
 0.062    
EU 12 and EU candidates x CAB  -0.165** -0.085 -0.141**
  0.077 0.059 0.062
EU eastern partnership x CAB 0.485*** 0.471*** 0.495*** 0.445***
 0.135 0.130 0.178 0.129
Investment  0.318***  
  0.068  
Savings  0.228***
  0.066
Observations 584 584 584 584
Number of countries 88 88 88 88
p value of Hansen statistic 0.204 0.204 0.188 0.062
Number of instruments 45 40 49 49
Note: Other growth determinants included (but not reported) are population growth, educational attainment, trade openness, and the relative price 
of investment goods. Robust standard errors are reported below each point estimate. ***, **, * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Source: Stojkov and Zalduendo 2011, table 5.
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Table A3.2: EU membership as an anchor for institutional development
(testing the role of EU proximity and investment-driven versus savings-substitutions effects)
Dependent variable is growth in GDP per 
capita (PPP terms)
Financial
development
Financial frictions
(institutional development)
Current account balance (CAB) 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.019 0.031 0.016
 0.034 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.057 0.041
EU 12 and EU candidates x CAB -0.164*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.674** -0.735*** -0.505*
 0.051 0.057 0.060 0.255 0.260 0.264
EU eastern partnership x CAB 0.488*** 0.477*** 0.476*** 0.498*** 0.429*** 0.499***
 0.082 0.101 0.107 0.086 0.095 0.074
CAB x dummy for financial development 0.006    
    in top two quartiles 0.049    
CAB x dummy for financial development -0.025   
    in top quartile 0.077   
CAB x dummy for institutional 0.027  
    development in top two quartiles 0.075  
CAB x dummy for institutional -0.037
    development in top quartile 0.055
Observations 329 329 329 208 208 208
Number of countries 88 88 88 59 59 59
p value of Hansen statistic 0.305 0.567 0.269 0.511 0.598 0.720
Number of instruments 37 46 46 37 46 46
Note: Other growth determinants included (but not reported) are population growth, educational attainment, trade openness, and the relative price of 
investment goods. Robust standard errors are reported below each point estimate. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Source: Stojkov and Zalduendo 2011, table 6.
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1 Emerging Europe includes all the countries 
integrating into the European Union, 
politically or economically: the 2004 and 
2007 entrants to the EU (the “new” member 
states or the EU12), the EU candidate 
countries, and the EU eastern partnership 
countries in the former Soviet Union. 
The EU12 comprises Bulgaria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia; data for 
Cyprus and Malta are not always available. 
The candidates are the Balkans (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) 
plus Turkey. The EU eastern partnership 
covers Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. This chapter 
refers to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain as the “old” EU cohesion countries, 
and the EU15 comprise Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.
2 There are differences within each country 
group. Estonia and Latvia, for example, 
relied heavily on Nordic banks, but at the 
peak of the crisis in Latvia these banks 
accounted for a smaller share of banking 
system assets: 90 percent in Estonia and 60 
percent in Latvia. While Nordic banks have 
maintained their exposures, banks in Latvia 
that relied on wholesale funding sources 
(delinked from parent-bank ownership 
structures) and on nonresident deposits 
were more vulnerable during the crisis. See 
Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo (2010) for a 
full discussion.
3 Private capital might ﬂ ow downhill, but it 
is redirected to the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves, which in effect is 
equivalent to capital ﬂ owing uphill; it is not 
absorbed. Absorption would take place only 
if imports expand or the domestic resources 
devoted to producing exports are reduced, 
in other words, if net capital ﬂ ows match 
current account deﬁ cits.
4 This is known as the allocation puzzle, 
posed by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007).
Notes
5 The country acronyms for ﬁ gure 3.4 and 
all subsequent ﬁ gures and tables are: ALB, 
Albania; ARM, Armenia; AZE, Azerbaijan; 
BGR, Bulgaria; BIH, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
BLR, Belarus; CAN, Canada; CZE, Czech 
Republic; DEU, Germany; ESP, Spain; EST, 
Estonia; GBR, Great Britain; GEO, Georgia; 
GRC, Greece; HRV, Croatia; HUN, Hungary; 
IRL, Ireland; ITA, Italy; JPN, Japan; KSV, 
Kosovo; LTU, Lithuania; LVA, Latvia; MDA, 
Moldova; MKD, FYR Macedonia; MNE, 
Montenegro; POL, Poland; PRT, Portugal; 
ROM, Romania; SRB, Serbia; SVK, Slovak 
Republic; SVN, Slovenia; TUR, Turkey; UKR, 
Ukraine; and USA, United States.
6 A similar argument is made by Prasad, 
Rajan, and Subramanian (2007a and 2007b), 
Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2009), and EBRD 
(2009) for all transition countries.
7 A few caveats before outlining the ﬁ ndings. 
The countries of emerging Europe have 
a limited economic history as market 
economies since central planning. In 
addition, transformational recessions 
dominated the early years of transition. As 
a result, empirical work on these countries 
is difﬁ cult, and for the growth analysis 
reported here, emerging Europe covers only 
three four-year periods between 1997 and 
2008. Moreover, the global crisis interrupted 
the progress of these countries over the 
past decade and this needs to be captured 
in the analysis. Finally, the verdict on 
ﬁ nancial integration would be less sanguine 
in relation to the EU cohesion countries, in 
particular countries such as Greece, where 
structural and ﬁ scal weaknesses were 
papered over with foreign borrowing in 
the aftermath of the euro’s introduction. 
These qualiﬁ cations notwithstanding, the 
evidence provides an encouraging story on 
the merits of Europe’s ﬁ nancial integration, 
but provides a warning that its tail risks 
are ignored only at considerable peril. The 
empirical work for this section can be found 
in Stojkov and Zalduendo (2011).
8 For most emerging markets the usual 
explanation is that the absorptive capacity 
of these countries remains limited despite 
the availability of ﬁ nancing and, as a result, 
foreign savings trigger a real overvaluation 
of the currency. In turn, this weakens the 
proﬁ tability of investment and results in 
consumption booms.
9 See Stojkov and Zalduendo (2011).
10 In the ﬁ ctional television saga Star Trek, 
smaller spaceships cede control to large 
spaceships or space stations upon approach, 
and are pulled into docking stations by a 
powerful “tractor beam.”
11 Two approaches yield similar results. The 
ﬁ rst excludes countries with growth rates 
that are one standard deviation above 
the precrisis average in each of the three 
four-year periods in our sample. This 
excludes one or two periods for countries 
that experienced sharp reversals in real 
GDP in 2009 and eliminates (somewhat 
mechanically) what could be referred to 
as the unsustainable effects of foreign 
savings on growth. The countries excluded 
are Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Montenegro, and Romania. The second 
approach excludes countries that have 
external imbalances that are one standard 
deviation above the average; many of the 
same countries are excluded.
12 See Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo (2010) 
for a discussion of the challenges faced 
by the monobank systems of transition 
countries in the 1990s.
13 The IMF’s AREAER (IMF 2010) is aggregated 
into three groups of countries: group 
1 (ﬂ exible or independent ﬂ oating): 
Albania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, 
Moldova, Poland, and Turkey; group 2 
(intermediate, including basket, peg within 
bands, crawling peg, crawling band, and 
managed ﬂ oating): Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, 
Romania, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, and 
Ukraine; and group 3 (ﬁ xed, which includes 
countries with no legal tender, currency 
boards, and conventional pegs): Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Montenegro, and Slovenia. Both 
de jure and de facto classiﬁ cations of these 
choices are used, but the conclusions are 
similar. To make the presentation simpler, 
only the de jure classiﬁ cation results are 
discussed. Following Tsangarides (2010), 
alternative deﬁ nitions of periods of interest 
are used. The regime in place at end-2007 
is assumed to remain valid in the two years 
reported in the ﬁ gures.
14 This arises from faster productivity 
growth in the tradable goods sector than 
in nontradables. Wages are determined 
in the tradable goods sector in line with 
productivity, and hence unit labor costs in 
the economy as a whole increase, causing a 
real appreciation.
15 The literature on the impact on credit is 
more mixed; De Haas and others (2011) ﬁ nd 
that foreign banks constrained credit more 
than domestic banks while Barba Navaretti 
and others (2010) ﬁ nd the opposite. The 
distinction between supply and demand 
factors remains a challenge and, as 
suggested by ﬁ gure 3.9, heterogeneity 
across emerging European countries will 
likely complicate a deﬁ nitive assessment.  
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16 In early 2009, several international 
organizations and the European Commission 
created what became known as the Vienna 
process: a forum for countries with IMF-
supported programs to exchange views 
on economic conditions with the primary 
banking groups involved in their countries as 
well as with banking supervision authorities 
of both the host and home countries. 
This process included legally nonbinding 
agreements in which banks committed to 
maintain their exposures in the countries 
involved. While it can be argued that banks 
already had strong incentives to remain in 
the countries concerned as a result of the 
long-term nature of their investments in 
the region, the forum facilitated exchange 
of views and instilled conﬁ dence in the 
economic programs being implemented 
with international ﬁ nancial support.
17 Allen and others (2011) highlight this 
feature—what Mitra, Selowsky, and 
Zalduendo (2010) refer to as golden 
handcuffs.
18 A similar argument is put forward by Lane 
(2010).
19 Purﬁ eld and Rosenberg (2010) put forward a 
similar argument for the Baltic states.
20 Some countries have experimented with 
dynamic provisioning rules. Spain, for 
example, requires a buildup of capital 
buffers when credit growth exceeds 
certain thresholds. Note, however, that 
these policies succeed in increasing buffers 
but appear to have a less clear impact in 
containing credit growth itself. 
21 The use of high rates of reserve 
requirements is not discussed because, 
although quite common in some Balkan 
countries, it represents a monetary policy 
tool.
22 It is difﬁ cult to estimate the impact of these 
measures on the health of the ﬁ nancial 
system and the degree to which they 
mitigated the negative impacts of the 
subsequent ﬁ nancial collapse. One attempt 
in this direction is a recent paper by Polgár 
and Zdzienicka (2010) where the authors 
attempt to assess the impact of different 
macroprudential policies on subsequent 
credit growth or lending in foreign 
exchange.
23 This subsection draws on Schinasi (2011).
24 Similarly, euro area and EU leaders 
have introduced reforms to establish 
permanent sovereign debt crisis-
resolution and ﬁ nancing mechanisms, 
as well as a pact aimed at improving 
European macroeconomic performance, 
competitiveness, and governance. In the 
meantime, the sovereign debt crises are 
being managed with temporary EU and euro 
area ﬁ nancing facilities and the resources of 
the IMF.
25 See Tait, Masters, and Braithwaite (2011).
26 Creditors might, for example, have no 
incentive to take part in debt-restructuring 
efforts because they would prefer to be 
repaid on existing lending terms; in doing 
so, however, they negatively impact the 
region’s recovery.
27 Recent government interventions—in Ireland 
most prominently—have greatly raised 
public debt, burdening economic activity.
28 The section draws on Brown and Lane 
(2011), which provides a framework for 
assessing debt overhang, and Sugawara and 
Zalduendo (2009 and 2011), which examines 
the stress-testing of household balance 
sheets.
29 In this section East Asia comprises 
Indonesia; the Republic of Korea, Malaysia; 
the Philippines; Taiwan, China; and Thailand. 
The LAC region comprises Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and 
Uruguay.
30 No doubt this positive aspect has its own 
risks, and what will happen as a result of 
ongoing developments in the eurozone 
is a concern (such as risks of added 
deleveraging). But so far the behavior of 
parent institutions has been a plus.
31 The bulk of external debt liabilities in euro 
area countries is denominated in euro, 
and these countries have access to ECB 
liquidity facilities. Thus, high gross debt and 
low foreign exchange reserves are more 
viable options than in countries outside a 
monetary union.
32 Historical comparisons have limitations. For 
instance, ﬁ nancial innovation might enable 
agents to carry greater debt burdens. This is 
why we complement the analysis by stress-
testing the balance sheets of households in 
emerging Europe.
33 Chapter 5 reports the results of a 
benchmarking exercise similar to Cottarelli, 
Dell’Ariccia, and Vladkova-Hollar (2005). It 
also carries out such benchmarking for the 
level of stock market development. The 
main conclusion is that in a few emerging 
European countries (after controlling for 
structural features), private sector credit is 
above the levels of other countries at similar 
stages of development. By contrast, stock 
markets are extremely underdeveloped. 
The extent to which this might simply be a 
reﬂ ection of differences in the importance 
of relationship-based ﬁ nancing is a subject 
for further research.
34 As noted in Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 
(2010), concerns that the survey might 
be contaminated by the early effects of 
the crisis are not supported by the data. 
Although the average complaint level across 
all dimensions of the business environment 
rises in 2008 relative to 2005, it is close to 
the 1999–2005 average and to the level 
observed in nontransition economies. 
By contrast, the 2008 complaint level 
for problems related to ﬁ nance remains 
similar to that in the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS 
surveys. This evidence would suggest that 
the responses from the last BEEPS survey 
should be interpreted as on the eve of the 
crisis rather than in its early stages.
35 The BEEPS survey does not include sampling 
weights, but as the surveyed sample size 
across countries accounts for country size, 
and industry and size quotas were set so 
as to get a representative sample within 
countries.
36 Some perception surveys highlight that 
respondents say they have more difﬁ culties 
servicing their debts, but this does not really 
mean that they are facing a debt overhang 
that would require debt restructuring or 
debt-relief interventions.
37 Roughly 9,000 ﬁ rms are covered in the 
BEEPS 2008–09 round. Of these, 4,667 ﬁ rms 
report that they have a loan (roughly 50 
percent). Among these ﬁ rms, 3,364 report 
positive leverage due to 2007 investment 
and 1,303 do not. Thus at most an additional 
1,303 of the 9,000 ﬁ rms in the sample could 
also be overleveraged.
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38 More detailed information for the 24 
countries in emerging Europe examined in 
this section is simply not available—thus the 
reliance on survey information. However, 
the analysis is consistent with earlier World 
Bank work (Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 
2010) using data from both Datastream 
and Bloomberg on nonﬁ nancial corporate 
leverage and on debt service coverage 
ratios. Speciﬁ cally, debt and debt service 
ratios among nonﬁ nancial corporates are 
not high when compared with the levels 
observed in past capital account crises 
events (see tables 3.3 through 3.6 in the 
referenced report). The drawback of such 
data is that they only cover large, listed 
ﬁ rms (and in a handful of countries) in the 
emerging Europe region.
39 The regression lines and corresponding 
conﬁ dence bands only depict the 
relationship between the indicators on 
each axis. Identifying endangered countries 
requires matching high-risk and high-shock 
countries.
40 Of course, some countries have experienced 
no adverse depreciation shock given their 
choice of exchange rate regime. This is a 
potential source of risk in some countries. 
For the case of households, Sugawara 
and Zalduendo (2009 and 2011) carry out 
stress-testing exercises that assume sharp 
changes in exchange rates even in countries 
that have ﬁ xed exchange rate regimes. Even 
in such cases the impact remains for the 
most part manageable.
41 The LITS dataset includes sampling weights 
to account for differences in the ratio of 
sample to population size across countries 
and for sampling biases within countries. 
The data enable a representative analysis of 
debt incidence.
42 The table suggests very low levels of debt 
among households in the region. But how 
good are these surveys? We explored 
central bank information and three different 
sources of household budget surveys: 
ofﬁ cial household budget surveys, the 
European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions, and the LITS. Overall, 
the data seem to be consistent though 
some indicators are unclear. For instance, 
what is understood by a foreign currency 
mortgage now that Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic have adopted the euro remains an 
open question. We also carried out some 
back-of-the-envelope calculations. For 
example, private sector credit to households 
in Ukraine amounts to some $40 billion (or 
25 percent of GDP), of which mortgage debt 
amounts to 14 percent of GDP. Because only 
about 250,000 of 13 million households have 
mortgage debt (2 percent of all households 
living in a dwelling that they own), this 
would imply an average mortgage loan 
size of about $90,000 at most. These 
surveys do not include consumer credits. 
In sum, even though there are some 
discrepancies between different household 
budget surveys and the LITS, they do not 
appear to be large enough to eliminate the 
conclusions presented in this chapter.
43 Respondents are asked whether during the 
crisis they reduced consumption of goods 
(food, luxury goods, alcoholic beverages), 
cut the use of services (phone, utilities, 
health insurance), or sold assets. Such 
behavior is then linked to the household’s 
use of bank debt (credit card, mortgage 
debt) after controlling for other household 
characteristics (income, education level, 
employment type) and a range of economic 
shocks (job loss, income reduction, closing 
of a family business, reduction in remittance 
ﬂ ows).
44 Unlike Brown and Lane (2011), we use the 
depreciation relative to the foreign currency 
that is most common in each country.
45 Given the concentration of debt in upper-
income quintiles, this vulnerability threshold 
overestimates households at risk. Another 
metric, used in Sugawara and Zalduendo 
(2011), is known in the literature as the 
ﬁ nancial margin (are households unable to 
maintain subsistence consumption levels?). 
It also suggests that household over-
indebtedness is not widespread.
46 A detailed discussion of the shocks 
methodology can be found in Sugawara and 
Zalduendo (2011) for the case of Croatia. 
This paper also includes an assessment of 
arbitrary exchange rate shocks.
47 The analysis depends crucially on the 
quality of the ofﬁ cial NPL statistics. For 
example, one concern could be that Albania 
has seen only a small increase in NPLs 
despite having about a third of foreign 
currency loans and experiencing a sharp 
depreciation.
48 Excesses have occurred, as noted. Thus the 
sectors to which resources are channeled 
will be quite important in the strength and 
sustainability of the recovery.
49 This is the approach followed by Brown and 
Lane (2011).
50 Although real estate prices have declined, 
recovery rates are higher than for movable 
collateral.
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Enterprise and Innovation
The chapters on trade and ﬁ nance analyzed how the 26 countries in emerging 
Europe have balanced the demands and dividends of integrating economically 
with advanced Europe. Chapters 4 and 5 now widen the analysis to include 
developed Europe. What binds these two chapters is productivity, a favorite 
subject of economists interested in economic growth. The chapters show that 
some parts of Europe are doing as well as North America, while others are 
falling behind.
Much is expected of Europe’s enterprises. Workers look to them for jobs. 
Owners expect them to create value and generate proﬁ ts. Governments want 
them to become export “champions.” Chapter 4 documents that between 
1995 and 2008, remarkably, European enterprises delivered all three—jobs, 
value added, and exports. But over the last decade, Europe’s southern 
periphery has been falling behind Continental and Northern Europe, while 
Eastern Europe has been catching up. The timing—100 million people in the 
new member states became part of the European Union as another 100 million 
living in Greece, southern Italy, Portugal, and Spain reached high income 
levels—may not be a coincidence. The chapter discusses whether the industrial 
structures in Eastern Europe—despite the communist past—are better suited 
for an integrated continent than those in the south, and suggests that they 
are. These differences are manifest in productivity growth differentials 
between countries in six internationally contestable sectors (manufacturing, 
construction, transport and telecommunications, wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants, and real estate and professional services). 
Two gaps in productivity motivate chapter 5—the widening gap between 
Southern and Northern Europe, and a persistent gap between advanced 
Europe and the United States. Europe’s “innovation deﬁ cit” is assessed, trying 
not to ﬁ xate on shortfalls in research and development (R&D) spending but 
seeing them instead as the most readily available measures of innovation 
performance. The chapter also tries to assess demand shortfalls and the 
weaknesses in linkages between demand and supply in European innovation 
systems. A big part of Europe’s R&D deﬁ cit is due to the lack of “young and 
large” companies such as Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft. This in 
turn may be due to regulations that inhibit labor turnover and mechanisms 
for funding research, and that discourage proﬁ table collaboration between 
business and research institutes. 
Because the information needed to carry out serious study of productivity 
growth is mostly available for the European Union, the 27 member states are 
the focus of chapters 4 and 5. Wherever possible, the analysis is extended to 
the other 18 countries in Europe: the four countries of the European Free Trade 
Association, the eight EU candidate and potential candidate countries, and the 
six eastern partners.
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Enterprise
Mr. Rossi (not his real name) owns a small mechanical ﬁ rm in Northern Italy. 
The company repairs valves and other components for manufacturing plants, 
serving mostly the agro-processing businesses in the region. Mr. Rossi’s father 
started the company more than 40 years ago and it remains a family-run 
enterprise with ﬁ ve or six employees and some family workers. 
The business is proﬁ table. But it has not grown since its ﬁ rst few years. When 
asked why, Mr. Rossi answers: “Do you know what I would have to deal with 
if my business employs 40 people? To start with, my workforce would be 
unionized by law. I would have to employ ‘a socially useful worker.’ The tax 
police and other government agencies like the labor safety agency would 
enforce stricter controls. I pay most of my taxes and I try to be current with the 
health and safety norms, but how much would this additional scrutiny cost? I 
would have to spend days running after the inspectors and I am sure that they 
would ﬁ nd something wrong. And to be frank, in family-run companies like 
mine, it is common to pay overtime in cash. We are happy because this 
costs 50 percent less than paying through the ofﬁ cial payroll, and our 
workers are happy to get some extra cash.” 
In Italy one out of two workers is employed by a company with fewer 
than 10 employees. In Greece the number is six out of ten. When the cost 
of dealing with the government is high, many businesses choose to stay 
small. Firms tend to be small in countries such as Sweden too but, as this 
chapter shows, for different reasons and with starkly different economic 
consequences. 
Chapter 4
What does Europe expect from its enterprises?
How have European ﬁ rms done 
in an enlarged Europe?
Why did some parts of Europe 
do better than others?
Which government policies help 
enterprises do better?
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This chapter assesses the performance of European enterprises over the past 
decade, asking and answering four questions: 
 · What does Europe expect from its enterprises and do they fulfi ll these 
expectations? Enterprises in Europe are expected to generate new 
employment, make jobs more productive, and export a large share of their 
output. European enterprises have generally delivered on these expectations, 
though recently there have been signs that in some parts of Europe—notably 
the south—enterprises are failing to deliver two or more of these three goals. 
 · How have European fi rms done in an enlarged Europe? While regional 
discrepancies exist, European ﬁ rms beneﬁ t from a bigger and more diversiﬁ ed 
market. Enterprises in the new member states have become part of the pan-
European supply chain, helping them restructure their production systems 
and increase their exports. Many Western European enterprises responded 
well to the growing competition in global markets (especially from East 
Asia) by investing in emerging countries in Europe and moving parts of 
their business eastward. However, Southern Europe has neither attracted 
investment nor taken advantage of the offshoring opportunities presented by 
cheaper eastern economies.
 · Why did some parts of Europe do better than others? This question is 
answered along two perspectives: geographic (a three-speed Europe); and 
the beneﬁ ts and drawbacks of foreign direct investment (FDI), offshoring, and 
lower quality of regulations. Countries with more efﬁ cient regulatory systems 
did best in increasing productivity. This helped them become internationally 
competitive, raise exports, and sustain job creation. These countries had 
entrepreneurial proﬁ les that were better suited for ever more integrated 
European markets. In particular, they had a critical mass of large enterprises. 
Regulatory arrangements that made complying with laws easy and did not 
penalize enterprises that grew, as well as supporting policies that attracted 
foreign investors, were most important in helping enterprises balance social 
responsibility at home and competitiveness abroad. 
 · What is the relationship between business regulation and enterprise 
growth? The answer is a little different looking east (emerging Europe) or 
west (Continental and Northern Europe, and Southern Europe). In advanced 
Europe, reducing the regulatory burden on ﬁ rms increases their productivity 
and brings about a size and sector distribution of enterprises that is most 
conducive for a single European market. An efﬁ cient—not necessarily 
lighter—regulatory framework is needed for ﬁ rms to reach the minimum 
size required to operate internationally, especially to attract FDI. In emerging 
Europe governments can also support enterprise through improved 
infrastructure and better access to credit to ﬁ nance investments, which are 
common features of the best-performing countries. 
In short, an economic model that requires enterprises to be socially responsible 
can be compatible with a vibrant private sector if it is supported by a simple 
and efﬁ cient regulatory framework. Not all countries in Europe have managed 
to strike this balance. Regulations still impede enterprises in some countries, 
preventing businesses from taking advantage of a more integrated Europe. 
Nevertheless, this chapter concludes that outside the EU15 southern states, 
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Europe’s enterprises have largely delivered what was expected of them by their 
workers, owners, and governments. 
What does Europe expect from enterprise? 
Jobs, value added, and exports
Firms may be more integrated with the social fabric in Europe than in any 
other part of the world. Private enterprises are not only held accountable by 
shareholders for proﬁ ts, but also held responsible by society for the social and 
environmental consequences of their actions. This is reﬂ ected in regulations 
that stress such consequences more than in other regions: labor regulations that 
protect the rights of workers;1 a taxation system that supports generous welfare 
policies;2 and licensing and permitting regimes that control access to speciﬁ c 
activities and verify adherence to strict codes and norms. 
In sum, ﬁ rms are expected by societies to create jobs and protect the 
environment, by shareholders to generate proﬁ ts, and by governments to pay 
taxes and—if they are sizable—to generate exports. Accordingly, this chapter 
assesses the performance of European enterprises using three criteria:
 · Jobs. Enterprises contribute to economic growth by generating employment. 
About three of four jobs in Europe are created by enterprises,3 and ﬁ rms are 
given a speciﬁ c social role: reducing unemployment. 
 · Productivity (value added). Enterprises contribute to growth by adding value. 
An enterprise’s contribution to aggregate growth is most easily measured by 
labor productivity growth: increases in value added per employee. Productivity 
is not a bad proxy of proﬁ tability.4  
 · Exports. The third performance indicator of an enterprise is its export 
propensity (the likelihood a ﬁ rm will export), which proxies its capacity to 
identify foreign markets where it can successfully place its products. Export 
propensity measures a ﬁ rm’s ability to compete on an international scale and, 
taken in aggregate, measures the competitiveness of an open economy. 
While pursuing these objectives, ﬁ rms in Europe must comply with regulations 
that, while reﬂ ecting society’s expectations, affect their performance by 
generating direct costs—for example, through tax or labor contributions and 
payments for licenses and permits. Regulations also affect performance by 
inﬂ uencing investment decisions. Similar regulations can have different impacts, 
depending on the way they are enforced. Many well-designed regulations have 
a negative impact due to poor implementation. 
The quality of the design and implementation of regulations across Europe 
can be assessed with the World Bank Doing Business indicators as proxies. 
These indicators measure the quality of regulations (such as the burden of tax 
systems, rigidity of labor laws, regulations affecting entry and exit, ease of 
access to ﬁ nance, and enforcement of contracts), based on the experience of 
users. They allow comparisons across countries and over time. In particular, the 
“time and motion” indicators measure the steps that enterprises must take to 
comply with business regulations—in number of procedures, time, and 
money spent.5
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Europe overall has heavier regulations than other regions, but intercountry 
variance is considerable. Northern and Continental European countries have 
better regulatory frameworks than Southern or Eastern European countries. 
Sweden, Finland, and Norway do better than the rest of Europe in balancing 
the quantity and quality of business regulations and are in line with the most 
advanced countries in the world thanks to the efﬁ ciency of their administrative 
systems, which makes compliance less burdensome. 
This chapter assesses the likely impact of the regulatory framework on how 
enterprises perform, measured by employment, productivity, and exports. It 
looks deeper than the aggregate indicators of an economy’s performance, 
employment growth, productivity growth, and total share of exports in GDP and 
looks into more disaggregate elements of successful ﬁ rm performance, such as 
ﬁ rm size and ownership. 
The investigation ﬁ nds that performance depends on the characteristics of a 
ﬁ rm such as its size, ownership structure, and age, as well as country-speciﬁ c 
factors related to the environment in which it operates. It focuses on the 
regulatory framework among the country factors, but also considers the 
amount of credit available to the private sector, the quality of infrastructure, 
workforce skills, and FDI inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows.6
When one disentangles the impact of ﬁ rm and country characteristics, the 
question arises whether seemingly similar companies perform equally well in 
different countries. If companies with similar characteristics do equally well 
in different countries, differences in “types” of companies would explain the 
difference in country aggregates. By contrast, if the performance of companies 
with similar characteristics is different, the differences can be explained by 
factors that vary across countries.
Figure 4.1: European 
enterprises did well 
in 1995–2009
Note: “Periphery” includes Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, 
based on ILO 2010; and WDI.
Periphery
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This distinction has policy implications. Government policies and regulations, 
and the institutions that enforce them, affect ﬁ rm performance by inﬂ uencing 
the enterprise’s cost structure. If ﬁ rm performance differs across countries, 
measuring the effect of policies on performance would be illuminating. The 
impact of regulations on ﬁ rm performance could be viewed as the “static” 
impact of regulations. 
Government policies might also affect market dynamics by inﬂ uencing ﬁ rms’ 
entry and exit decisions and growth patterns. The type of ﬁ rms that survive 
and succeed in different environments depends on the policies in different 
countries. If the mix of enterprises operating in each country differs, the link 
between market structure and the regulatory framework must be understood. 
The impact of regulations on enterprise growth—the “dynamic” impact of 
regulations—is as important in explaining how ﬁ rms produce jobs, value added, 
and exports. Both ﬁ rm- and country-speciﬁ c elements affect performance, but 
their relative importance differs in ways relevant to policy reforms. 
How have enterprises done? Quite well
Over the past two decades, the competitive landscape for European enterprises 
has changed. The globalization of markets and enlargement of the European 
Union have altered the way European ﬁ rms do business. European ﬁ rms have 
generally coped well with these changes: during 1995–2009, they managed 
to deliver against the three objectives set out above and remained globally 
competitive (ﬁ gure 4.1 and table 4.1).7
A comparison of the performance of European subregions shows the following: 
 · In 1995, enterprises in Europe employed a larger share of the working-age 
population than in the rest of the world, but lower than other most advanced 
economies. Since then, Europe has produced jobs faster than the United 
States but more slowly than the rest of the world. In fact, emerging market 
countries, notably China, saw a massive reallocation of labor from agriculture 
to industry, which Europe experienced soon after World War II. 
 · Value added per worker has increased in much of Europe. While European 
productivity8 grew in line with its competitors (but from a higher base), 
Europe did not close the productivity gap with the United States. However, 
the EU15 grew at a rate comparable with Japan, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand taken together, while many European countries 
performed as well as the United States. 
 · European enterprises have maintained a favorable position in global trade. In 
1995, Europe exported goods and services worth more than 40 percent of its 
GDP, a much higher share than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) average. Since then, Europe has increased exports 
in value terms, although less quickly than emerging countries. 
Average trends mask differences in performance among countries and ﬁ rms 
in Europe. Disparities are evident not only between advanced and emerging 
Europe, but also between countries in each group. 
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Table 4.1: European enterprises, benchmarked quantitatively and globally
(GDP, labor participation (industry and services), productivity, and exports, 1995–2009)
Real GDP 
growth, 
percent, 
CAGR
GDP per 
capita, PPP, 
'000, current 
int'l$, Latest
Employment participation, 
percentage of working-age population
Productivity, '000, constant 
2005 US$
Exports of goods and 
services, BOP, percentage
of GDP
Level Growth, 
percent, 
CAGR
Level Growth, 
percent, 
CAGR
Level
Initial Latest Latest Initial Latest
Norway 2.4 55.7 68.4 75.5 0.7 111.9 0.4 37.6 40.9
Switzerland 1.7 45,1 76.4 72.7 -0.4 96.9 1.2 39.0 57.0
Iceland 3.6 36.7 73.9 79.9 0.6 84.7 2.5 35.5 52.8
Liechtenstein 3.7 - - - - - -
Ireland 5.3 39.6 48.6 60.3 1.6 98.1 2.1 73.7 90.9
Denmark 1.3 37.7 70.7 74.4 0.4 78.9 0.7 36.1 47.7
Sweden 2.3 37.2 68.7 72.1 0.3 74.1 1.4 37.7 47.9
Finland 2.8 35.3 57.2 65.7 1.0 71.8 1.4 36.7 38.2
United Kingdom 2.1 35.1 67.5 69.3 0.2 71.8 1.4 27.8 27.4
Luxembourg 4.1 84.8 53.4 58.1 0.6 188.2 2.0 132.7 142.0
Netherlands 2.3 40.8 59.8 69.2 1.0 76.5 0.9 57.6 65.2
Austria 2.0 38.8 65.1 68.0 0.3 73.7 1.4 37.7 49.9
Germany 1.1 36.3 62.0 70.3 0.9 67.0 0.5 23.8 41.8
Belgium 1.8 36.3 54.6 60.7 0.8 80.2 0.7 67.1 70.8
France 1.7 33.3 53.6 59.2 0.7 77.2 0.4 23.1 23.6
Italy 0.8 32.4 48.0 56.0 1.1 68.2 -0.5 26.3 23.8
Spain 2.9 32.3 42.5 57.7 2.2 56.9 -0.5 22.4 24.0
Greece 3.3 29.3 42.1 52.5 1.6 56.4 1.4 11.8 18.1
Portugal 1.9 25.1 57.9 62.9 0.6 36.7 1.0 27.7 28.8
Slovenia 3.4 27.6 57.2 63.0 0.7 40.2 3.5 49.9 58.2
Czech Republic 2.6 25.6 65.9 64.9 -0.1 27.1 3.0 51.0 67.2
Slovak Republic 4.4 22.9 54.8 57.9 0.4 26.7 2.8 43.5 70.5
Hungary 2.7 20.3 48.4 53.6 0.8 25.7 2.8 44.3 77.8
Poland 4.4 18.9 44.9 50.4 0.8 22.7 3.0 25.7 39.7
Estonia 4.8 19.7 60.2 69.2 1.1 21.7 5.7 59.1 71.2
Lithuania 4.6 17.1 49.9 55.8 0.8 18.1 4.3 40.4 54.8
Latvia 4.7 16.2 48.3 57.7 1.3 15.3 4.2 39.9 43.4
Cyprus 3.3 30.7 58.1 65.7 0.9 34.0 0.5 49.8 48.3
Malta 2.6 24.8 50.1 56.3 1.0 33.1 0.1 83.8 79.0
Romania 2.5 14.2 43.4 43.6 0.0 15.6 3.4 26.5 31.3
Bulgaria 3.0 13.8 44.0 57.7 2.1 8.8 2.5 51.9 47.9
Croatia 3.2 20.0 47.7 51.9 0.7 25.2 2.8 31.6 35.7
Turkey 3.6 14.2 30.9 33.9 0.7 24.8 1.2 21.6 23.3
Montenegro 2.6 12.9 31.9 36.2 1.8 13.3 3.8 - -
Serbia 3.6 11.5 44.6 42.5 -1.2 10.9 8.4 30.1 28.4
Macedonia, FYR 2.5 11.1 30.9 34.0 1.6 10.3 1.9 29.4 38.2
Albania 5.4 8.6 16.4 21.6 2.8 12.5 4.2 12.5 29.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12.2 8.5 49.4 52.7 0.8 6.5 3.4 27.3 32.4
Kosovo 6.4 - - - - - - - -
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Real GDP 
growth, 
percent, 
CAGR
GDP per 
capita, PPP, 
'000, current 
int'l$, Latest
Employment participation, 
percentage of working-age population
Productivity, '000, constant 
2005 US$
Exports of goods and 
services, BOP, percentage 
of GDP
Level Growth, 
percent, 
CAGR
Level Growth, 
percent, 
CAGR
Level
Initial Latest Latest Initial Latest
Belarus 7.1 13.0 52.8 61.3 1.1 7.8 6.9 37.7 50.5
Azerbaijan 12.8 9.4 32.2 40.1 1.7 8.7 9.2 25.7 53.1
Ukraine 2.0 6.3 29.3 54.5 4.9 4.7 -1.2 35.4 46.3
Armenia 7.3 5.3 46.4 29.1 -3.3 6.3 10.6 20.4 15.7
Georgia 6.1 4.7 34.1 31.1 -1.0 6.6 9.5 16.4 29.8
Moldova 2.3 2.9 38.3 37.6 -0.1 2.7 4.4 50.4 36.7
United States 2.5 45.7 69.6 70.1 0.1 84.6 1.6 10.8 11.2
Australia 3.5 39.4 65.0 71.4 0.7 64.1 1.5 18.8 21.2
Canada 2.6 37.8 64.2 71.0 0.9 66.2 1.1 37.2 28.8
New Zealand 2.7 29.3 63.7 70.3 0.9 50.7 0.9 28.5 26.2
Singapore 5.1 50.7 67.4 67.3 0.0 58.1 2.4 183.2 200.6
Japan 0.6 32.0 69.5 72.8 0.4 76.3 1.2 9.4 13.4
Taiwan, China 4.3 31.0 - - - - - - -
Korea, Rep. 4.1 27.1 55.8 62.4 0.9 38.1 2.9 28.8 51.8
Malaysia 4.5 13.7 48.7 52.2 0.5 15.3 1.9 93.8 96.5
Thailand 2.7 7.8 39.1 46.3 1.2 7.8 0.1 41.8 68.5
China 9.8 6.8 40.7 49.2 1.5 6.1 7.8 20.2 26.7
Indonesia 3.5 4.0 36.2 39.7 0.7 4.7 0.8 26.2 24.6
Philippines 4.1 3.7 36.3 40.9 0.8 4.7 0.9 36.2 28.9
Vietnam 7.2 3.0 24.6 40.4 5.1 2.0 0.1 38.5 64.7
Argentina 3.4 14.5 54.0 67.9 1.7 11.1 0.3 9.7 21.7
Chile 3.8 14.3 46.1 50.5 0.6 20.0 1.1 27.1 38.9
Mexico 2.8 13.8 45.1 52.2 1.1 21.5 -0.1 31.2 27.8
Uruguay 2.7 13.1 61.9 63.2 0.2 11.5 0.4 18.2 27.3
Venezuela, RB 2.5 12.3 50.2 56.7 1.2 13.4 -3.2 27.7 18.3
Brazil 2.7 10.3 50.8 59.1 1.1 10.6 0.0 6.8 11.3
Columbia 3.0 9.0 50.9 45.5 -0.8 11.0 1.9 13.3 16.2
Peru 4.3 8.7 62.8 62.7 0.0 7.7 2.7 12.3 24.1
South Africa 3.3 10.2 37.1 39.0 0.6 18.5 1.0 22.8 27.8
Tunisia 5.0 8.2 35.2 36.1 0.6 12.1 2.8 44.3 45.8
Algeria 3.5 8.1 34.1 39.4 5.0 10.1 -2.5 47.7 34.3
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.1 6.0 31.1 32.1 0.3 5.7 2.4 22.0 23.6
Morocco 4.6 4.5 47.6 30.2 -3.4 8.5 5.9 27.4 28.9
Russian Federation 3.7 18.9 56.5 59.0 0.3 11.8 3.3 23.5 28.2
India 6.9 3.3 24.0 26.2 1.7 3.5 4.2 10.7 18.9
Note: CAGR refers to compound annual growth rate. Although for most countries the initial and latest years are 1995 and 
2009, the period varies by country and data series: for real GDP growth, Kosovo (2000 -09) and Montenegro (1997 -2009); 
for GDP per capita, Taiwan, China (2008); for exports, Luxembourg (2002 -09), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998 -2009), 
Macedonia, FYR (1996 -2009), Serbia (2007 -09), Georgia (1997 -2009), Vietnam (1996 -2009), and Algeria (2005 -09). 
Selected Indicators table A4 (Enterprise) at the end of the report gives the periods for productivity data.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on ILO 2010; WDI; UNdata; and data from country sources.
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In the EU15, different development patterns can be discerned by geography, 
according to the three criteria. Performance differs among Northern Europe 
(Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), 
Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands), and Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain): 
 · Job creation. Southern countries have done better than others though 
they started with a lower participation rate. Spain generated 6.8 million 
jobs in 1995–2009. Northern, particularly Continental, Europe has lagged in 
employment generation, but has increased employment, and the average 
share of the working-age population employed remains higher overall. Ireland 
is the best performer in the EU15, increasing its workforce by 3.4 percent 
a year. (The global economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, however, highlighted that 
employment resilience is as critical as employment generation. In some 
countries, the crisis reversed some of the earlier gains: from end-2008 to the 
second quarter of 2011, Spain lost 1.5 million jobs, Ireland 200,000.)
 · Productivity. Northern European countries have outperformed the rest, with 
productivity growing by 1.4 percent a year. However, productivity declines 
from north to south. Italy and Spain show a fall in productivity, while Greece 
and Portugal narrowed the gap dividing them from the rest of the EU15.
 · Exports. Trade performance reveals a “winners-take-all” pattern. Continental 
Europe, already more outward-oriented than the rest of Europe, became 
even more open, while Southern Europe shows only a modest increase of 
its export share. In Continental Europe, France’s stagnant exports resemble 
those of its southern neighbors. 
Emerging Europe (the EU12)9 can be categorized in three groups: Central Europe 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia); the 
Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania); and the south (Bulgaria and 
Romania). The EU12 demonstrates a pattern similar to the EU15, with two groups 
(the Baltic countries and Central Europe) dominating exports and the south 
lagging behind: 
 · Job creation. The economies that proceeded fastest in enterprise 
restructuring generated new jobs. Romania appears to be the only country 
still grappling with its restructuring.
 · Productivity. With an average annual growth in value added above 5 
percent—realized mainly through vigorous restructuring starting from low 
productivity levels—the Baltic economies outperformed the rest of the EU12. 
Central and Southern Europe also did well, with intercountry variations. 
 · Exports. Emerging Europe maintained a high share of exports in GDP. Central 
Europe responded to European integration by increasing its share of exports, 
while the Baltic countries remained highly open economies. Bulgaria and 
Romania beneﬁ ted less from close relationships with the rest of Europe, but 
have maintained their export shares.
The EU candidates and eastern partnership countries are different from EU 
member states: 
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 · Job creation. The share of the working-age population employed in industry and 
services is about 60–70 percent of the share in the European Union, reﬂ ecting 
lower participation rates in the labor force following transition and greater 
reliance on traditional sectors (such as agriculture) and on the government. 
However, employment growth in enterprises is consistently higher than in the 
European Union.
 · Productivity. Countries outside the European Union recovered from the transition 
with high growth rates, but the development patterns remain different. While 
some EU candidate countries show productivity in line with or higher than that 
of the EU12, the gap between Europe and the eastern partnership countries 
remains, as productivity in the latter is about one-tenth that in Western Europe. 
Catch-up accounts for a large share of productivity improvements.
 · Exports. The EU eastern partnership countries’ exports/GDP ratio is close to 
Europe’s and more than double that of the EU candidate countries. The ratio is 
increasing, testifying to increased integration with Europe and global markets. 
Why did some parts of Europe do better than 
others? A three-speed union
Prato was one of the most famous Italian industrial districts. Its specialization in 
textile production dates to the seventh century, when clothes production was 
regulated by the Arte della Lana craft guild. By the 1980s Prato had the biggest 
concentration of textile ﬁ rms in Europe specializing in yarns for weaving and 
knitwear, woven and knitted fabrics for the apparel industry, and special fabrics. 
Changes in global textile production patterns altered Prato’s fortunes. From 
1991 to 2010 about 1,600 of the 7,600 textile ﬁ rms in Prato closed or relocated. 
Between 2002 and 2009 Prato’s total textile exports fell from $2.2 billion to $1.5 
billion.10 The loss of market share is not the only result of globalization. Prato’s 
surviving clothing industry now has a different business model. More than half of 
Prato textile businesses are reportedly owned by the Chinese, who import fabric 
from China and produce cheap “fast fashion” clothes for sale in the single market. 
Siemens, the electronics and engineering conglomerate, is increasingly less 
German and more global. Founded in 1847 by the inventor of the pointer 
telegraph, Siemens was already operating in countries such as Estonia, Turkey, 
and Ukraine in its ﬁ rst 10 years. Its introduction of the ﬁ rst direct transatlantic 
telegraph cable in 1874 signaled the company’s global goals. After World War II, 
Siemens maintained a global presence through foreign investments, acquisitions, 
and partnerships. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the company started to operate 
again in Eastern European countries. Between 1996 and 2008 Siemens’ overall 
employment increased from 380,000 to 430,000 and the company became more 
international. More than 20,000 jobs were created in production and service 
facilities in the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Romania 
while Germany’s employment share decreased from 54 to 31 percent. Siemens 
reached new product markets and by 2008, just 17 percent of its revenues were 
generated in Germany, compared to 39 percent in 1996.  A German economist 
described Siemens as “a global value chain with its R&D and engineering activities 
located in Europe and the United States, procurement and logistics located in south 
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east Asia, its assembly activities located in eastern Europe, and its marketing 
activity organised at local level or via the Internet.”11
Škoda Auto, the automaker from the former Czechoslovakia discussed in 
chapter 2, began as a bicycle manufacturer. The collapse of communism left 
Škoda in a difﬁ cult position. Its products were based on obsolete Soviet-era 
technologies and faced a wide technological, design, and quality gap with 
Western competitors. Lada-AutoVaz, an automaker in the Russian Federation, 
was in a similar state. Škoda was acquired by the Volkswagen Group, which 
revamped its product range. Škoda is now the entry brand of a global group. It 
produces ﬁ ve times as many cars as in 1990, generating proﬁ ts for its parent, 
and employs nearly 25,000 workers. Lada, on the other hand, still produces cars 
that are not competitive in the bigger European market.
These three examples—Prato, Siemens, and Škoda—come from the south, 
north, and east, respectively. They illustrate three different responses to a 
new economic landscape (box 4.1). This section analyzes these differences, 
the changes in the European economy, and their consequences for jobs, 
productivity, and exports. 
A period of structural change
In the early 2000s, economists in Europe debated which pressures the European 
model would face as the European Union enlarged. Enterprises in the EU12 were 
emerging from a decade of restructuring and had large productivity gaps with 
older EU member states. The prognosis was unclear:
The accession of 10 more countries also adds a dimension of complexity and 
heterogeneity that was not present in the previous round. … Because of the 
gap in income, convergence between the new member states and the current 
EU members is more than ever the key to successful enlargement. Neither 
theory nor the experience of earlier enlargement convincingly supports a 
hypothesis of automatic convergence. … On the one hand the new member 
states have relatively high levels of human capital. On the other hand, they 
have a legacy of old industrial investment, environmental damage and poor 
public administration to remedy (Sapir and others 2004, рр. 4-5).
Policymakers sought to integrate these diverse entities into a single market 
without creating imbalances and compromising competitiveness.
In hindsight, European ﬁ rms mostly did well. The 2004 and 2007 
enlargements—along with integration efforts since the mid-1990s—appear 
successful so far. Enterprises in the new member states experienced vigorous 
productivity improvements and generated new jobs, contributing to economic 
growth in all parts of Europe. European enterprises fought off the increasing 
competition from emerging markets and maintained a signiﬁ cant share of 
global trade. In 2002–08, in aggregate, enterprises in the European Union 
increased value added by 16 percent. In 2008, the European Union exported the 
equivalent of 40 percent of its GDP.12
Discontinuity in Europe’s competitive landscape challenged the way ﬁ rms did 
business and created winners and losers. Winners captured the opportunities 
to expand sales and production into new markets. Siemens and Volkswagen-
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Škoda expanded networks in the bigger European market to grow outside Europe 
as well. Firms with traditional business models whose markets were disrupted 
by the competition from emerging economies were the losers. Italian industrial 
districts like Prato are among the entities that depended on the ﬂ exibility offered 
by local networks of small companies and are struggling in a world where a 
minimum scale is critical to success. 
As a result of these and other changes (box 4.1), and despite decent performance 
overall, the expanded single European market did not beneﬁ t incumbents 
equally. A decomposition of overall performance depicts a European Union13 
where convergence of emerging Europe toward advanced Europe coexists with 
a divergence within advanced Europe. The result is a Europe growing at different 
speeds (ﬁ gure 4.2): 
 · The leaders. Continental and Northern Europe saw value added grow in 2002–08 
at an average of 3 percent a year, due in equal part to productivity gains and 
employment creation. The average export share in GDP in these countries was 
more than 40 percent. 
 · The chasers. Emerging Europe reduced part of the gap with the rest of the 
European Union, generating value added at more than twice the rate of the 
EU15, mostly because of increased productivity. These economies became 
increasingly connected to the rest of Europe and the world: on average, exports 
now stand at more than 50 percent of their GDP.
 · The laggards. Southern Europe (EU15 South) shows the slowest value-added 
growth (1.3 percent) in the same period, coming exclusively from employment 
generation. Southern countries did not register productivity improvements 
and showed little growth in export intensity (the share of foreign sales in total 
turnover) which, at 28 percent of GDP, is well below the EU average. 
Figure 4.2: The east giving chase, 
the south falling behind
(employment, productivity, and 
exports, 2002–08)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat and WDI.
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These changes also had implications for product and factor markets in Europe. 
In the product market, the reduction in the cost of accessing foreign and other 
European markets implies that the competition in the local market increases. 
This effect can be offset by the opportunity to compete in other product 
markets. In factor markets, the forces at play are less obvious: while access 
to international markets opens new opportunities for companies to reduce 
their cost base, the impact on the local market can be negative or positive, 
depending on local conditions.14
A strategy to protect a market niche can only be pursued in the short term: over 
time most markets open, so the best strategy for a ﬁ rm is to be prepared. For 
ﬁ rms to fully beneﬁ t from the single market, they need to engage in foreign 
operations in the form of sales, sourcing, or both. Companies that do not can 
ﬁ nd themselves in a “lose-lose” world in which competition increases in the 
local product markets, but there are no beneﬁ ts in international markets. 
Not all ﬁ rms can access international markets—the costs are often simply too 
high to justify the investment. In particular, the costs of entry—especially access 
to information and management of subsidiaries abroad or a decentralized sales 
network—are often too high for small ﬁ rms. Hence minimum scale is becoming 
more important. In other words, although falling barriers to entry to new 
markets imply that the minimum scale for international operations is now lower, 
reaching that scale becomes critical to success (box 4.2). 
To address current imbalances and learn lessons to make future EU enlargement 
even more effective, it is necessary to understand the determinants of Europe’s 
varied performance. More immediately, policymakers need to understand 
Box 4.1: Is staying local now riskier?
When measuring the performance of European 
enterprises, one should keep in mind some 
structural changes: 
• Transition in emerging Europe. For 
emerging Europe, the transition from 
the socialist to market system involved 
privatizing on a large scale, restructuring 
production and distribution systems, and 
shedding surplus labor. Transition affected 
small and medium enterprises, with 
slower and still incomplete privatization 
and restructuring of larger state-owned 
enterprises. At the macro level, the biggest 
challenge was an efﬁ cient reallocation 
of the enterprise workforce that was 
made redundant during rationalization. 
For ﬁ rms, the changes went beyond the 
pure shift in the ownership structure and 
encompassed technological and managerial 
modernization to align production and 
commercial processes with those in the 
rest of the world. FDI inﬂ ows were essential 
to the transition’s success: in 1990–2009, 
$814 billion was invested in emerging 
Europe, according to UNCTAD (at current 
prices and exchange rates). It brought 
new technologies, managerial know-how, 
and cooperative links with ﬁ rms from 
advanced Europe and other mature market 
economies. It also presented a unique 
opportunity for thousands of start-ups and 
spin-offs to emerge, bringing the diversity 
of Western Europe to the broader group of 
countries. 
• Globalization of markets. Trade and 
production became more globalized, with 
developed and emerging economies around 
the world becoming more integrated. 
This is evidenced by the growth in trade 
volumes, which almost tripled in 2000–10. 
(Trade also improved timing and reliability 
of shipments, allowing ﬁ rms to better 
control the decentralized supply chain, 
since, along with costs, they are key factors 
in ﬁ rms’ outsourcing decisions.) European 
enterprises, operating in one of the largest 
markets in the world with about 500 million 
high- and middle-income consumers, 
were increasingly exposed to international 
competition. On the cost side, the reduction 
of transaction costs introduced additional 
opportunities to maximize proﬁ ts as ﬁ rms 
attempted to move labor-intensive activities 
offshore. This fragmented the production 
process and supply chain, rewarding ﬁ rms 
that could better manage the complex 
structures involved. 
• EU enlargement and the creation of the 
single market. EU enlargement—built on the 
principle of a common market for goods, 
services, capital, and labor—strengthened 
a global trend. In Europe, due in part to 
the macroeconomic stability provided by 
(prospective) membership, geographic and 
market borders became thinner, allowing 
increased mobility for products and factors 
of production. The EU expansion process 
opened new markets to enterprises 
in advanced Europe. It also expanded 
opportunities for offshoring parts of the 
production process, while providing an 
opportunity for ﬁ rms in emerging Europe to 
enter niche markets and take over parts of 
the value chains. For example, the Slovak 
Republic, with virtually no tradition of car 
manufacturing, became one of Europe’s 
largest car manufacturers, and many Polish 
enterprises are becoming suppliers to 
German companies.
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how to help lagging countries catch up or at least to ensure that the gaps 
grow no wider. Enterprise productivity growth in the south is needed most of 
all. Policymakers will also need to ensure that the countries now catching up 
will continue to grow in an enlarged Europe, where new entrants will vie for 
potential investors. Finally, internal sources have driven enterprise growth in 
Europe to date. The sources of growth once the EU12 catches up remain unclear 
(chapter 5). 
Jobs—some are more durable than others
Contrary to common perceptions, enterprises created employment across 
Europe in 2002–08: enterprises outside ﬁ nancial and extractive sectors, for 
example, created more than 12 million jobs.15 Of these, 25 percent were made in 
the new member states, 31 percent in Southern Europe, and 44 percent in the 
rest of the European Union. 
Employment generation in emerging Europe was almost double that in the 
EU15. Following the large reallocation of labor resulting from the transition, 
private enterprises became net job creators. The domestic service sector, which 
is underdeveloped in emerging Europe relative to advanced Europe, drives 
employment growth across all countries (ﬁ gure 4.3). Construction, fueled by the 
precrisis real estate boom in the Baltic states, but also in Bulgaria and Romania, 
explained much of the difference between Central European countries and the 
rest of New Europe. Manufacturing jobs fell slightly in emerging Europe overall, 
Box 4.2: Firms in Europe are becoming more similar—in size
Regional integration and globalization are 
making ﬁ rms increasingly similar. As barriers 
to entry to new markets have fallen, so have 
differences among ﬁ rms operating across 
countries. A critical and observable ﬁ rm 
characteristic is size, where European ﬁ rms 
appear to be increasingly similar. This is in 
line with economic theory: thanks to reduced 
barriers to entry, markets become more 
competitive and industries converge toward 
their minimum efﬁ cient scale. According to the 
theory of contestable markets, in an industry 
with no ﬁ xed costs, extra proﬁ ts would be 
eliminated through entry and ﬁ rms should 
converge to the efﬁ cient minimum scale. In 
this way, dispersion of ﬁ rm sizes is explained 
by barriers to entry in the form of ﬁ xed costs. 
When observing the evolution in size of the 
European ﬁ rms in sectors most exposed to 
international competition– manufacturing, 
transport and telecoms, real estate, and other 
services—both trends are visible, especially 
in transport and telecommunications (box 
ﬁ gure 1). The forces described above affect the 
day-to-day operations of companies in Europe 
and around the globe. Some companies have 
managed to successfully adapt and beneﬁ t—
but not all.
Box ﬁ gure 1: Average ﬁ rm size by sector in EU countries: 2002 and 2007
Note: Nonparametric estimations of the density function of EU average ﬁ rm size (10 employees and above) for 2002 and 2007. Empirical densities 
were estimated using Epanechnikov kernel techniques.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat. 
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reﬂ ecting two opposite forces: growth in some parts due to delocalization 
of labor-intensive tasks from advanced to emerging Europe to leverage the 
lower labor costs of the skilled workforce; and decline in the EU entrants’ 
larger enterprises, especially the Baltic economies, as they restructured their 
industries from the legacy of the Soviet system. 
In advanced Europe, the southern countries outperformed the rest in job 
creation, with an average yearly growth of 1.9 percent in 2002–08 (compared 
with 1.5 percent and 1.1 percent in Continental and Northern Europe, 
respectively). The sector distribution of employment creation followed a path 
similar to emerging Europe’s. Manufacturing declined overall, emphasizing the 
shift toward services (ﬁ gure 4.4). The type of companies generating service 
jobs varied. In Southern Europe, microenterprises (mostly family-owned ﬁ rms 
with fewer than 10 employees) and small and medium enterprises generated 
most jobs. Construction contributed to employment in the south, accounting for 
a large share of the growth: in Spain alone, it accounted for one out of ﬁ ve jobs 
in 2007.
Yet a simple comparison of growth rates misses the fact that jobs do not all 
contribute equally to growth. Decomposing job creation by sector and size 
brings out two main trends:
 · Some jobs are more stable than others. Domestic, consumer-driven retail 
services16 accounted for the largest share of the difference in job-growth 
rates across countries. More than half the growth in the EU15 South (1.8 
percent of 2.9 percent) was concentrated in these sectors, which are cyclical 
and credit-dependent: in Southern Europe alone more than 1.4 million 
jobs created in 2000–08 (about half the total) disappeared by end-2010. 
Similarly, jobs created in microﬁ rms (those with fewer than 10 employees) 
Figure 4.3: In the EU12, most 
jobs created were in services 
and construction
(employment growth, by size of 
ﬁ rms and sector, 2002–07)
Note: Data for 2008 are not included as sector classiﬁ cation changed from 2007 to 2008. The period 
of time considered varies by country: Estonia and Lithuania (2004–07), Latvia and Poland (2003–07), 
and the Slovak Republic (2002–05).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
201
CHAPTER 4
are less resilient than those in larger companies, as they are less likely to 
survive—bad news for the EU15’s south, where half the new jobs were in 
microenterprises.17
 · Some jobs add more value than others. Jobs in microenterprises often have 
low productivity. This is evident in Southern Europe where one job in a large 
ﬁ rm produces on average the same value added as two jobs in a small 
family-run business with up to nine employees (ﬁ gure 4.5). The additional 
jobs created in microﬁ rms and in labor-intensive nontradable sectors in 
the EU15 South have only a small impact on value addition. The size of 
enterprises generating jobs in Southern Europe—mostly smaller ﬁ rms with 
fewer than 10 employees—is also relevant to explain the high unemployment 
rates, especially among young people, despite reasonably rapid job creation. 
This could signal a mismatch between what is demanded by such 
ﬁ rms—essentially unskilled labor—and the skilled labor available in the 
market. A worker in a microﬁ rm generates output valued at about $40,000 
annually, including the gross salary, gross proﬁ ts, and depreciation. With 
this low value added per worker, microﬁ rms cannot afford to hire educated 
Europeans, who form a sizable fraction of job seekers. Besides, they may only 
require unskilled or semiskilled workers. 
When the durability and value added of the new jobs is taken into account, the 
gap between the apparently sluggish north and faster south in creating jobs 
narrows.
Value added—closing one productivity gap, opening another
Intercountry differences are most telling in productivity indicators (ﬁ gure 
4.6). These differences are instrumental in understanding ﬁ rm performance. 
Over time, in a single integrated market like Europe, ﬁ rms in low-productivity 
countries are expected to upgrade their technology, adopt new management 
Figure 4.4: In the EU15, a loss of 
manufacturing jobs, replaced 
by small service enterprises
(employment growth, by size of ﬁ rms 
and sector, 2002–07)
Note: Data for 2008 are not included as sector classiﬁ cation changed from 2007 to 2008. For Belgium, 
France, and Greece, the period considered is 2003–07.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
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Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 4.5: Microenterprises in 
the EU15 South cannot pay for 
skilled workers
(productivity level, by ﬁ rm size 
and sector, 2007)
Note: For Belgium and Greece, productivity levels refer to 2003.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 4.6: Productivity levels 
were lower in the south 
and lower still in the east
(average productivity in 2002, 
thousand 2005 US$)
Figure 4.7: The east has 
been catching up, the south 
has been falling behind
(average productivity growth 
in EU27, annual percentage 
rates, 2002–08)
Note: The period of time considered varies by country: Belgium (2003–08), Greece (2003–07), and 
Great Britain, France, Czech Republic, Latvia, and Romania (2002–07).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
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processes, and learn from the more productive ones through the ﬂ ow of 
knowledge, capital, labor, and goods, moving toward the efﬁ ciency frontier 
(Acemoglu, Zilibotti, and Aghion 2006). Productivity growth should be inversely 
correlated with initial productivity levels. 
The data for Europe show a different story.18 As expected given the low initial 
level, from 2002 to 2008 EU12 productivity growth was strong, three to four 
times as high as in the average EU15 country. However, while the productivity 
divide between advanced and emerging Europe was closing, another gap was 
growing—that between the EU15 South and the rest of Western Europe (ﬁ gure 
4.7). North and Continental Europe improved productivity, while the EU15 South 
showed a decline.
A breakdown of the productivity contribution from 2002 to 2007 according to 
the different mix of sectors and size of enterprises helps explain in particular 
why Southern Europe was lagging. 
The catch-up of productivity in emerging Europe was vigorous, with annualized 
growth rates above 6 percent for almost all countries, from all types of ﬁ rms 
(ﬁ gure 4.8). The sectors more exposed to foreign trade (manufacturing and 
other services) accounted for a similar productivity gain across countries, 
while differential productivity growth in the remaining sectors (construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurants, and transport and 
telecommunications) accounted for most of the difference, particularly the 
higher growth in the Baltic economies and the EU12 South (Bulgaria and 
Romania). In Central Europe, where larger enterprises shed excess labor, and 
drove productivity levels close to Portugal’s, smaller enterprises have increased 
productivity. In Romania and Bulgaria, ﬁ rms of different sizes show similar 
growth patterns, although in Bulgaria—where the average ﬁ rm size is larger—
the productivity gains by large enterprises account for half of overall growth.
Figure 4.8: In the EU12, 
manufacturing and services are 
more productive, construction less
(productivity growth, by size of ﬁ rms 
and sector, 2002–07)
Note: Data for 2008 are not included as sector classiﬁ cation changed from 2007 to 2008. 
For Estonia and Lithuania, the period considered is 2004–07; for Poland and Latvia, 2003–07.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
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In the EU15, the construction sector shows limited or no productivity growth. 
Excluding construction, the gap between the EU15 South and the other countries 
is seen in all type of enterprises and sectors. On average, productivity growth 
for micro, small and medium, and large enterprises in all sectors is 0.5–1 
percent lower than in the rest of Europe, pointing to a structural issue rather 
than ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c patterns. The mix of ﬁ rms may also explain part of the gap. 
Productivity growth in Southern Europe particularly lagged in services and in 
microenterprises. Microenterprises showed less productivity growth than larger 
enterprises across the continent and revealed a productivity decline in some 
southern countries. Given the relative importance of the microenterprises in 
these economies, this has a clear implication for overall growth. Likewise, while 
services increased productivity over the period in Northern Europe, the South 
(and to some extent Continental Europe) showed a different pattern. In Portugal 
and Greece, services made a negative contribution to productivity growth 
(ﬁ gure 4.9). 
The combined effect of these two patterns explains why the gap in productivity 
growth between Southern Europe and the rest is concentrated in real estate 
and other services, where microﬁ rms have the largest productivity gap versus 
their peers elsewhere. 
Exports—a winner-take-all reality?
Generally speaking, European countries with higher export shares are pulling 
ahead and countries that are less open to trade are losing ground. Continental 
Europe and the new member states in the center are the export winners. Not 
only are they more export-oriented than the rest of Europe, their performance 
over the period is superior, with exports equivalent to more than half GDP. 
These export results are a function of the pan-European value chains 
Figure 4.9: Manufacturing drives 
productivity growth in the EU15 
center, services in the north
(productivity growth, by size of 
ﬁ rms and sector, 2002–07)
Note: Data for 2008 are not included as sector classiﬁ cation changed from 2007 to 2008. For Belgium, 
France, and Greece, the period considered is 2003–07.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
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developed by ﬁ rms across countries. Although overall exports relative to GDP 
increased across Europe, level and growth remain consistently lower in EU15 
South (ﬁ gure 4.10).
The presence of exporters in an economy is not only relevant from a 
macroeconomic perspective, but also at ﬁ rm level. Research shows that 
although the number of ﬁ rms that export is small, these ﬁ rms make a big 
contribution to economic growth and welfare. Higher-productivity ﬁ rms tend 
to export more.19 When looking at the EU15 and EU12 countries separately 
to account for differences in initial conditions, one ﬁ nds a strong correlation 
between country productivity and export performance (ﬁ gure 4.11). A recent 
study of manufacturing in six major European countries shows that exporting 
ﬁ rms in Europe tend to be larger, more productive, more innovative, and 
faster-growing than nonexporters in the same industry (box 4.3).
Why did some parts of Europe do better than others?
—FDI, offshoring, and heavy regulation
Volkswagen, on the edge of bankruptcy in 1993 with €1 billion in losses, 
achieved a turnaround by consolidating platforms among its brands 
(Volkswagen, Škoda, Audi, and Seat); cutting development time and cost; 
and relocating production to Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and elsewhere. 
Škoda’s Mlada Boleslav plant became Volkswagen’s leader for supplier 
integration, offering jobs in several on-site suppliers to deliver carpets, seats, 
exhaust systems, rear axles, dashboards, and instrument panels. By 2010, 
Volkswagen Group had increased non-German employment from 41 percent 
in 1993 to 53 percent (Kubes and Radler 2002) and had 22 percent of the car 
markets in Central and Eastern Europe.20 The reconﬁ guration of the value chain 
transformed both the parent and the subsidiary. 
Benetton Group, an apparel manufacturer and retailer, has around 6,000 stores 
in 120 countries and annual sales of about €2 billion. Distinct from its smaller 
peers in Prato, Benetton is an Italian “globalizer.” Its supply and distribution 
chains are characterized by the combination of upstream vertical integration, 
outsourcing of labor-intensive downstream production, and retail outlets 
Figure 4.10: Exporting—
Central Europe’s specialty
(exports as share of GDP, 2002 and 
2008)
Source: WDI.
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managed by third parties—balancing quality control, cost competitiveness, and 
responsiveness to market shifts (Camuffo, Romano, and Vinelli 2001). Benetton 
has production facilities in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine.
Škoda and Benetton exemplify the successful companies in Europe: those that 
attracted investors, expanded, and accessed new markets, often by setting 
up foreign subsidiaries. The success of a country in generating jobs, value, and 
exports depends on its enterprises. Over the past decade in Europe, this meant 
having export-oriented, sizable companies. But not all European ﬁ rms like to 
grow. Mr. Rossi’s ﬁ rm in Northern Italy, referred to in the opening paragraphs 
of this chapter, remains a family-run enterprise and has not grown in size 
since its early years. Mr. Rossi’s experience is unfortunately all too common 
in Italy, Greece, and some other countries. When the cost of dealing with the 
government is high, many businesses prefer to stay small. 
Together, these examples help answer three questions: 
 · Why did countries in emerging Europe manage to successfully start catching 
up to the EU15? Being open to foreign investments, like Škoda was, helped 
countries begin to catch up. Lada, which until 2008 was owned by the Russian 
government, did not perform nearly as well. Investment ﬂ ows from advanced 
to catch-up economies beneﬁ ted host countries by generating employment, 
transferring technological and managerial knowledge that raised productivity, 
and linking the companies to global networks, which increased exports. 
 · How did EU15 North and Continental countries manage to keep doing well? 
These countries had the right type of ﬁ rms to take advantage of enlargement. 
These ﬁ rms could offshore and enter new markets. Volkswagen is just one of 
many companies that decentralized its production chain in Eastern Europe. 
Figure 4.11: The size and 
productivity of ﬁ rms inﬂ uence a 
country’s exports, late 2000s
(export share as a function of 
aggregate size and productivity)
Note: The variables on the y-axis in each panel are for 2009, while those on the x-axis are for 2007. 
For the Slovak Republic, data refer to 2005. WAP is working age population.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat, UNCOMTRADE, and WDI. 
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 · What makes the EU15 South a laggard? Southern Europe had few global 
companies. If the south had more Benettons, or attracted more foreign 
investment, it would have been a different story. Mr. Rossi’s company is typical 
of many in the south. A complex business environment—especially poor design 
and enforcement of regulations—stiﬂ es enterprises’ growth, making them 
unsuited for increasingly competitive European and global markets. 
The northeastern achievement: attracting FDI
In 1990–2009, Poland took in more than $180 billion in FDI,21 equivalent to 39 
percent of its GDP. Estimations based on a representative sample of ﬁ rms from 
Eastern Europe show that in 2008, one of six Polish companies with 10 employees 
or more was foreign-owned. The same foreign companies employ a third of Polish 
workers and generate close to half its value added. In 2003–08, foreign enterprises 
were responsible for creating one of four new jobs in Poland.22
This trend is not unique to Poland. Since 1990, other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe have also received large volumes of FDI—for emerging Europe, 
equivalent to one-quarter of its GDP (ﬁ gures 4.12 and 4.13).23 FDI ﬂ ows have 
accelerated since enlargement in the 2000s, when about 20 percent of FDI ﬂ ows in 
Europe were directed toward former Soviet bloc countries.
FDI through new subsidiaries and the acquisition of existing enterprises—most 
often due to privatization of former state-owned enterprises—affects the 
performance of the economy.
Box 4.3: What do successful exporters look like?
An extensive economic literature analyzes 
the relationship between ﬁ rm characteristics 
and export propensity. Barba Navaretti and 
others (2011) analyze the export activity of 
ﬁ rms in Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Using 
data collected by the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys in 2009, this report extends the 
analysis to 20 emerging Europe and eastern 
partnership/EU candidate countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine). 
Following Barba Navaretti and others (2011), 
this report uses a cross-country linear 
probability model for the extensive margins 
(the share of exporting ﬁ rms) and a linear 
regression model for the intensive margins 
(the share of the export value over total sales, 
restricting the sample to exporters) to identify 
the features that characterize exporters 
and nonexporters. The empirical estimation 
considers a number of ﬁ rm characteristics: size 
(measured in number of full-time employees), 
labor productivity, domestic versus foreign 
ownership, and age.
Some common patterns in advanced and 
emerging Europe emerge, indicating that ﬁ rm 
characteristics are what matter more than 
country conditions. 
• Extensive margin: larger, foreign, more 
productive, and more innovative ﬁ rms are 
more likely to export; differences in age 
between exporters and nonexporters do 
not appear to be signiﬁ cant. 
• Intensive margin: the share of exports 
is higher for larger, young, and foreign-
owned ﬁ rms. 
Some differences indicate peculiarities of 
emerging Europe: size and foreign ownership 
have a much higher impact on exports in 
emerging Europe than in the EU15 (Hungary 
is the exception). Age does not appear 
relevant, conﬁ rming that in emerging Europe 
young ﬁ rms are often more dynamic. And in 
emerging Europe, research and development is 
relevant to explain the propensity of a ﬁ rm to 
export, but not its export intensity.
Barba Navaretti and others (2011) show 
that ﬁ rm characteristics are more relevant 
than country characteristics in explaining 
export behavior. The export performance of 
Eastern European ﬁ rms is largely explained 
by ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c characteristics. When trying 
to measure the extent to which differentials 
in export behavior in emerging Europe are 
correlated with business regulations, and 
particularly trade-related regulations, the 
results show that:
• Extensive margin is positively correlated 
with business regulation (measured by the 
principal components analysis indicator 
of the Business Operations Index). A 
similar result holds for the speciﬁ c trade 
indicator (one component of the Business 
Operations Index). 
• Intensive margin appears correlated with 
the Business Operations Index, but not 
speciﬁ cally with trade regulations.
These results indicate that better trade 
regulations facilitate exports by reducing 
barriers to new market. For ﬁ rms that reach 
new sale destinations and overcome the 
entry costs, export intensity is affected by the 
overall regulatory environment rather than by 
regulations governing foreign trade.
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As Poland’s example shows, foreign-owned ﬁ rms in the EU12 are more 
productive and tend to grow faster than domestic ones. This is the result of 
parent company investments in plants and people, which materialized in new 
technology and processes, but also in management skills, access to better 
inputs, and connection to international markets. This is the case for most 
countries in the sample (ﬁ gure 4.14).24
FDI does not beneﬁ t only the receiving company (Javorick 2004). It has broader 
sector and economywide beneﬁ ts, producing spillover effects as productivity 
improvements and employment effects are captured not only by the receiving 
ﬁ rm, but other enterprises in the country. Other members of the value chain, 
which receive knowledge from international best practices (vertical spillovers, 
as through quality certiﬁ cation systems), and competitors which learn from 
the products brought to the market by the foreign-owned ﬁ rms (horizontal 
spillovers), also beneﬁ t from FDI. FDI was positively correlated with growth 
in jobs and productivity in the EU12, and contributed to value-added growth 
(ﬁ gure 4.15).
The export performance of ﬁ rms in Eastern Europe conﬁ rms that foreign 
ownership—along with size—is one of the most important explanations for the 
enterprise’s export propensity and export intensity.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UNCTAD (2010).
Figure 4.12: The south has 
become less attractive 
to foreign investors, 
the east more so
(FDI ﬂ ows into Europe, all 
sectors, 1985-2009)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 4.13: Not all countries in 
emerging Europe are equally 
attractive for foreign investors
(EU12 FDI stock, 2008, 
percentage of GDP)
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Beyond FDI, what are the factors behind the productivity performance of the new 
member states? A panel of surviving ﬁ rms (with 10 employees or more) from the 
Amadeus dataset in EU12 countries25 helps illuminate the drivers of productivity 
growth in different sectors of the real economy in 2003–08. The analysis 
disentangles ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c characteristics from country-level attributes. 
 · Do country characteristics explain enterprise performance in the EU12? 
Yes. Considering ﬁ rm productivity growth as a function of the ﬁ rm’s initial 
productivity level, ﬁ rm characteristics (size, age, ownership, and sector of 
activity), and country dummies, country dummies are statistically signiﬁ cant and 
differ greatly, indicating that similar companies perform differently in different 
countries (table A4.2).26, 27 For example, the productivity of a manufacturing 
Figure 4.15: In the EU12, 
FDI is positively associated 
with productivity and jobs
(growth in employment, 
productivity, and value 
added, 2002–08)
Figure 4.14: Foreign ﬁ rm are 
more productive and have 
faster productivity growth
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Amadeus.
Note: For the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Romania, data on the y-axis refer to 2002–07.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
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company in Poland grows 2.1 percentage points slower than that of a similar 
manufacturer in Slovenia. The results are similar for manufacturing and 
services—a country that does well in facilitating business in one sector tends 
to do well in the other. 
 · Are country characteristics more important than fi rm characteristics in 
explaining enterprise performance in the EU12? They appear to be. The 
exclusion of ﬁ rm characteristics from the regression of productivity growth 
for manufacturing ﬁ rms reduces the explanatory power of the model by 
8 percent. However, when country dummies are excluded, the model 
loses about four times as much of its predictive power, or 33 percent. For 
services, a similar pattern emerges: the explanatory power of the model is 
reduced more when dropping country-ﬁ xed effects (23 percent) than when 
excluding variables of ﬁ rm characteristics (8 percent). The conclusion is that 
cross-country differences are more relevant for ﬁ rm performance than ﬁ rm 
characteristics in the new member states. 
 · What are the most important country characteristics for fi rm performance 
in the EU12? The “fundamentals.” This response emerges from a correlation 
of estimated country dummies with country characteristics such as the 
regulatory environment, quality of hard infrastructure, skills of the workforce, 
share of credit to GDP, and FDI inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows.28 The quality of 
infrastructure, FDI inﬂ ows, availability of credit, and ease of conducting 
business operations appear to drive country productivity improvements 
(ﬁ gure 4.16). That most variables are similarly correlated with ﬁ rms’ 
performance in both manufacturing and services points to the importance of 
fundamentals. 
To infer causality, an extended version of the model is used in which ﬁ rm 
productivity growth (in 2003–08) is explained by the same ﬁ rm controls, 
sector dummies, country ﬁ xed effects, and changes of country characteristics 
in the same period. By including both country characteristics and country 
dummies, the unobservable country-speciﬁ c inﬂ uences are controlled for, 
allowing a more reliable understanding of what causes what. For both 
manufacturing and services, productivity gains in the EU12 are indeed linked 
to increases in inward FDI and, relatedly, to better business regulations, 
especially for taxes, foreign trade, and employment.29
 · What are the most important fi rm characteristics for explaining fi rm 
performance in the EU12? In one word—ownership. This question was 
answered in two ways. First, a counterfactual exercise compared how the 
estimated country dummies change when adding each control (baseline 
productivity, sector, ownership, size, and age) in the model that explains 
productivity growth. A Czech manufacturing ﬁ rm is a good illustration. 
The average productivity gap between a Slovenian and a Czech ﬁ rm in 
manufacturing is 6.7 percent. When considering two ﬁ rms with the same 
baseline productivity, this gap falls to 4.7 percent, indicating greater 
productivity for the average Czech ﬁ rm. Limiting the observation to two ﬁ rms 
with the same sector specialization would not change the result (4.6 percent). 
Finally, if the two ﬁ rms had the same ownership, size, and age composition, 
the gap narrows further, to 3.8 percent, indicating that the Czech Republic 
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has a negative mix of ﬁ rm characteristics (table A4.2).30 The remaining effect is 
country-speciﬁ c.
A complementary way to explore the role of ﬁ rm features in ﬁ rm performance 
is to look at the coefﬁ cients of the ﬁ rms’ characteristics in the regression model. 
Results show that ownership is especially important for productivity growth in 
the EU12 (table A4.2). Being part of an international group pays: foreign-owned 
ﬁ rms grow faster than purely domestic ones, in manufacturing and services. 
Home-based companies with an international presence31 also grow faster than 
domestic-owned companies: by 6.7 percent in manufacturing and by 3.1 percent 
in services. Size seems to matter less: both in manufacturing and services, size 
is negatively correlated with productivity growth. Lower productivity growth 
for larger enterprises can be part of the legacy of the Soviet system; newer, 
smaller enterprises are more likely to have efﬁ cient production processes and less 
cumbersome employment structures. The age of the ﬁ rm does not seem to matter 
for productivity growth in the EU12. 
Together, the productivity performance of foreign-owned ﬁ rms and the positive 
correlation of inward FDI at the country level with productivity growth at the 
level of the ﬁ rm conﬁ rm a prominent role for FDI in emerging Europe.32 Inward 
FDI can be attracted and stimulated. Good infrastructure and favorable business 
regulations help the most, even when adjusting for market size and skills of the 
workforce (box 4.4). Among the business regulations that matter most, three 
stand out: trade, labor, and taxation (the burden of which is calculated as the total 
tax rate and compliance costs).
Why Northern Europe thrived: fl exibility in offshoring
About 10 percent of Swedish ﬁ rms belong to Sweden-based enterprise groups with 
at least one subsidiary in Europe.33 By contrast, fewer than 3 percent of Italian or 
Spanish ﬁ rms are part of a domestic group with an international presence. As a 
result, more Swedish ﬁ rms operate on a European scale and have taken advantage 
of an enlarged Europe. Such offshoring introduces substantial beneﬁ ts. Domestic 
companies in Europe with an international presence involved in manufacturing and 
Figure 4.16: In the EU12, 
infrastructure, credit, 
FDI, and regulations are 
correlated with productivity
(correlation between country 
dummies and policy variables 
in EU12 countries, 2002–08)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Amadeus, Doing Business, WEF's Global 
Competitiveness Reports, and WDI .
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services are at least 30 percent more productive, and their value added grows 
much faster, than domestically owned companies (ﬁ gure 4.17).
Investment in new member states—facilitated by the enlargement process—is 
not only beneﬁ cial for FDI-receiving companies. FDI-providing ﬁ rms in tradable 
sectors—largely in manufacturing but also in services—leveraged vertical FDI 
to establish production facilities in foreign markets, reducing labor costs and 
maintaining competitive advantage. German Mittelstand companies are the 
best example of this successful integration (ﬁ gure 4.18).
Successful countries in Northern and Continental Europe not only nurtured 
domestic ﬁ rms that invested abroad, but also attracted foreign ﬁ rms, as 
reﬂ ected in their FDI. In 2000–09, $4,400 billion came into the EU15 economies, 
49 percent of which went to the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (ﬁ gure 
4.19).34 The result is a widely internationalized enterprise sector.
As with the EU12 above, the drivers of productivity growth in different sectors 
of the real economy in 2003–08 may be analyzed for the EU15, as follows. 
Despite similarities, the different stages of enterprise development in advanced 
and emerging Europe stand out.
 · Do country characteristics explain enterprise performance in the EU15? 
Yes. Based on the panel of surviving ﬁ rms from the Amadeus dataset, a 
regression model is applied to explain ﬁ rm productivity growth in the EU15 
countries as a function of the ﬁ rms’ initial productivity level, characteristics 
(size, age, ownership, and sector), and country dummies.35 Country dummies 
Box 4.4: What attracts FDI?—Decent infrastructure and good regulations
Regardless of geographic focus, most studies 
of the drivers of FDI point to market size (and 
its growth potential) and factor endowments 
(infrastructure, human capital) as signiﬁ cant 
factors in attracting FDI.1 
The policy environment also matters, 
however. According to Demekas and others 
(2005 and 2007), even though market size 
explains a large part of FDI inﬂ ows in Central 
and Eastern Europe, including Southeastern 
Europe, the investment climate is another 
determinant. Expropriation risks, lack of 
contract enforcement, poor provision of public 
goods, overregulation, and unreasonable costs 
of doing business are likely to deter private 
activity. Mukim (2011), using worldwide data, 
ﬁ nds that better access to and availability 
of land information increases the chances of 
new investment. Also using worldwide data, 
Waglé (2011) ﬁ nds a statistically signiﬁ cant 
relationship between FDI regulations and the 
value of inward FDI, after controlling for market 
size and quality of infrastructure logistics.
The Amadeus database can also be used to 
shed light on the relationship between the 
business environment and FDI. By considering 
a list of top-performing manufacturing ﬁ rms 
in Europe—the 150 international groups that 
contributed the most to value added in 2003–
08—and analyzing their asset allocation across 
countries, we can measure the country-speciﬁ c 
factors in a location choice. These 150 groups 
made manufacturing investment (for example, 
car parts and assembly factories) as well as 
retail, wholesale (car dealers, for example), and 
other services (car leasing) subsidiaries. 
To calculate the factors, we use the value 
of the assets of these companies’ foreign 
subsidiaries as proxies for the FDI in a speciﬁ c 
country in given sectors. Exogenous factors 
affecting FDI decisions about where to locate, 
such as the country’s market size, labor skills, 
infrastructure, and business regulations, we 
also consider. GDP (in US$ billions) is used as a 
proxy for the market size of the host country, 
while the proxy for FDI-relevant institutions 
comes from the World Bank’s Investment 
Across Borders database. 
The analysis for Europe conﬁ rms what Mukim 
(2011) and Waglé (2011) found for the rest of 
the world: the quality of FDI-related institutions 
(measured by the ease of accessing industrial 
land), regulation of business operations, and 
infrastructure quality in a speciﬁ c country are 
positively associated with the share of total 
investment made by the top global groups in 
Europe, even when controlling for market size 
and workforce skills. A one standard deviation 
increase in the Doing Business indicator raises 
the country share by 2.1 percent. For the 
Investment across Borders index on access to 
land, a one standard deviation increase would 
augment the country share by 0.7 percent. 
And a one standard deviation increase of 
the infrastructure quality would increase the 
country share by 2.8 percent.
1 Mukim and Nunnenkamp 2010 offer an 
overview of the literature; World Bank 2010b 
gives a compilation of recent studies on this 
subject.
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are statistically signiﬁ cant and large, indicating that cross-country differences 
are a relevant correlate of the performances of similar companies across the 
EU15. Locating in one country or another can mean up to 7 percentage points of 
productivity variation in manufacturing and 5 percentage points in services (table 
A4.3).36 Country performances differ widely among sectors: Norway leads in 
productivity in services, but is the laggard in manufacturing. 
 · Are country characteristics more important than a fi rm’s features in 
explaining its performance in the EU15? Generally no. The ﬁ rm’s type matters 
most. The exclusion of country dummies from the regression of productivity 
growth in manufacturing reduces the explanatory power of the model by 19 
percent. For services, the model loses 11 percent. With the same exercise but 
excluding ﬁ rm characteristics—size, ownership, sector of activity,37 and age—the 
model loses about 25 percent of its explanatory power, in both manufacturing 
and services. Overall, these results suggest that the ﬁ rm size, age, ownership, 
and sector composition explain a large share of cross-country disparities. 
 · What are the most important country characteristics for fi rm performance 
in the EU15? The factors for advanced Europe appear to be different from 
those for emerging Europe. Different variables explain productivity growth 
in manufacturing and services, with one element in common: entry and 
employment regulations are positively correlated with productivity growth. 
But while manufacturing productivity is largely correlated with FDI inﬂ ows and 
outﬂ ows, services appear to be most affected by regulations (ﬁ gure 4.20). As 
with emerging Europe, an extended version of the model including variation in 
country characteristics as explanatory variables was used to understand causes 
and effects. Results show that for manufacturing in EU15, changes in supply of 
outward FDI increase productivity growth. Similarly, improvements in business 
regulation appear to increase productivity growth in both manufacturing and 
services.
Figure 4.17: In the EU15, ﬁ rms 
with a foreign presence are 
more productive and grow faster
(productivity levels, 2008, 
and growth of value added, 
2002–08)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Amadeus.
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 · What fi rm features explain fi rm performance most in the EU15? Italian 
manufacturing is illustrative. The average productivity growth gap between 
an Italian and a Finnish ﬁ rm in manufacturing is 2.9 percent. However, 
considering companies with the same sector specialization, the gap declines 
to 2.4 percent. If ﬁ rms in these two countries were similar in size, age, and 
ownership composition, the gap would be just 1.7 percent (table A4.3).38 These 
results suggest that ownership, size, and sector are important.
Estimated coefﬁ cients of the ﬁ rm characteristics in the regression model reveal 
other points. For EU15, ownership, size, and age are important ﬁ rm features 
for productivity growth (table A4.3). Foreign-owned ﬁ rms and afﬁ liates of an 
international group grow more. Unlike within the EU12, scale is important in 
EU15 countries in both manufacturing and services: larger ﬁ rms’ productivity 
rises faster. Firms that have 50–499 employees grow faster than ﬁ rms with 
10–49 employees. Older ﬁ rms in services expand faster than the youngest. In 
manufacturing, however, age does not seem to matter.
In the EU27 as a whole, workforce skills do not appear to be an important 
country characteristic to explain productivity growth at ﬁ rm level. Using the 
Amadeus sample of ﬁ rms, the correlation between estimated country dummies 
and workforce skills—measured as the proportion of the workforce with 
tertiary education—showed a positive but small effect for EU12 ﬁ rms: 0.16 for 
manufacturing and 0.07 for services. For the EU15, the estimate was negative 
(but also small): –0.08 for manufacturing and –0.11 for services. 
Figure 4.18: Investing abroad is 
related to higher productivity growth
(correlation between economywide 
productivity and investments abroad)
Note: Both productivity and FDI ﬁ gures refer only to manufacturing industry. For France and United 
Kingdom, the period of time considered to calculate the productivity growth is 2002–07. For Greece, 
data over the period of 2003–07 are used to compute the growth rate.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
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The results are somewhat surprising, because much evidence shows that 
human capital is an essential factor in economic growth. One possible reason 
for this result might be the indicator used to proxy skills. The outcome of 
education is composed of quantity and quality of educational capital. While 
quantity can be measured by the proportion of the workforce with a certain 
level of instruction, or even by the number of graduates, it is hard to accurately 
measure the quality of educational capital. Conceptually, quality is reﬂ ected in 
the performance of students and graduates, but it can be also measured by the 
perceptions about the quality of the educational system. 
Using the quality of education systems reported by the World Economic Forum 
and performing the same exercise with the estimated country dummies 
provides somewhat different results. The quality of labor force does seem 
to matter for ﬁ rm level productivity growth at ﬁ rm level, particularly in EU12 
countries.39 It appears to matter even more among the non-EU countries of 
Europe (box 4.5). 
Figure 4.19: Northern 
and Continental Europe 
get the bulk of FDI
(EU15 FDI stock, percentage of 
GDP, 2008)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 4.20: In the EU15, FDI 
and regulations are the closest 
correlates of productivity
(correlation between country 
dummies and policy variables)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Amadeus, Doing Business, WEF's Global 
Competitiveness Reports, and WDI.
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Why the south is slow: inappropriate 
structures and burdensome regulations 
Why did the southern countries in the EU15 not experience the productivity 
improvements that beneﬁ ted the rest of Europe? The answer lies in both 
ﬁ rm and country drivers of productivity. First, the mix of companies nurtured 
at home—skewed toward microenterprises—and the limited number of 
ﬁ rms attracted from abroad explain part of the productivity gap. Second, an 
unfavorable set of country characteristics, including a more complex regulatory 
framework, also creates an environment that is not conducive to productivity 
growth. The two elements are connected: the “mix” of companies is largely 
driven by a country’s environment, and each requires analysis. 
A comparison of the EU15 South with the rest of the EU15 shows that business 
regulations and FDI—the country-level variables positively correlated with ﬁ rm 
performance in advanced Europe—consistently lag in Southern Europe (ﬁ gure 
4.21). 
But size, too, plays an important role. The average size of ﬁ rms in Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain is a little more than half that of ﬁ rms in the rest of 
the European Union (according to Eurostat data). Size is a good proxy for the 
“type” of company and the sophistication of its operations. Microenterprises are 
mostly family-owned and have a limited division of tasks. Flexibility in the use 
of labor and limited overhead costs allow microenterprises to reach a basic level 
of efﬁ ciency. However, limited capital investments constrain microenterprises 
in scaling up operations, especially in capital-intensive sectors. Microﬁ rms 
play a role in the economies of Southern Europe, which is uncommon in the 
other developed economies of Europe. One of two workers in the EU15 South 
is employed by microenterprises. In addition, about a third of the entire value 
added of the economy is generated by these ﬁ rms. These ﬁ gures are almost 
double those for the rest of Europe, where large enterprises have a more 
prominent role. The proportion becomes even higher when small and medium 
enterprises are added to microﬁ rms: taken together, micro and small and 
Box 4.5: Productivity drivers are similar outside the European Union
Using the sample of surviving ﬁ rms (with 10 
employees or more) from the Amadeus dataset 
it is possible to study a few non-EU European 
countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine. By performing 
exactly the same set of exercises, a picture 
similar to the one for EU12 countries emerges. 
First, country characteristics explain enterprise 
performance more, indicating that similar 
companies perform differently in different 
countries (table A4.4, columns 1 and 6). For 
example, the productivity of a manufacturing 
company operating in Croatia grows 8.6 
percentage points higher than a similar 
manufacturer in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
results also show that country characteristics 
are more important than ﬁ rm features, a 
pattern that is similar for manufacturing and 
services. The exclusion of country dummies 
from the regression of productivity growth in 
manufacturing reduces the explanatory power 
of the model by 20 percent. For services, 
the model loses 16 percent. Excluding ﬁ rm 
characteristics—size, ownership, sector of 
activity, and age—the model loses about 
10 percent of its explanatory power in 
manufacturing, and 11 percent in services. 
Second, the most important country 
characteristics are incoming FDI, availability 
of credit, and ease of conducting business 
operations (particularly trade and tax 
regulation). Similar results for manufacturing 
and services indicate that for this group of 
countries, these “fundamentals” are more 
relevant for enterprise productivity.
Third, ownership is the most important ﬁ rm-
speciﬁ c variable for productivity growth. Being 
part of an international group pays off. Foreign-
owned ﬁ rms grow faster than purely domestic 
ones, both in manufacturing and services. 
Home-based companies with an international 
presence grow 8 percent more than domestic-
owned companies, but only in manufacturing. 
Older ﬁ rms grow less than young companies, 
both in manufacturing and services, while 
size does not seem to matter for productivity 
growth (table A4.4, columns 1 and 6).
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medium enterprises employ four of ﬁ ve workers in Southern Europe 
(ﬁ gure 4.22).
Microenterprises are one of the factors behind the productivity gap between 
the EU15 South and the rest of the EU15. If the south had a size mix similar to 
that of the other countries in advanced Europe, and its microenterprises had a 
productivity level equal to that of its comparators, Southern Europe would reduce 
its productivity gap by 40 percent. 
A smaller share of large ﬁ rms explains not only Southern Europe’s gap in 
productivity, but also the difference in export levels. Medium and large enterprises 
perform consistently better in exports than smaller enterprises, and Southern 
Europe is no exception. The export propensity of larger ﬁ rms in Southern Europe is 
similar or better—as in Italy—than in the rest of advanced Europe (ﬁ gure 4.23). 
Figure 4.21: Southern Europe 
underperforms the rest 
of the EU15 in all aspects 
but access to credit
(country-level 
indicators, 2008-12)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Doing Business, WEF's Global Competitiveness 
Reports, WDI.
Figure 4.22: Microﬁ rms 
generate half the 
employment and a third 
of the value added in the 
EU15 South
(distribution of ﬁ rm 
population, employment, and 
value added per ﬁ rm size 
structure, 2008)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
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If Southern Europe had a higher share of larger ﬁ rms, its export gap could be 
ﬁ lled (see Barba Navaretti and others 2011). 
Similarly, larger companies are more inclined to invest in foreign markets. Larger 
ﬁ rms are most likely to have an international subsidiary and to beneﬁ t from 
offshoring (box 4.6).
The industrial structure is not a given. For instance, the presence of 
foreign-owned ﬁ rms is inﬂ uenced by policy decisions and a country’s ability 
to attract FDI. The business environment is a critical driver in this process 
(box 4.4). Lagging in regulations, Southern European economies are making 
themselves less attractive to foreign ﬁ rms. Additionally, microﬁ rms in Southern 
Europe prefer to stay small and informal as a coping strategy, to simply bypass 
a complicated regulatory framework. 
Comparing countries in advanced Europe, the correlation between a heavier 
regulatory framework (measured by a lower quality of regulations) and the 
share of employment in microenterprises becomes evident. On the one hand, 
microenterprises face simpliﬁ ed regulations in most countries.40 On the other, 
weaker enforcement mechanisms are applied to microﬁ rms,41 which allow 
Box 4.6: The features of a global ﬁ rm
Firm ownership is an important characteristic 
in the evolution of ﬁ rm performance. 
Companies with international operations 
(a global headquarters of an international 
group or one of its domestic afﬁ liates) have 
higher productivity growth than purely 
domestic-owned ﬁ rms in the EU15, both in 
manufacturing and services. 
Size is the most important correlate of 
internationalization. Firms with more than 
1,000 employees are 35 percent more likely to 
be the global headquarters of a company in 
the EU15 (box table 1). Age is not important. 
But there is country-speciﬁ c bias. For 
example, being in Italy and Spain signiﬁ cantly 
reduces the probability of being a global 
headquarters, while being in Sweden increases 
this likelihood. Why? Business regulations 
and related productivity differences. The 
probability of internationalizing is correlated 
with better business regulation (box ﬁ gure 
1). This might reﬂ ect the fact that ﬁ rms in 
countries with better business regulation 
have higher productivity growth. “Global 
sourcing” models (Antràs and Helpman 2004, 
for example) suggest that as ﬁ rms increase 
productivity, they tend to access international 
markets by producing abroad.
Box table 1: Average estimated marginal effects on 
the probability of being a global headquarters in EU15
Variable dy/dx (percent) P>|z|
Size (50–249) 7.25 0.000
Size (250–499) 18.34 0.000
Size (500–999) 22.92 0.000
Size (1,000 or more) 35.04 0.000
Age –0.06 0.494
Note: Additional controls considered but not reported are sector 
(NACE) dummies. The omitted size category is (10–49).
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
Box ﬁ gure 1: Better business regulations 
aid successful globalization of enterprises
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Doing 
Business 2008.
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them to more easily operate semiformally. This is corroborated by the relationship 
between density of microﬁ rms and the share of the informal sector in the 
economy.42 Both elements provide an incentive for ﬁ rms to stay small 
(ﬁ gure 4.24).
At the same time, faced with more complicated business regulations and 
competition from microenterprises, small and medium enterprises and larger ﬁ rms 
in Southern Europe ﬁ nd it harder to grow. They are likely to survive but shrink in 
size. A healthy competitive process should select companies so the better ones 
survive and graduate toward larger classes while inefﬁ cient companies exit the 
market. This is not what happens in Southern Europe. Firms do not grow, they 
often downsize, but do not exit the market. 
Figure 4.24: In a difﬁ cult business 
environment, ﬁ rms stay small 
and operate more informally
(business environment, share 
of informal economy and 
microenterprises in the EU15)
Note: For Ireland, data refer to 2005.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat, Doing Business, and Schneider 
and others (2010). 
Figure 4.23: In the EU15, 
size matters more than 
country for exports
(percentage of exporting 
ﬁ rms and share of export per 
size class, 2008)
Source: Barba Navaretti and others 2011; and Eurostat.
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The matrices in ﬁ gure 4.25 show the distribution of ﬁ rm size using the initial 
(2003) and ﬁ nal (2008) size for a given class. For instance, in the EU15 North/
Continental, 83 percent of surviving ﬁ rms with 10–49 employees in 2003 were 
in the same size category in 2008, while 12.4 percent were smaller (but still in 
business). In the EU15 South, this latter proportion was higher: 18.5 percent of 
ﬁ rms of that size class had transited to a smaller size category by 2008.
By estimating the probabilities of a ﬁ rm’s downsizing, staying in the same size 
category, or jumping to a higher size class from 2003 to 2008—based on the 
Amadeus panel of survival ﬁ rms and relating these probabilities to country 
characteristics (regulations, industrial structures, and access to credit)—one sees 
what helps foster competition and creative destruction.43 
Regulations seem related to this Southern European phenomenon, both directly 
and through their impact on microﬁ rms. The industrial structure is approximated 
by the density of microenterprises in the country: the share of microﬁ rms 
per 1,000 employable people. Credit-to-GDP is used to approximate access to 
ﬁ nancing.44 Figure 4.26 presents the marginal effect of both business regulation 
(measured by each alternative indicator used in the model) and density of 
microﬁ rms on the probability of decreasing in size class. 
The probability that a ﬁ rm transits to a smaller size class from 2003 to 
2008 is negatively related to business regulation in the country where it is 
located, suggesting that better business regulation reduces the probability 
Figure 4.25: Firms in southern 
and emerging Europe are most 
likely to survive, but shrink
(share of ﬁ rms that maintained (stay) 
or modiﬁ ed (down or up) their size 
between 2003 and 2008)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Amadeus data.
Figure 4.26: In a better business 
environment, ﬁ rms are less 
likely to shrink
(marginal effect of a 10-point 
improvement in business regulations 
and the density of microﬁ rms)
Note: Data refer to the estimated marginal effects of varying, separately, the key variables used in 
the multinomial logit model: regulation on business operations and density of microﬁ rms.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Amadeus.
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of downsizing. For instance, improving regulation by 10 points decreases the 
probability of downsizing by 3.5 percent. When regulations are complicated, 
ﬁ rms survive, but stay small. The existence of microﬁ rms might even drag down 
ﬁ rms that are larger, hampering their growth. An increase of 10 points in the 
density of microﬁ rms is related to increases of about 8 percent in the probability 
that a ﬁ rm will downsize. The effect of credit on the probability of downsizing 
did not seem to be statistically signiﬁ cant. 
What is the relationship between regulations and 
enterprise growth?
Parmalat, an Italian dairy and food corporation, became famous in 2003 for the 
biggest bankruptcy in Europe’s history.45 Parmalat was rescued, its business 
downsized, and the company brought back to market in 2005. In early spring 
2011, Lactalis, a large French dairy group, expressed interest in acquiring 
Parmalat. The announcement spurred heated political discussion in Italy. After 
three months Lactalis was allowed to take over Parmalat, but not before 
politicians denounced the acquisition by foreign companies of Italy’s “family 
jewels.” 
In July 2011, the Italian parliament approved a law regulating book sales, crafted 
along the lines of similar legislation in force in France since 1981 known as the 
“anti-Amazon Law.” The law regulates the price of books (physical and digital) 
that can be sold in retail and wholesale outlets and over the Internet, restricting 
the timing and amount of discounts. The law protects small bookstores against 
competition from large chains and Internet sellers. 
Regulations such as these are a major obstacle to business in Southern Europe. 
Consider a truck company operating in both the United Kingdom and Italy. The 
payroll slip of a truck driver in the United Kingdom consists of ﬁ ve lines, and 
costs about €5 to ﬁ ll in. The payroll slip for a similar driver in Italy is a page long, 
requires the services of an accounting expert, and costs about €25–30 to ﬁ ll in. 
This section explores whether European enterprises are overregulated and 
whether these regulations are an obstacle to economic growth. The short 
answer is mostly not. Sweden shows how a heavily regulated country can, 
indeed, perform well (box 4.7). 
Country and ﬁ rm characteristics matter for performance, and business 
regulations are a signiﬁ cant part of the puzzle. On the one hand, regulations 
directly affect company performance in producing jobs, value added, and 
exports, because simplifying payroll ﬁ ling requirements is likely to reduce costs 
and improve ﬁ rms’ productivity. On the other, regulations can change the type 
of businesses that succeed. An unnecessarily complex business environment 
breaks the virtuous circle encompassing productivity, enterprise growth, and 
internationalization. Faced with complicated regulations, ﬁ rms tend to be 
smaller, less productive, and less inclined to operate in international markets.
The relationship between business regulation and enterprise growth can 
be disentangled into three (interrelated) threads: regulation for graduating 
small and medium enterprises; that for increasing productivity; and that for 
internationalizing ﬁ rms (either through exports or offshoring) and attracting 
foreign companies. 
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Small fi rms are beautiful—when they are young
“Small is beautiful” was the industrial development slogan of the 1970s in Italy. 
Italian family-run enterprises were praised for their dynamism, efﬁ ciency, and 
ﬂ exibility, which ﬂ owed mainly from their small size. But there is a minimum 
scale below which size becomes a constraint to growth. Growing is an 
important part in nurturing productivity growth and internationalizing ﬁ rms. As 
seen, larger ﬁ rms beneﬁ t from economies of scale, are more productive, and 
are likely to engage in international operations (through export and FDI). 
Business regulation plays an important role in this process (ﬁ gure 4.27). A better 
regulatory framework affects the growth of ﬁ rm size. Hence policies concerning 
the operation of ﬁ rms, such as tax administration and labor regulation, can 
improve the ﬁ rms’ cost structure. Reforms in these areas can be especially 
important in graduating small and medium enterprises to larger ﬁ rms (Shiffer 
and Weder 2001). 
The instruments that help ﬁ rms grow bigger depend on the stage of 
development. In emerging Europe, improving access to credit and institutional 
development, such as greater judicial efﬁ ciency, by the late 1990s, moderates 
ﬁ nancial constraints and contributes to ﬁ rm growth (Kumar, Rajan, and 
Zingales 1999).
Reducing costs to increase fi rm productivity
Enterprise productivity growth is largely associated with country characteristics 
where ﬁ rms operate. The analysis of surviving ﬁ rms showed that similar ﬁ rms 
(in size, age, ownership, and sector) perform differently across countries, 
suggesting that the country and its policy environment are relevant to 
productivity performance. The same analysis highlighted some of the country 
characteristics related to productivity performance. Business regulation was 
important. As highlighted by Crafts (2006), business regulation can result in 
resources directed toward compliance rather than the creation of productive 
output, and can impose constraints on the choice of production techniques 
(such as preventing the use of inputs) or lead to a misallocation of resources.
The earlier empirical analysis shows that the size of the relationship between 
business regulation and productivity performance differs according to region 
(EU15 or EU12) and sector (manufacturing or services). In the EU12, business 
regulation, with infrastructure and credit, positively correlates with productivity 
Box 4.7: The Swedish model
Sweden has a total corporate tax rate of 50 
percent but achieves employment participation 
rates above 70 percent. Swedish enterprises 
increased their productivity at 1.4 percent a 
year over the last 15 years, almost up to the 
level seen in the United States. 
Sweden achieved its productivity growth by 
keeping regulation compliance requirements 
to a minimum. According to Doing Business, 
ﬁ rms in Sweden are only required to pay 
taxes twice a year—the fewest in the world. 
The time required for Swedish ﬁ rms to fulﬁ ll 
their tax requirements is just 122 hours 
a year, signiﬁ cantly lower than the OECD 
average of almost 200 hours. (Italy requires 
15 tax payments, taking small and medium 
enterprises about 285 hours.) A simple tax 
system also reduces reliance on, for example, 
tax accountants. By eliminating a burden 
on ﬁ rms, a simple tax system partially 
compensates for a higher tax rate. 
Source: World Bank staff calculation, based on 
Doing Business 2011.
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performance (both for manufacturing and services), with the strongest 
correlation with trade, employment, and taxes. In the EU15, business regulation, 
especially for services, is an important country factor, particularly through 
regulations on business start-ups and labor.
Ensuring that business regulation is well designed and targeted is likely to have 
a positive impact on the productive capacity of an economy and productivity 
at ﬁ rm level. These important regulatory areas—trade, employment, taxes, and 
business start-ups—can be illustrative of how to design regulations to improve 
productivity performance. 
For employment regulation, reducing the costs of hiring and ﬁ ring workers 
would increase the incentives to innovate, and hence productivity growth 
(Scarpetta and Tressel 2002). Reforms that simplify tax regulations and reduce 
the administrative costs of compliance (which tend to be proportionately higher 
for smaller ﬁ rms) will likely have a positive effect on productivity growth as 
resources are freed to create productive output. Reforms that reduce start-
up cost for entrepreneurs, simplify company registration procedures and 
requirements, eliminate steps to register property, and streamline bankruptcy 
procedures (which facilitate exit of inefﬁ cient enterprises) are likely to increase 
Figure 4.27: Better 
regulations create jobs 
(regulatory quality, ﬁ rm size, and 
employment ratios, 2007)
Note: For the Slovak Republic, data refer to 2005.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Doing Business and Eurostat.
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competition and contestability of markets. Increased competition will in turn 
provide an incentive for ﬁ rms to adopt more advanced technologies, thereby 
increasing productivity (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2006; Poschke 2010).
Firms beyond borders 
A regulatory environment conducive to private sector growth closely relates to 
international expansion, either through exports or through production abroad. 
Reforms that make it easier for ﬁ rms to export and run their business 
operations are likely to lift the export performance of an economy and 
therefore overall economic growth. Recent literature provides evidence that 
“behind the border” policies matter for trade performance (Hoekman and 
Nicita 2008) and that trade facilitation measures and the prevailing business 
environment in the trading countries have a signiﬁ cant effect on trade 
development. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) ﬁ nd that weak institutions act as 
signiﬁ cant barriers to international trade. Francois and Manchin (2007) measure 
institutional quality through the lens of economic freedom, focusing on the size 
of government, freedom of trade, protection of property rights, and business 
regulation. They ﬁ nd that strong institutions are associated with increased trade 
at both the intensive and extensive margins. 
Overall, aggregate data suggest that trade-speciﬁ c regulation helps ﬁ rms 
internationalize, either through exports or production abroad. Policy reforms 
to facilitate trade can enhance countries’ competitiveness, allowing them 
to trade goods and services on time and with low transaction costs. By the 
same token, policies that set certain requirements in some sectors for product 
quality—such as technical standards or safety requirements—can force ﬁ rms 
to be internationally competitive and promote exports when such policies are 
harmonized with international standards. 
Building a regulatory environment that is friendly to foreign investors is 
necessary (box 4.4). Even though enforced legal frameworks may not be the 
main drivers of foreign investment decisions, they can tip the balance in favor 
of one economy over another (World Bank 2010). Speciﬁ cally, expropriation 
risks, lack of enforcement of contracts, poor provision of public goods, 
overregulation, and unreasonable costs of doing business are likely to deter 
private activities, domestic or foreign. Northern Europe is a good example of 
an environment in which more stringent rules and regulations are compatible 
with a thriving private sector because they are accompanied by efﬁ cient 
implementation procedures that minimize the burden for enterprises. 
Enterprises for a growing Europe
Enterprise is not a weak part of the European growth model. The overall 
soundness of the European enterprise model is indicated by its 
performance—European enterprises have largely delivered what they are 
expected to, with only a few qualiﬁ cations. 
European ﬁ rms have created jobs at roughly the same pace as other developed 
economies around the world. The south has been particularly successful in 
creating jobs, but mostly in  cyclical activities such as construction. The northern 
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and continental countries also increased labor participation rates—already 
among the highest in the world. In Eastern Europe, enterprises recovered from 
the transition and in many cases generated employment rapidly. Productivity 
patterns show that Western Europe has largely succeeded in keeping pace 
with other advanced economies. Eastern Europe impressively increased in its 
productivity, while the EU15 North and Continental countries also beneﬁ ted from 
eastward outsourcing of labor-intensive activities. 
Lately, however, Southern Europe has moved away from such convergence, 
and its productivity growth has stalled. Northern and Eastern Europe, already 
more outward-oriented than the south, are expanding productivity and exports 
faster than the south. This internal divergence will strain the economic union, 
especially countries using the euro. 
What has helped the countries that did better than others? In advanced Europe, 
northern and continental countries succeeded globally by developing 
pan-European and global businesses, both in sales and in sourcing. In emerging 
Europe, the winners are the countries that set aside a “fear of foreigners” and 
created an environment favorable for FDI. Southern Europe, however, was 
caught in a no man’s land. With an industrial structure dominated by smaller 
ﬁ rms—largely because of unfriendly regulations—Southern Europe has fewer 
ﬁ rms equipped to beneﬁ t from the single market, either in attracting foreign 
capital from the north or in making use of cheaper labor in the east. These 
experiences offer three lessons: 
 · More Europe, not less. Countries whose enterprises were ready to operate in 
the single market seem to be winning the race. When barriers to entry were 
eliminated and transaction costs cut, countries with industrial structures with 
larger and more outward-oriented enterprises did better. Enterprises in the 
former communist countries adjusted to this new European imperative better 
than those in the EU15 southern states. 
 · Regulations can upgrade industrial structures or degrade them. The type of 
enterprises operating in each country—particularly their size and ownership—
is a function of the design and enforcement of regulations. Good regulations 
provided the right incentives for ﬁ rms to grow and reach an optimal size, and 
were as critical as the quality of the physical infrastructure in attracting FDI. 
Similar companies performed better when regulations were less burdensome. 
Of course, other aspects played a role. In countries at an earlier stage of 
development of the enterprise sector—like those of the former Soviet bloc—
hard infrastructure and credit were as important as regulations. In advanced 
Europe, regulations were a critical competitive factor, especially in services.
 · Better entrepreneurial structures can be built—or imported. Countries 
do not necessarily need to create domestic enterprises, especially when 
entire sectors need to be revamped, as was the case for emerging Europe. 
Successful countries did not enact protectionist policies, but welcomed FDI. 
Foreign companies modernized their subsidiaries and afﬁ liates and connected 
them to international markets, but they also created spillovers among 
suppliers and competitors. Openness to FDI also helps advanced countries like 
Germany. Countries that took advantage of these opportunities fared better 
than those that did not. 
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Workers expect enterprises in Europe to create 
jobs, shareholders to generate value added, and 
governments to bring in sizable export earnings.
In most parts of Europe, ﬁ rms have taken advantage 
of greater regional integration to decentralize 
production, attract foreign investment, and expand 
the markets for their products.
In Western and Eastern Europe, industrial structures 
were better suited for a single market; Southern 
European enterprises have been slower to offshore 
activities and to attract foreign investors. 
In advanced European economies, many 
governments have to streamline regulations to make 
doing business easier; in emerging Europe, most 
have to improve infrastructure and credit as well.
Answers to questions on page 187
If they continue to improve their regulations, ﬁ nancial sectors, and 
infrastructure, countries in emerging Europe will keep beneﬁ ting from 
the successful European convergence machine. Southern Europe must 
also deal with its entrepreneurial deﬁ cit. Greater openness to the rest of 
Europe seems to be the solution for the laggards: importing ﬁ rms, capital, 
regulations, and institutions from the most advanced countries would help 
Southern Europe grow in line with its peers. Northern and continental 
countries should ﬁ x their sights on enterprises in North America and East 
Asia. Maintaining their position at the frontier requires efﬁ ciency and 
an outward orientation. Future growth will require reestablishing the 
momentum for regulatory reform last seen in the mid-1990s and early 
2000s, this time aimed at services. And it will require improving Europe’s 
innovation performance, addressed in chapter 5. 
For now, the answer to the main question asked at the beginning—are 
regulations an obstacle for enterprise in Europe?—is a qualiﬁ ed no. Outside 
the EU15 southern states, European enterprises have created jobs, added 
value, and generated exports over the last decade.
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Chapter 4: Annexes
Annex 4.1: Using the Amadeus dataset
Amadeus is a comprehensive, pan-European, ﬁ rm-level database of ﬁ nancial 
information for more than 11 million public and private companies throughout 
Europe, provided by Bureau van Dijk. A 2010 version of the Amadeus database 
is used for the ﬁ rm-level analysis in this chapter. 
Although rich and detailed in balance sheet information, the Amadeus database 
does not necessarily reﬂ ect the underlying population. In most countries 
Amadeus did not have a satisfactory coverage of microﬁ rms. For this reason 
we focused our research on companies with 10 or more employees, small and 
medium enterprises, and large ﬁ rms.
Another limitation of the Amadeus database is that ﬁ rms are not removed 
from the database unless they fail to report ﬁ nancial information for at least 
ﬁ ve years. Companies that exit the market or stop reporting their ﬁ nancial 
statements are represented as “not available/missing” for four years following 
their last ﬁ ling. Amadeus does not distinguish ﬁ rms that close their activities 
from those that exit the sample because they either fall below a size threshold 
or were reorganized through a merger, for example. This limitation drove our 
choice to focus our analysis on a (balanced) sample of surviving ﬁ rms that were 
present in the database for the entire period of observation. In addition, ﬁ rms 
that were involved in merger and acquisitions operations during 2003–08 were 
excluded in order to eliminate meaningless growth measures. 
To ensure that the sample is representative of the ﬁ rm population and supports 
the application of inferences to the broader population, a resampling technique 
was applied. Population weights were computed using the Eurostat database 
for the year 2006 for every size, sector, and country stratum.46 Random draws 
were taken from each size-sector-country stratum in the sample (targeting 
ﬁ rms with 10 employees or more) in order for each stratum to correspond to 
its population weight. Once the sample was drawn, a two-step procedure was 
implemented to control for extreme outliers. First, observations for which the 
employment growth rate was larger than 300 percent (if the ﬁ rm had fewer 
than 50 employees) or 50 percent (if the ﬁ rm had more than 50 employees) 
were excluded from the analysis. Second, companies with annual productivity 
growth more than three standard deviations away from the average value in 
each country were excluded. 
The Amadeus dataset was used to collect information on the following:
 · Company characteristics: The main sector of activity and year of registration 
and ownership were collected to verify differential performance. For 
ownership, information on the global ultimate owner contained in the 
Amadeus database was used to distinguish companies that are purely 
domestic, part of a domestic group operating on a European or global scale, 
or foreign-owned.
 · Company performance indicators: Value-added data47 and total number of 
employees included in the company’s payroll48 were collected to perform 
calculations of productivity and employment growth over time. 
228
GOLDEN GROWTH
Table A4.1 shows the composition of the ﬁ nal sample of surviving ﬁ rms adopted 
in the empirical analysis.
Table A4.1: Sample composition
Country Number of ﬁ rms per year
Bosnia and Herzegovina 590
Belgium 2,485
Czech Republic 2,410
Estonia 561
Spain 16,850
Finland 1,035
France 15,029
Croatia 1,211
Italy 17,143
Norway 1,523
Poland 3,811
Romania 4,249
Serbia 1,465
Sweden 2,436
Slovenia 526
Ukraine 6,782
Econometric results
To analyze productivity growth in Europe, while disentangling the impact of ﬁ rm 
level from country-level characteristics, we start from estimating the following 
ﬁ rm-level equation:
Δln(Prodi)03-08 = α + β2ln(Prodi)03 + β2Agei,03 + β3Sizei,03 + β4OwnTypei,03 + ∑φSectorm + ∑γCountryj + εi,
where Δln(Prodi)03-08 is the annualized growth rate of productivity (deﬁ ned as 
value added per employee) of the  i  ﬁ rm from 2003 to 2008.49 On the right side, 
besides the error term we include some observable ﬁ rm characteristics such as 
size, age, and ownership. Size, as in 2003, is expressed in number of employees 
on the company’s payroll, deﬁ ned by the categories 10–49 total employees, 
50–249, 250–499, 500–999, and 1,000 or more. Age (in years), as in 2003, is 
deﬁ ned by the categories of 1–5 years old, 6–10, 11–20, 21–30, and older than 
30. Ownership type, in 2003, is deﬁ ned by a categorical variable distinguishing 
whether the ﬁ rm is: a global headquarter of a group with international presence 
or one of its local subsidiaries, a foreign-afﬁ liated ﬁ rm,50 or a purely domestic-
owned ﬁ rm.51 As we control for (initial) ﬁ rm characteristics in 2003, we also 
include as a right-side variable the (log of) productivity level in baseline as a 
way to control for the fact that ﬁ rms that start at a higher level may grow at a 
slower rate. Sectorm is a vector of sector dummy variables deﬁ ned at NACE 1.1 
level and Countryj is a vector of country ﬁ xed effects.
Estimations are produced using ordinary least squares, and errors are 
clustered by country to allow for possible correlations in growth rates across 
ﬁ rms in the same country. Regressions are run separately for EU15, EU12, 
and other countries as a way to better search for the sources explaining the 
differences between the two regions. Besides, in order to explore the sector 
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heterogeneity—mainly related to different technologies used—we also separate 
the regressions by manufacturing and services, which highlight the drivers of 
productivity growth in different sectors of the real economy.52 Results are then 
presented separately for EU12 and EU15 as well as for manufacturing and services 
(except construction) industries separately.
Table A4.2: Firm-level productivity growth, 2003-08, EU12 countries
Manufacturing
All controls
Ownership + sector + 
baseline prod + 
country dummies
Sector + baseline prod 
+ country dummies
Baseline prod + 
country dummies
Only country 
dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(prod) 2003 –0.1237*** –0.1242*** –0.1227*** –0.1167***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Size (50–249)1 –0.0156**
(0.007)
Size (250–499)1 –0.0530***
(0.012)
Size (500–999)1 -0.0229
(0.019)
Size (1,000+)1 –0.0582**
(0.029)
Age (6–10)2 -0.001
(0.009)
Age (11–20)2 -0.0027
(0.009)
Age (21–30)2 0.0102
(0.021)
Age (older than 30)2 0.0079
(0.018)
Global head.3 0.0670** 0.0589*
(0.033) (0.033)
Foreign aff.3 0.0298*** 0.0269***
(0.010) (0.009)
Czech Republic 0.0384*** 0.0371*** 0.0457*** 0.0466*** 0.0666***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Estonia –0.0371** –0.0346** –0.0201 –0.0280* 0.0436***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Poland –0.0209*** –0.0242*** –0.0212*** –0.0237*** 0.0051
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Romania –0.1437*** –0.1440*** –0.1408*** –0.1488*** 0.0057
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
_cons 1.2183*** 1.2161*** 1.2039*** 1.1768*** 0.0438***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.006)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.2185 0.2153 0.2124 0.2002 0.0128
Number of observations 3,925 3,925 3,925 3,925 3,981
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1. 10–49 is the omitted size category. 
2. 1–5 is the omitted age category. 
3. Domestic-owned is the omitted ownership category; Slovenia is the omitted country.
Signiﬁ cance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Services (except construction)
All controls
Ownership + sector + 
baseline prod + 
country dummies
Sector + baseline prod 
+ country dummies
Baseline prod + 
country dummies
Only country 
dummies
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln(prod) 2003 –0.1122*** –0.1120*** -0.1108*** -0.1053***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size (50–249)1 –0.0130***
(0.004)
Size (250–499)1 –0.0269***
(0.009)
Size (500–999)1 –0.014
(0.015)
Size (1,000+)1 –0.0217
(0.032)
Age (6–10)2 0.0013
(0.005)
Age (11–20)2 –0.0017
(0.005)
Age (21–30)2 –0.0132
(0.018)
Age (older than 30)2 –0.0036
(0.010)
Global head.3 0.0309* 0.0253
(0.018) (0.018)
Foreign aff.3 0.0276*** 0.0270***
(0.005) (0.005)
Czech Republic 0.0344*** 0.0349*** 0.0437*** 0.0475*** 0.0893***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Estonia –0.0384*** –0.0365*** –0.0233** –0.0258*** 0.0457***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Poland –0.0152*** –0.0171*** –0.0152*** –0.0110** 0.0241***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Romania –0.1114*** –0.1105*** –0.1078*** –0.1054*** 0.0533***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
_cons 1.0991*** 1.0923*** 1.0819*** 1.0681*** 0.0212***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.005)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.2007 0.1998 0.1975 0.1839 0.0122
Number of observations 5,927 5,927 5,927 5,927 5,927
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Table A4.3: Firm-level productivity growth, 2003-08, EU15 countries
1. 10–49 is the omitted size category. 
2. 1–5 is the omitted age category. 
3. Domestic-owned is the omitted ownership category; Finland is the omitted country.
Signiﬁ cance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Manufacturing
All controls
Ownership + sector + 
baseline prod + 
country dummies
Sector + baseline prod 
+ country dummies
Baseline prod + 
country dummies
Only country 
dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(prod) 2003 –0.0896*** –0.0888*** –0.0860*** –0.0796***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Size (50–249)1 0.0059**
(0.003)
Size (250–499)1 0.0148*
(0.008)
Size (500–999)1 –0.0046
(0.013)
Size (1,000+)1 0.0037
(0.013)
Age (6–10)2 –0.0018
(0.003)
Age (11–20)2 0.0021
(0.003)
Age (21–30)2 0.0031
(0.003)
Age (older than 30)2 0.0046
(0.003)
Global head.3 0.0228*** 0.0254***
(0.005) (0.005)
Foreign aff.3 0.0185*** 0.0203***
(0.004) (0.004)
Belgium –0.0001 0.0005 –0.003 –0.0077 –0.0297***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Spain –0.0630*** –0.0632*** –0.0694*** –0.0728*** –0.0532***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
France –0.0224*** –0.0213*** –0.0224*** –0.0236*** –0.0225***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Italy –0.0167*** –0.0167*** –0.0237*** –0.0291*** –0.0288***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Norway –0.0723*** –0.0730*** –0.0801*** –0.0857*** –0.1222***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Sweden –0.0306*** –0.0300*** –0.0343*** –0.0319*** –0.0152**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
_cons 1.0112*** 1.0049*** 0.9822*** 0.9162*** 0.0502***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.005)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.136 0.1353 0.1318 0.1052 0.0181
Number of observations 16,800 16,800 16,800 16,800 16,800
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1. 10–49 is the omitted size category. 
2. 1–5 is the omitted age category. 
3. Domestic-owned is the omitted ownership category; Finland is the omitted country.
Signiﬁ cance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Services (except construction)
All controls
Ownership + sector + 
baseline prod + 
country dummies
Sector + baseline prod 
+ country dummies
Baseline prod + 
country dummies
Only country 
dummies
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln(prod) 2003 –0.0850*** –0.0842*** –0.0817*** –0.0743***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size (50–249)1 0.0057***
(0.002)
Size (250–499)1 0.0118*
(0.006)
Size (500–999)1 –0.0081
(0.008)
Size (1,000+)1 0.0256*
(0.015)
Age (6–10)2 –0.003
(0.002)
Age (11–20)2 0.0016
(0.002)
Age (21–30)2 0.0049**
(0.002)
Age (older than 30)2 0.0065***
(0.002)
Global head.3 0.0287*** 0.0307***
(0.004) (0.004)
Foreign aff.3 0.0236*** 0.0245***
(0.002) (0.002)
Belgium 0.0091* 0.0096* 0.0046 0.0031 –0.0218***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Spain –0.0302*** –0.0308*** –0.0378*** –0.0414*** –0.0244***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
France –0.006 –0.0038 –0.0058 –0.0067* –0.0157***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Italy 0.0089** 0.0091** 0.0012 –0.0035 –0.0123***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Norway 0.0161*** 0.0149*** 0.008 0.0022 0.0044
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Sweden –0.0074 –0.007 –0.0124** –0.0113** –0.0025
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
_cons 0.9349*** 0.9299*** 0.9116*** 0.8331*** 0.0308***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.004)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.1115 0.1107 0.1066 0.0851 0.0024
Number of observations 28,366 28,366 28,366 28,366 28,366
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Table A4.4: Firm-level productivity growth, 2003-08, non-EU countries
1. 10–49 is the omitted size category. 
2. 1–5 is the omitted age category. 
3. Domestic-owned is the omitted ownership category; Bosnia and Herzegovina is the omitted country.
Signiﬁ cance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Manufacturing
All controls
Ownership + sector + 
baseline prod + 
country dummies
Sector + baseline prod 
+ country dummies
Baseline prod + 
country dummies
Only country 
dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(prod) 2003 –0.1397*** –0.1365*** –0.1352*** –0.1300***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Size (50–249)1 0.0043
(0.016)
Size (250–499)1 0.0059
(0.025)
Size (500–999)1 0.0079
(0.045)
Size (1,000+)1 0.0486
(0.036)
Age (6–10)2 –0.0277*
(0.017)
Age (11–20)2 –0.0205
(0.017)
Age (21–30)2 –0.068
(0.062)
Age (older than 30)2 –0.0708***
(0.019)
Global head.3 0.0810*** 0.0884***
(0.027) (0.020)
Foreign aff.3 0.0337** 0.0523***
(0.014) (0.013)
Croatia 0.0857*** 0.0854*** 0.0897*** 0.0886*** –0.0401
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Serbia –0.0579** –0.0609** –0.0311 –0.0239 –0.0453*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027)
Ukraine –0.1749*** –0.2050*** –0.2036*** –0.1985*** –0.0448*
(0.028) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
_cons 1.2556*** 1.1993*** 1.1917*** 1.1720*** 0.0571**
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.024)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.1966 0.1913 0.1881 0.1764 0.0014
Number of observations 3592 3592 3592 3592 3690
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1. 10–49 is the omitted size category. 
2. 1–5 is the omitted age category. 
3. Domestic-owned is the omitted ownership category; Bosnia and Herzegovina is the omitted 
country.
Signiﬁ cance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Services (except construction)
All controls
Ownership + sector + 
baseline prod + 
country dummies
Sector + baseline prod 
+ country dummies
Baseline prod + 
country dummies
Only country 
dummies
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln(prod) 2003 –0.1419*** –0.1396*** –0.1391*** –0.1345***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Size (50–249)1 0.0123
(0.012)
Size (250–499)1 0.0314*
(0.019)
Size (500–999)1 0.0194
(0.033)
Size (1,000+)1 0.0149
(0.034)
Age (6–10)2 –0.0322***
(0.010)
Age (11–20)2 –0.0288***
(0.010)
Age (21–30)2 –0.0713
(0.044)
Age (older than 30)2 –0.0726***
(0.011)
Global head.3 0.031 0.0405
(0.115) (0.114)
Foreign aff.3 0.0225*** 0.0377***
(0.008) (0.007)
Croatia 0.0830*** 0.0761*** 0.0875*** 0.0822*** –0.0502***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Serbia –0.0103 –0.0134 0.007 0.0188 0.0065
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Ukraine –0.1760*** –0.2093*** –0.2087*** –0.2000*** –0.0395***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
_cons 1.2687*** 1.2222*** 1.2197*** 1.2379*** 0.0741***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.012)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.2305 0.2262 0.2248 0.2045 0.0038
Number of observations 4519 4519 4519 4519 4519
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Annex 4.2: Measures of business regulation
As a proxy of the quality of the business regulatory framework and its 
institutions, this chapter uses a set of cross-country Doing Business indicators. 
Several factors support the choice of the Doing Business data. First, they 
provide a comprehensive database of regulations for most countries in 
the world. The Doing Business dataset allows for time and cross-country 
comparisons because the data in it have been collected in every European 
country since 2003. Second, a complication in evaluating the regulatory 
framework is distinguishing between the quality of the underlying legislation 
and the effectiveness of the government body that is responsible for its 
implementation. The indicators partly address this issue by measuring the 
quality of basic regulations across countries, based on the experience of actual 
users. For example, the so-called Doing Business “time and motion” indicators 
measure the actual steps taken by local enterprises when complying with the 
business regulations. They are therefore able to measure the quality of both the 
regulation and the implementing bodies.
This chapter considers all 10 topics covered by Doing Business: starting a 
business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts, employing workers, and closing a business. Each of these indicators 
is constructed on several subindicators, such as procedures, time, and cost 
required to open a business. The analysis utilizes a number of indices based on 
the Doing Business indicators to study the combined effect of these indicators 
on private sector performance. These indices were created using a principal 
components analysis for each Doing Business topic. The principal components 
analysis indices are linear combinations of Doing Business subindicators, where 
each subindicator is multiplied by an optimal weight. The weights are optimal 
in the sense that they produce the index that best accounts for the variance 
of the indicators. For example, the principal components analysis index for the 
enforcing contracts indicator is calculated through the following equation: 
Enforcing contracts principal components analysis index = 
w0*Procedures + w1*Time + w2*Cost,
where the weights w0, w1, and w2 are the ones that lead to the greatest 
variance of the enforcing contracts principal components analysis index. All 
principal components analysis indices are coded so higher numbers indicate less 
complex regulation. 
Using the principal components analysis methodology, the chapter also 
constructs a synthetic index including all Doing Business indicators.53 Finally, 
to assess the impact of different aspects of the business environment on 
enterprises development, three combined principal components analysis indices 
reﬂ ecting the following aspects of business regulations are deﬁ ned: 
1. Business Entry includes the indicators for starting a business, closing a 
business, and registering property. This indicator measures the complexity 
of a number of procedural aspects related to the entry and exit process. 
Starting a business measures the bureaucratic and legal obstacles that an 
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entrepreneur must overcome to incorporate and register a new ﬁ rm. It 
examines the procedures, time, and cost involved in launching a commercial 
or industrial ﬁ rm with up to 50 employees and start-up capital of 10 
times the economy’s per capita gross national income. Closing a business 
identiﬁ es weaknesses in existing bankruptcy laws and the main procedural 
and administrative bottlenecks in the bankruptcy process. It focuses on 
the time, cost, and outcome of insolvency proceedings involving domestic 
entities and estimates the recovery rate on the dollar. Registering property 
examines the steps, time, and cost involved in registering property, assuming 
a standardized case of an entrepreneur who wants to purchase land and a 
building that is already registered and free of dispute title.
2. Business Operations covers the aspects of paying taxes, trading across 
borders, employing workers, and obtaining construction permits. This 
indicator measures the burden of regulations faced by an enterprise in 
managing recurrent operations. Paying taxes addresses the taxes and 
mandatory contributions that a medium-size company must pay or withhold, 
as well as measures of administrative burden in complying with these 
regulations. Trading across borders looks at the procedural requirements 
for exporting and importing a standardized cargo of goods. Documents 
associated with every ofﬁ cial procedure are counted—from the contractual 
agreement between the two parties to the delivery of goods—along with the 
time necessary for completion. Employing workers measures the regulation 
of employment, speciﬁ cally as it affects the rigidity of hiring, the cost of 
redundancy of workers, and the rigidity of working hours.54 Last, dealing 
with construction permits tracks the procedures, time, and costs to build a 
warehouse, including necessary licenses and permits, completing required 
notiﬁ cations and inspections, and obtaining utility connections.
3. Institutional Environment covers the rules for protecting investors, getting 
credit, and enforcing contracts. The indicator measures the quality of the 
legal and institutional framework. Protecting investors measures the strength 
of minority shareholder protections against misuse of corporate assets by 
directors for their personal gain. This indicator covers three dimensions of 
investor protections: transparency of related-party transactions, liability 
for self-dealing, and shareholders’ ability to sue ofﬁ cers and directors for 
misconduct. Getting credit explores two sets of issues: credit information 
registries and the effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws in 
facilitating lending. The ﬁ rst set of indicators describes how well collateral 
and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. The second set measures the 
coverage, scope, and accessibility of credit information available through 
public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Last, enforcing contracts 
looks at the efﬁ ciency of contract enforcement by following the evolution of 
a sale of goods dispute and tracking the time, cost, and number of procedures 
involved from the moment the plaintiff ﬁ les the lawsuit until actual payment.
The principal components analysis indexes for the countries considered are 
normalized to range from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates the country with 
the best business environment over the observation period. The principal 
components analysis indices allows not only a ranking of countries according 
to the Doing Business indicators, but also an objective measurement of 
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the improvements achieved over the period.55 The Doing Business principal 
components analyses are highly correlated with the country ranking provided 
by Doing Business. For example, the correlation between the comprehensive 
principal components analysis index and the overall rank in Doing Business 2010 
was –0.91, using all 150 countries for which both variables are available.56
Given that the principal components analysis is built on the basis of the 
indicators, they share methodological limitations.57 To verify the quality of 
the principal components analysis indicator, we compare it with alternative 
measures of the quality of business regulation. The chapter utilizes what is 
considered a well-regarded methodology, the Product Market Regulation 
indicators constructed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 2011). The analysis indicates that the two indicators are 
similar proxies of the quality of the business environment: the correlation 
between the comprehensive principal components analysis index of Doing 
Business indicators and the economywide Product Market Regulation indicator 
is very high: –0.74, using Doing Business 2008 data for the 39 countries for 
which both indicators are available (ﬁ gure A4.1). But one of the advantages of 
the Doing Business indicators is their availability for a comprehensive set of 
countries and on a yearly basis.58
When analyzing the effects of business regulation on ﬁ rm performance based 
on the Amadeus panel of incumbent ﬁ rms, the last two principal components 
analysis indices—on business operations and institutional environment—are 
used. For these companies that managed to survive over the period, entry and 
exit regulation tend to matter less. For other types of analysis, especially when 
using country-level data from Eurostat, the principal components analysis of 
overall business regulation and also the three combined indices are considered.
Figure A4.1: Correspondence 
between product market 
regulation indicator and 
principal components 
analysis index
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Doing Business and OECD (2011).
Product market regulation indicator (2008)
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Figure A4.2: Quality of regulations 
index based on Doing Business 
indicators, 2012
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
Doing Business.
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Annex 4.3: Transition matrices for EU countries
Table A4.5: Transition matrix of survival ﬁ rms, by subregion (percent)
EU15 North and Continental
Size in 2008
Size in 2003 0–9 10–49 50–249 250–499 500–999 1,000+
10–49 12.4 82.9 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
50–249 0.8 12.2 81.9 4.4 0.6 0.0
250–499 0.4 0.0 23.7 57.6 16.8 1.5
500–999 0.7 0.7 3.5 13.2 61.8 20.1
1,000+ 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 10.2 85.7
EU15 South
Size in 2008
Size in 2003 0–9 10–49 50–249 250–499 500–999 1,000+
10–49 18.5 76.9 4.5 0.1 0.0 0.0
50–249 1.7 19.6 73.9 4.0 0.8 0.1
250–499 0.0 1.9 25.0 57.2 13.6 2.3
500–999 0.9 0.0 3.7 21.1 53.2 21.1
1,000+ 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 14.9 83.0
EU12
Size in 2008
Size in 2003 0–9 10–49 50–249 250–499 500–999 1,000+
10–49 19.3 68.0 12.7 0.1 0.0 0.0
50–249 3.1 11.7 77.5 6.6 1.0 0.1
250–499 1.2 2.7 25.0 55.1 14.5 1.6
500–999 1.0 2.0 5.0 19.0 58.0 15.0
1,000+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 18.2 79.6
Note: Consider all sectors
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Amadeus.
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1 The European Working Time Directive 
requires member states to limit the 
maximum length of a work week, including 
overtime, to 48 hours in seven days. In the 
United States, employers can ask workers 
to work more than the standard 40 hours a 
week with appropriate compensation; the 
law sets no limit.
2 The average total corporate tax rate in 
Western Europe is 48 percent, compared 
with an average of about 40 percent in 
other OECD countries. This is the total tax 
rate, including local taxes and mandatory 
social contributions paid by enterprises as 
calculated according to the “Paying Taxes” 
indicator in 2010 (Source: Doing Business 
database, www.doingbusiness.org). Data 
exclude Luxembourg. 
3 According to Eurostat “Economy and 
Finance” Statistics (2007), the remaining 
28.9 percent of jobs are in public 
administration, health, education, other 
services, and households.
4 “Value added” is deﬁ ned as sales revenues 
minus the value of intermediate outputs. 
It includes the contribution to sales from 
both labor and capital. Value-added 
growth can be decomposed in the growth 
of employment and in the growth of 
value added per employee—that is, labor 
productivity.
5 See annex 2 for a detailed presentation of 
the Quality of Regulations Index, method 
of construction, and components: Start-up 
Index, Business Operations Index, and 
Institutional Quality Index. 
6 Source: Access to credit measured by 
private sector credit over GDP (WDI); 
quality of infrastructure measured by a 
survey to business leaders (WEF); skills 
of the workforce measured as percent of 
workforce with tertiary education (WDI); 
and FDI inward and outward stock measured 
as stock over GDP on six sectors that this 
chapter focuses on (Eurostat).
7 Due to data availability, years covered vary 
for some countries. See table 4.1 note for 
details.
Notes
8 Given data availability, productivity is 
calculated as value added per worker 
employed in manufacturing and services, 
including the government and ﬁ nancial 
sectors. In the rest of the chapter, 
productivity considers the six sectors (see 
endnote 12). 
9 Given limited data coverage and size of the 
economies, Cyprus and Malta are excluded 
from the analysis (as well as Luxembourg in 
the EU15).
10 Data are taken from the Italian National 
Institute of Statistics. 
11 Marin (2010, p. 4).
12 Analysis based on Eurostat Structural 
Business Statistics database. Using the 
Eurostat microeconomic data, we consider 
private and public enterprises operating 
in six main sectors (manufacturing, 
construction, hotels and restaurants, 
retail and wholesale trade, transport 
and telecommunications, and real estate 
and other services) according to NACE 
1.1 classiﬁ cation. We exclude social 
services, which are mainly provided by the 
government, extractive industries, utilities, 
agriculture, and the ﬁ nancial sector. These 
data cover EU countries plus Norway. 
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta are 
not included in the analysis due to limited 
data coverage. The analysis measures the 
gross effect of changes in labor and value 
added within the six selected sectors. As 
such, the impact of a new job created in one 
sector does not distinguish whether the job 
results from the reallocation of labor from 
agriculture to industry or is a new one. 
13 The analysis in this chapter focuses on the 
countries of the European Union, for which 
the best data are available. Wherever 
possible the analysis is extended to 
countries outside the European Union.
14 For example, labor could become scarcer, 
but the quality of other inputs could 
improve if foreign companies enter the 
market.
15 The analysis is for the gross job creation by 
the six industries considered, and does not 
distinguish which jobs are new ones for the 
economy and which ones are reallocated 
from other industries. 
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19 Bernard and Jensen (1995), Bernard and 
Wagner (1997), and Aw and others (2000) 
provide evidence that export-oriented ﬁ rms 
are closer to the efﬁ ciency frontier than 
nonexporters.
20 See Volkswagen annual report.
21 Variation of FDI stock (UNCTAD 2010).
22 The data refer to a panel of surviving 
ﬁ rms with 10 employees or more from the 
Amadeus database. Foreign-owned ﬁ rms 
are deﬁ ned as enterprises with more than 
a 50 percent stake held by a foreign owner. 
A detailed description of the panel data is 
presented in annex 4.1.
23 Figure 4.12 describes all FDI, including 
ﬁ nance; ﬁ gure 4.13 limits itself to the six 
sectors.
24 Except for Estonia and Romania, though in 
Romania, foreign ﬁ rms depart from a higher 
level.
25 The countries included in the sample are the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, 
and Slovenia. A detailed description of the 
panel data is presented in annex 4.1.
26 The results refer to manufacturing and 
services separately. Given the cyclical 
nature of the construction sector, it 
is excluded from the analysis. Within 
manufacturing and services, the model 
distinguishes ﬁ rms belonging to different 
NACE 1.1 codes.
27 See annex 4.1 table A4.2, columns 1 and 6.
28 Country data measured in 2005. See 
endnote 6 for a detailed explanation of the 
data sources. 
29 Results also show that increasing supply 
of credit and of skilled workforce lead to 
productivity growth at ﬁ rm level.
30 See results for Czech dummy, in table A4.2, 
columns 1 to 5.
31 Global headquarters based in one of the 
EU12 countries or their domestic afﬁ liates.
32 FDI inﬂ ows are a measure of both the 
amount of FDI received—not possible at ﬁ rm 
level—and positive spillovers toward ﬁ rms 
that are not direct recipients of FDI. 
16 Includes construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels, and transport.
17 This is shown by exit rates data from 
Eurostat Business Demographic Statistics. 
Exit rates for ﬁ rms smaller than 10 
employees are 10.6 percent in the south, 
and 8.9 percent in the rest of EU15. 
Equivalent numbers for larger ﬁ rms are 
2.2 percent in the south, and 1.7 percent 
in the rest. Note that entry/exit rate is not 
available from Eurostat for all countries. The 
south includes Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and 
the rest includes Austria, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom.
18 The productivity growth ﬁ gures 
presented in this section are based 
on the Eurostat Structural Business 
Statistics database for contestable sectors 
(manufacturing, construction, transport 
and telecommunications, wholesale and 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and 
real estate services). As such, these data 
do not exactly mirror the aggregate ones 
presented in table 4.1, which rely on WDI/
ILO data and include mining, energy utilities, 
ﬁ nancial intermediation, government, and 
other services such as education and health. 
In addition, the data reﬂ ect different time 
coverage (1995–2009 versus 2002–08, 
respectively). These data also differ from 
the Eurostat data for the same sectors, 
but based on national accounts. The gap 
between two data sources remains evident 
for a few countries, most evidently Greece. 
This discrepancy—acknowledged also by 
Eurostat—could be due to the fact that 
value-added ﬁ gures relying on national 
accounts data include an estimate for the 
informal economy. In addition, value added 
in Eurostat is computed at factor cost 
while in national accounts value added is 
expressed in basic prices. Moreover, the 
statistical unit is different in the two data 
sources: national accounts normally use the 
kind-of-activity unit whereas in the Eurostat 
Structural Business Statistics the unit is the 
enterprise, so part of the value added for 
a certain activity in Eurostat can in fact be 
attributed to another activity in national 
accounts.
33 Considering companies with 10 employees 
or more based on the Amadeus sample. 
Purely domestic companies are considered 
as independent companies or the ones 
belonging to a domestic group, foreign-
owned companies and companies belonging 
to a group with international presence in 
Europe.
34 Excluding Luxembourg, where most FDI was 
in the ﬁ nancial sector.
35 The EU15 countries included in the sample 
are Belgium, France, Finland, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, and Sweden. A detailed description of 
the panel data uses is presented in 
annex 4.1. 
36 For manufacturing, the 7 percentage points 
refer to the difference between the largest 
and smallest country dummy (respectively, 
–0.01 percent for Belgium, and –7.23 percent 
for Norway). See table A4.3, columns 
1 and 6.
37 Within manufacturing and services, the 
model distinguishes ﬁ rms belonging to 
different NACE 1.1 codes.
38 See results for Italian country dummy, table 
A4.3, columns 1 to 5.
39 In EU12 countries the correlation between 
the estimated country dummies and the 
measure of quality of education system is 
0.63 for manufacturing and 0.65 for service 
companies. For EU15 correlations are 0.46 
and 0.15 respectively.
40 Typical examples are a simpliﬁ ed ﬁ ling 
system for taxes and more ﬂ exible 
employment regulations.
41 The enforcement mechanism of business 
regulations in developed countries is usually 
based on risk-based systems, and larger 
businesses are subject to higher scrutiny 
than microenterprises. Several country-
speciﬁ c studies refer to the relationship 
between the size of the enterprise 
and compliance, for example, with tax 
regulations. 
42 Share of informal economy over GDP 
calculated by Schneider, Buehn, and 
Montenegro (2010).
43 The probabilities are estimated using a 
multinomial logit model.
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44 All of the explanatory variables are lagged 
to 2003. Region dummies (EU15 North/
Continental, EU15 South, and EU12) are 
included as well as sector dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered to allow 
for possible correlations in the related 
probability across ﬁ rms within the same 
country.
45 Parmalat’s accounts were forged for a 
number of years and—upon discovery—the 
company went bankrupt, leaving a hole 
in its account of €14 billion, eight times 
the sum originally stated in the audited 
accounts.
46 For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
and Ukraine the population weights were 
computed using the World Bank’s Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey database for 2007.
47 Value added is deﬁ ned in the Amadeus 
dataset as proﬁ t for period plus depreciation 
plus taxation plus interest paid plus cost 
of employees. The value-added ﬁ gures 
(originally in local currency) were deﬂ ated 
by an appropriate 2005 output deﬂ ator 
obtained from the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe and then converted 
to 2005 US$ using the annual exchange rate 
obtained from WDI dataset.
48 The reported number of employees includes 
all part-time and full-time employees on 
the company payroll, both temporary and 
permanent.
49 Δln(Prod) i 03-08 is calculated as  
 [ln(Prodi 08) — ln(Prodi 03)] / (2008 — 2003)
50 We classify foreign-owned ﬁ rms as those 
with a global ultimate owner (outside the 
country of ﬁ rm’s registration), as deﬁ ned by 
Bureau van Dijk. We can identify the speciﬁ c 
ownership share for 66 percent of those 
ﬁ rms, and in this case, ﬁ rms have at least 51 
percent of foreign stake. For the remaining 
34 percent of ﬁ rms that are classiﬁ ed as 
foreign-afﬁ liated by Bureau van Dijk, we 
cannot identify the exact ownership stake. 
However, as they are mostly small ﬁ rms, we 
assume they are not publicly traded ﬁ rms 
for which parent’s ownership can be diluted, 
and we then assume they are managerially 
fully in control of the foreign parent.
51 We use the latest ownership status (based 
on the mapping of ﬁ rm ownership available 
in the 2010 Amadeus version) to create 
these ownership dummies for 2003. As our 
sample excludes all ﬁ rms that were involved 
in merger and acquisitions operations, we 
assume that the ownership structure of a 
ﬁ rm observed in 2009 is the same in 2003. 
But note that we could not control for cases 
where the ﬁ rm ownership structure has 
changed due to a joint venture in 2003–08.
52 Given the cyclical nature of the construction 
sector, it is excluded from the analysis. 
Within manufacturing and services, the 
model distinguishes ﬁ rms belonging to 
different NACE 1.1 codes.
53 Since Doing Business already provides a 
summary index for projecting investors, 
this index is used directly in the analysis 
(reverse-coded, as mentioned earlier). 
It is also included in the construction of 
the comprehensive principal components 
analysis index of all indicators.
54 Data related to this indicator are still 
being calculated and reported, though the 
indicator is no longer included in the Doing 
Business overall ranking.
55 This is one of the main differences between 
the index and the ranking provided by the 
Doing Business report. The latter creates 
a yearly (relative) ranking of the different 
countries. As a result of the relative ranking, 
one country might reduce its position simply 
because other countries have improved 
their environment. The Doing Business 
principal components analysis is modiﬁ ed 
only when an objective change is realized in 
the country. 
56 At individual indicator level, the lowest 
correlation among the calculated Doing 
Business principal components analysis 
indices and Doing Business ranks occurs 
for the paying taxes principal components 
analysis index and the paying taxes Doing 
Business rank: –0.85.
57 For a comprehensive review of the 
Doing Business methodology, see www.
doingbusiness.org. 
58 Product Market Regulation indicators are 
only available for 2003 and 2008 during the 
time period analyzed in this study and their 
country coverage is more limited.
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Innovation
Google did not exist in 1995. Today, its market value is about $150 billion. Google’s 
story epitomizes the success of the American “innovation machine.” In 1999, roughly 
a third of the world’s 1,000 largest ﬁ rms by market capitalization were based in the 
United States, and of these, 35 percent were founded after 1950. Europe had only 181 
ﬁ rms among the 1,000 largest, and of these, only 14 percent were founded after 1950 
(Cohen and Lorenzi 2000). Europe is a “convergence machine” but not an innovation 
machine. Over the past 15 years, with a few exceptions in the north, Europe has 
started falling behind the United States in productivity growth (see spotlight one). 
Europe’s most successful companies seem to grow by doing what they are already 
doing—but better. Following the slogan of the German car manufacturer Audi—
Vorsprung durch Technik (Leading through Technology)—they have developed ever-
more efﬁ cient versions of traditional technology hits. But European companies have 
not shifted to radically new technologies, especially information and communications 
technologies (ICT). 
As the Google success story unfolded, another was in the making in tiny 
Estonia. In 2003, four Estonian programmers, along with a Swedish and a 
Danish entrepreneur, founded Skype.1  A U.S. venture capital ﬁ rm, Draper 
and Company, provided seed capital and further investments before eBay 
took over the company in 2005. Despite ups and downs and disputes 
among the founders and subsequent owners, the company was sold for 
$8.5 billion to Microsoft in 2011. Skype’s success demonstrates that Europe 
can produce young, innovative companies. 
But the average productivity gap between Europe and the United States 
will likely persist until Europe’s larger continental economies emulate 
their intrepid northern neighbors in innovative enterprises. Europe’s most 
successful new entrepreneurs are small: while Europe does produce 
internationally competitive innovators in niche markets, the United States 
dominates among the world’s leading innovators, and this has Europe-
wide effects. 
Chapter 5
How much does Europe’s innovation deﬁ cit matter?
Why does Europe do less R&D than the United 
States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea?
What are the special attributes of a successful 
European innovation system?
What should European governments do to 
increase innovation?
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This chapter asks whether Europe has fundamental ﬂ aws in its economic 
environment that make its innovation deﬁ cit a fact of life. It looks at both 
the degree of innovative activities and the way innovative ﬁ rms grow. In 
dimensions important for innovation, such as the availability of venture capital 
funding for European innovators, the business orientation of scientiﬁ c research, 
and the share of people with tertiary education, Europe lags the United States. 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland have been building 
strong national innovation systems that go toe-to-toe with the best in North 
America and East Asia, suggesting that there are other factors holding Europe’s 
leading innovators back from growing to a global scale. One big obstacle is 
Europe’s fragmented internal market for services. Until Europe realizes the 
gains from market integration and continentwide competition, it is unlikely that 
enterprises in innovation-intensive sectors such as ICT will match the growth of 
U.S. enterprises like Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. 
In analyzing Europe’s innovation performance and comparing it with Europe’s 
peers in America and Asia, this chapter answers four questions: 
 · How much does Europe’s innovation defi cit matter? The innovation deﬁ cit 
explains why Europe has lagged the United States in productivity growth 
since the mid-1990s—but it is not the only factor. Using various measures 
of innovation, such as research and development (R&D), patent registration, 
and the introduction of new products and processes, this chapter shows that 
these measures correlate with the rate of productivity growth across both 
countries and ﬁ rms. But the relationship is complex. Productivity growth 
depends on ﬁ rms’ performance at the frontier as well as below it. Having 
leading innovators in fast-developing sectors, as the United States does, 
is important to push out the technological frontier. For companies below 
the frontier and for Europe’s lagging economies, lifting barriers to general 
investment and human capital formation may be as important as reducing 
barriers speciﬁ c to innovation. 
 · Why does Europe as a whole do less R&D than the United States, Japan, 
and the Republic of Korea? The short answer is that Europe has fewer 
innovators in sectors that require a lot of investment in R&D. Otherwise 
identical enterprises are as likely to engage in R&D in Europe as they are in 
other advanced countries, but in Europe leading innovators are less likely to 
engage in R&D-intensive sectors like biotech and the Internet. So, what keeps 
entrepreneurs from venturing into new activities? While this chapter offers no 
deﬁ nite answer, it suggests that one reason may be the lack of an integrated 
market for digital services, which leads Europe’s entrepreneurs to beneﬁ t less 
from clustering together than their peers in Silicon Valley or Tokyo. 
 · What are the special attributes of a successful European innovation 
system? Successful European economies—Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Sweden, and Switzerland—have essentially downloaded the “killer apps” that 
have made the United States a powerhouse for innovation. The apps include 
incentives for enterprise-based private R&D, an abundant supply of workers 
with tertiary education, and public funding mechanisms and intellectual 
property regimes that foster links between universities and ﬁ rms. But 
Europe’s leaders are constrained by their market’s small size and incomplete 
integration.
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 · What can European governments do to increase innovation where it is most 
needed? The answer is a two-pronged approach. First, reform the innovation 
ecosystem—regulations, ﬁ nance, science, and incentives—to ease entry and 
reward risk-taking. Second, increase the size of the market for European 
innovators by strengthening the single market for digital and other modern 
services, which would allow agglomeration. 
Google’s success provides some clues about priorities and payoffs (box 5.1). The 
most important may be that to compete with the United States, Japan, and soon 
China, Europe has to bring together academic intellect, public funding, and private 
ﬁ nance on a European scale. 
Europe’s innovation defi cits matter—but not 
equally for everyone
In 1950–73, the Golden Age of European growth, productivity in Western and 
Eastern Europe converged rapidly toward that in the United States, the world’s 
leading industrial economy. Growth and income convergence slowed over 1973–95, 
but for productivity it continued, as European working hours fell to less than those 
of the United States. During this period, the cohesion countries of Southern Europe 
and Ireland caught up rapidly with the European Union’s founding members. Since 
1995, the “old” EU members (EU15) have recorded slower productivity growth than 
the United States and have essentially stopped converging, while the new member 
Box 5.1: Google—a uniquely American innovation
Europe wonders what it takes to raise fast 
growers. The story of Google’s birth and 
growth is instructive. 
Google began as part of a project at Stanford 
University on investigating the technological 
requirements for a single, universal digital 
library. The project was funded by U.S. 
federal government agencies, including the 
National Science Foundation. A Stanford Ph.D. 
student, Larry Page, had the insight that a 
better search engine—using the analogy of 
academic citations—would rank web pages by 
the number of times they were linked to other 
web pages, rather than how many times the 
searched word or phrase appears on a web 
page. He was encouraged to follow this line 
of inquiry by his supervisor, Terry Winograd, 
and was joined by another graduate student, 
Sergey Brin. 
By 1998, with a $100,000 contribution 
from Andy Bechtolsheim of nearby Sun 
Microsystems, Google Inc. was operating out 
of a Menlo Park garage. The next year, it got 
$25 million in equity funding from venture 
capital ﬁ rms who, by 2001, forced it to hire a 
CEO. Three years later, in August 2004, with 
help from Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse 
First Boston, Google went public, raising $1.67 
billion in its initial public offering. In 2005, 
Google was valued at more than $50 billion, 
making it one of the world’s largest media 
companies, allowing Google to raise $3.5 billion 
in the stock market to acquire complementary 
businesses and technologies. In 2006, Google 
became one of Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. 
The same year, Merriam-Webster and Oxford 
dictionaries ofﬁ cially added “google” as a verb. 
Besides the ideas and technical expertise of 
its two founders, Google’s success is the result 
of an unparalleled environment for innovation 
in information technology. Its four main 
attributes are these:
• First, universities that—through close 
links to ﬁ rms—start and nurture the 
agglomeration of expertise and enterprise. 
In this case, the university is Stanford, and 
the agglomeration is Silicon Valley in the 
San Francisco peninsula, which radiates 
outward from the university. The university 
itself, founded privately in 1891, helped 
create Silicon Valley by leasing land to 
entrepreneurs, and then by providing 
human capital. Close to half of Silicon Valley 
ﬁ rms are started by Stanford alumni. 
• Second, ﬁ nancial support from the U.S. 
government for such projects as the 
Stanford Digital Library Project. The National 
Science Foundation is a major supporter of 
innovation in U.S. universities, as are other 
federal agencies such as the departments 
of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and 
Transportation. 
• Third, proximity to investors who specialize 
in information technology ventures—who 
take a chance on new ideas and enterprises 
and provide management oversight. A 
culture of risk-taking and a tolerance for 
failure provides a conducive climate for such 
long shots as Google. 
• Fourth, the ability to attract global talent. 
Bechtolsheim grew up in Germany before 
coming to the United States on a Fulbright 
scholarship, and he stayed on after his 
studies. Had he returned, he might not have 
been worth $2 billion, and Page and Brin 
might not have received a big check to get 
started. 
Source: Google.
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states in Eastern Europe have started to catch up rapidly. As chapter 4 shows, 
productivity growth in Europe’s south has been especially disappointing since 
1995, while the north kept pace with the United States until the crisis (spotlight 
one; ﬁ gure 5.1).2  
Innovation as a source of long-term growth differentials
Innovation as a driver of long-term productivity growth has contributed to the 
EU15’s failure to close its productivity gap with the United States. Economists 
have long linked long-term growth to technological improvements (for 
example, Solow 1956), but how technology improved remained a black box. 
More recently, Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998) proposed 
theories that link an economy’s growth rate to its innovation rate. Aghion 
and Howitt’s theory is of particular interest, because it accounts for empirical 
phenomena that characterize economic growth and convergence in Europe 
(Aghion and Howitt 2006):
 · Productivity growth results from improvements in product quality, as ﬁ rms 
that innovate substitute old, obsolete production with new, better-quality 
production. This “creative destruction,” described ﬁ rst by Joseph Schumpeter, 
has led to accelerated structural change and productivity catch-up in Eastern 
Europe (Alam and others 2008). 
 · Firms innovate both by pushing out the technological frontier and by adapting 
technologies from the stock of global knowledge. As the stock grows, so too 
do the returns to innovation for all technological followers. Innovation has 
positive spillovers that can account for long-term growth differentials among 
economies. The European Union has targeted an increase in R&D investments 
as a key policy variable for improving long-term growth prospects.
 · The forces driving innovation at or below the frontier differ. Competition 
spurs ﬁ rms at the frontier to innovate to “escape” competitors, but for ﬁ rms 
Figure 5.1: Mind the gap: convergence 
followed by slowdown in Europe’s 
productivity relative to the 
United States
(GDP per hours worked in Geary/
Khamis $, United States = 100)
Note: EU15 North = Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; EU15 Continental = Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; EU15 South = Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Conference Board 2011.
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well below the frontier, competition may discourage technological adaptation, 
because it reduces the rents available from adapting better technologies.3  As 
a result, policies to promote productivity growth through innovation depend 
on whether a country’s ﬁ rms are below or at the technological frontier. For 
instance, comprehensive secondary education may be critical during catch-up, 
but tertiary education acquires greater weight once a country has reached the 
frontier; bank-led relationship-based ﬁ nancing may be optimal during catch-up, 
but for innovation at the frontier, equity (or venture capital) ﬁ nancing is likely 
better suited. Europe moved from below the frontier in the period of rapid 
convergence to close to it by the mid-1990s, and therefore the same policies 
that were good for growth before may not be optimal now (Abramovitz 1986; 
Eichengreen and Vazquez 2000; Aghion and Howitt 2006). 
Considerable empirical literature supports the importance of structural change 
and innovation for productivity growth. Van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 
(2008) decomposed economic growth in the United States and Europe into the 
contribution of several inputs to understand the productivity gap between the 
United States and the EU15 since 1995. The authors ﬁ nd that the key factor is the 
different rate of multifactor productivity growth in market services, such as retail 
trade, ﬁ nance, and business.4  Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) further show that 
the United States has beneﬁ ted from much faster total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth in distribution and personal services than has the European Union. While 
the different rate of investment in ICT made a small contribution, organizational 
changes and product and process innovation in services—rather than capital 
deepening as a result of the introduction of ICT—lie behind the divergence in 
performance between the United States and Europe. In short, the United States 
gets a bigger productivity kick out of ICT than does Europe. 
In addition, vast empirical literature investigates innovation’s role in productivity 
and growth across enterprises or sectors of an economy. Hall, Mairesse, and 
Mohnen (2009) and Hall (2011) estimate the return on investments in R&D from 
those that link innovation to productivity growth through qualitative measures of 
product and process innovation (see box 5.2 for deﬁ nitions of the various forms 
of innovation). The distinction is important because measures of investment in 
innovation, such as R&D spending, might not fully capture the nature of innovation 
in service industries such as retail or ﬁ nance, which have been important in 
driving productivity growth differences between Europe and the United States. 
The conclusion from the empirical literature conﬁ rms the intuition behind recent 
Box 5.2: Deﬁ ning innovation
• Innovation: The development and 
commercialization of products and 
processes that are new to the ﬁ rm, the 
market, or the world. Activities involved 
range from identifying problems and 
generating new ideas and solutions to 
implementing those solutions and diffusing 
new technologies.
• Product innovation: The development 
of new products representing discrete 
improvements over existing ones.
• Process innovation: The implementation 
of a new or greatly improved production or 
delivery method, or of a new organizational 
method in ﬁ rms’ business practices, 
workplace organization, or external 
relations. This includes “soft innovation,” 
such as layout reorganization, transport 
modes, management, and human resources.
• Incremental innovation: Innovation that 
builds closely on technological antecedents 
and does not involve much technological 
improvement upon them.
Source: Goldberg and others (2011), based on 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development.
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endogenous growth literature: innovation is positively associated with higher 
ﬁ rm productivity and growth, and the social rate of return on innovation 
exceeds the private rate of return because of positive spillovers from growth in 
the available stock of knowledge.5  
How large is Europe’s innovation defi cit?
Given the role of innovation in productivity growth, how does Europe measure 
up? Comparing the share of R&D investment in GDP in Europe with that in the 
United States and East Asia’s high-income economies, Europe as a whole does 
less R&D (ﬁ gure 5.2). Moreover, China has increased its R&D investment rapidly 
over the past decade, closing the gap with the EU15 and exceeding the new 
member states (EU12), EU candidate countries, and European partnership states. 
As chapter 1 shows, Europe’s gap in R&D investments is due entirely to the 
lower R&D investments of Europe’s business sector. 
Aggregate comparisons, however, may be misleading. Innovative activity varies 
across European countries, and a wider range of indicators depicts a more 
varied landscape than a simple comparison of aggregate investment rates in 
R&D. One recent comparative data collection effort is the Innovation Union 
Scoreboard (IUS) prepared by the European Commission (European Commission 
2011b), which compares innovation efforts across countries in Europe and is 
benchmarked against the United States and Japan.6 
R&D investments and patent counts are the measures of innovation used most 
in enterprise-level studies linking innovation with productivity (Hall, Mairesse, 
and Mohnen 2009; ﬁ gure 5.3). The leading countries in business investment 
in R&D are also the leading countries in patent counts.7  Europe’s leaders in 
both ﬁ elds perform as well as or better than the United States and Japan.8 The 
data on public R&D investments and international revenues from patents and 
licenses present a less clear pattern. Austria, France, the Netherlands, and 
Figure 5.2: Europe has a large 
innovation deﬁ cit relative to 
both the United States and East 
Asia’s high-income economies
(R&D expenditures as share of 
economic output of selected 
countries, 2000–08)
Note: Europe includes the EU27, EFTA, and EU candidate countries.
Source: UNESCO.
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Norway are among Europe’s leaders and have higher spending on public R&D 
than do the United States or Japan. License and patent revenues from abroad 
show a diverse pattern, with the Benelux, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, and the United 
Kingdom performing well alongside Japan, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the 
United States. Overall, these four measures are highly correlated: the correlation 
coefﬁ cient between a country’s business and public R&D investment is 0.71, 
between a country’s business R&D investment and its international patent count is 
0.91, and between business R&D investment and international license and patent 
revenues is still 0.63.
The European Commission also collects data for non-R&D innovation spending, as 
well as the share of companies undertaking product, process, and organizational 
innovation. These data are collected only for European countries. Non-R&D 
innovation spending is high in Europe’s emerging economies, such as Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Estonia, Poland, and Romania (ﬁ gure 5.4).9 Interpretations are speculative, 
but one possibility is that ﬁ rms in emerging economies, particularly in the 
Figure 5.3: Europe’s leaders 
invest as much in innovation as 
the United States and Japan
(business and public R&D expenditure, 
percentage of GDP)
(patent counts and revenues from 
international licenses and patents)
Note: Data refer to different years by country.
Source: European Commission 2011b; UNESCO; and IMF BOPS.
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transition economies of the former Soviet bloc, now are trying harder to adapt 
advanced technologies to local circumstances.
The Community Innovation Survey collects data on the share of companies 
undertaking innovative activities, measuring countries’ share of all companies 
undertaking some kind of innovation, collaborating with partners outside 
Europe (China, India, and the United States), and collaborating with other 
companies or research institutions as opposed to doing it in-house (table 5.1). 
The survey measures collaboration with other companies to gauge the extent 
of innovation spillovers within and outside Europe. Several observations follow 
from looking at this survey alongside parallel data on small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) (from the IUS but also based on Community Innovation 
Survey data).
There is a high correlation between the overall share of companies innovating 
and the share of SMEs innovating (0.85). The country with the largest share 
of companies innovating overall is Germany (close to 80 percent). The lowest 
proportion of innovating companies, as well as innovating SMEs, is in the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe: Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, and Romania.
There is also a close correlation between the share of companies undergoing 
process and product innovation and the share undertaking marketing and 
organizational innovation (0.79). As Hall (2011) summarizes, at the ﬁ rm level, 
distinguishing the type of innovation is important, because ﬁ rms may have 
different effects on productivity. At the country level, the data suggest 
countries that have innovative ﬁ rms tend to have more of innovation overall.
The share of companies collaborating with others is also consistent across 
all ﬁ rms and the subpopulation of SMEs (correlation of 0.81). Top performers 
are the United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, Estonia, and Slovenia. The least 
cooperation takes place in Romania, Latvia, and Bulgaria.10 German and Italian 
companies are far less likely to cooperate and consequently appear to be 
doing most of their innovation in-house. When looking at where companies’ 
partners are located, a distinct group of countries emerges that cooperate 
more internationally than others. This group includes Finland and Sweden as 
Figure 5.4: In Europe’s catching-up 
economies innovation is not 
always R&D
(non-R&D innovation expenditure, 
percentage of turnover of 
all enterprises)
Note: Data refer to different years by country.
Source: European Commission 2011b.
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Table 5.1: A large share of companies in Europe innovate, less so in the east
Note: Data refer to different years by country and data source.
Source: European Commission 2011b; and sixth Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
SMEs 
innovating 
in-house
Innovative 
SMEs 
collaborating 
with others
Total 
innovating 
SMEs
SMEs 
introducing 
product 
or process 
innovation
SMEs 
introducing 
marketing/ 
organizational 
innovation
Total share 
of innovating 
enterprises
All types of 
cooperation
Cooperation 
with United 
States
Cooperation 
with China 
and India
IUS IUS IUS IUS IUS CIS CIS CIS CIS
Denmark 40.8 22.7 63.5 37.6 40.0 51.9 56.8   
Finland 38.6 15.3 53.9 41.8 31.5 52.2 36.9 11.1 6.7
Ireland 38.8 9.8 48.6 27.3 41.6 56.5 24.1 2.5 2.8
Sweden 37.0 16.5 53.5 40.6 36.7 53.7 39.9 11.2 7.3
United Kingdom  25.0  25.1 31.1 45.6    
EU15 North 38.8 17.9 54.9 34.5 36.2 52.0 39.4 8.3 5.6
Austria 34.4 14.7 49.1 39.6 42.8 56.2 38.8 3.1 1.8
Belgium 40.2 22.2 62.5 44.0 44.1 58.1 48.8 9.4 5.8
France 30.0 13.5 43.5 32.1 38.5 50.2 42.4 5.2 2.4
Germany 46.0 9.0 55.0 53.6 68.2 79.9 20.7 2.4 1.3
Luxembourg 37.4 12.3 49.7 41.5 53.0 64.7 30.1 8.7 3.7
Netherlands 26.3 13.0 39.2 31.6 28.6 44.9 40.2 7.4 3.1
EU15 Continental 35.7 14.1 49.8 40.4 45.9 59.0 36.8 6.0 3.0
Greece 32.7 13.3 46.0 37.3 51.3     
Italy 34.1 6.0 40.1 36.9 40.6 53.2 16.2 1.3 0.8
Portugal 34.1 13.3 47.4 47.7 43.8 57.8 28.4 1.8 1.1
Spain 22.1 5.3 27.4 27.5 30.4 43.5 18.7 1.0 0.4
EU15 South 30.8 9.5 40.2 37.4 41.5 51.5 21.1 1.4 0.8
Bulgaria 17.1 3.5 20.6 20.7 17.4 30.8 16.6 1.1 0.5
Cyprus 41.6 21.3 62.9 42.2 47.3 56.1 51.4 3.6 3.2
Czech Republic 29.6 11.3 40.9 34.9 45.9 56.0 32.9 2.8 2.0
Estonia 34.0 22.3 56.3 43.9 34.1 56.4 48.6 2.7 1.4
Hungary 12.6 7.2 19.8 16.8 20.5 28.9 41.3 3.1 2.7
Latvia 14.4 3.3 17.7 17.2 14.0 24.3 16.6 1.2 0.1
Lithuania 19.4 8.0 27.4 21.9 21.4 30.3 38.7 4.5 2.6
Malta 21.6 5.2 26.8 25.9 25.6 37.4 19.8 3.1 2.0
Poland 13.8 6.4 20.2 17.6 18.7 27.9 39.3 4.2 2.0
Romania 16.7 2.3 18.9 18.0 25.8 33.3 13.8 1.4 0.8
Slovak Republic 15.0 5.8 20.7 19.0 28.3 36.1 32.2 4.0 3.5
Slovenia  14.2  31.0 39.4 50.3 48.0 6.6 4.1
EU12 21.4 9.2 30.2 25.8 28.2 39.0 33.3 3.2 2.1
Iceland  14.1        
Norway 25.4 13.1 38.5 28.9 30.8 49.2 35.1 4.3 2.2
Switzerland 28.2 9.4 37.6 57.0      
EFTA 26.8 12.2 38.1 43.0 30.8 49.2 35.1 4.3 2.2
Croatia 25.6 11.9 37.5 31.5 32.5 44.2 38.1 2.3 1.1
Macedonia, FYR 11.3 9.6 20.9 39.2 30.8     
Serbia 27.8 3.5 31.3 18.3 18.1     
Turkey 28.2 5.3 33.5 29.5 50.3     
EU candidates 23.2 7.6 30.8 29.6 32.9 44.2 38.1 2.3 1.1
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leading international cooperators, but also the Benelux, Slovenia, and—to less 
extent—France. The United Kingdom does not report which countries its ﬁ rms 
collaborate with, but likely belongs with this group. 
In sum, there appears to be a group of leading innovators in Europe, 
distinguished by sizable investments in business R&D, a strong record in 
international patent registrations, and a substantial proportion of companies 
that undertake one type of innovation or another. This group does not have 
an innovation deﬁ cit relative to the United States or Japan, though it still lags 
behind the United States in productivity, particularly in services. Many other 
European countries do, however, have an innovation gap. Among the top 
performers in Europe, there is a distinct difference between the pattern in 
Germany—with many ﬁ rms innovating mostly in-house—and the pattern in 
Scandinavia or the Benelux, where there is a stronger propensity for ﬁ rms to 
innovate through collaboration with other companies or research institutes. 
Europe’s emerging economies in the east are lagging behind on most indicators 
of innovation (with some notable exceptions such as Slovenia and Estonia) 
except for investments in non-R&D-related innovation.
The North innovates more than others; in 
the East investment matters more
Do these patterns help to explain the strong economic performance of Europe’s 
northern economies relative to the less impressive performance in the south, 
as demonstrated in chapter 4? And how can we account for strong productivity 
growth in Eastern Europe, given that most transition economies do not seem 
to invest a lot in innovation or have a large share of innovative ﬁ rms? The 
answer to the ﬁ rst question is to some extent. The answer to the second is that 
innovation is only one input into the productivity of ﬁ rms, and the rate of return 
on innovation investments varies not only across companies but also across 
countries. 
Figure 5.5: Innovation: another 
north-south gap in Europe
Note: Data are normalized to lie between zero (worst) and one (best) and refer to different years by 
country.
Source: European Commission 2011b; sixth Community Innovation Survey (CIS); UNESCO; IMF BOPS.
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A word of caution: this chapter makes no attempt at a robust growth-accounting 
exercise that would allow the contribution of country-level innovation to be 
disentangled from other factors such as investments in physical and human 
capital. We undertake two simple exercises. The ﬁ rst shows the average scores 
by geographical country groups across all indicators used to measure innovation 
in ﬁ gures 5.2 and 5.3 and table 5.1 (ﬁ gure 5.5). The country groups are the same as 
used in chapter 4: the EU15 split into a northern group (Ireland, Scandinavia, and 
the United Kingdom), a continental group (Austria, Benelux, France, and Germany), 
and a southern group (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), and all of the new EU 
member or candidate countries in the sample (not distinguished here between 
subgroups among the emerging European countries). These scores tell a clear 
story: across most innovation measures the southern group lags the northern and 
the continental (ﬁ gure 5.5). The only exception is the share of SMEs that introduce 
product and process innovation or marketing and organizational innovation.
The emerging economies in Eastern Europe score poorly on most dimensions 
of innovation, despite their strong productivity growth record, though they 
outperform the south in the share of enterprises cooperating with others inside 
and outside Europe and in non-R&D spending. 
The second simple exercise correlates the measures of innovation introduced 
above with a measure of TFP, drawn on the ECFIN-AMECO database for TFP 
calculations available annually for 1998–2008 (ﬁ gure 5.6).11 In the EU15, there is a 
clear positive correlation between TFP growth and two of the three measures of 
innovation in ﬁ gure 5.6: business R&D and registered international patents. The 
total share of ﬁ rms innovating is not correlated with TFP growth in the EU15. In the 
EU12, the correlation between innovation and TFP growth is slightly negative. In 
other words, while innovation matters, it matters much more in “old” Europe than 
in “new” Europe to explain differences in productivity growth.12 
In sum, there is no single innovation and productivity gap between Europe and 
the United States. Europe’s leading innovators in the north (and to less extent, 
the continental countries) have kept pace with U.S. productivity growth and seem 
Figure 5.6: Innovation matters 
much more in “old” Europe than 
in “new” Europe in explaining 
differences in productivity growth
(innovation and TFP growth—different 
patterns in east and west)
Note: Business R&D is expressed as percentage of GDP and registered patents refer to patent 
applications per billions of GDP in euro. Data refer to different years by country and indicator.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on European Commission 2011b; and European 
Commission’s annual macro-economic database (AMECO).
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Box ﬁ gure 1: R&D level may not show innovation problem
Note: R&D expenditure (percentage of GDP) is average for 1995–99. Tax on innovation is the calibration of the model by Maloney and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2007), adjusting for natural resources activities. The calibration is done using data for the 1990s, except for Hong Kong SAR, 
China (1980s).
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WDI; statistical yearbook (Taiwan, China); and UNESCO (South Africa).
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to be matching U.S. innovative investment and activity. For these countries, 
the question is how to become global productivity leaders. Europe’s south 
innovates less and has fallen behind in productivity. These countries have an 
innovation and productivity gap to close with their Northern and Continental 
European peers and with the United States. Europe’s east is catching up 
in productivity, but remains far behind in innovation. For these countries, 
sustaining productivity growth is what matters, but the innovation gap so far 
has not been a binding constraint. 
Evidence from other emerging markets conﬁ rms that returns on innovation 
vary in relation to both the stock of complementary investments in physical 
and human capital (box 5.3) and a country’s position relative to the global 
technological frontier (box 5.4). Chapter 4 analyzed the variation in enterprise 
performance in relation to a wider range of factors, including the business 
climate, the availability of skills, the quality of a country’s infrastructure, and 
Box 5.3: Is R&D/GDP a good measure of innovation performance?
It is common to rank innovation performance 
by the share of R&D investment in GDP. But 
intuitively it cannot be true that, given huge 
differences in the sophistication of the private 
sector, the optimal level of investment in R&D 
should be the same in Albania and Germany. 
Generally, the question is whether countries 
face a barrier to accumulating knowledge 
capital, or to all factors of production. To 
approach the question of whether Latin 
America showed innovation shortfalls, 
Maloney and Rodríguez-Clare (2007) used a 
model developed and calibrated by Klenow 
and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) that allows 
for both types of barriers and captures 
interactions in accumulating different types 
of capital, including “knowledge capital.” 
To extend this to additional countries, we 
compare the conventional measure of R&D 
investment (box ﬁ gure 1, vertical axis) with the 
degree to which, controlling for other factors 
of production, it appears that innovation is 
inhibited (taxed) or, if to the left of the origin, 
subsidized (box ﬁ gure 1, horizontal axis).
Although the analysis depends on notoriously 
ﬁ ckle measures of relative TFP, it suggests 
several interesting ﬁ ndings. For instance, even 
though China is far above Colombia in R&D 
spending, the analysis suggests that it could 
invest more given the accumulation of human 
and physical capital. But Hong Kong SAR, 
China—below China in R&D spending—appears 
to be innovating more than expected given 
the other factors accumulated; it may not be 
efﬁ cient to push toward a higher share of R&D.
The analysis is only suggestive, but it makes 
an important point: innovation does not exist 
independent of other factors of production. 
When barriers to accumulation are high and 
binding, additional R&D spending may yield 
few beneﬁ ts.
Source: World Bank staff, based on Maloney 
and Rodríguez-Clare 2007.
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others. When these factors are binding, innovation may matter less. Comparing 
Europe’s leading innovating companies with those in the United States and Japan, 
how does Europe perform “at the frontier”?
Why European enterprises do less R&D—not enough Yollies
If Europe’s most innovative countries invest as heavily in R&D as the United States 
and Japan, comparing favorably with these peers on innovation indicators, why 
don’t we ﬁ nd Googles and Apples in Sweden and Finland? One answer is that 
Europe’s leading innovators are mostly older companies operating in less innovation-
intensive sectors. Europe struggles to nurture young, innovative companies in 
sectors characteristic of the “new” economy, such as ICT, biotechnologies, or medical 
services, which would grow into global leaders. Europe’s leading innovators are more 
Box 5.4: Why don’t lagging countries do more R&D?
Although R&D spending is associated with 
inventions at the frontier, Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989) stress the “second face” of R&D, 
which facilitates the adoption of existing 
technologies from abroad. Grifﬁ th, Redding, 
and Van Reenen (2004) test this using sectoral 
time series data from 11 OECD countries. They 
ﬁ nd that countries further from the frontier 
had rates of return almost twice those at the 
frontier. For instance, the United States had a 
total rate of return of 57 percent while Finland 
and Norway had rates of return close to 100 
percent, with 50 percent due to enhanced 
learning. These numbers are extraordinarily 
high, but not necessarily out of line with those 
found in other studies (see Jones and Williams 
1998, and Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen 2009). 
Jones and Williams (1998) calculate that at 
these returns, the United States should be 
investing roughly four times what it does 
presently. The question arises, if returns 
increase as we get further from the frontier, 
why would lagging countries invest in anything 
besides R&D? Shouldn’t the southern and 
eastern countries of Europe invest more than 
those at the frontier?
Using a country-level panel, Goñi, Lederman, 
and Maloney (2011) conﬁ rm previous ﬁ ndings 
that, up to a point, returns rise with distance 
from the frontier (box ﬁ gure 1). Each point 
corresponds to a distance from the frontier 
represented by a particular country in a 
particular ﬁ ve-year period, though the 
estimates, based on a rolling window, do not 
correspond to that particular country-time 
combination per se. To the right, we see rich 
countries with returns consistent with the 
literature, and then as we move left and away 
from the frontier to countries such as the 
Republic of Korea and Greece in 1996–2000, 
the returns rise. Beyond the distance 
corresponding to Mexico, Chile, and Hungary in 
1996–2000, returns begin to fall. At Romania’s 
distance from the frontier, countries actually 
experience negative returns to R&D. Perhaps 
the ﬁ nance minister of Romania is reasonable 
not to see a 3-percent-of-GDP target as a good 
use of his resources.
Why is this the case? As we get further from 
the frontier, the business climate is likely to 
worsen and the private sector become less 
sophisticated, such that even the best of ideas 
will yield limited fruit. Moreover, progressively 
weaker human capital in both the public and 
private sector could imply few good ideas 
that actually result from R&D investments. To 
the degree that they displace more feasible 
investments in education or infrastructure, the 
overall return on R&D could be negative. 
Box ﬁ gure 1: Rate of return on R&D versus distance from the frontier
Source: Goñi, Lederman, and Maloney 2011.
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likely to push out the technological frontier in established sectors by developing 
better-quality versions of the same basic product. But they are less likely than 
their American counterparts to push into new ﬁ elds. 
A word of caution: this section does not directly examine the link between the 
presence of young, leading innovators and economywide productivity growth. 
However, the basic argument linking productivity and innovation to the age, 
size, and sectoral structure of an economy has received signiﬁ cant empirical 
support (O’Sullivan 2007; Aghion and others 2008). Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, 
and Scarpetta (2004) found, for instance, that postentry performance differs 
markedly between Europe and the United States, suggesting barriers to ﬁ rm 
growth as opposed to barriers to entry. New European ﬁ rms’ inability to grow 
large manifests in the high-tech, high-growth sectors, most notably the ICT 
sector (Cohen and Lorenzi 2000).13 This correlates with a lower specialization of 
the European economy in R&D-intensive, high-growth sectors, most notably 
the ICT sectors (O’Mahony and van Ark 2003; Denis and others 2005; 
Moncada-Paternó-Castello and others 2010). 
The global expenditures of leading innovators by age cohort and sector, taken 
from the JRC-EC-IPTS Industrial R&D Scoreboard (Hernández Guevara and others 
2008), demonstrates Europe’s lower rate of investment in R&D compared with 
the United States. Comparing the innovative proﬁ le of young, leading innovators 
(which we will call “Yollies”) with that of old, leading innovators (“Ollies”) 
shows how the lower share of Yollies contributes to Europe’s lagging business 
innovation performance.14  
Europe has fewer Yollies than the United 
States, and its Yollies invest less in R&D
Among the United States’ leading innovators in the Industrial R&D Scoreboard, 
more than half are “young” (born after 1975; ﬁ gure 5.7). U.S. Yollies include 
Microsoft, Cisco, Amgen, Oracle, Google, Sun, Qualcomm, Apple, Genzyme, 
and eBay. By contrast, only one in ﬁ ve leading innovators in Europe is “young.” 
In the United States, Yollies account for 35 percent of total R&D of leading 
innovators; in Europe, a mere 7 percent! Notably, Japan has almost no young 
ﬁ rms among its leading innovators. The remaining ﬁ rms in the sample of 
leading innovators (mostly from emerging Asia) have a high share of young 
ﬁ rms, to be expected given the recent economic take-off of these countries.
Of the 74 European Yollies in the Scoreboard, 20 are based in the United 
Kingdom. France, Germany, and Switzerland each hold nine, the Netherlands 
has eight.15 In relative terms, when looking at the share of Yollies in a country’s 
total R&D of leading innovators, Italy does poorest with only 3 percent, but 
Germany and Sweden have surprisingly low shares at 4 percent, way below 
the European average. The Netherlands, with 15 percent, is above average. 
Switzerland scores highest in Europe with 24 percent. But even this share is 
far below the United States’ 35 percent. European Yollies include U.K.-based 
Vodafone in telecom services, UK Shire in specialty biopharma, Swedish 
Hexagon in measuring technologies, Dutch ASML in semiconductors, and French 
Ubisoft in entertainment software. 
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The share of Yollies in R&D is higher than in net sales, indicating that Yollies have a 
higher R&D intensity than their older counterparts (ﬁ gures 5.7 and 5.8). Once again, 
the United States stands out, with the highest relative R&D intensity of its Yollies. 
While on average, Yollies are about twice as R&D-intensive as Ollies, for the United 
States this ratio stands at almost 3. And for Europe, it is only 1.5. U.S. Yollies are by 
far the most R&D-intensive ﬁ rms. Moreover, the gap between the United States 
and Europe in R&D intensity is larger for Yollies (57 percent) than for Ollies (20 
percent).
Compared with their U.S. and European counterparts, Yollies from Japan and the 
rest of the world are less R&D-intensive. Not only does Japan have far fewer 
Yollies, but its Ollies are more R&D-intensive than its Yollies. This is a remarkable 
difference from the United States pattern, considering that Japan has just as high 
a share of business R&D in GDP as the United States. Japanese companies such 
as Toyota and Sony have retained global leadership through heavy investments 
in product and process innovation, while maintaining core focus areas. To some 
extent, the same can be said of ﬁ rms in Europe’s export champion, Germany. 
While the United States has Amazon, eBay, Google, and Microsoft, Japan has 
Toyota and Germany has BMW and Mercedes Benz. Germany’s success relies 
on consumers in emerging markets who aspire to traditional quality consumer 
durables from Germany, and investors who prefer German machine tools. For 
Europe as a whole, as for Japan, the lack of Yollies does, however, reﬂ ect lower 
structural ﬂ exibility, reducing its economic competitiveness. 
Three facts explain the lower overall R&D intensity of Europe’s leading innovators: 
 · Europe has fewer Yollies than the United States, which matters because Yollies 
have higher R&D intensity than Ollies.
 · Europe’s Yollies are less R&D-intensive than their U.S. counterparts.
 · Europe’s Ollies are less R&D-intensive than their U.S. counterparts, though to a 
lesser extent than its Yollies.
Figure 5.7: The role of Yollies among leading innovators 
is bigger in the United States than in Europe or Japan
(percentage of young ﬁ rms in leading innovators, 2007)
Note: The total numbers of ﬁ rms in the sample are in parentheses.
Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on European 
Commission’s IPTS R&D Scoreboard.
Figure 5.8: Yollies spend the most on R&D and U.S. 
Yollies are the most R&D-intensive of all ﬁ rms
(R&D intensity, percent, 2007)
Note: R&D intensity is deﬁ ned as R&D to total sales ratio.
Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on 
European Commission’s IPTS R&D Scoreboard.
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Because the difference in R&D intensity between Europe and the United States 
is small for Ollies, the explanation falls to the Yollies. Not only does Europe have 
fewer Yollies, but those that Europe has are less R&D-intensive.16
Europe’s Yollies are in less innovative sectors so they 
invest less in R&D
Why do Europe’s Yollies have lower R&D intensity than those in the United 
States? Europe specializes in less innovative sectors. Comparing Yollies within 
the same sectors shows that Europe’s Yollies are just as R&D-intensive as their 
U.S. competitors, as expected given the global markets for many of their inputs 
and outputs. 
Table 5.2: Europe specializes in sectors with medium R&D 
intensity, the United States in high intensity
(relative technological advantage (RTA) indices by sector, ratio, 2007)
Note: Relative technological advantage is calculated as the region’s share in total sectoral R&D 
relative to the region’s share in overall R&D. A value in relative technological advantage that is 
higher than 1 means that the region is technology-specialized in this sector. Japan and the rest of the 
world are not reported because of too few observations when disaggregating to individual sectors. 
Innovation-based growth sectors are bold and in italics.
Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on European Commission’s IPTS R&D 
Scoreboard.
Europe United States 
Aerospace and defense 1.50 1.13
Automobiles and parts 1.26 0.58
Biotechnology 0.32 2.20
Chemicals 1.31 0.64
Commercial vehicles and trucks 1.30 1.06
Computer hardware and services 0.08 1.39
Electrical components and equipment 1.56 0.18
Electronic equipment and electronic office equipment 0.18 0.37
Fixed and mobile telecommunications 1.53 0.20
Food, beverages, and tobacco 0.92 0.74
General industrials 0.61 1.49
Health care equipment and services 0.70 1.86
Household goods 0.84 1.60
Industrial machinery 1.84 0.24
Industrial metals 1.00 0.30
Internet 0.00 2.54
Oil 1.00 0.85
Personal goods 1.44 0.69
Pharmaceuticals 1.27 1.16
Semiconductors 0.50 1.72
Software 0.51 2.05
Support services 0.78 1.19
Telecommunications equipment 1.38 1.09
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Disaggregating the R&D Scoreboard by sector—listing all that have above-average 
R&D intensity, above-average R&D growth, or an above-average share of young 
companies among its leading innovators—can show whether or not Europe 
specializes in innovation-intensive sectors (ﬁ gure 5.9).17 The innovation-based 
growth sector includes aerospace, biotech, computer hardware and services, 
health care equipment and services, Internet, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, 
software, and telecom equipment—all in the ICT and the health nexus (innovation-
based growth sectors).
With the innovation-based growth (IBG) sectors identiﬁ ed, where are Europe’s 
R&D efforts concentrated? Europe spends a larger share of its R&D investments in 
sectors characterized as medium-R&D-intensive, as found by Moncada-Paternò-
Castello and others (2010; table 5.2). These include automobiles, chemicals, 
electrics, industrial machinery, and telecom services. None of these sectors is 
young or has a high R&D intensity; all are older with medium R&D intensity. 
Further, automobiles, chemicals, and electrics have below-average R&D growth. 
When looking at individual IBG sectors, it can be seen that Europe has a 
technological advantage (as indicated by an RTA>1) in aerospace, pharmaceuticals, 
and telecom equipment. Of these three, only telecom equipment is a “young” 
sector. The United States, by contrast, specializes in all IBG sectors (ﬁ gure 5.10).
The ﬁ nal step in this decomposition analysis is comparing the relative importance 
and R&D intensity of Yollies in the IBG sectors across regions. Europe has 
signiﬁ cantly less of its Yollies in sectors with the highest opportunities for 
innovation-based growth (ﬁ gure 5.11, top panel). But the ones it has in these 
Figure 5.9: Innovation-based growth sectors 
(percentage of total sales, 2007, and annual percent 
growth, 2004-07)
Figure 5.10: Only the United States focuses its 
R&D efforts in innovation-based growth sectors
(average relative technological advantage in 
innovation-based growth sectors, ratio, 2007)
Note: R&D intensity is expressed as percentage of total 
sales. R&D growth is average annual growth over 2004–07. 
The percentages of Yollies among all ﬁ rms in a sector are in 
parentheses.
Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on 
European Commission’s IPTS R&D Scoreboard.
Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on 
European Commission’s IPTS R&D Scoreboard.
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a. Cells with fewer than ﬁ ve observations.
Note: In the top panel, the shares of Yollies in innovation-based growth sectors are in parentheses. In 
the bottom panel, disaggregating the data into sectors, geographic areas, and age groups leaves few 
observations for analysis, calling for caution when interpreting results. Shaded cells are the young 
sectors. RDI refers to R&D intensity, which is, as deﬁ ned above, R&D as percentage of total sales.
Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on European Commission’s IPTS R&D 
Scoreboard.
Figure 5.11: Europe has fewer 
Yollies in innovation-based growth 
sectors, but they are as R&D-
intensive as in the United States
(R&D intensity in innovation-based 
growth sectors, percent, 2007)
(relative weight of innovation-based 
growth sectors in the overall population 
of Yollies, 2007)
Note: The shares of Yollies in innovation-based growth sectors are in parentheses.
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sectors are as R&D intensive as their United States counterparts, if not more. In 
other words, European Yollies are less R&D-intensive than their United States 
counterparts because they operate in less R&D-intensive sectors.
Across most IBG sectors, Europe’s Yollies are just as R&D-intensive as their 
U.S. counterparts, with a notable advantage in aerospace (ﬁ gure 5.11, bottom 
panel). But Europe has a much smaller share of Yollies in the most conspicuous 
representatives of the knowledge-based economy, such as the Internet (where 
not one European company makes the list of leading innovators), telecom 
equipment, biotechnology, and health care.18 Europe’s comparable innovation 
deﬁ cit is due to a structural composition effect, not an intrinsically lower 
propensity to innovate among its ﬁ rms (Veugelers and Cincera 2010b).
Japan demonstrates an alternative strategy to achieve productivity growth 
in traditional industries and to maintain global leadership. Germany might 
be following a similar route. But for Europe as a whole, greater success in 
innovation-intensive sectors such as ICT, biotech, and health care will be needed 
to catch up with the technological frontier represented by the United States. 
European innovation systems need updating
What makes the United States better at generating new technological, 
organizational, or scientiﬁ c ideas and applying them successfully in business? 
Many factors inﬂ uence the innovation process. We call the interaction of these 
factors a country’s National Innovation System. The fundamentals include the 
actors—managers and ﬁ rms—and the main inputs: capital, skills, and ideas. A 
review of these fundamentals shows that Europe has several economies that do 
as well as the United States at creating the basis for innovation—if not better. 
National innovation systems
Firms decide whether to innovate using existing technologies. In deciding, 
a ﬁ rm will typically start by examining its competitive position. Firms facing 
limited competitive pressure are less likely to innovate, since innovation needs 
both effort and money (Aghion and Howitt 1998 and 2006).19 The ﬁ rm will 
want to know whether it faces a reasonably stable or highly uncertain outlook 
in its major markets, since innovation is a long-term business. The ﬁ rm will 
consider its access to markets with the necessary income level and density of 
potential customers and suppliers to allow economies of scale inherent in many 
innovative technologies to be used to their potential. The ﬁ rm may also respond 
to opportunities presented by public sector contracts. And last but not least, 
company managers decide whether to innovate. Quality of management differs, 
inﬂ uencing these decisions and whether innovations succeed (Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2010). 
A potential innovator will also examine the availability of new ideas that may 
present a business opportunity, though it is often a scientiﬁ c discovery or 
intuition that generates a business idea. An innovator has to assess whether it 
has the necessary skilled workers to realize this opportunity. The innovator may 
also be spurred by upward shifts in an industry’s quality standards or by the 
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example of other innovators operating in similar markets. These are factors that 
inﬂ uence the supply of ideas that innovators can use. 
Intermediating between supply and demand are a host of other factors, some 
speciﬁ c to innovation, some affecting any investment. Key among these are: 
the availability of credit, venture capital and “angel” investors (for innovators 
speciﬁ cally), and direct public support; intellectual property rights (IPR); 
regulatory barriers that may discourage innovation (for example,  the costs 
of licensing new technologies, starting up or closing a business, and changed 
complementary inputs such as hiring and ﬁ ring labor); and other factors such 
as the structure and efﬁ ciency of the tax or legal system, which inﬂ uence the 
probability that an innovator will retain proﬁ ts. Another factor inﬂ uencing both 
supply and demand—and recently receiving considerable attention—is the 
existence of an “entrepreneurial culture.” There is strong evidence suggesting 
that attitudes to entrepreneurship vary across countries and regions (box 5.5). 
Moreover, the presence of other entrepreneurs may stimulate innovators to 
start a new venture. This explains the interest of policymakers in creating 
innovation clusters (Lerner 2009; Delgado, Porter, and Stern 2010). 
Below are three additional observations on the National Innovation System 
framework (ﬁ gure 5.12):
 · Discussions of National Innovation Systems often overemphasize supply-side 
factors and inputs into the innovation process, neglecting the fact that the 
best test for any innovation is its success with customers. Understanding and 
reinforcing incentives for ﬁ rms to innovate and for entrepreneurs to enter 
new markets is key to a successful innovation system. Without “market pull,” 
resources can be wasted. The painful transformation of public R&D institutes 
Box 5.5: Where does entrepreneurship ﬂ ourish?
A hundred years ago, the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter published his ﬁ rst major 
work, The Theory of Economic Development, 
laying the foundation for a large literature 
examining the role of the entrepreneur in 
economic development. For most economists, 
entrepreneurship is an activity responsive 
to material incentives such as competition, 
income taxes, or bankruptcy laws, and their 
inﬂ uence on risk (Aghion and Howitt 2006). 
Some economists offer cultural theories of 
entrepreneurship, which emphasize how value 
systems encourage people to invest their 
talents in economic activities (rather than 
achieving cultural excellence, for instance; for 
a useful summary, see Shiller 2005). 
To explain why some regions develop 
economic clusters and others do not, Glaeser, 
Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010) examine the supply 
of entrepreneurship versus the relative role of 
economic incentives stimulating demand for 
entrepreneurial activity, using an established 
empirical correlation between average 
company size and employment growth across 
locations in the United States. Their ﬁ ndings 
indicate that the supply of entrepreneurship 
matters. Some regions have a higher density 
of enterprises to start, reducing costs for 
others, and allowing clusters to grow (see 
also Delgado, Porter, and Stern 2010). But 
some regions are simply lucky to have more 
entrepreneurial people who, at the right 
juncture, were able to exploit new economic 
opportunities. This insight seems conﬁ rmed 
by evidence that attitudes toward values 
associated with entrepreneurship—such as 
risk-taking, thrift, and preference for work over 
leisure—vary across not only countries but also 
regions within a country (Shiller 2005). 
It is likely that a combination of cultural, 
structural, and economic factors foments 
entrepreneurial clusters such as Silicon Valley 
or route 128. In the United States, such clusters 
have grown to international signiﬁ cance 
because labor is more mobile, venture capital 
more developed, and the home market large 
enough to nurture domestic companies to a 
global scale. Whether Europeans as a whole 
are less entrepreneurial than Americans is not 
clear. The challenge for Europe is to create a 
network of smaller innovation clusters that 
achieves the global reach of Silicon Valley. If 
Europe integrates its services markets, the 
livability of its historic cities and the quality 
of its transport network may enable it to 
compete with California (Crescenzi, Rodríguez-
Pose, and Storper 2007). 
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in Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation—well known for their scientiﬁ c 
achievements under Soviet rule—is a case in point (Goldberg and others 2011). 
 · Due to the potentially large spillovers of R&D, there is often ample public 
support. Moreover, coordination failures in “discovering” a country’s 
competitive advantage have motivated calls for government intervention 
to promote particular sectors or industries assumed to have high positive 
spillovers (Rodrik 2004). Although well motivated by empirical examples, 
these calls should not divert attention from the more mundane barriers to 
investment, as detailed in chapter 4. “Setting the table” well is necessary for 
a successful National Innovation System (Lerner 2009). 
 · The interaction between supply and demand matters most. A comprehensive 
diagnosis is needed to understand what requires ﬁ xing. For Europe as a 
whole, there are important gaps in supply and demand, as well as in the links 
between them. But in each area where Europe is weak, several countries 
already achieve global best practice. To understand what might constrain 
leading innovators in these European top performers, we must turn to 
Europe-wide factors.
The fundamentals: management quality, 
adventurous capital, and skills
How do European countries compare with their peers—most importantly the 
United States—in key dimensions of their National Innovation Systems? Using 
the framework of ﬁ gure 5.12, a survey of evidence highlights where Europe lags. 
The survey is selective rather than comprehensive, and is based on ﬁ ndings in 
the literature rather than original research. Aggregating the data across more 
dimensions to rank European countries against their peers conﬁ rms the ﬁ ndings 
of Europe’s main innovation weaknesses. 
Figure 5.12: The supply of 
innovation gets a lot of 
attention, supply-demand 
interactions too little
Source: Based on a framework developed by William Maloney, World Bank Development Economics 
Research Group.
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Management quality in the United States is higher than in Europe
In natural selection, the ﬁ ttest organisms survive, adapting to their environment 
in unexpected ways.20 What is true in nature is also true for market economies, 
though many factors intervene in the selection process. Aghion and Howitt 
(1992 and 1998) stress competition’s importance in stimulating the innovation 
in companies near or on the technological frontier. But how competition 
stimulates innovation has only recently begun to be investigated in depth. 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) report the results of research that scores the 
quality of company management in several thousand companies in 17 countries 
(ﬁ gure 5.13). Managers in the United States scored the highest, while many 
European countries scored quite poorly (see Iwulska 2011 for a summary of the 
literature). Indeed, Greek companies seem to be as poorly managed as those 
in Brazil, China, or India. Germany and Sweden do almost as well as the United 
States—and better than Canada and Japan. The index can be broken down into 
subindices measuring the extent that managers monitor what is going on, 
manage human resources with appropriate incentives, and set the right targets 
and take action when outcomes deviate. The main reason for the United States’ 
lead is its higher score in managing human resources. Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2010) attribute the country’s greater use of incentives as management tools 
to its lighter labor market regulations, which allow poor performers to be more 
easily removed and top talent more easily attracted and retained. As chapter 
6 shows, there are big differences among European countries in the quality of 
labor market regulations, but as a whole Europe struggles to attract and retain 
global talent.
Another important insight from the research on management quality is that 
weaker average management scores tend to be associated with tolerance 
of poorly managed companies, which allows these companies to stay in the 
Figure 5.13: The United States 
outperforms Europe on 
management quality
Note: Numbers of ﬁ rms are in parentheses. Data refer to 2006–08.
Source: Bloom and Van Reenen 2010. For data, see Nicholas Bloom’s website at Stanford University, 
www.stanford.edu/~nbloom.
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market (Van Reenen 2011). This insight can be linked to evidence showing 
that in industries with higher exit rates, productivity growth is faster (Aghion 
and Howitt 2006). Competition spurs managers to innovate to escape their 
competitors, pushing poorly performing ﬁ rms out of the market and raising a 
country’s aggregate performance. As chapter 4 shows, the survival of poorly 
performing microenterprises and SMEs is one reason for the poor productivity 
of Southern European countries such as Italy. Multinational ﬁ rms and exporters 
are better managed than domestic ﬁ rms and nonexporters—in line with results 
in chapter 4 on the role of foreign direct investment, internationalization, and 
export orientation for ﬁ rm performance. 
A ﬁ nal insight from this research is that better management may increase 
returns to new general purpose technologies such as ICT. Bloom, Sadun, 
and Van Reenen (2007) argue that greater use of managerial incentives in 
U.S. companies has led to better use of the reduction in information costs to 
decentralize key decisions within the ﬁ rm hierarchy. This explains why the 
United States got a larger kick than Europe out of roughly the same levels 
of information technology investments during the second half of the 1990s, 
particularly in wholesale, retail, and ﬁ nancial services (van Ark, O’Mahony, and 
Timmer 2008). 
Venture capital markets in Europe are thinner than in the United States
One of the most frequently cited explanations for the differences in dynamic 
structure between Europe and the United States is a greater willingness on the 
part of U.S. ﬁ nancial markets to fund the growth of new ﬁ rms in new sectors 
(O’Sullivan 2007). Survey evidence from the German Community Innovation Survey 
conﬁ rms the importance of ﬁ nancial constraints for innovating ﬁ rms in general, and 
particularly for young innovating ﬁ rms (Schneider and Veugelers 2010). 
The importance of access to external ﬁ nance—particularly for young, fast-growing 
innovators—should not come as a surprise. Risk and informational asymmetries 
create capital market imperfections, and a ﬁ rm’s lack of reputation and collateral 
Figure 5.14: The United States has 
the largest venture capital 
market in the world
(venture capital investment, 
percentage of GDP, 2010)
Source: EVCA (European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association) 2011; and Thomson Reuters via 
PricewaterhouseCoopers/National Venture Capital Association MoneyTree Report, based on Kelly 2011.
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become crucial to how these asymmetries disadvantage it. Although young, 
highly innovative companies are rich in intangible assets such as technology and 
specialized knowledge, they lack the collateral assets that could help them access 
external ﬁ nance. Young innovators, combining the disadvantages of small scale, 
short history, risky innovative projects, and less or no retained earnings, can be 
expected to be more affected by ﬁ nancial barriers. 
The venture capital market is most adept to address the need of external 
ﬁ nancing for highly innovative growth projects coming from young companies 
lacking internal funds. The high risk proﬁ le of young, highly innovative growth 
companies often impedes other modes of external ﬁ nancing, like bank loans.
The United States has by far the largest and most developed venture capital 
market, about twice the size of that of Europe’s leading innovators, Switzerland 
and Sweden, as a share of GDP (ﬁ gure 5.14).21 It is not clear, however, whether 
this disparity reﬂ ects the supply side (insufﬁ cient funding for potentially 
proﬁ table projects) or the demand side (insufﬁ cient proﬁ table investment 
opportunities). The evidence provides arguments for both. 
Kelly (2011) shows that European venture capital, while smaller, chases more 
deals—leading to fragmentation and smaller investment volumes per deal than 
in the United States. There is a substantial difference in average investment 
sizes between the United States and Europe, particularly at the initial stage 
of seed capital, where the average European investment is just €0.4 million 
against €2.2 million in the United States (table 5.3). There is also qualitative 
evidence suggesting that fewer venture capital investors in Europe have an 
entrepreneurial or engineering background themselves, potentially weakening 
links with investee companies (Kelly 2011). Venture capital investment in 
Europe is more diversiﬁ ed and less focused on ICT and biotechnology than 
in the United States, where IBG sectors account for 75 percent of all venture 
capital investments. Finally, the lower development of European equity markets 
means investments may be more costly (box 5.6). These factors put European 
innovators and especially European Yollies at a disadvantage to their U.S. 
counterparts in raising ﬁ nancing.
Table 5.3: Average deal size of venture capital investment
(euro, millions, 2003–06)
Investment stage (EVCA) Europe Investment stage (NVCA) United States
Seed 0.425 Seed/start-up 2.181
Start-up 1.425 Early stage 3.499
Expansion 2.652 Expansion 6.011
Replacement capital 7.208 Later stage 7.699
Note: Investment stages in Europe and the United States are deﬁ ned by EVCA (European Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association) and NVCA (National Venture Capital Association), 
respectively.
Source: Raade and Dantas Machado 2008.
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Yet Skype’s story suggests that venture capital is internationally mobile. 
In principle, a European yollie should have no difﬁ culty raising ﬁ nancing in 
the deeper U.S. capital markets. For many years, returns on venture capital 
investments in the European Union were considerably worse than in the 
United States, though this gap may now be declining (Kelly 2011; Brandis and 
Whitmire 2011). Low returns explain low investment ﬂ ows, and low returns 
might themselves reﬂ ect nonﬁ nancing-related barriers to innovation. Indeed, 
a likely explanation for limited venture capital ﬁ nancing is that markets for 
venture capital are too thin. A limited number of investors and entrepreneurs 
have difﬁ culties contracting with each other at reasonable costs. In European 
innovation leaders such as Sweden or Finland, though the size of the venture 
capital market relative to GDP is smaller, availability of ﬁ nancing may no longer 
be a binding constraint.
Europe’s university research lags the United States’ in quality and 
business linkages
An available labor force with the skills to use new technologies is a key factor 
in encouraging innovation—whether by pushing out the technological frontier 
or by adopting global best practice in the domestic market. Universities play a 
key role in educating future cohorts of workers, but they also generate scientiﬁ c 
Box 5.6: Role of ﬁ nancial systems in convergence and innovation 
Relationship-based ﬁ nancial (RBF) systems 
played a key role in countries where income 
convergence was the main challenge, as well 
as in the reconstruction of Europe after World 
War II. The main motive was technology 
absorption. By contrast, arms-length ﬁ nancial 
(ALF) systems better enable innovation 
and have gradually risen in importance 
in continental Europe’s more advanced 
economies. ALF systems have also played a 
central role in making the United States and 
the United Kingdom leaders in innovation. 
The differences
An ideal RBF system emphasizes long-term 
relationships between customers and ﬁ nancial 
institutions, with transactions conducted and 
priced in the context of these relationships. 
Reputation is integral to this system. The 
underlying legal framework is less important, 
and informal enforcement plays a more 
prominent role, so the institutional and 
information requirements are fewer. Ownership 
structures tend to be more concentrated. 
An ideal ALF system treats ﬁ nancial 
transactions as stand-alone decisions, each 
structured and priced according to its merits 
and provided by the ﬁ nancial institution that 
can offer the best service. The institutional 
framework is more demanding, due not 
only to the necessary legal and regulatory 
frameworks but also to the enforcement 
mechanisms that such frameworks require. 
In reality, the two systems often commingle. 
RBF systems are characterized by an above-
average importance of banks, small bond 
and equity markets, and limited emphasis on 
formal disclosure and corporate governance 
standards. This is an efﬁ cient arrangement 
to collect savings, monitor borrowers, and 
select investment projects. ALF systems 
have smaller specialized banks, a greater 
importance of capital markets, and extensive 
formal disclosure and corporate governance 
standards.
The advantages and disadvantages
Long-term relationships in RBF systems, 
often enhanced by equity stakes and 
board positions, help generate information, 
providing banks with the opportunity and 
incentive to obtain in-depth knowledge 
of their customers, reducing information 
asymmetry, and facilitating monitoring. The 
option value for both ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms and 
customers of maintaining the long-term 
relationship provides an incentive to resolve 
contract disputes that might arise while 
funding borrowers during lean periods, 
therefore facilitating longer-term planning 
and reducing the need for self-insurance. But 
RBF systems also have disadvantages. The 
desire to maintain the value of the investment 
in existing relationships creates a preference 
for funding projects in established ﬁ rms. 
Borrowers with intangible assets and start-ups 
with disruptive technologies or strategies 
challenging incumbents are less likely to be 
supported. Some analysts even argue that 
RBF systems stiﬂ e innovation by limiting 
competition (Rajan and Zingales 2002).
ALF systems have different advantages. The 
existence of a broad range of alternative 
funding sources, coupled with a lower 
inherent preference for continuing existing 
ﬁ nancial relationships, raises the likelihood 
of funding new technologies and ﬁ rms. It 
also provides incentives for adjusting rapidly 
to new economic conditions—and thus to 
permanent shocks. The reduced importance 
of lock-in effects for both ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms 
and customers generates an incentive for 
stringent disclosure requirements. But there 
are disadvantages, too. ALF systems have less 
repeat business and thus an increased need 
for self-insurance. Because of the requirement 
for frequent disclosure, the management 
compensation structures are tilted toward 
short-term results. Finally, the transient nature 
of ﬁ nancial transactions reduces the incentive 
to resolve disputes internally. An efﬁ cient legal 
system is crucial for an ALF system to function 
effectively.
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knowledge that becomes available for business applications. Close links 
between research institutes, universities, entrepreneurs, and venture capital 
investors are key ingredients of a successful National Innovation System. And 
universities are an important vehicle for countries that wish to attract global 
talent—both academics and students. The United States outperforms Europe on 
all three counts. 
European governments regard scientiﬁ c research as a primary responsibility 
of the public sector, placing less emphasis on leveraging private funding for 
scientiﬁ c discovery. While total funding per student correlates closely with 
GDP per capita, in the United States the average ratio of spending per student 
to GDP per capita was 58 percent, against 55 percent in Canada and between 
40 and 50 percent in most advanced European countries (Italy lags with less 
than 30 percent). Differences in private funding explain the bulk of spending 
RBF still dominates in Europe, 
but ALF are on the rise
Examining private sector credit and stock 
market capitalization, after controlling for 
the characteristics of individual countries—
population, demographics, and other features 
such as being a transition country or an 
offshore ﬁ nancial center—indicates that 
banking sectors in Continental Europe are 
overdeveloped and that equity markets are 
underdeveloped (box ﬁ gures 1 and 2). But 
this is not true for all countries. For instance, 
banking systems in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia perform 
above the world’s benchmark for private 
sector credit but have underdeveloped equity 
markets (except for Bulgaria and Croatia). The 
southern periphery of the European Union 
followed a similar path before the ﬁ nancial 
crisis. For instance, Spain has overdeveloped 
banking and equity markets, but Italy lags the 
“old” EU cohesion countries in stock market 
development.
From the standpoint of innovation ﬁ nance, 
only a few countries in emerging Europe 
appear to have excessively expanded their 
credit markets. And sustained growth 
differentials relative to the EU15 have 
narrowed the productivity gap and increased 
the share of ﬁ rms with characteristics more 
amenable to external ﬁ nancing through capital 
markets. Moreover, the supporting legal 
system is more open to ALF systems due to 
the nature of EU regulatory requirements. 
Whether a country develops ﬁ nancially is 
more important than the relative weight of 
ALF and RBF systems. The experience of 
emerging Europe is interesting since foreign 
banks have become a part of RBF systems. 
But improvements in supporting institutions 
suggest greater scope for ALF systems in the 
future. 
Source: This box draws on Wolf (2011), on 
the features of RBF and ALF systems, and 
on Sugawara and Zalduendo (2011), on the 
benchmarking of banking and capital markets.
Box ﬁ gure 1: Private sector credit
(percentage of GDP, 1997–2008)
Box ﬁ gure 2: Stock market capitalization
(percentage of GDP, 1997–2008)
Note: Arrows begin in 1997 and end in 2008, except for Ukraine, which begins in 1998. The arrows in the top-left panel are median 
values for each country group. The y-axis reﬂ ects the indicator referenced in the title of each chart after all effects of structural factors 
are ﬁ ltered out and plotted against per capita income with cubic splines (dash lines). Speciﬁ cally, each of the two indicators is regressed 
on the mentioned income and structural factors using median estimates of quartile regressions.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000 and 2010.
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differences per student. Similarly, while public funding for researchers in the United 
States and Europe is roughly the same, Europe’s per capita funding per scientist 
is only around 40 percent of the United States’ level because the United States 
has far fewer publicly funded researchers. The European Research Council, with a 
budget of around €1 billion a year, attempts to provide more targeted and scaled-
up research grants to European centers of excellence to overcome fragmentation. 
Greater public funding has not led to a larger share of the workforce with higher 
education. Japan has the highest share of graduates in its population, with a mixed 
funding system (ﬁ gure 5.15). The United States has a better average than the 
European Union, though several European countries with predominantly public 
funding outperform the United States.22 Public funding often comes with less 
ﬂ exible governance, allowing for less diversiﬁ cation in courses offered and weaker 
ability to attract, remunerate, and retain top faculty (Aghion and others 2005).
Figure 5.15: Most European countries 
produce fewer graduates than 
the United States or Japan
(percentage of the population ages 
30–34 that has completed tertiary 
education, 2010)
Source: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Vienna Institute of Demography 
(IIASA/VID), via World Bank Education Statistics (EdStats).
Figure 5.16: Europe is falling 
behind the United States in 
top university rankings
(world’s top 100 universities)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from Shanghai Jiao Tong University and 
Thomson Reuters/Times.
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The consequences of this policy choice: First, Europe’s universities 
underperform their United States peers in indicators measuring the quality of 
scientiﬁ c output and the education opportunities offered. Second, the links 
between scientiﬁ c research and business are more developed in the United 
States, and the U.S. system is more likely to generate scientiﬁ c discoveries 
that turn into commercial “hits.” Third, the United States outperforms Europe in 
attracting and retaining global talent to boost the quality of its workforce. 
According to the rankings of the world’s top 100 universities produced by the 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the Times Higher Education Supplement 
index, European universities lag behind the United States—particularly at the 
top (ﬁ gure 5.16).23 Moreover, both rankings show Europe losing to the United 
States over 2004–10. While in absolute numbers the United States dominates 
in quality universities, some European countries do well relative to their 
population. The United Kingdom, with two top 20 universities (Oxford and 
Cambridge), is an obvious example, but Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland all have a higher share of top 200 universities per 1 
million population than does the United States. Once again, within Europe there 
are innovation leaders that match the quality of the U.S. National Innovation 
System, even if Europe as a whole is falling behind.
Emerging technologies are often built on insights from frontier research, 
developed at universities or research institutes. The links between science and 
business are thus as critical as the quality of the science. Such links are forged 
more easily when researchers and entrepreneurs are close to one another, 
leading to attempts to create global innovation clusters around centers of 
academic excellence. The obvious examples are Silicon Valley in California 
for ICT, the greater Boston area and the area around Cambridge in the United 
Kingdom for biotech, and the Munich and Zurich areas for engineering. The 
United States is fortunate to have top research universities producing frontier 
research. The U.S. National Innovation System is unique in how its top research 
universities interact productively with businesses. 
Interactions between science and industry can take various forms—including 
formal relationships, such as collaborative agreements between science and 
Figure 5.17: Science-business 
links are as strong in Europe’s top 
performers as in the United States
(public-private co-publications, per 
millions of population)
Note: Data refer to different years by country.
Source: European Commission 2011b.
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industry; R&D contracting, but also own licensing policies and intellectual property 
management; and spin-off activities of science institutions. Behind this group 
of formal links are myriad informal contacts, personnel mobility, and science-
business networks on a personal or organizational basis. These informal contacts 
and human capital ﬂ ows exchange knowledge between enterprises and public 
research, creating spillovers. While more difﬁ cult to quantify, informal contacts are 
nonetheless important, often instigating more formal contacts.
There are few available quantitative indicators that demonstrate the strength 
of links between industry and science across countries.24 The IUS reports 
public-private co-publications as a measure for science-business links (ﬁ gure 5.17). 
It shows that the top countries in Europe in co-publications are Switzerland and the 
Scandinavian countries, which are also the innovation leaders overall, indicating 
that strong links between universities and the private sector are necessary for a 
well-functioning innovation system.
University patents illustrate the capacity of a nation’s science system to contribute 
to technological development (table 5.4).25 When measured by quantity and use 
by the corporate sector, different proﬁ les for Europe, Japan, and the United States 
emerge.
Country University patents
Country share in 
university patents
(percent)
Country share in 
corporate citations of 
university patents
(percent)
Percentage of 
university-owned 
patents that are cited 
by company patents
Impact of cited 
university-owned 
patents
United States 13,088 69.8 66.8 14 6.03
United Kingdom 1,813 9.7 6.5 15 3.96
Canada 868 4.6 3.1 14 4.34
Australia 605 3.2 1.2 9 3.90
Belgium 553 2.9 6.2 36 5.17
France 455 2.4 2.3 28 3.03
Netherlands 427 2.2 3.0 28 4.26
Germany 278 1.5 1.4 22 3.89
Japan 272 1.4 3.8 49 4.77
Switzerland 180 1.0 1.1 23 4.29
Spain 124 0.7 0.9 40 2.98
Italy 101 0.5 0.5 21 3.90
EU15 average 4,062 21.7 22.8 28 3.74
Table 5.4: United States universities produce more patents, and 
if picked up by business, the patents have greater impact
(citation-based statistics for all countries with at least 100 university patents)
Note: The analysis uses application data from the European Patent Ofﬁ ce for 1980–2000, which 
allows a citation window of 10 years (until 2010). Citations are from all patent systems (United States 
Patent and Trademark Ofﬁ ce; European Patent Ofﬁ ce). The patent impacts are measured by the 
amount of citations received per cited patent.
Source: Veugelers and others 2011.
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In quantity, the United States dominates, producing a large volume of university 
patents and leaving the EU15 behind. But just 14 percent of U.S. academic 
patents are cited by the corporate sector, compared with 28 percent for the 
EU15 and 48 percent for Japan. These countries have fewer but more frequently 
Figure 5.18: The United States has 
the largest market share for 
international students
(percentage of all foreign tertiary 
students, 2008)
Source: OECD 2010.
Figure 5.19: Switzerland, 
Scandinavia, and Germany are 
global innovation leaders
(EU27 and non-European states, percent, 2010) (index for individual European countries, 2010)
Source: European Commission 2011b.
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cited university patents. When looking at the average number of citations 
received, conditional on being cited, the United States again leads the EU15 and 
Japan, as their university patents have a higher average impact. 
The U.S. model of technical innovation is one of experimentation on a massive 
scale. U.S. universities generate a large volume of patents, but few are “used” 
in creating corporate technology. At the same time, this large volume provides 
fertile ground for university patents to turn into commercial “hits.” The biotech 
(pharmaceutical) ﬁ eld employs this experimentation process. The proﬁ le of Europe 
suggests more mediocrity: universities are much less active in generating patents, 
only bringing out ideas more likely to be used commercially. However, with less 
experimentation, European universities are less likely to register “high-impact” 
patents. In Europe, there is considerable heterogeneity, which can be traced back 
to IPR legislation and institutional set-up (Veugelers and others 2011).26 Japan’s 
university patents are the most likely to be cited by company patents, but—
conditional on being cited—their average impact is not exceptionally high.
Moreover, the total share of corporate citations traced back to U.S. university 
patents is almost as high as the share of U.S. universities in the quantity of all 
patents produced. The higher probability of patent citations by U.S. companies 
suggests that U.S. universities provide more truly global knowledge, despite the 
predominance of local science-business links in all countries. The citation ﬂ ow also 
shows that U.S. corporations are more likely to source knowledge globally, citing 
patents registered by non-U.S. universities. Not only does the United States have 
the strongest local science-business links of any country, it leads in globalizing 
these links, building on experience gained at home. 
Europe’s lower success in attracting global scientiﬁ c talent and students is the third 
consequence of its underperforming science and university complex. The United 
States dominates the market for international students (ﬁ gure 5.18). In advanced 
U.S. research programs, close to a third of all students are international. Many of 
Europe’s most promising researchers are attracted to the United States by better 
remuneration packages (Salmi 2009), better teaching and research facilities, and 
the greater density of talented colleagues and students.
Europe’s innovation systems ranked and compared
The evidence surveyed so far points to four distinct country groups in Europe. 
First, there are the leading innovating countries, including the Nordics, Switzerland, 
and Germany. On many dimensions, this group either equals or outdoes the 
United States and Japan. Second, there are the continental economies, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland, which are performing reasonably well, though not at the 
level of global leaders on most dimensions. Third, there are the Southern European 
economies, which have struggled to increase productivity, reﬂ ected in relatively 
weak innovation systems. And fourth, there are the emerging economies in 
Eastern Europe, including front-runners in the EU12, who have on most dimensions 
exceeded the south and economies where innovation does not appear to be a 
policy priority given general constraints to the business environment (Goldberg 
and others 2011). 
We now summarize this evidence by using the European Commission’s IUS 
indicator—a composite indicator using some data in this report and a few additional 
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measures.27 On the aggregate IUS indicator, Europe as a whole performs poorly 
(ﬁ gure 5.19, left panel). The United States has the highest IUS score, followed 
closely by Japan. The United States score in 2010 was 49 percent higher than 
that of the EU27. This gap persisted over 2006–10 (in 2006, the United States 
score was 46 percent higher). Relative to the main emerging market economies, 
Europe still has a considerable lead. But except for the Russian Federation, the 
BRIC countries—especially China—are catching up fast. This aggregate result 
conﬁ rms that Europe’s National Innovation Systems need updating. 
Europe’s best are performing as well as the United States, while its least 
innovation-friendly economies are not different from emerging economies 
elsewhere, and may even lag the BRICs. The IUS for 33 European countries, 
covered by all 25 subindicators (essentially most of the EU27, the European Free 
Trade Association, and candidate countries), shows that Switzerland had an IUS 
score about 60 percent higher than the EU average (ﬁ gure 5.19, right panel). 
Although the data are not strictly comparable since not all subindicators are 
available for non-European countries, Switzerland is arguably on par with the 
United States on most dimensions of its National Innovation System. Finland, 
Germany, Denmark, and Sweden also do well. 
The weakest group includes mostly transition or EU candidate countries. The 
bottom seven are Latvia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Romania. But the innovation divide in 
Europe does not follow a simple transition divide. Among the innovation 
laggards are some older member states, notably Spain and Italy, while Estonia 
and Slovenia have already joined Europe’s more innovative half.28
The rankings in ﬁ gure 5.19 are thus consistent with the pattern observed by 
looking at the individual dimensions of the IUS score, as well as other rankings 
of innovation capacity within Europe, such as the World Competitiveness 
Indices. The rankings are also persistent over time—the top ﬁ ve countries in 
2006 were the same as in 2010, though Sweden ranked ahead of Switzerland in 
the top spot. The bottom ﬁ ve did not change either. 
Achieving global leadership for Europe’s best
The Nordic economies, Switzerland, and Germany are getting the innovation 
fundamentals right, combining public support for innovation with private 
incentives to proﬁ t from it. Is there something Europe’s other countries can 
learn from its leaders? Does Europe’s failure to specialize more in IBG sectors, 
and thus beneﬁ t from the spillovers that come from innovation-intensive 
activities, reﬂ ect an industrial policy failure, even among its leading countries? 
The answer to the ﬁ rst question is yes, but implementing public support for 
innovation is difﬁ cult and institutionally demanding. Failure abounds and caution 
is in order. The answer to the second question is no. Instead, Europe’s failure to 
achieve global leadership in IBG sectors has more to do with three factors: its 
segmented labor and services markets; the nature of incentives for innovation 
resulting from European antitrust legislation and the absence of an integrated 
public procurement market; and unnecessary transaction costs imposed by 
the absence of a single European patent or greater bundling of public funding 
for scientiﬁ c research. This does not exclude a role for cultural or other 
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idiosyncracies that might have helped create technology clusters in the United 
States, such as Silicon Valley. But there is much that Europe can do at the policy 
level to encourage its own clusters to grow to a global scale, without appeal to 
good luck or good weather. 
An industrial policy for the 21st century?
Finland is a top innovator in Europe. Its total investment in R&D was 3.9 percent 
of GDP in 2009 (European Commission 2011b), the highest in Europe and 
second-highest in the world. Finland has the second-highest registration of 
patents per euro of GDP in Europe, and the second-largest share of innovating 
companies cooperating with ﬁ rms outside Europe. Over 1995–2009, Finland’s 
annual productivity growth was 1.5 percent and its rate of job creation 1.3 
percent, making for one of the fastest GDP growth rates in Europe (chapter 4). 
Finland’s innovation success is the result of conscious national policy.29 At the 
heart of this policy is public support for commercially targeted R&D through the 
National Technology Agency of Finland. This organization provides matching 
grants and subsidized and convertible loans geared to early-stage technological 
development. And, administering around a third of the public sector’s R&D 
spending ($1.9 billion in 2009, or slightly more than 1 percent of GDP), it is 
complemented by a publicly owned venture capital fund (SITRA). SITRA provides 
funding for preseed start-ups; a public applied research institute that, while 
publicly owned, obtains a third of its revenues from sales to the private sector; 
and basic research through the Academy of Sciences and universities. Political 
leadership is an important factor: the prime minister chairs a national research 
and innovation council. Yet, policy instruments have generally gone with the 
market by leveraging market incentives, rather than substituting for business 
decisions.
Finland is not alone in boosting innovation through active public support. 
Financial incentives, matching grants, targeted procurement policies, and 
other measures have helped boost innovation and venture capital from 
Silicon Valley to Singapore, and Tel Aviv to Bangalore. But many more times 
public interventions have failed. Lerner (2009) summarizes the evidence as a 
“boulevard of broken dreams.” Typical mistakes include public support programs 
that are of insufﬁ cient length and ﬂ exibility; that do not leverage an existing 
scientiﬁ c and research base, disregarding agglomeration economies; that fail to 
let the market provide direction, setting national standards rather than following 
global best practices; that are either too large or too small and fail to pay 
sufﬁ cient attention to careful monitoring so that adjustments can be made; and 
that are not evaluated, so that policymakers and stakeholders do not learn from 
mistakes. 
Successful public policies to support innovation often require governance 
structures unlike those usually found in the public sector. This conclusion 
echoes a more general point about industrial policy: where public interventions 
can catalyze or emulate competitive market selection, and where they can 
encourage experimentation despite imperfect information, they can lift an 
economy’s overall performance (Aghion and others 2011). Too often industrial 
policy tries instead to prevent competition, and another broken dream takes its 
place along the boulevard. 
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On the agenda: single market, competition, and
public procurement 
The demand for innovation investments is a function of market pressures 
and perceived opportunities. Because the commercial opportunities resulting 
from innovation are greater when markets are larger and denser, the degree 
of market integration (or “thickness”) matters. In this respect, Europe is 
disadvantaged for two reasons. First, companies in Europe operate within 
domestic borders, due largely to the incomplete realization of the single 
market—particularly in services—and to other EU policies. The incomplete 
realization reduces the incentive to innovate, as the market of potential 
consumers remains smaller and competition lower. Second, Europe’s labor is not 
as mobile as that in the United States (chapter 6). Mobile labor allows the U.S. 
economy to respond more rapidly to shifts in the technological frontier, realizing 
agglomeration beneﬁ ts in newly emerging centers of excellence. By rapidly 
reallocating resources in line with new technologies, the U.S. economy has a 
higher capacity for shifting to new technologies and markets. 
Pelkmans and Renda (2011) highlight a striking example of the lack of market 
integration in communication services, one of the IBG sectors identiﬁ ed earlier.30 
Despite three packages of market liberalization, the European Union has failed 
to develop an integrated market for e-communications. In the European Union, 
the highest price for a wide range of e-communication services exceeds the 
lowest price by several multitudes (up to 1,300 percent in the case of 
ﬁ xed-line calls to Japan!). The average monthly spending of European 
businesses differs by as much as 270 percent (not counting outliers), whereas 
the difference between New York and California is close to zero. The same is 
true in residential telecom bills. Of perhaps greater economic signiﬁ cance, given 
the impact on the cost of information ﬂ ows and thus the scope for productivity-
enhancing decentralization (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2007), the quality 
of broadband services differs greatly within the European Union—and not only 
because of differences in incomes and available infrastructure. Regulatory 
obstacles—traceable to the existence of national telecom regulators in each EU 
state and to the lack of a Europe-wide approach to promoting investment in 
network industries—are partly to blame. Research suggests that a single digital 
market in the European Union would noticeably boost Europe’s economy. 
Tilford (2008) notes that Europe has been gradually losing its R&D leadership 
in pharmaceuticals to the United States. Between 1990 and 2005, the annual 
growth rate of pharmaceutical R&D in the United States was 4.6 percent, 
compared with just 2.8 percent in the European Union. One reason may be 
that national price regulation leads to market segmentation and free-riding 
by EU member states that are not hosts to large pharmaceutical companies. 
Prices in Southern Europe tend to be signiﬁ cantly lower than in Germany, 
the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom, where most R&D in 
pharmaceuticals happens. Europe’s high-price markets, smaller than those 
in the United States, may limit incentives for companies to develop, test, and 
introduce new drugs in Europe. And the average price for patented drugs in the 
European Union was only half that in the United States. This may keep health 
costs down (chapter 7), but it is bad for innovation. Moreover, the arbitrage 
opportunities resulting from price differences in the European Union may lead 
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pharmaceutical companies to attempt to restrict sales in low-price markets to the 
detriment of patients. 
Crescenzi, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper (2007) estimate a so-called knowledge 
production function, which compares the number of patents registered to R&D 
investments in Europe (and a number of other factors at the regional level) with 
that in the United States. An insight from their analysis is that in the United States, 
knowledge production is more concentrated at the regional level, and there are 
fewer spillovers to other regions. In the European Union, R&D produced in one 
region helps generate patents in regions as far as several hundred kilometers 
away. This pattern may weaken incentives to create regional centers of excellence 
large enough to attract global leaders, risking the duplication of R&D across 
regions in Europe. In a nutshell, Europe’s most successful innovating economies 
are not big enough to allow innovators to grow to global leadership. A particularly 
prominent example for European fragmentation in innovation policy is the absence 
of a single Europe-wide patent. Leading European countries cannot agree on which 
languages to register the patent in. This is a case where overcoming national pride 
and prerogatives will be critical to create functioning Europe-wide innovation 
clusters. 
It is not just barriers to the single market resulting from national regulations that 
may reduce incentives for innovation-based growth sectors to develop. EU policy 
may have a role too, important in competition policy and procurement. Mowery 
(2011) discusses the role of competition policy and IPR protection in the evolution 
of R&D in the United States. During the postwar years, antitrust legislation 
prevented established U.S. companies from acquiring new technologies through 
mergers and acquisitions, thus promoting the birth of small innovative companies 
in new technologies such as semiconductors and electronics. After 1980, U.S. 
policy became considerably more patent-friendly. With the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
United States tightened protection of IPR, leading to an explosion in patents and 
collaboration among ﬁ rms to beneﬁ t from technology diffusion. The role of the 
Bayh-Dole Act in promoting business-relevant research by universities—and the 
greater role of patent revenues for universities—has led Denmark and Japan to 
emulate its provisions. There are, however, critics of tight IPR regimes—regimes 
that could lead to strategic use of patents to prevent new entry, with little value 
created in the process. 
Tilford (2008) discusses the European Commission’s interpretation of its 
competition policy mandate with respect to network industries such as ICT, noting 
that an overly stringent interpretation of consumer risk from dominant market 
power may fall short. In industries where beneﬁ ts to consumers may increase with 
the number of consumers, market dominance may not harm consumer interests. 
At the same time, companies anticipating antitrust action may hold back from 
innovation. The design of competition and IPR policies is an important element of a 
Europe-wide National Innovation System, though Mowery (2009) emphasizes that 
successful U.S. policies may not bring the same result in places with a different 
tradition of university-business collaboration.
Finally, the United States’ success in innovation-based growth sectors owes a good 
amount to an integrated national procurement policy, particularly in the military 
and defense sector. Access to early users willing to take up and co-develop 
innovations is critical for new ﬁ rms entering new sectors. One early customer 
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is the government. In many health and ICT sectors, history has shown U.S. 
public institutions to be an important early user, pivotal in leveraging further 
private markets through public procurement (Mowery 2009; Lerner 2009). In 
Europe, the use of public procurement as a policy tool to foster innovation and 
structural change is much less developed and far from integrated on a European 
scale (Monti 2010). 
America’s innovation machine 
versus Europe’s “Vorsprung durch Technik”
As corporate emblems of their continents, it is not unfair to contrast Apple 
and Audi. Since its inception in 1976, Apple has revolutionized the computer 
industry, changed the way music is bought and heard, and made the telephone 
a smart device, capable at once of voice, visual, and data communications. In 
35 years, the company has transformed three industries. It has rewarded its 
shareholders and grown big while still young. Indeed, in summer 2011, Apple 
brieﬂ y became the world’s largest company by market capitalization. Audi was 
founded more than a century ago, and its main innovation was to produce the 
ﬁ rst left-hand drive cars, making driving in trafﬁ c easier and safer. A luxury arm 
of the massive Volkswagen Group since 1965, it has been making cars safer and 
more reliable ever since. 
Both Apple and Audi are global companies, sourcing parts from around the 
world and manufacturing products in countries where assembly is cheapest. But 
one is an emblem of unimaginable innovation, the other perhaps of persistence. 
One is a Yollie, having grown big while still young, and the other is an Ollie, 
becoming big only after it became old. 
European leaders have long recognized Europe’s innovation deﬁ cit relative to 
the United States, Japan, and other countries in East Asia. The European Union 
even carved into its 2002 Lisbon Strategy the ambition to become the most 
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world. In the subsequent 
EU-2020 strategy and Innovation Union Flagship, it set a roadmap for 
sustainable and inclusive growth to be “smart” (for example, European 
Commission 2011a). European efforts focus on investment in R&D. An ambitious 
target of devoting 3 percent of GDP to R&D by 2010 was set in 2002. The 
same 3 percent was again targeted in the EU-2020 strategy. But reality has 
disappointed. R&D as a share of GDP has remained less than 2 percent in the 
EU15, and the gap between its R&D investments by the business sector and 
those of the United States—and even East Asia’s high-income countries such as 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore—has been growing. It is increasingly 
apparent that such R&D targets are unrealistic; it may also be that they are not 
optimal. 
Yet, as the analysis has shown, Europe is capable of creating successful 
National Innovation Systems, which stand toe-to-toe with the world’s leading 
innovation machine: the United States. This raises the question: What are the 
characteristics of successful innovation systems in Europe? In particular, are 
there any uniquely European features of effective systems? 
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One clue is that Europe’s leaders perform especially well where Europe lags 
as a whole. For example, Switzerland has revenues from international licenses 
and patents of 2.5 percent of GDP, 10 times the EU27 average and more than 3 
times that of the United States. Sweden’s licensing and patent revenues were 
more than 1 percent of GDP in 2008, Finland and Denmark’s around 0.7 percent, 
about the same as that of the United States (European Commission 2011b). 
Finland’s population of 30–34-year-olds with tertiary education exceeds the level 
in the United States and is close to Japan’s; Finland’s business R&D was almost 
3 percent—on par with the United States. Public-private co-publications were 
between three and six times larger in Europe’s innovation leaders than in the EU27 
average, and much higher than in the United States. 
So, how are these aggregate differences reﬂ ected at the enterprise level? 
Europe’s innovation deﬁ cit relative to the United States can be attributed in part 
to the lack of Yollies in innovation-based growth sectors. European companies 
in traditional sectors do not innovate less than their competitors in the United 
States. But Europe has far fewer Yollies and is much less specialized in sectors 
characterized by innovation and rapid productivity growth—such as ICT, biotech, 
and medical technologies and services. This ﬁ nding comes with a caveat: to 
measure innovation at the ﬁ rm level, the analysis relies on R&D investments. This 
is obviously not the only way to measure innovative behavior. But the list of major 
R&D spenders overlaps other rankings of the world’s most innovative companies. 
In short, while the United States has Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, eBay, and 
Facebook, Europe has BMW, Mercedes Benz, Siemens, Vodafone, and Nokia.31
And what measures should European countries take to ﬁ x their innovation 
fundamentals? Three policy priorities emerge. First, speed up the integration 
of markets for business services and skilled labor to increase the thickness of 
markets for innovators, and shift resources rapidly to new, untested business 
opportunities. Doing so leads to more competition in IBG sectors, dominated 
by services. Second, improve incentives in scientiﬁ c research and university 
education systems to generate ideas that can be business successes. Third, assess 
the role of venture capital in catalyzing the growth of Yollies, both in providing 
access to patient capital and ensuring attention to good management. Venture 
capital markets are integrated globally, and public policy to attract such ﬁ nancing 
is difﬁ cult to design, so the early focus should be on setting the table before 
launching into speciﬁ c programs of public support.
These things are difﬁ cult to do, so this analysis has daunting implications for 
Europe’s policy agenda. The evidence suggests that policies aimed at raising R&D 
expenditure across all types of industries and ﬁ rms do not address the roots of 
Europe’s innovation deﬁ cit. Policies need to address the barriers to developing 
new high R&D-intensity sectors and ﬁ rms, as the evidence has shown how pivotal 
these sectors and ﬁ rms are for tackling the deﬁ cit in Europe’s capacity to shift. 
These barriers have roots in poor access to early risk-ﬁ nancing, frontier research, 
specialized knowledge and skills, and risk-taking lead customers, including the 
government. Lacking this access, aspiring young innovators are hampered in their 
search for partners to develop, ﬁ nance, produce, market, distribute, and sell their 
breakthrough innovations. 
A general innovation policy for improving the risk-taking environment is needed. 
Yollies need to interact with other innovators, and innovators should not be impeded 
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Europe’s innovation deﬁ cit matters most for 
the EU15, and so it also matters for the 
economies of emerging Europe because they 
are closely integrated.
European enterprises do less R&D than American 
ﬁ rms because they tend to be in sectors that are 
not as innovation-oriented.
The most innovative European economies such 
as Switzerland spend a lot on R&D, but also 
share key attributes with the United States—tight 
business–university links, good management 
skills, and top universities.
Measures to fully integrate the Single Market for 
Services will provide the scale, more privately 
funded universities will supply the skills, and 
regulations that foster competition will create the 
incentives for European enterprises to innovate.
Answers to questions on page 245
while they mature, so a policy to address the lack of young ﬁ rms in new, 
R&D-intensive activities needs to ﬁ t in an overall innovation framework. 
This overall innovation policy should further integrate the European capital, 
labor, and goods and services markets, making it easier for players in the 
innovation system to interact and thus creating competition. Updating 
Europe’s overall innovation policy framework should also look closer at 
competition and IPR policies, where ﬁ nding the balance between promoting 
new entry and creating incentives for innovators by protecting their 
innovation is a delicate task. Agreeing on a single European patent would be 
a simple but important step forward.
Europe’s leading innovators in Scandinavia, Switzerland, and around the 
Baltic Sea have narrowed the gap with the United States in access to venture 
capital and in the quality of science and universities. But even they still 
depend on decisions in Brussels to address the weaknesses in the single 
market for modern services. Constraints are exacerbated by Europe’s sluggish 
labor markets, which slow the adoption of new technologies and the shift 
in effort from old and stagnant to new and growing sectors. How can these 
constraints be eased? Chapter 6 tries to answer this. 
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Chapter 5: Annexes
Annex 5.1: Indicators used in the 
innovation union scoreboard
The Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) is a composite indicator composed of 
indicators capturing eight dimensions of innovation: 
 · Human resources. 
 · Research systems. 
 · Finance. 
 · Firm investment. 
 · Linkages and entrepreneurship. 
 · Intellectual property rights. 
 · Innovators.
 · Economic effects. 
Within Europe, the IUS covers 34 European countries over time: 27 EU Members 
(15 old member states and 12 new member states) and Switzerland, Norway, 
Turkey, Croatia, Iceland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia. 
For the intra-European comparison, 25 indicators are used.32
 · Human resources: new doctorate graduates, population ages 30–34 with 
completed tertiary education, youth ages 20–24 with upper secondary level 
education.
 · Research systems: international scientiﬁ c co-publications, top 10 percent 
most-cited scientiﬁ c publications worldwide, non-EU doctorate students.
 · Finance and support: public R&D expenditures, venture capital.
 · Firm investments: business R&D expenditures, non-R&D innovation 
expenditures.
 · Linkages and entrepreneurship: small and medium enterprises innovating 
in-house, innovative small and medium enterprises collaborating with others, 
public-private scientiﬁ c co-publications.
 · Intellectual assets: Patent Corporation Treaty patent applications, Patent 
Corporation Treaty patent applications in societal challenges, community 
trademarks, community designs.
 · Innovators: small and medium enterprises introducing product or process 
innovations, small and medium enterprises introducing marketing or 
organizational innovations.
 · Economic effects: employment in knowledge-intensive activities, medium 
and high-tech manufacturing exports, knowledge-intensive services exports, 
sales of new-to-market and new-to-ﬁ rm innovations, license and patent 
revenues from abroad.
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Outside Europe, the comparison countries included the United States, Japan, and 
the BRIC countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China).
Because of limited data availability, only 12 indicators from the 25 were used for 
comparing countries outside Europe. These indicators are for human resources: 
new doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1,000 people ages 25–34, percentage 
of people ages 25–64 with completed tertiary education; for research systems: 
international scientiﬁ c co-publications per million people, scientiﬁ c publications 
among the top 10 percent most-cited publications worldwide as a percentage of 
total scientiﬁ c publications of the country; for ﬁ nance: public R&D expenditures 
as a percentage of GDP; for ﬁ rm investment: business R&D expenditures 
as a percentage of GDP; for linkages and entrepreneurship: public-private 
co-publications per million people; for IPR: Patent Corporation Treaty patents 
applications per billion GDP in euro adjusted by the purchasing power standard 
(PPS€), Patent Corporation Treaty patent applications in societal challenges 
per billion GDP (in PPS€) (climate change mitigation, health); for innovations: 
none; for economic effects: medium- and high-tech product exports as a 
percentage of total product exports, knowledge-intensive services exports as 
a percentage of total service exports, license and patent revenues from abroad 
(as a percentage of GDP). 
Annex 5.2: The dataset on leading innovators
We start with the ﬁ rms belonging to the EU-1000 and non–EU-1000 largest 
R&D spenders in the 2008 edition of the EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard.33 This dataset was augmented with information on the age of the 
ﬁ rm’s creation.34  The information on the ﬁ rm’s age allows the United States to 
distinguish between young and old leading innovators. 
As the scoreboard database only records the largest R&D spenders, “young 
ﬁ rms” are not small start-ups. Indeed, the average size for the young ﬁ rms 
in our sample is 10,000 employees worldwide. Some top young ﬁ rms in our 
sample (by R&D size) are Microsoft, Cisco, Amgen, Oracle, Google, and Sun. As 
it includes (almost) no ﬁ rms with fewer than 250 employees, the scoreboard 
dataset is not suited for analyzing small and medium enterprises. 
The young ﬁ rms in our analysis managed on their own (without being taken 
over), in a short time since their birth (after 1975), to grow to a leading global 
position deploying substantial R&D resources. We will label them young leading 
innovators (Yollies) and old leading innovators (Ollies). 
Besides the age of the ﬁ rm’s foundation, the dataset contains information 
on the following variables: main industrial sector (according to the Industry 
Classiﬁ cation Benchmark), country of origin, net sales, number of employees, 
and R&D investment for each year over 2004–07. The geographic classiﬁ cation 
of ﬁ rms is based on ownership, not on location of the activities.35 Due to missing 
data for some ﬁ rms, the ﬁ nal sample includes 1,111 ﬁ rms. Of our sample ﬁ rms, 
32 percent are from Europe, 38 percent from the United States, 19 percent from 
Japan, and 10 percent from the rest of the world.36
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1 The Estonian programmers were Jaan 
Tallin, Ahti Heinla, Priit Kasesalu, and Toivo 
Annus. The company founders were Niklas 
Zennstroem (Sweden) and Janus Friis 
(Denmark).
2 This analysis presents productivity as GDP 
per hours worked, as is common in the 
literature (ﬁ gure 5.1). If we were to use 
GDP per person employed, as in chapter 4, 
Europe’s leading economies would reach 
only around 83 percent of the United States 
peak in 1990. Moreover, the north would 
overtake the continental economies in 
labor productivity around 2003. The basic 
pattern that interests the United States in 
this chapter—the reversal of convergence in 
productivity between Europe and the United 
States after 1995—would remain.
3 Among technology followers, demand for 
a particular vintage of products is given. 
Market share declines with the number of 
competitors, reducing returns on moving 
into a new product vintage through 
adaptation. At the frontier, however, 
innovation creates new demand by offering 
new product types.
4 A general caveat: the measurement 
of productivity in services is fraught 
with problems. For instance, ﬁ nal prices 
for many services reﬂ ect both quality 
improvements and cost reductions, 
but quality improvements are often 
insufﬁ ciently captured. It is not clear 
whether such measurement issues affect 
cross-country comparisons of productivity 
growth in services. To the extent that they 
do, the conclusions drawn in the literature 
referenced in this chapter would also be 
affected.
5 See also Dewatripont and others (2010). 
6 The Selected Indicators table A5 reports 
selected data series that draw on the 
original source data quoted in the IUS. In 
some cases, data used in the IUS are not 
available for non-European countries, and 
alternative data series are reported. We 
have checked the robustness of the results 
in the IUS against alternative data series and 
indicate where results diverge. The main 
conclusions are not affected.
7 There are signiﬁ cant differences in the 
productivity of R&D. The transition 
economies of Europe and Central Asia, 
for instance, are characterized by much 
higher costs of R&D investment per patent 
registered than the EU15 or the United 
States (Goldberg and others 2011). By and 
large, countries that generate a lot of R&D, 
particularly in the business sector, have a 
larger output of innovations, as measured 
by patents and corresponding business 
applications.
Notes 
8 The patent data in the bottom panel come 
from the IUS and refer only to patents 
registered under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty. In the Selected Indicators, we also 
report the data on patent counts based 
on all patents registered under the Treaty, 
whether with national patent ofﬁ ces or 
under the European Patent Ofﬁ ce. Countries 
such as Brazil, China, Japan, and the Russian 
Federation considerably improve their 
ranking against smaller European countries 
using this alternative measure. We prefer 
the IUS data given the market signiﬁ cance 
of an international registration with the 
European Patent Ofﬁ ce.
9 The data do not tell us what this spending 
is on. They are calculated as a residual from 
overall innovation spending minus R&D. 
The denominator is enterprise turnover. The 
data are obtained from enterprise surveys.
10 Goldberg and others (2011) examine 
collaboration of business across borders 
in patent registrations. Generally, data on 
collaboration show an upward trend, but in 
the past decade, the region has been falling 
behind such countries as China and India. 
For technology followers, collaboration 
across borders may be particularly 
important to absorb and adapt cutting edge 
technologies for domestic applications.
11 These are aggregate data based on a simple 
growth accounting framework, subtracting 
investment in physical capital and labor 
inputs, but do not account separately for 
ICT investments or structural shifts in the 
economy, as in van Ark, O’Mahony, and 
Timmer (2008). Data are also reported 
for the United States but not for a larger 
sample of countries. We therefore do not 
know whether the EU12 are outliers among 
emerging markets.
12 It would be preferable to link TFP growth to 
a measure of innovation at the start of the 
period. The Commonwealth of Independent 
States data are, however, only collected 
since 2006, and there is not much change in 
the cross-country distribution in the other 
two measures over time. The results should 
be seen as indicative, not conclusive.
13 Based on an analysis of the top 1,000 global 
ﬁ rms in market capitalization, which were 
listed in Business Week in 1999, Cohen 
and Lorenzi (2000) found that information 
technology was by far the most important 
sector in determining the difference in the 
total number of new giants between the 
two regions. 
14 Using ﬁ rm-level information from the 
scoreboard of largest R&D spenders, it is 
possible to trace the age and sectoral proﬁ le 
of the largest ﬁ rms investing in R&D. As the 
number of observations quickly becomes 
low, however, particularly when age groups 
in sectors in regions have to be analyzed, 
the level of individual European countries 
cannot be used for analysis. Annexes 2 
and 3 describe the scoreboard data and 
its caveats. Veugelers and Cincera (2010b) 
performed and reported a similar exercise 
for the EU27 countries.
15 Finland (four Yollies), Sweden (three), Spain 
(two), Italy (two), and Iceland, Denmark, 
Luxemburg, and Austria (each with one) 
complete the picture.
16 Veugelers and Cincera (2010a) perform a 
decomposition analysis to calculate the 
exact size of these effects. This analysis 
shows that the contribution of Ollies to 
the total deﬁ cit in R&D is small. The most 
important factors to explain Europe’s overall 
poor business R&D performance are that 
Europe has fewer Yollies and that the Yollies 
it has are less R&D-intensive. Having less 
R&D-intensive Yollies accounts for more 
than half the business R&D deﬁ cit with the 
United States.
17 This precludes any analysis at the country 
level, so only aggregate differences 
between Europe and the United States are 
reported.
18 For an interesting comparison of European 
and U.S. spending patterns on health care 
and the implications for innovation in the 
sector, see Cowen (2006).
19 Although the relationship between 
competition and innovation is not linear, 
ﬁ rms well below the technological 
frontier may actually be discouraged from 
innovating if competition is too intense.
20 For examples, see the British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s Planet Earth series.
21 Because of signiﬁ cant year-on-year 
volatility, the ranking among countries 
changes quite a bit across years. But the 
United States is always the largest market 
for venture capital—both in absolute terms 
and as a share of GDP.
22 The data used in ﬁ gure 5.15 come from 
IIASA/VID. Data in the IUS indicate that 
the United States has a large advantage 
over Europe in the share of graduates in its 
population, but the IUS for the United States 
only reports graduate shares among people 
ages 25–64, thus reﬂ ecting cumulative 
investments in tertiary education, not recent 
investments. 
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23 The Shanghai Ranking ranks universities on 
a set of indicators measuring their research 
performance. The indicators include the 
number of alumni winning Nobel Prizes, 
the number of university faculty winning 
Nobel Prizes, the number of articles 
published in Nature and in Science, the 
number of articles published in ISI Web of 
Science journals, the number of highly cited 
researchers, and the size of universities.
24 The World Economic Forum reports 
qualitative measures of the business-
research links, based on interviews with 
executives. Managers are asked to rank 
the quality of research institutions and 
the extent to which they collaborate with 
business. The United States, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden 
come out on top. The transition economies 
are mostly at the bottom of the European 
ranking, but Italy and Greece rank worse 
than Turkey and Ukraine. The Czech 
Republic and Hungary score roughly the 
same as Austria and Luxembourg (Schwab 
2011).
25 An ANCOVA conﬁ rms that country 
differences, as well as technology ﬁ elds 
of the cited and citing patents, explain a 
considerable share of the observed variance 
in the share of cited university patents. In 
terms of impact, country effects prevail 
(Veugelers and others 2011).
26 Within the EU15, Belgium’s university 
patents hold a top position in corporate 
citations received. Not only do Belgian 
university patents have a higher probability 
of receiving citations by corporate patents, 
they also have the highest impact in 
Europe. The success of Belgian university 
patenting is due largely to the country’s 
Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre. 
27 The aggregate score is based on 8 
dimensions comprising 25 indicators. Each 
indicator is normalized, and the aggregate 
score is the unweighted average. For 
comparisons with non-European countries, 
only 12 indicators are available. See annex 1 
for details.
28 Radosevic (2004) found similar results. 
In addition to a high-tech “north” cluster 
composed of four countries with the 
highest national innovation capacities in the 
European Union (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, 
and the United Kingdom), he obtained 
two other clusters comprising most of the 
catching-up member states, as well as some 
other member states. One cluster comprises 
the three cohesion states (Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain) and six less-advanced new 
member states (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic). 
These nine states are characterized by weak 
national innovation capacities. The four 
more-advanced new member states (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia), 
together with six old member states 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
and Italy), form a middle-level group of the 
European Union.
29 This short summary draws on Goldberg and 
others (2011). See also Roos, Fernström, and 
Gupta (2005).
30 For an example of how single market 
reforms in medical devices have promoted 
innovation in the industry, see Steg and 
Thumm (2001), who note the limitations 
imposed by national health systems and the 
incomplete harmonization in applying single 
market rules. 
31 According to the Business Week ranking 
of the 50 most innovative companies in 
the world, only one European company—
Nokia—made it into the top 10. Microsoft, 
Intel, and Google (all Yollies)—in the top 10 
of the world’s largest R&D spending—are 
ranked 5th, 33rd, and 2nd among the most 
innovative companies. In Europe, Vodafone, 
BMW, Daimler, Siemens, and Audi rank 
among the most innovative companies and 
are among the largest R&D spenders. Only 
Vodafone is a Yollie. 
32 While 25 indicators compose the Innovation 
Union Scoreboard, only 24 are currently 
computed, as the indicator on “high-growth 
innovative enterprises as a percentage of all 
enterprises” is not yet available.
33 The European Commission JRC-Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies collects 
annual data since 2004 on companies 
investing the most in R&D worldwide (the 
EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard). 
See http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/research/
scoreboard.htm.
34 The sources used for retrieving the age 
information are mainly company websites. 
This has been cross-checked with other 
databases (for example, the Amadeus 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk, and 
Véron 2008). To construct the ﬁ rms’ ages, 
we used the ﬁ rst year of its creation (ex 
nihilo). In case of a merger and acquisition 
(14.9 percent of cases), we used the oldest 
age of the merged entities.
35 All activities of the ﬁ rm are consolidated in 
the scoreboard. We have no information on 
the geographic or sectoral distribution of 
ﬁ rms’ activities. 
36 Europe includes the EU27 and countries in 
the European Free Trade Association. The 
rest of the world includes Canada (14 ﬁ rms), 
China and Hong Kong SAR, China (10), India 
(12), Israel (8), the Republic of Korea (18), 
and Taiwan, China (33).
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CHAPTER 6
Labor and Government
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the 26 economies in emerging Europe, analyzing 
their economic links with the 19 countries in the EU15 and European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) economies. In assessing trade and ﬁ nance, the chapters 
paid special attention to services, which comprise more than two-thirds of the 
European economy and are believed to be performing worse than in America 
and Asia. Chapters 4 and 5 shifted the focus to the 27 member states of the 
European Union. The link between the chapters on enterprise and innovation 
was productivity, whose pace of improvement is less than satisfactory. 
Chapters 6 and 7 widen the scope to all of Europe’s 45 countries. The link 
between the chapters on labor and government is that the population is aging, 
which provides the strongest imperatives for rethinking the European model 
of work and government.
Most parts of the world have to contend with aging, but Europe must do so 
with a model of work that might be least suited to deal with the approximately 
50-million-person decline in the workforce expected over the next 50 years, 
much of which will be occurring in the next two decades. Europe’s work model 
is marked by unprecedented security for those with jobs, relatively generous 
beneﬁ ts for those without, and easy pension eligibility. Chapter 6 ﬁ nds that 
this model is making Europe uncompetitive. To address this, most countries 
in Europe have to increase labor force participation and make it easier for 
younger people to get jobs that “insiders” have secured for themselves. 
Collectively, Europe has to decide how to unify its labor market and by how 
much, and how to attract global talent. Labor has become one of the weak 
components of the European economic model.
Finding a better work-life balance has meant that most European governments 
are about a ﬁ fth larger than their peers and that they spend about 10 percent 
of GDP more than governments in other parts of the world. Much of this 
difference is due to spending on social protection (pensions, unemployment 
insurance, and social assistance). Well-organized governments in Europe 
manage to keep their economies growing despite the high taxes needed to 
ﬁ nance this spending; others have begun to stagnate and accumulate debt. 
Chapter 7 discusses what helps some economies with large governments—
such as Sweden and Finland—keep growing. It requires considerable discipline 
in delivering social services, making it easy to pay taxes and conform with 
regulations, and allowing enterprises the economic freedom to compete 
abroad. Others can make governments more efﬁ cient by reforming social 
protection and social services: this should be the long-term objective. But it is 
not easy to increase the efﬁ ciency of governments. In the meantime, chapter 
7 reasons that many European governments must shrink. Their ability to 
consolidate spending during the 1990s—and the willingness of many to do so 
during the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-11—should be cause for optimism.
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Labor
In February 2000, the world watched as France instituted the 35-hour 
workweek, down from the 39 hours expected of French workers and the 
more than 40 in most developed countries. The reasoning was that because 
there are only so many hours of work needed, it would be better to share 
them among more workers. Unemployment in late 1999 was about 10 
percent, so cutting the number of hours by about 10 percent might take 
care of the problem. Economists call this the “lump of labor fallacy.” Another 
reason was the belief that French workers should be rewarded for their high 
productivity by allowing them to work less. Researchers had found that the 
output per hour worked was higher in France than in almost every other 
country. Getting employers to pay overtime wages for work beyond 35 
hours would help labor capture more of the beneﬁ ts of high productivity. 
What happened over the next few years? Unemployment did not fall by 
much, though the new requirements might have encouraged workers 
to move to smaller ﬁ rms that were not covered by the law (Estevão 
and Sá 2006). The 35-hour workweek has since been watered down, 
but no government has tried to repeal it. Instead, businesses have been 
given ways around the problem, and the regulations have become more 
complicated. In the meantime, productivity growth has slowed in Western 
Europe and sped up in the United States. Between 1990 and 2000, output 
per hour worked in manufacturing—the sector with the most reliable 
data—grew at roughly 4 percent a year in both France and the United 
States. Between 2000 and 2007, it accelerated to 6 percent in the United 
States, while French productivity growth slowed to 3.3 percent (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2011). 
Chapter 6
Is there a European work model?
Given demographic changes, how can Europe 
achieve a stable and more productive workforce?
Are employment and social protection practices 
inhibiting labor participation and efﬁ ciency?
Is Europe taking full advantage of the beneﬁ ts 
associated with internal labor mobility?
How can Europe become a global magnet for talent?
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The “lump of labor fallacy” might also be responsible for attitudes toward 
mobility and immigration in Europe. If there is only so much work to divvy up, 
people from other EU states—not to mention, other parts of the world—should 
not be allowed in. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, reacting to reports that Italian 
and Portuguese workers were being hired for construction contracts during the 
ﬁ nancial crisis, called for “British jobs for British workers.” In contrast, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, partly freed from this fallacy by 
their tradition as centers of immigration, have attracted the best and brightest 
from around the world. They have succumbed occasionally to the same 
instincts, even though many studies have found that workers mainly move to 
places where there are jobs that locals are not willing or able to do (Vedder 
and Gallaway 1997). But the ﬂ ow of immigrants serves to inject economic 
adrenaline in a manner that is less evident in Europe. 
Although institutions and social norms vary across Europe, the stereotype is 
that Americans “live to work” and Europeans “work to live.” Few would argue 
that the two weeks of leave that many workers in the United States get is 
good for their productivity and for national economic growth. Americans who 
have traveled or lived in Europe often lament the imbalance between work 
and life in the United States, and attribute the rise in stress and tensions in 
family life to the importance Americans give to work. The stubbornly high 
rates of unemployment since the ﬁ nancial crisis have encouraged skeptics of 
the “U.S. work model” to question the beneﬁ t of its ﬂ exibility. These skeptics 
point out that the U.S. work model seems to deliver a much higher level of 
inequality and “working poor” than the European work model. One could be 
forgiven for wondering whether in the years since Europe’s “Golden Age” of 
growth between 1950 and 1973, Europeans have been drifting to the opposite 
but equally questionable extreme. In the 1970s, the French worked the longest 
hours among advanced countries. By 2000, they worked about 300 fewer hours 
each year—a month and a half less—than Americans. In France, just 1 in 10 
people aged 60–65 works; in the United States, the ratio is 1 in 2. 
Europeans have a choice: work more productively to maintain the European 
social model or give up a substantial part of it, with major cuts in the 
generosity of beneﬁ ts. It will probably end up being a mixture of both. With few 
exceptions, the labor force will be shrinking everywhere in Europe. Nowhere 
on the continent is this more apparent than in Europe’s emerging economies. 
For them, the problem has an added dimension: they have become old before 
they could become rich. The wealthy part of Europe could tap into its assets 
to ﬁ nance part of their beneﬁ ts. But the way labor markets are regulated 
in emerging Europe and the comprehensive social entitlements available 
to households are quickly starting to resemble those in their far wealthier 
neighbors. For a middle-income country, the combination of a shrinking 
labor force and EU-type labor market and social institutions could create an 
insurmountable high debt/low growth trap. As chapter 7 on government will 
document, spending on pensions is already as much as 15 percent of GDP in 
some countries such as Serbia and Ukraine. Europe as a whole now spends 
10 percent of GDP on pensions, about twice the spending on education. This 
cannot be good for growth. 
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As people cut their work lives in most of Europe, populations in all European 
countries are aging, shaping their economic potential for years to come. The 
European Union’s labor force (including the EFTA’s) is expected to decline 
by about 39 million by 2060. If the Balkans, Turkey, the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, and Belarus are included, the decline is about 50 million; the projected 
increase of 6 million in Turkey’s labor force is more than offset by the decline 
elsewhere. Only if actual retirement age were to increase substantially (by 
around 10 years) and participation rates—especially in Turkey and among 
women—were to increase to levels seen in Northern Europe could Europe offset 
the decline in the labor force. None of these outcomes, though, would prevent 
its aging. Europe needs to make its labor force more productive and to attract 
more productive workers from abroad.
Europe is not alone in feeling the force of aging populations. Japan and other 
developed parts of Northeast Asia already ﬁ nd themselves under the strains 
of low fertility and increasing longevity. In the Southern Cone of Latin America, 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay also feel the effects of aging. Even China faces 
this challenge, sooner than it would have if it did not have its one-child policy. 
But the most “European” features of the work model—unprecedented job 
security, generous beneﬁ ts for the unemployed, and easy pension eligibility—
make the imperatives created by an aging population most acute in Europe.
The ﬁ rst imperative is to counter the shrinking of the labor force. The second is 
to increase labor force productivity. Europe’s adverse demography also means 
that its human capital has to be better leveraged. Labor market regulations, 
interventions, and institutions have to become more “pro-work.” To ease 
the brakes on growth caused by aging, it is necessary to have labor market 
regulations that encourage more people to work, to work longer, and to work 
more productively. Changes that make jobs more contestable will increase 
productivity. And increasing the productivity of the labor force will require 
that Europeans become more mobile. But even if Europe can put its human 
resources to best use, the pace of aging and the decline of the labor force will 
leave a demographic deﬁ cit that can be closed only by tapping into talent from 
abroad. Europe will have to rid itself of the obstinate “lump of labor” fallacy 
that impedes smart immigration policy. This chapter aims to answer the most 
pertinent questions about work and economic growth in Europe.
Is Europe’s approach to work making it uncompetitive? Yes. Most countries in 
Europe are not making the best use of their scarcest asset: workers. European 
countries must offset the impending labor force decline by increasing the 
labor force participation of people of all ages, regardless of gender, ethnicity, 
or socioeconomic background. They must also increase labor productivity, 
especially by equipping workers with more generic skills that allow them to 
redeploy their human capital more ﬂ exibly across jobs. European countries must 
improve regulations and interventions so that labor is allocated more efﬁ ciently, 
within and across countries. Europe must change immigration policies to make 
them respond more to economic imperatives and less to politics. 
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This chapter arrives at these conclusions in ﬁ ve steps. Each step involves 
answering a question:
 · Is there a European work model? A common approach sets Europe apart. 
Europe’s approach for balancing economic freedom for employers and social 
protection for workers is unique. By and large, non-European OECD countries 
feature less generous protection beneﬁ ts and more ﬂ exible labor markets. In 
much of Europe, these arrangements do not work well. But the features and 
performance across countries vary considerably. Over the next decade, two 
developments—unprecedented in size—will strain the European work model 
even more. The ﬁ rst is a demographic shift at home, with a quick aging of 
the population. The second is competition from workers outside Europe, most 
notably a billion increasingly educated Chinese and Indian workers. Europe 
must contend with both. 
 · Given the demographic changes underway, how can Europe achieve a 
stable and productive labor force? Labor markets will need to become more 
inclusive, with increasing participation among women, youth, the elderly, and 
excluded groups. None of these measures, however, would prevent the aging 
of the European labor force. Given the scale and nature of the challenges, 
Europe needs to make its labor force more productive through better 
regulation of labor markets and better design of social welfare. In emerging 
Europe and in parts of southern Europe, skill gaps will need to be closed. 
Immigration will have to be part of the solution: Europe will have to become a 
magnet for talented young people from other parts of the world.  
 · Are employment and social protection practices inhibiting labor 
participation and effi ciency? In most parts of Europe, they are. Current 
policies allow “insiders” to make their jobs incontestable through strict 
employment protection, while creating considerable work disincentives 
for “outsiders” through ill-designed social beneﬁ ts, especially those in 
low-wage segments. European workers cannot ignore the fact that more 
than a billion workers have entered the global market over the last decade. 
Strict employment protection and weak work incentives undermine labor 
participation and efﬁ ciency in Europe. Many governments in the region have 
been making the labor market more contestable, and others can learn from 
them. 
 · Is Europe taking advantage of the greater potential for labor mobility 
arising from economic integration? The short answer is no. Although 
migration between EU countries is higher than in other parts of the world, 
intra-EU migration falls short of the European Union’s aspiration of a fully 
integrated labor market. In addition, internal labor mobility in most countries 
is low. The explanations (beside the obvious difference in language and 
culture between EU countries): housing markets are inefﬁ cient, wages do not 
signal labor shortages and surpluses, and the absence of a Europe-wide social 
safety net makes moving too risky.  
 · How can Europe become a global magnet for talent? With more self-
interested immigration policies. Without changes in labor force participation, 
the European Union will need about a million immigrants a year for the 
next ﬁ ve decades to offset its population decline. Immigration policies in 
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most European countries focus too much on political factors, such as family 
reuniﬁ cation, asylum, and human rights, and too little on economics, such as 
the demands of employers and skill shortages. Though morally laudable, this 
tilt may make Europe a loser in the competition for globally mobile talent. 
Some countries have introduced demand-driven residency and work permits, 
but even their systems struggle to keep up with shifts in shortages and 
demand for new talent. Immigration policy needs to be complemented with 
policies that make risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and skills more proﬁ table. 
Europe is aging and its labor force shrinking. This is not news. But the speed 
and size of these developments may shock readers, and should motivate policy 
responses. Labor market regulations, interventions, and institutions are restraining 
growth, and they must be updated. Education and training systems will need 
reform to enable workers to move to more productive jobs, with greater ease and 
to greater proﬁ t. Europeans are still less likely to move than people in other parts 
of the world, and the success of the Single Market for Services depends on their 
becoming more mobile. Much more can be done to make Europe a global—not 
just a regional—magnet for talented people. To do all this, Europe’s policymakers 
will have to convince themselves and their constituents that the rewards of hard 
work can be shared sensibly without treating labor as a lump.
The European work model
If a “European work model” exists, it likely features structures that grant greater 
power and protection to workers and greater importance to security, possibly at a 
cost to entrepreneurial risk-taking and individual enterprise. Because any “model” 
is likely to reﬂ ect social norms or values, microdata from the European Values 
Survey and World Values Survey can be used to examine attitudes toward work. 
Country-level indicators constructed by the OECD in Paris and the Institute for the 
Study of Labor in Bonn can also be used to capture structural differences in labor 
markets and to try to categorize European countries and their non-European 
peers into work-model types.
Attitudes and values toward work
People who study social norms and preferences speak of “work centrality” in 
reference to the importance that work plays in a person’s life. In societies where 
work centrality is greater, work ethics rest on the belief that work is desirable 
and rewarding in its own right (Hirschfeld and Feild 2000). Economists focus 
analysis of work centrality on differences in working hours, and quite a bit has 
been written on the differences in hours worked between the United States and 
Europe. Some theorists relate the increased working hours in the United States 
to the long-standing cultural differences possibly rooted in America’s puritan 
Calvinist heritage: “New England’s Puritan settlers avidly struck long-standing 
religious holidays off the calendar (including Christmas) and thereby increased 
their total work days signiﬁ cantly” (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2006, p. 46). 
However, Europeans actually worked longer hours than Americans up until the 
late 1960s.1 Blanchard (2004) asks whether the large decrease in hours worked in 
Europe should be interpreted as a growing preference for leisure as productivity 
increased, or as the result of increasing distortions, such as high taxes on work, 
early retirement programs, and so on.
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A large body of empirical research ﬁ nds that taxation (Rosen 1997; Prescott 
2004; Davis and Henrekson 2005), unionization and regulation (Alesina, 
Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2006), and individual preferences (Blanchard 2004) all 
lead to Europeans’ working fewer hours than people in other countries. When 
reasonable elasticity estimates are used, however, differences in tax rates and 
distortions explain only about half the discrepancy between hours worked in 
the United States and Europe.2 Attributing the fall in hours worked since the 
mid-1970s to increases in tax rates and regulation alone depends on unrealistic 
assumptions about utility and the strength of income and substitution effects 
(Blanchard 2004).
In Ireland, average hours worked per year fell from 2,140 in 1970, to 1,670 in 
2000 (25 percent), and during this period the Irish economy boomed, with major 
in-migration, an increase in labor participation rates, and low unemployment, 
together with a small increase in the average tax rate. Using this example, 
Blanchard (2004, p.9) argues that “a large part of the decrease in hours per 
capita over the last 30 years in Europe reﬂ ects … a choice that is likely to be 
made voluntarily by workers”. From analysis of 10 years of microdata from 
Germany, and country-level data from 12 OECD countries, Alesina, Glaeser, and 
Sacerdote (2006) conclude that “Europeans seem to be happy to work less and 
less. Whether they internalize the macroeconomic effects of working less, like 
relative shrinking of the size of their economies relative to emerging countries, 
or a decline in the relative prominence of Europe as an economic superpower, is 
of course a different matter” (p. 55).
Several researchers have looked at the relationship between work satisfaction 
and overall reported happiness. Clark (1997) argues that an understanding of job 
satisfaction provides “an additional route towards the understanding of certain 
important labour market behaviours,” and that job satisfaction is “… as close as 
we are likely to come to a proxy measure of utility at work” (p. 344). There is a 
strong positive correlation between job satisfaction and subjective measures of 
happiness, and a negative correlation between annual working hours and job 
satisfaction (r = –0.65, ﬁ gures 6.1 and 6.2). A large body of empirical research, 
Figure 6.1: Self-reported measures 
of happiness are positively 
associated with job satisfaction
Figure 6.2: People who work fewer hours 
report higher levels of job satisfaction
Source: Torgler 2011, based on European Values Survey and World Values Survey.
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for example, shows a strong link between low job satisfaction and quitting 
behavior, absenteeism, and lower work performance.3
A negative correlation (r = –0.47) between work and leisure preferences is 
reported by respondents to the European and World Values Surveys (ﬁ gure 6.3). 
Sweden is an outlier. Excluding Sweden strengthens the negative correlation 
(r = –0.75). The broader European neighborhood is different, with a positive 
correlation (r = 0.44) between the reported importance of work and leisure 
(ﬁ gure 6.4). Excluding Albania, the positive correlation increases signiﬁ cantly 
(r = 0.77). Somewhat counterintuitively, given the rising concern for a tradeoff 
between work and family life, the data show a strong and positive correlation 
between the importance of work and that of family centrality (r = 0.76), 
particularly in newer EU members and countries in the broader European 
neighborhood. There is a similarly positive—but a substantially smaller—
correlation (r = 0.37) for the wealthier countries of Western Europe.
Including a wider set of variables to control for individual, household, and other 
characteristics, regression analysis conducted for this report using the microdata 
from the European Values Survey and World Values Survey indicates that work 
centrality is signiﬁ cantly greater in the European Union’s newest members and 
further in Central and Eastern Europe. The results of this analysis are reported in 
annex 6.2.
Living in emerging Europe rather than in wealthy Western Europe increases 
the probability that work is viewed as very important by 5–7 percentage 
points (ﬁ gures 6.5 and 6.6). It also increases by around 10 percentage points 
the probability of strong agreement to the statement “Work should always 
come ﬁ rst.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, part-time workers (those who work less 
than 30 hours a week) are less likely to care more about work than full-time 
employees. Again not surprisingly, work is more central to the lives of the self-
employed than it is to full-time employees. Less in line with earlier research, 
though, analysis of the microdata shows not only a positive correlation between 
religious activity and work centrality but an observable impact of being 
Protestant (controlling for religiosity and church attendance) on extreme work 
Figure 6.3: In advanced Europe, 
a clearer tradeoff between 
preferences for work over leisure
Figure 6.4: In emerging Europe, a tradeoff 
between work and leisure is less apparent
Source: Torgler 2011, based on European Values Survey and World Values Survey.
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centrality (“work should always come ﬁ rst, even if it means less spare time”). 
Ideology is important: people who are “conservative” are more likely to rank 
work higher. By contrast, there is a negative correlation among income, level of 
education, and work centrality.4
Europe’s policies regulating work are distinct
Interest among academics and policymakers in identifying a European work 
model became apparent in the mid-1990s, as part of broader discussion of a 
“European social model” to combine economic growth with social cohesion. 
The European social model distinguished economic policy in Europe from that 
in the United States. In the early 2000s, identifying and promoting a European 
work model and European social model became an ofﬁ cial EU project, and the 
Lisbon Agenda was forged as a response to declining growth and increasing 
unemployment in Europe. The Lisbon objective was to make Europe “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy of the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion by 2010.”5
Since then, there have been several attempts to identify the components of the 
model—or models—that set work in Europe apart from that in other countries 
with similar economic and institutional development. The most prominent 
attempt examines indicators of labor market outcomes and poverty rates. 
Sapir (2005, p.1), for example, differentiates between the “Nordic” and “Anglo-
Saxon” models (“both efﬁ cient, but only the former manages to combine equity 
and efﬁ ciency”) and the “Continental” and “Mediterranean” models (“which 
together account for two-thirds of the GDP of the entire EU[25] and 90 per cent 
of the GDP of the [12-member] eurozone” that are “inefﬁ cient and 
unsustainable”).
Is there indeed a European model, or rather several distinct ones, and do the 
differences across work models matter for the functioning of the labor market? 
To answer this question, the OECD, European Union, and other European 
Figure 6.5: The importance of work 
is only weakly associated with the 
importance of family in the EU15
Figure 6.6: In emerging Europe, 
the importance of work and 
family are closely associated
Source: Torgler 2011, based on European Values Survey and World Values Survey.
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countries are mapped—using principal component analysis—into groups based 
on labor market policies (regulations, interventions, and institutions).6  These 
policies try to mitigate a tradeoff in the labor market between ﬂ exibility and 
security. Flexibility refers to the costs to ﬁ rms of hiring, maintaining, and 
ﬁ ring workers, which is determined by regulation (employment protection 
legislation, minimum wage, and maximum length of temporary contracts), 
interventions (the level of the tax wedge indicating the cost of hiring workers), 
and institutions (the bargaining power of workers, measured by union density). 
“Security” refers to the state’s ability to help workers manage labor market 
transitions and provide them with appropriate safety nets and work conditions 
(spending on employment assistance programs and social assistance, gross 
replacement rates of unemployment beneﬁ ts, unemployment beneﬁ t duration, 
and days of paid annual leave).
The principal component analysis yields four different groups of countries along 
the dimensions of ﬂ exibility and protection (ﬁ gure 6.7). Group 1 comprises 
countries with fairly high labor market ﬂ exibility and worker protection; group 2 
countries display low labor market ﬂ exibility but high worker protection; group 3 
countries have low labor market ﬂ exibility and offer little worker protection; and 
group 4 countries have high labor market ﬂ exibility but low worker protection.7
The groups that emerge indicate that there is a European work model, distinct 
from that of other OECD countries. Based on the extent of labor market 
regulation and the nature of interventions and institutions, all non-European 
OECD countries fall into group 4 (ﬂ exible labor markets but less generous safety 
nets and social assistance). 
Within Europe there is signiﬁ cant variation. The four models do not always 
coincide with geographic groupings within Europe, especially when considering 
a set of countries larger than wealthier Western Europe. That said, some 
Figure 6.7: Europe’s approach 
is distinct—but there are 
differences within Europe
(four work models, based on ﬂ exibility 
and protection, 2007)
Note: Classiﬁ cation is obtained through principal component analysis (see annex 1). Countries with 
highly ﬂ exible labor markets (higher values) are those with low employment protection legislation, 
low union density, low tax wedge, low minimum wages, and high maximum duration of temporary 
contracts; countries with high protection (higher values) are those with higher spending on 
“active” employment assistance programs, social assistance beneﬁ ts, high replacement rates of 
unemployment beneﬁ ts, long duration of unemployment beneﬁ ts, and annual leave. The value 0 
represents the average position in ﬂ exibility and protection across all countries in the sample.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data on labor regulation, interventions, and 
institutions from the Institute for the Study of Labor, OECD, and the World Bank. See annex 1 for more 
information.
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countries have managed to achieve both high labor market ﬂ exibility and high 
worker protection (group 1). Denmark’s ﬂ exicurity model is the most salient 
example, but Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom also fall 
into group 1. Most of the other EU15 countries, together with Norway, Slovenia, 
and Serbia, also provide signiﬁ cant worker protection, but their labor markets 
are fairly rigid (group 2). The majority of transition countries and Turkey are in 
group 3, with rigid labor markets and low worker protection. Some transition 
countries—most notably Georgia, but also Albania, Moldova, and Montenegro 
among others—can also be found in group 4, together with the non-European 
OECD countries.
In general, there seems to be a tradeoff between ﬂ exibility and protection in 
labor markets, with a negative correlation between ﬂ exibility and protection 
across countries. This correlation is even stronger when considering only 
high-income countries. As discussed above, there seems to be a split among 
high-income countries, with the EU15 countries concentrating in group 2 and 
the non-European OECD countries in group 4. This suggests that as incomes 
increase, countries gravitate toward one of two work models: one that forgoes 
ﬂ exibility or one that forgoes protection. In that sense, transition countries 
might embark on a path toward one of the two work models. Some already 
seem to have chosen—Georgia, for example, the high ﬂ exibility/low protection 
model, and Slovenia, the low ﬂ exibility/high protection model.
Similar policies can yield different results
Similar labor policies can lead to different outcomes. Efﬁ ciency is higher in 
countries with higher than median labor force participation rates and lower 
than average unemployment rates, youth unemployment rates, and long-term 
unemployment rates (table 6.1). Countries with structurally high labor force 
participation rates and low unemployment rates are considered efﬁ cient; all 
others, inefﬁ cient.8 Equity is measured by the Gini coefﬁ cient in consumption/
income.9 Labor market outcomes across countries can vary with different 
Table 6.1: Similar policies can lead to different outcomes
(labor market efﬁ ciency versus equity, 2007)
Low equity High equity
High “efficiency” in labor markets Canada, Estonia, Latvia, New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Australia, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden
Low “efficiency” in labor markets
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Lithuania, 
Macedonia FYR, Mexico, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Turkey
Armenia, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Republic of Korea, Poland, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Ukraine
Note: Color coding corresponds to the work models as deﬁ ned in ﬁ gure 6.7, based on labor market 
instruments and outcomes: purple (group 1); brown (group 2); yellow (group 3); and black (group 4). 
Equity classiﬁ cation is based on Gini coefﬁ cients for consumption and income and does not reﬂ ect 
equality in opportunities.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from the Institute for the Study of Labor, OECD, 
and the World Bank; and ILO 2010. See annex 6.1 for more information.
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instruments and institutions, especially in efﬁ ciency and equity. Countries that 
have a similar work model, as deﬁ ned above and indicated in the table by the 
color codes, can actually have very different labor market outcomes. 
What can we learn from this exercise? For wealthy countries, the tradeoff 
between equity and efﬁ ciency might be overstated. Many countries—the Nordic 
countries and Australia, Austria, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and Slovenia—
have achieved equity and efﬁ ciency. At the other extreme, many others achieve 
neither (table 6.1). As reasoned by Sapir (2005), the discussion of the “European 
social model” and of equity and efﬁ ciency in labor markets suggests that in some 
countries the current model may not be sustainable, and this report concurs. 
Given the current ﬁ scal and demographic pressures, models that underperform 
in efﬁ ciency have become unsustainable or will soon be. At the same time, many 
countries with efﬁ cient labor markets display low equity, among them many non-
European OECD countries such as the United States. 
The experience of some countries in Europe provides reason to believe that 
increasing labor market efﬁ ciency need not mean a big loss of equity. Countries 
with both equity and efﬁ ciency are among the richest in Europe. These countries 
arguably have strong institutions in place that cannot easily be replicated. In 
countries where institutions are not as mature, there might be a tradeoff between 
equity and efﬁ ciency. Europe is not left with many choices. 
More—and more productive—workers
Looking ahead, Europe will have to counter the aging and shrinking of its working-
age population by having workers work more, recruiting more workers from at 
home and abroad, and critically, making workers more productive by equipping 
them with the right skills for a competitive global economy. As outlined in the 
previous section, workers in Europe beneﬁ t from the most effective protection 
against abuse by employers and the most comprehensive job security and 
nonwage beneﬁ ts, such as unemployment insurance, paid leave, and retirement 
pensions, which sustain shorter work hours than in most of the developed world. 
In many ways, these characteristics set Europe apart from other regions and are 
a triumph of economic development and liberal democracy. But given changes in 
Europe and the rest of the world since the end of the continent’s “Golden Age” 
between 1950 and the mid-1970s (see spotlight one), and the speed of global 
economic integration since, many features of the European work model are 
coming under critical scrutiny. These challenges are exacerbated by a shrinking 
and aging labor force. This in turn reinforces the need to develop human capital 
that is relevant in a constantly changing labor market, especially among excluded 
groups, by rethinking education, training, and lifelong learning policies.
The decline of work
People in many countries are working less than they used to. As countries have 
grown richer, people have consumed more leisure, and the average number of 
hours worked in a year has declined in most middle- and high-income countries 
(ﬁ gure 6.8). Where this reduction in hours worked is matched by gains in 
productivity—the output of the average worker—the decline should be expected 
and treated as healthy, as in Ireland, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. Yet, the 
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speed of the decline in hours worked in France, Italy, and Spain since 1995 
raises concern when juxtaposed with their modest gains in labor productivity 
during the last two decades (ﬁ gure 6.9).
Several countries in Europe hold the dubious distinction of having rates of labor 
participation among the lowest in the world. This is a feature that marks both 
high- and middle-income countries in the region. The percentage of working-
age people who participate in the labor market has fallen at a faster pace in 
several large European economies than in other member countries of the OECD 
(ﬁ gure 6.10). In Europe’s southern periphery, a rare coincidence threatens future 
prosperity: women have low participation rates and low fertility, adding less to 
both today’s economic output and tomorrow’s. 
Figure 6.8: The decline in hours worked was 
faster in Europe than elsewhere in the OECD
(reported average hours worked per year, 
2008, 1990 = 100)
Figure 6.9: Europe has both 
productivity leaders and laggards
(GDP per hour of work, 2008, 1990 = 100)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the 
OECD Productivity Database.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on ILO 
2010.
Figure 6.10: The decline in work 
participation has been faster in Europe
(change in the labor force participation 
of men ages 15–64, percentage point 
difference 1980–2008)
Figure 6.11: Europeans are retiring 
at earlier ages than they used to
(change in the average effective 
retirement age of men, number of years 
difference 1965–2007)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WDI. Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on 
updated data from OECD 2006.
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Europeans have also been withdrawing from the labor market to retire at a 
much earlier age than previously (ﬁ gure 6.11). In France and Spain, for example, 
the effective age of retirement of men has fallen about twice as much as it 
has in Canada, Japan, and the United States. With the notable exception of the 
Czech Republic and Germany, where workers are staying active a bit longer 
than they used to, the trend in Europe is toward earlier retirement, despite 
efforts of governments in many countries to make qualifying for pensions more 
difﬁ cult. This contrasts with the gentler decline in the effective retirement age 
of workers in the United States, and sharply with the relative stability in the age 
of retirement in high-income East Asian countries. Men in the Republic of 
Korea, for example, are actually working almost six years longer than they 
were in 1965.
The decline of populations
The countries covered in this report—EU countries, EFTA countries, EU candidate 
countries, and EU eastern partnership countries—will lose 50 million workers 
between now and 2060.10 Today, the European labor force—employed and 
active job seekers—consists of 323 million people; in 50 years, it will be down 
to 273 million, a decrease of 15 percent. Over the next 20 years, the labor force 
will decrease by 15 million (5 percent). The younger labor force—below the age 
of 40—will shrink substantially during the 2020s. After 2030, the decline of the 
European labor force will happen among workers over 40 and gradually slow 
down. The largest crunch will happen during the 2030s: in that decade alone, 
the European labor force will fall an additional 14 million people, though mainly 
among those age 40 or older (ﬁ gure 6.12). 
The European Union has been facing an aging crisis since the “baby boom” 
generation that was born between 1945 and 1960 began retiring in 2005. The 
largest population cohort, “Generation X,” born between 1960 and 1970, will 
approach retirement age over the next 15 years. Generation X will start to retire 
in the 2020s, but thereafter, ever-smaller cohorts of young people will follow, 
pushing what experts call the “old-age dependency ratio” rapidly downward, so 
that by 2050 in some European countries there will only be two people working 
for every person receiving a retirement pension.
Figure 6.12: The big reduction in 
the number of young European 
workers will happen before 2030
(projected changes in labor force, by 
age group and period, millions)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the methodology 
described in Koettl 2009; and data from UN 2011.
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The decrease in labor force participation varies considerably across European 
countries. The main reason is that fertility rates in Europe range from around 
1.2 to 1.5 in the Eastern, Central, and Southern European countries, to 1.6 to 
2.0 in the Benelux and Northern European countries. This is lower than the 
demographic replacement rate of 2.1 required to keep the size of the population 
stable.
The fall in the labor force will be particularly severe for EU and EFTA countries. 
Their labor force will decrease by 39 million people (18 percent) over the next 
50 years. The other Eastern European countries do not fare much better, with 
an equally steep decline of 16 percent. The only exception is Turkey, where the 
labor force is projected to increase 12 percent until 2060.
The natural consequence of falling fertility and rising longevity is an increase in 
the old-age dependency ratio—the number of people older than 65 relative to 
those of working age (15–64). By 2050, this ratio will double to about 50 percent 
in Europe, with Spain (68), Italy (66), and Portugal (58) projected to have the 
highest ratios (Muenz 2007). The projected changes in Europe—especially 
Southern and Eastern Europe—contrast with trends south of the Mediterranean, 
where the population is still fairly young (ﬁ gure 6.13). These trends are seen as 
complementary and fortunate by some but as a potential threat by others.
Figure 6.13: Aging in Europe 
is matched by a “surplus” of 
working-age people in the 
Middle East and North Africa
(population pyramid 
Europe, Middle East and 
North Africa, years)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the methodology described in Koettl 2009; and data 
from UN 2011.
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Improving Europe’s demographic mathematics
Can Europe overturn these trends without increased immigration? Only with 
radical policy and behavioral changes could Europe counter the shrinking 
labor force. Yet, even under optimistic conditions, Europe would not be 
able to prevent the aging of its labor force. First, if participation rates in all 
countries were to converge to those seen in Northern Europe or, second, if the 
retirement age were to increase by 10 years across the board, the European 
labor force would actually increase by 2060 (by 5 percent and 2 percent, 
respectively; ﬁ gure 6.14). In a third scenario, if female labor force participation 
were to converge to that of men, the labor force would still decrease, but 
only by 5 percent, as opposed to 15 percent in the baseline scenario. None 
of these scenarios counteracts the loss of young workers due to continually 
decreasing younger-age cohorts. Under all four scenarios—including the 
combined maximum scenario—the labor force below age 40 will shrink. In other 
words, the only large pool of potential additional workers—apart from new 
immigrants—that Europe could draw from in the future is among the elderly 
(ages 65 and older).
The potential to reverse the shrinking of the European labor force therefore 
hinges on young, populous countries like Turkey. In fact, in the four scenarios, 
Turkey would contribute up to 40 percent of any gains in the size of the 
European labor force and almost all of the younger workers. Without Turkey, 
European countries would not be able to prevent the labor force from shrinking 
under any of the scenarios.
Improving incentives for work
Given the low participation rates in many European countries, there is room 
to improve and to stem some of the decline of the European labor force. To 
encourage people to participate, incentives for work must be aligned to ensure 
that work pays for both the employee and the employer. This could require, 
among other policy reforms, signiﬁ cant changes on labor taxation and social 
beneﬁ t design. 
Women constitute 50 percent of the working-age population, and given that 
they are increasingly more educated—more than men among younger 
Figure 6.14: To keep the size of the 
labor force stable, Europeans have to 
work longer and more productively, 
but a demographic deﬁ cit of young 
people will probably persist
(change in European labor force 
between 2010 and 2060 by scenario 
and age group in millions)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the methodology described in Koettl 2009; and data 
from UN 2011.
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cohorts—they represent a large pool of untapped talent. Even if their entry into 
the market in larger numbers does not produce the payoff in additional workers 
that increasing the retirement age does, it could have a large productivity 
payoff. Increasing female labor force participation would require interventions 
that allow women to better juggle multiple roles by providing, for example, 
child care facilities and ﬂ exible work arrangements (World Bank 2011e). The 
latter might also play an important role for keeping elderly workers in the labor 
force by allowing them to phase in retirement on a part-time basis.
To increase labor force participation across the board, both employees and 
employers need the right incentives. Currently, it seems that disincentives 
for (formal) work are substantial in many European countries, especially for 
low-productivity workers. For example, Koettl and Weber (forthcoming) show 
that when comparing formal jobs with informal jobs, the beneﬁ ts of formal 
jobs would have to be quite large to offset their costs in terms of taxes, social 
security contributions, and withdrawn social beneﬁ ts. A similar result might 
hold for a comparison between formal jobs and inactivity. This leads to the 
conclusion that formal (part-time) jobs at low wage levels may not be an 
economically viable option for low-productivity job seekers in many European 
countries. For employers, high labor taxation has similar implications as it 
increases the total costs of labor and makes it less attractive to hire (see also 
chapter 7 on labor and corporate income taxation). A microeconometric analysis 
using EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions data suggests that there is 
a negative correlation between the incidence of formal employment and work 
disincentives at the individual level.
Two main levers can make (formal) work pay for low-productivity workers 
and their employers: decreasing the labor tax wedge at lower wage levels 
and “smoothing” incentives with changes to social assistance, housing, and 
family beneﬁ ts. Regarding the tax wedge, current social protection ﬁ nancing 
in several countries discriminates against lower-wage earners. Options for 
reducing the labor tax wedge include incentives linked to wage subsidies, 
social insurance contribution credits, or so-called “in-work” or employment-
conditional beneﬁ ts—cash beneﬁ ts or refundable income tax credits conditional 
on formal employment—for low-wage earners. With regard to the design of 
social assistance, housing, and family beneﬁ ts, the key is to keep the marginal 
effective tax rate in mind when designing eligibility conditions and the ways 
that beneﬁ ts are withdrawn. The goal is to reform these beneﬁ ts toward so-
called “smart safety nets,” making social protection beneﬁ ts more compatible 
with work. In particular, any additional wage should also increase beneﬁ ciaries’ 
net incomes, including beneﬁ ts. Otherwise, additional work does not pay, and 
beneﬁ ciaries will prefer not to work at all, to work informally, or to underreport 
their earnings.11
Developing skills
Besides getting more people to work, Europe will have to enable workers to 
contribute at their highest potential. Doing so requires continual reform of 
education and training systems.
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, skills are critical for innovation and ﬁ rms’ 
growth. Recent studies from OECD and developing countries spotlight the 
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importance of skills—cognitive, socioemotional, technical—in determining 
productivity. For example, Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) have shown that 
cognitive skills (proxied by Programme for International Student Assessment 
scores) explain a sizable part of the variation in growth rates observed in 
OECD countries, including Western Europe.12 In fact, the evidence suggests 
that generic skills also have substantial growth payoffs, even in advanced 
economies. Unsurprisingly, skills are at the center of the policy agenda of 
the European Union and Europe at large, as reﬂ ected in the European Union’s 
growth strategies (Lisbon Agenda, Europe 2020) and numerous strategic and 
policy documents (European Commission 2010b; Sondergaard and Murthi 2011).
Skills include not only technical ability, but also generic cognitive skills (literacy, 
numeracy, problem solving) and generic noncognitive skills (socioemotional 
and behavioral attributes such as teamwork, self-discipline, and perseverance). 
A solid base of generic skills seems to be a prerequisite for further acquisition 
of technical skills, whether through post-secondary education or on the job.13 
Figure 6.15: Better-educated 
people are more likely to 
participate in the labor market
(percentage point difference in labor 
force participation rates between 
those with tertiary education and 
those with less than upper secondary 
education, 2010)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 6.16: Skills are an 
important constraint for many 
ﬁ rms in emerging Europe
(distribution of ﬁ rms that consider 
skills to be a major or very severe 
constraint, 2008)
Source: Sondergaard and Murthi 2011.
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Further, the foundation for the development of generic skills is built early in 
life and during adolescence and hinges on having access to adequate nutrition, 
nurturing environments, and high-quality basic education (World Bank 2011b). 
Efforts by the OECD and the World Bank to measure the availability of and 
demand for cognitive and noncognitive skills are underway.14
Skills not only matter for economywide productivity but also individual 
labor market outcomes. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) document the 
evidence for the United States, while Brunello and Schlotter (2011) review the 
emerging literature for Western Europe. Differences in labor force participation 
rates between those with tertiary education and those with less than upper 
secondary education range from about 8 percentage points in Iceland to 
28 percentage points in Turkey (ﬁ gure 6.15). In other words, in Turkey the 
higher-educated are 28 percent more likely to participate than those with 
lower education. This could be of particular importance for excluded groups. In 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia, the share of the Roma working-age population 
with at least some secondary education is 60 percentage points lower than 
that of the non-Roma. Not surprisingly, there are also signiﬁ cant gaps in the 
labor force participation of the two groups, especially among women. In some 
countries, the Roma could be a quarter of labor market entrants in the near 
future. Helping them become more productive is not only a matter of social 
inclusion, it could also increase economic growth (World Bank 2010).
Firm surveys show that skills have in recent years become increasingly binding 
for productivity and job creation in emerging Europe. Skilled-labor shortages 
have become the second-most commonly reported constraint to growth in the 
enterprise surveys across all countries in Eastern Europe, behind only tax rates 
(Sondergaard and Murthi 2011). On average, 30 percent of ﬁ rms considered 
education and skills to be a major or severe constraint in 2008 (ﬁ gure 6.16). 
Upwards of 40 percent of ﬁ rms were dissatisﬁ ed with the availability of skilled 
workers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine. These 
surveys have found that in addition to technical skills, the lack of noncognitive 
generic skills appears especially binding (World Bank 2009 and Rutkowski 2010). 
Also in OECD countries and some middle-income countries, noncognitive skills 
are as important as cognitive and technical skills in ﬁ rms’ hiring decisions.15
Despite overall success in increasing student enrollment, the quality of 
education needs to be improved. The picture of education quality in Europe is 
diverse. Outcomes—as measured by the Programme for International Student 
Assessment—appear particularly poor in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and 
Romania, which have students in early grades that underperform relative to 
the country’s level of development (ﬁ gure 6.17). For another group of countries 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and FYR Macedonia), the performance in 
cognitive tests worsened between 2006 and 2009. Worrisome for labor market 
outcomes, upper secondary and tertiary education students may be graduating 
with the wrong skill sets (Sondergaard and Murthi 2011). There is evidence that 
after the transition, the obsolescence of technical skills was not addressed 
and that vocational education systems have not performed well. As a result, 
employers today often assert that it is difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd graduates with adequate 
technical skills.
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Effective policy interventions can address many of these problems. As 
discussed in a recent World Bank report, interventions should focus on 
overcoming failures in information and quality assurance. Countries in emerging 
Europe have to reorganize their school networks to deal with shrinking student 
populations. Countries should also rethink their training and education systems 
to avoid specialization in narrow (technical) ﬁ elds too early in a student’s career. 
Countries should also ensure that preschool and basic education curricula and 
pedagogic practice pay adequate attention to the development of cognitive 
and noncognitive skills. The experience with related reforms and interventions 
in Europe and the rest of the world can offer useful lessons. Lifelong learning 
will become increasingly important given the demographic trends (Chawla, 
Betcherman, and Banerji 2007; European Commission 2006). In short, it is the 
formation of the right skills rather than diplomas that should be the focus of 
reforms (Sondergaard and Murthi 2011). To that end, more information is needed 
on the learning and employment outcomes of students and graduates.
Making jobs more contestable
Economists view competition much like most people view exercise. At some 
abstract level, we all know it is good for us, but go to surprising lengths to avoid 
it. Economic agents—individuals or enterprises—are constantly hunting for an 
opportunity to monopolize a market. Just as we accept that exercise is a good 
thing, paying ever-higher fees to go to the gym and be put through a punishing 
workout by a personal trainer, as taxpayers we ﬁ nance government agencies 
to eliminate uncompetitive practices. The rationale for the government’s 
role in the labor market is much the same: to protect workers from a lack of 
competition among employers for their labor and human capital.
Figure 6.17: Cognitive skills are 
adequate in most European countries
(reading competency of 15-year-olds 
on the Programme for International 
Student Assessment 2009 
versus income)
Note: The ﬁ gure shows a log-linear regression line representing countries’ predicted reading score 
in the Programme for International Student Assessment on their GDP per capita. The blue line is the 
OECD mean reading score.
Source: Sondergaard and Murthi 2011.
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Yet, these policies are from a time in Europe’s history when large-scale 
manufacturing dominated economies, and a few (and in some places even 
single) employers could set the price of labor and manage their human 
resources with impunity. Images come to mind of the abuses in Victorian-era 
Britain, where workers toiled for 14-hour shifts and could be dismissed at the 
employer’s whim. The balance of information and power between those who 
seek jobs and those who offer them has shifted considerably in the decades 
since. And along with this shift, the changing economic structure of most 
European countries—away from large-scale industry toward varied services—
has made the labor market more “atomistic.” As more and more services 
become tradable (see chapter 2), it is harder for employers and workers to 
avoid competition.
But labor market policy has not kept up with these changes. The policies 
prevalent in Europe—and parts of the world that Europeans trade and compete 
with—make its labor markets more difﬁ cult to contest, especially for new, 
younger entrants. This lack of contestability may discourage some from 
entering the labor market at all, impede the efforts of others to match up 
with employers who could most beneﬁ t from their skills and attitudes, and 
increase the incidence and duration of unemployment. Recent evidence shows 
that in countries where the labor market is less contestable—especially due 
to restrictions on dismissal—individuals and ﬁ rms are more likely to take their 
activities into the shadows of unregulated and untaxed markets, depriving the 
state and society of public goods and holding back economies from fulﬁ lling 
their growth potential.
Box 6.1: Is a ﬂ exible labor market necessary for successful monetary union?
For some countries, the last few years has 
been difﬁ cult, being part of a currency 
union during, particularly one as large and 
economically diverse as the eurozone. 
Depreciation could have come in handy, as it 
did in the Czech Republic and Poland. But for 
euro area members and those with currencies 
pegged to the euro, this was not an option. 
For the few such as Latvia that made it easier 
to adjust wages downward, being linked to a 
strong currency was less of a problem.
The 2008 crisis and contraction put these 
strains into sharp relief. But tensions had 
been growing long before. Differences in real 
unit labor costs (RULCs) between euro area 
members have persisted since the start of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, widening 
during the crisis. RULCs reﬂ ect prices and 
nominal labor costs, and on both indicators 
euro area members have diverged. This is 
most noticeable in shifts in nominal unit labor 
costs since 2003: while in Germany the growth 
rate in nominal unit labor costs has been well 
below the euro area average, reﬂ ecting a 
stronger wage discipline, in Greece, Ireland, 
and Spain nominal unit labor costs have 
increased noticeably compared with the 
average.
Widening or persisting differentials in RULCs 
are at odds with the expectation that adopting 
a common currency—and hence a common 
anchor for inﬂ ation—should have facilitated 
convergence in prices and wages across euro 
area countries, narrowing growth differentials 
in RULCs. Three reasons seem to explain the 
divergence: 
• Technological factors, with capital 
accumulation and increases in the price of 
intermediates both leading to higher growth 
in RULCs. This would be consistent with 
capital and labor not being easy substitutes. 
• External factors, captured for example 
by the degree of openness, leading to 
downward pressure on RULCs due to 
both the disciplining effect on wage 
increases and the positive impact on labor 
productivity as a result of more access to 
new technologies and markets. 
• Institutional factors, reﬂ ecting the degree of 
competition in product and labor markets. 
Higher replacement rates in unemployment 
beneﬁ ts and wage bargaining centralization 
are associated with higher RULCs as 
they strengthen the bargaining power of 
workers; stringent labor regulations for 
hiring and ﬁ ring workers could be associated 
with lower RULCs because they come with 
lower employment.
Since the divergence in labor costs across euro 
area members is partly the result of structural 
differences in the labor and product markets, 
better policy and institutional alignment could 
reduce the gaps. With a single currency and low 
inﬂ ation, closing the gaps in RULC growth can 
be painful, requiring wage cuts and possible 
unemployment increases. A smaller gap is 
needed for lagging countries to be competitive 
within the eurozone; given Europe’s increasing 
integration with the global economy, to remain 
competitive the convergence in RULCs will have 
to be downward.
Source: Based on Lebrun and Pérez 2011.
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Does it matter if Europe’s labor markets are inﬂ exible and uncontestable? The 
broad divergence in the speed with which employment rates are recovering 
in the wake of the global ﬁ nancial crisis and recession suggests that it does. In 
countries that forgo the macroeconomic shock absorber offered by a ﬂ exible 
exchange rate (that is, all current euro area members and those preparing to 
join by tying their currencies to the euro), the impact of a sudden fall in demand 
on the product and labor markets can be mitigated if wages are allowed to fall, 
hours are ﬂ exible, and workers at the margin can be dismissed (World Bank 
2011c; box 6.1).
When examining the relationship between labor market structures and 
outcomes, it is helpful to distinguish between regulations, interventions, and 
institutions. Regulations set work’s legal parameters, in the form of a minimum 
wage and/or restrictions on dismissal. The state deploys interventions to correct 
market failures, such as the inability of private ﬁ nancial markets to viably insure 
the risk of unemployment (unemployment insurance) and differences in how 
much information employers and job seekers have (job-seeking assistance). 
Institutions are the structures and agreed procedures for exerting inﬂ uence 
and carrying out decisions. For the labor market, the best example is the space 
afforded in the legal code of most countries for collective bargaining through 
labor unions. 
Hiring and fi ring workers is costly
A legislated minimum wage increases labor costs for ﬁ rms and can dissuade 
them from offering employment to workers whose marginal productivity 
does not exceed the minimum. This effect will be stronger for workers with 
lower productivity, especially younger, unskilled, less experienced workers 
(Montenegro and Pagés 2005). Priced out of jobs on the formal (regulated 
and taxed) market for labor, they can join those genuinely unemployed, take 
an informal (unregulated and untaxed) job, or pretend to look for a job while 
Figure 6.18: Minimum wages 
in the newest EU member 
countries are increasing faster
(level and growth, 2000-07)
Note: Dark blue bars represent Western Europe, and light blue emerging European economies.
Source: Fialová and Schneider 2011.
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working informally. But a minimum wage might also motivate workers to 
increase productivity or persuade job seekers and some outside the labor 
market to hold out for a job on the formal market, even if plenty of informal 
employment is on offer (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995; Manning 1995).
All new members of the European Union introduced legislated minimum 
wages. Although several older members do not have legally binding minimum 
wages, an effective minimum wage is secured through the collective 
bargaining process in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden. 
Generally, legislated minimum wages in the European Union’s new members 
are considerably lower than the legislated or effective minimum wages in the 
older member states. Over the past decade, however, these have been on a 
clear upward trend. Since 2000, the minimum wage as a percentage of average 
wages has risen fastest in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (ﬁ gure 6.18).
A second common set of labor laws, employment protection legislation 
(EPL), restricts employers’ ability to dismiss workers—reducing ﬂ ows into 
unemployment but also out of it. Strict EPL can slow new employment if 
restrictions on dismissing workers make employers wary of hiring someone new. 
For this reason, restrictions on dismissal can increase unemployment, the duration 
of unemployment, and the attraction of ﬁ xed-term contracts. Past a certain 
threshold, it can even cause employers to turn to the untaxed, unregulated 
labor market. Beyond affecting ﬂ ows into and out of employment, EPL creates 
an “insider-outsider” divide. Those who have a protected job (“insiders”) are 
relatively guarded from losing it, while the inactive and unemployed (“outsiders”) 
ﬁ nd it more difﬁ cult to gain employment. EPL changes the distribution of jobs, 
with important implications for ﬁ rst-time job seekers, youth (especially), women, 
the disabled, and other disadvantaged groups.
Using the OECD’s measure of the strictness of employment protection 
(OECD 1999, OECD 2004, and Venn 2009)—and its application by Lehmann 
and Muravyev (2010) to non-OECD European countries—the least restrictive 
conditions for employers are in Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, and the Slovak 
Figure 6.19: Employment protection 
is converging through liberalization 
in more rigid labor markets
(level and change, 1999-2007)
Note: Dark blue bars represent Western Europe, and light blue emerging European economies.
Source: Fialová and Schneider 2011.
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Republic. France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain have the most restrictive regulations. 
In Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and the Slovak Republic, employment protection 
has been noticeably relaxed. Partly, this relaxation has come in the form of more 
temporary contracts, especially in Italy and Spain (box 6.2). But over the same 
period, Hungary, Ireland, and Poland have tightened their EPL. EPL in the European 
Union’s newest member states is lower than in the older members, but there has 
been convergence driven both by liberalization in parts of the west and growing 
restrictions among members in the east (ﬁ gure 6.19). Lithuania and Slovenia had 
the most restrictive legislation, though Slovenia has liberalized recently. Romania, 
by contrast, recently tightened its EPL and, after Portugal and Spain, now has the 
most restrictive regulation.
Box 6.2: Do temporary contracts make labor markets ﬂ exible?
During the past decades, employment 
protection legislation (EPL) reform in Europe 
was mostly “partial” or “two-tier.” In the mid-
1980s, several European countries, with high 
levels of EPL, introduced temporary contracts to 
increase labor market ﬂ exibility. Many countries 
deregulated the use of temporary contracts 
substantially but maintained strict protection for 
permanent ones. There is substantial evidence 
on these reforms, based largely on the Spanish 
experience (Dolado, García-Serrano, and Jimeno 
2002; Bentolila, Dolado, and Jimeno 2008). 
Because temporary contracts involve much 
lower ﬁ ring costs, both in severance payments 
and legal costs, their incidence increased 
signiﬁ cantly.
Spain is a good example of labor market 
dualism, with the highest incidence of 
temporary contracts. In 1984, a two-tier 
EPL reform liberalized the use of temporary 
contracts. Spain registered the most rapid 
growth in temporary jobs, from 11 percent of 
total employment in 1983 to about 35 percent 
in 1995 (Güell and Petrongolo 2007). But Spain 
is far from unique. According to the European 
Commission (2010a), EU member states that 
introduced two-tier EPL reforms have seen 
an increase in temporary employment since 
the mid-1980s. Countries with relatively less 
stringent regulations for permanent contracts—
like Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—
do not show any trend increase in the incidence 
of temporary employment.
Temporary contracts affect young workers 
more. In most EU member states, 40 percent 
of young people (ages 15–39) are on temporary 
contracts, especially among those under 
25 years of age. The share of temporary 
employment among workers in the 15-to-24 
age group ranges from more than 50 percent 
in countries like France, Germany, Poland, 
Slovenia, and Spain to less than 20 percent in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, and the United 
Kingdom. 
Temporary contracts have both positive 
and adverse effects. They can help ﬁ rms to 
evaluate workers’ suitability for jobs. In that 
sense, temporary jobs could act as a stepping 
stone to more stable jobs. Temporary contracts 
could also act as a shock absorber, protecting 
ﬁ rms from temporary demand ﬂ uctuations by 
avoiding costly adjustments to their core labor 
force. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and Boeri 
(2011) show that the “ﬂ exibility at the margin” 
provided by temporary contracts increases both 
hiring and ﬁ ring rates for newly created jobs, as 
ﬁ rms try to restrict ﬁ ring costs through reduced 
conversion. Of course, temporary contracts can 
be an easy way for ﬁ rms to reduce labor costs, 
substituting temporary for permanent workers 
(Layard 2005). 
Temporary contracts can help make labor 
markets more dynamic. Two-tier EPL reforms 
have dramatically raised the proportion of new 
recruitments of temporary contracts (Cahuc 
and Postel-Vinay 2002). Bover and Gómez 
(2004) found that in Spain, exit rates from 
unemployment into temporary contracts were 
10 times larger than exit rates into permanent 
ones between 1987 and 1994. 
Using a sample of large Spanish ﬁ rms in 
1993–94, García-Serrano (1998) found that 
turnover rates varied by type of employment 
contract. In particular, a rise of one percentage 
point in the share of temporary employment 
increased ﬂ ows from employment to 
unemployment, unemployment to employment, 
and employment to employment by 0.26 
percentage points. Bentolila, Dolado, and 
Jimeno (2008) found that, insofar as the use of 
temporary contracts implies a rise in the hiring 
rate, they have helped decrease long-term 
unemployment, especially in periods of high 
growth. 
Despite helping to create labor market 
dynamism and employment, temporary 
contracts can adversely affect productivity 
and investment in skills. Greater turnover and 
low conversion rates can reduce incentives to 
invest in ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c human capital (Dolado, 
García-Serrano, and Jimeno 2002; Bentolila, 
Dolado, and Jimeno 2008). Güell and Petrongolo 
(2007) argue that the negative impact of 
temporary work on vocational training depends 
on whether temporary contracts are used 
mainly to lower wage costs or to screen for 
entry-level jobs. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) 
found that the share of temporary workers in 
Italy has a large negative impact on ﬁ rm-level 
productivity growth. The authors argue that 
rising employment, in the aftermath of two-tier 
EPL reforms, led to falling labor productivity 
through decreasing marginal returns for labor.
In conclusion, the Spanish experience is mixed. 
It suggests that the two-tier EPL reform led to 
an increase in worker turnover, and a reduction 
in long-term unemployment. But it also is 
associated with a fall in investment in ﬁ rm-
speciﬁ c human capital and productivity.
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Figure 6.20: The wedge created by 
income taxes and social insurance 
contributions is highest in Italy
(average personal income tax and 
social security contributions)
Note: Social security includes both employee and employer contributions. Dark blue bars represent 
Western Europe, and light blue emerging European economies.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the OECD Tax Database.
Figure 6.21: Labor costs have 
been rising quickly in the EU’s 
newer members
(average hourly labor costs, 
calculated as cost of labor divided 
by hours worked)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat.
Figure 6.22: In Emerging Europe, 
the tax wedge for lowest-wage 
earners tends to be high
(wage level at which tax wedge is 
binding, percent of average wage)
Note: The scatter plot depicts the wage level where the tax wedge starts to increase (x-axis) versus 
the tax wedge at 1 percent of average wages (y-axis). Hungary, the Netherlands, and Serbia feature 
falling tax wedges at low-wage levels and are not depicted, just like Bulgaria, which has a ﬂ at tax 
wedge. Austria, Belgium, and Canada have partly negative tax wedges at low wage levels, especially 
for families, and Canada is excluded. The new member state countries of Eastern Europe are in light 
blue.
Source: Koettl and Weber forthcoming.
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Labor market interventions—“active” labor market programs such as training 
and job search assistance, and “passive” unemployment beneﬁ ts such as 
unemployment insurance and other forms of social insurance—are common 
in the European Union, including the new member states. These interventions 
are typically ﬁ nanced directly through a tax on earnings. In much of Europe, 
the cost of these interventions raises the cost of labor, creating a “tax wedge” 
between what employers pay for work and what workers take home (ﬁ gure 
6.20). The largest component of the tax wedge comes as personal income 
tax and contributions to pensions and health insurance, but ﬁ nancing these 
interventions also adds to labor costs. A higher tax wedge contributes to 
higher labor costs in the formal sector and can dissuade employers from taking 
on workers or increase demand for informal ways of contracting workers 
(Davis and Henrekson 2005; ﬁ gure 6.21). Not only is the level of labor taxation 
important, but also how it progresses over income levels. In the new member 
states of Eastern Europe, labor taxation tends to be high on low-wage earners, 
potentially making it more difﬁ cult for them to work in the formal sector (ﬁ gure 
6.22). Moreover, the wage level at which labor taxes start to increase is also 
fairly high, making labor taxation less progressive in these countries.
When well designed and administered, such programs may improve labor 
market performance. Active programs that enhance skills or eliminate 
information asymmetries that delay or frustrate matching in the labor market 
should shorten the job search period. Active programs might lower the search 
and training costs of ﬁ rms and indirectly subsidize the creation of better jobs. 
Passive programs, such as unemployment beneﬁ ts, can remove the urgency of 
ﬁ nding a new job and improve the quality of matches. But the record of active 
programs is mixed at best, and if unemployment beneﬁ ts are overly generous 
or poorly designed, they can lower peoples’ motivation to look for and accept 
a job.
Finally, it is difﬁ cult to isolate institutions that impact only the labor market 
from those that also shape other social and economic interactions. One is 
especially relevant: collective bargaining as proxied by the strength of labor 
unions. The impact of labor unions is felt largely through the importance of 
minimum wages, EPL, and active and passive interventions already discussed 
Figure 6.23: In much of the 
European Union, membership in 
labor unions has been declining
(percentage of workers who belong to 
a labor union, 2000-07)
Note: Dark blue bars represent Western Europe, and light blue emerging European economies.
Source: Fialová and Schneider 2011.
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(ﬁ gure 6.23). But strong labor unions can shape the labor market beyond the 
direct impact of regulation and interventions. For example, even where the 
share of the total labor force that is unionized is small, it may be high in the 
public administration and the provision of essential services including education, 
health, and transportation. The labor code in some countries even augments 
collective bargaining and the power of unions: the salaries and beneﬁ ts that 
unions succeed in negotiating for their members become binding for others in 
regulated employment, whether they are members or not.16
Work is being pushed out of (regulated) markets
Taxes and regulations can create incentives for people to consume more 
“own-provided” services at home and for workers and employers to transact 
“in the shadow” on the unregulated and untaxed market (Rosen 1997; Davis 
and Henrekson 2005). The likelihood that they will transact informally increases 
where a government’s capacity to enforce regulation is low. Conventional 
textbook models show how restrictions on ﬁ ring, a relatively high minimum 
wage, and the taxes on labor that ﬁ nance active and passive assistance 
programs can segment insiders who beneﬁ t from the labor code from outsiders 
who cannot. Less conventionally, in countries where governments fail to 
provide or sustain high-quality services, employers and workers can become 
disenchanted with complex labor regulation and consider taxes and compliance 
efforts not worthwhile. There is evidence that high taxes increase nonmarket 
or home production of services in Northern Europe, and they push legal market 
activities into the informal market in the south (ﬁ gure 6.24). 
What helps, what hurts
Because there is no simple mapping between labor market outcomes and social 
protection policies, a more rigorous analysis of the links between the two is 
needed, controlling for country characteristics. Country-level data from the 
OECD, the Institute for the Study of Labor, the International Labour Organization, 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development can be used to 
assess how the institutions, regulations, and interventions discussed above are 
associated with the performance of Europe’s labor markets relative to those 
Figure 6.24: Informal 
self-employment is most 
prevalent in Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain
(unregulated, untaxed work, 
percentage of labor force)
Source: World Bank 2011a, based on Hazans 2011a.
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Figure 6.25: In Europe, active labor programs are 
associated with higher labor force participation
(percentage point change in the working-age population 
working or searching for a job: estimated impact of a unit 
change in statistically signiﬁ cant explanatory variables)
Figure 6.26: Rigid employment protection legislation 
is associated with lower employment rates
(percentage point change in employment rate: 
estimated impact of a unit change in statistically 
signiﬁ cant explanatory variables)
Note: Only coefﬁ cients signiﬁ cant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels are 
shown in the ﬁ gure. Full results and more information are available in annex 2.
Source: Fialová 2011.
Note: Only coefﬁ cients signiﬁ cant at the 1 percent and 5 percent 
levels are shown in the ﬁ gure. Full results and more information are 
available in annex 2.
Source: Fialová 2011.
Figure 6.27: Rigid laws and high taxes are associated with higher 
unemployment, active labor programs with lower unemployment
(percentage point change in unemployment and long-term unemployment rates: estimated 
impact of a unit change in statistically signiﬁ cant explanatory variables)
Change in unemployment Change in long-term unemployment
Note: Only coefﬁ cients signiﬁ cant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels are shown in the ﬁ gure. Full 
results and more information are available in annex 6.2.
Source: Fialová 2011.
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of other countries.17 This approach also complements the ﬁ rm-level analysis 
provided in chapter 4, focusing on country-level legal and institutional variables, 
which are not captured in that analysis. The cross-country analysis also 
complements microeconomic evidence at the individual level when analyzing 
disincentives for formal work originating in the tax and beneﬁ t system, as 
discussed in the subsection on work disincentives.
Fialová (2011) examines the impact of policies on four indicators of labor market 
performance: the activity rate (AR); employment rate (ER); unemployment rate 
(UR); and long-term unemployment rate (LTUR). This is done for three sets of 
countries: the European Union and other OECD members,18 the European Union,19 
and EU new member states, accession countries, and others in the European 
neighborhood (ﬁ gures 6.25–6.27).20
With regard to employment protection, stricter EPL is mostly associated with 
lower participation rates—except in Western Europe—and higher unemployment 
rates. Similarly, higher labor taxation is negatively correlated with labor force 
participation—with the exception of the new member states—and positively 
correlated with unemployment rates, though the latter result is less robust. High 
labor taxation, associated with long-term unemployment, appears to be a major 
problem in Europe. Overall, the strictness of EPL and high labor taxes lower the 
employment rate. 
Box 6.3: Denmark’s “ﬂ exicurity”: increasing contestability, the gentler way
Every year, about 20 percent of Danes 
lose their jobs. But they do not lose their 
incomes. Unemployment beneﬁ ts replace 
close to two-thirds of their earnings, and the 
government helps them ﬁ nd work. Flexicurity, 
the combination of ﬂ exibility for employers 
and income security for workers, has been 
in place since at least the 1970s, but it has 
evolved over time as the active component 
has been strengthened. And it seems to 
work well. Between 1995 and 2008, Danish 
unemployment rates averaged 4.9 percent, 
while the rest of the EU15 suffered rates close 
to 8.5 percent. Denmark has been getting a lot 
of attention among policymakers.
Danish employment laws have evolved 
from the “Gent system,” when labor and 
trade unions, not the government, paid 
unemployment beneﬁ ts. In the 1970s and 
1980s, unemployment rates remained high, 
while those without jobs got good incomes. 
The arrangements became too expensive 
and were reformed in the 1990s. The new 
approach is sometimes called the “Golden 
Triangle,” because it added both generous 
unemployment beneﬁ ts and active labor 
market programs to ﬂ exible hiring and ﬁ ring 
laws. 
• The ﬁ rst component, ﬂ exibility of ﬁ ring and 
hiring, remained practically unchanged. The 
OECD employment protection legislation 
index for Denmark fell from 2.4 in 1983 to 1.5 
in 2009; the OECD average is 1.9. Relatively 
ﬂ exible laws work in Denmark because the 
country has a history of self-regulation by 
employers and unions, going back to the 
“September Compromise” of 1899, which set 
rules for resolving labor disputes.
• The second part of the Danish model is 
unemployment insurance ﬁ nanced from 
contributions and taxes. Membership is 
voluntary, but it covers around 80 percent 
of the labor force. Beneﬁ ts last up to four 
years, and replacement rates cannot exceed 
90 percent of wages, capped currently at 
€2,173 a month. After four years of beneﬁ ts, 
recipients have to switch to social assistance, 
which means a reduction of between 20 and 
40 percent of their beneﬁ t income (Andersen 
and Svarer 2007). 
• The new system uses active labor market 
programs like job search assistance and 
training to nudge the unemployed back to 
work. The spending on these programs is 
sizable: out of €13 billion spent on labor 
market programs in 2010, about 75 percent 
was on active instruments. 
How well does ﬂ exicurity work? The 
unemployment rate dropped from 10 percent 
in 1993 to 3.3 percent in 2008. The incidence of 
long-term unemployment (being out of work 
for more than a year) decreased from a third 
of total unemployment in 1994 to a tenth in 
2009. Despite liberal ﬁ ring and hiring practices, 
employment has not ﬂ uctuated too much in 
response to output variability. All this is good. 
There are some qualiﬁ cations. First, though 
ofﬁ cial unemployment has fallen, there is a 
gap between actual unemployment (adding 
up the unemployed, those in “activation,” and 
early retirees) and ofﬁ cial statistics. Second, 
it is difﬁ cult to assess how much of the fall in 
unemployment is due to ﬂ exicurity on its own. 
Economic performance matters too: active 
labor policies are useless if the economy is not 
producing jobs. Finally, the already high ﬁ scal 
burden can become enormous in a protracted 
slowdown. The Danish model costs 4.5 percent 
of GDP in terms of active and passive labor 
market measures. And Denmark spent 2.6 
percent of GDP for labor market programs in 
2008 (a good year), compared with 1.4 percent 
for the OECD as a whole, 1.5 for Sweden, 2.2 for 
Finland, and 2.3 in the Netherlands. The Danes 
have ﬂ exicurity because of their history and 
can afford it in part due to high participation 
rates of 81 percent; the OECD average in 2009 
was 71 percent. Those wishing to learn from 
the Danes should note this. 
Source: Andersen and Svarer 2007; Bredgaard 
and Larsen 2007; Hansen 2010; OECD 2010. 
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Minimum wages are also negatively correlated with participation rates. This 
appears counterintuitive: the prospect of a higher wage should entice people 
into the market, not keep them out. But workers priced out of jobs as a result 
of minimum wages might be discouraged from further participating in the 
labor market—especially younger people and women. The minimum wage 
is also associated with higher unemployment rates—especially long-term 
unemployment rates—and lower employment rates.
Unionization is positively associated with participation in the labor market 
and employment rates, and seems to reduce long-term unemployment (in 
the European Union). Spending on active labor market programs is associated 
with higher rates of participation, lower unemployment rates, and higher 
employment rates. The relationship between the generosity of passive 
labor market programs and labor market outcomes appears more complex: 
while generosity tends to increase participation in Europe, it appears to 
have the opposite effect in non-European OECD countries. The generosity 
of unemployment beneﬁ ts is also associated with lower unemployment and 
higher employment in Europe.21 
Box 6.4: Germany’s Hartz reforms: modernizing social welfare and unemployment beneﬁ ts
Germany experienced high unemployment 
rates of almost 10 percent between 1993 and 
2004. By contrast, U.S. unemployment was 
about 5 percent. By 2004, almost 4.5 million 
Germans were unemployed according to the 
Federal Labor Agency. Less-skilled and older 
workers had higher unemployment rates; 
vocational school graduates and high school 
dropouts had unemployment rates of about 18 
percent. 
In February 2002, a commission suggested 
ways to modernize the labor market. 
Volkswagen’s personnel director Peter Hartz 
headed the commission, which comprised 
business executives, trade unionists, 
politicians, and scientists. No economists were 
invited to join. 
The commission proposed a three-part 
reform strategy: improve employment 
services and active labor market programs, 
reform unemployment and social assistance 
beneﬁ t programs, and foster employment by 
deregulating the labor market. 
The reforms were implemented between 
2003 and 2005. They modernized public 
employment services and social welfare 
centers, modiﬁ ed existing active labor 
programs, and introduced new active 
labor programs. The reforms changed the 
institutional and legal framework for the rights 
and responsibilities of the unemployed and the 
beneﬁ ciaries of social assistance. Employment 
protection was reduced for parts of the 
labor market.
• Public employment services and social 
welfare centers adopted results-based 
accountability and outsourced services 
through competition between public and 
private providers. Employment ofﬁ ces were 
(partly) merged with social welfare units 
and converted into centers that provided 
job search assistance, social services, and 
beneﬁ t payments.
• Unemployment and social beneﬁ t levels 
and duration were reduced. Eligibility for 
subsistence allowances was changed 
according to a person’s ability to work rather 
than previous history of contributions. 
Beneﬁ ts were cut if recipients did not meet 
their responsibilities. 
• Wage subsidies and start-up grants were 
provided to entrepreneurs. Jobs with 
reduced social security contributions were 
introduced (“midi-jobs”), and the regulations 
for jobs exempt from such contributions 
were reformed (“mini-jobs”). The objective 
was to lower the cost of hiring low-skilled 
workers.
Between January and October 2006, the 
number of claimants in jobs requiring social 
insurance contributions rose 47 percent. 
The number of claimants working part-time 
grew 30 percent, and the number in marginal 
employment (“mini-jobs”) rose 14 percent. 
Workers who had survived on low wages 
without income support could now supplement 
their incomes with Hartz IV beneﬁ ts. The 
reform of temporary work regulations 
increased employment in ﬁ xed-term jobs after 
the reform. But evaluations have found limited 
impact on mini-jobs.
The Hartz reforms helped reduce 
unemployment. Despite the crisis, Germany’s 
unemployment rate today is about 7.5 percent, 
lower than the U.S. rate of more than 8.5 
percent. Many of the newly introduced part-
time and temporary jobs have served as a 
bridge to regular jobs. But the reforms might 
also have reduced the income of low-wage 
earners, which has declined 16–22 percent over 
the last decade. Net real monthly income of 
workers in mini-jobs declined from €270 in 
2000 to €211 in 2010, while income of workers 
in midi-jobs declined from €835 to €705. This 
is mainly due to an increase in the number of 
people in temporary work and part-time jobs.
The reforms raise several questions. First, 
given the difﬁ culty of comprehensive labor 
reforms, does a partial liberalization targeted 
at some groups or sectors work? Second, 
do allowances in the labor code for more 
ﬂ exible forms of employment lead to a 
“two-tier” market and a legally sanctioned 
underclass of workers? Third, do ﬂ exible and 
temporary forms of employment serve as a 
step toward advancement, or are people who 
enter through a midi- or mini-job experience 
scarred in ways that limit their future 
options? Germany’s experience appears to be 
promising, but these doubts will be raised in 
countries that try to adopt strategies similar to 
the one proposed by the Hartz Commission. 
Source: Zimmermann 2007; Goethe Institut 
(2007); Goebel and Grabka (2011).
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When it comes to untaxed and unregulated work in the “shadow economy,” 
World Bank (2011a) found that when taking a country’s development into 
account, EPL is associated with larger shares of shadow economy in GDP and 
greater labor informality. In the southern members of the European Union, 
where EPL is the most restrictive, all but the highest educated new entrants to 
the labor market are restricted to part-time and informal work.
The need to keep EPL sensible is at the core of Denmark’s “ﬂ exicurity” model, 
which shifts protection away from jobs to the incomes of people who lose 
employment, with efforts to get them back to work through training, 
job-search assistance, and help with starting businesses (box 6.3). These 
“active” intervention measures seem to improve performance and lower 
informal employment in OECD member countries and Northern and Western 
EU member countries. Active programs also lower informal self-employment 
(Hazans 2011b; World Bank 2011a). Germany has been getting attention for its 
attempts to liberalize a section of its labor market and to motivate people with 
strong incentives to remain idle (people supported by unemployment and social 
assistance beneﬁ ts; box 6.4). Although Germany’s approach may be all that can 
realistically be achieved given the controversial nature of labor market reform, 
it has raised questions about the sustainability and welfare of what could be a 
working “underclass” in jobs with less protection and even lower wages, which 
are still subsidizing a relatively privileged class of tenured workers.
Labor mobility—the freedom forgone
There are many reasons why labor mobility matters for productivity and 
growth. A country with a more mobile labor force uses available resources 
more effectively and is more likely to better match its human capital to other 
factors—both those that are more ﬂ uid such as capital, and those that do not 
move at all such as land. Recent work indicates that labor mobility is critical 
for social cohesion and the improvement of welfare in lagging regions.22 When 
people move, they create links between places where economic activity is 
densely concentrated and those where it is not. These links become channels 
for resources that ﬂ ow back to peoples’ places of origin in the form of know-
how and remittances,  sustain the welfare of family members left behind, and 
Figure 6.28: Europeans 
are less mobile
(labor mobility, share of working age 
population that has moved, 2000-05)
Source: Bonin and others 2008; and OECD 2005 and 2007.
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lead to investments in locally appropriate enterprises. A mobile labor force 
can better adjust to shocks, and recover more quickly. Given the demographic 
outlook and the decline in the working-age population, increased labor mobility 
will be needed in Europe. And there is a lot of room for it. 
Europeans are less mobile
The European Union is the most integrated region in the world, and accordingly, 
migration between EU countries is higher than in other world regions. Europe’s 
aspiration, however, is more ambitious: a fully integrated labor market. Against 
this yardstick, Europe still falls short. By most measures, these differences are 
particularly great between the European Union and the United States (Ester 
and Krieger 2007, Eurofound 2006 and 2007, using Eurobarometer data 2005; 
ﬁ gure 6.28). In the former EU15, prior to enlargement in 2004 and 2007, only 
about 1 percent of the working-age population changed its country of residence 
in a given year. By contrast, until recently about 3 percent of the working-age 
population in the United States moved to a different state in a given year. In 
Australia, this ﬁ gure is 2 percent; in Canada, slightly less than 2 percent. Even in 
Russia, with its history of restrictions on peoples’ movement, mobility is 
1.7 percent. 
With a common language and fewer institutional differences, people in 
Australia, Canada, and the United States can move with greater ease than 
Europeans. Measures of movement between territories (at the Nomenclature 
of Territorial Units for Statistics 2 level) within EU countries change the picture 
considerably: about 21 percent of the EU population has lived in a territory 
or country other than where they were born. But even by this measure, 
labor mobility is still below that of the United States, where 32 percent of the 
population lives outside the state they were born in.23 About 2 percent of the 
Figure 6.29: Europeans—especially in 
the east—are less internally mobile
(internal migration, percentage of 
population, by size of area)
Note: Countries display differing internal migration rates, depending on the size of the unit of 
measurement. For example, internal migration measured at the village level (movements from one 
village to another) is much higher than migration measured across larger geographic areas, like 
districts or regions. The line represents the log trend.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Bell and Muhidin 2009; Eurostat; U.S. Census Bureau; 
and State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
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EU labor force was born in a member state different from their current state of 
residence; approximately 4 percent of the EU population have lived in another 
EU country at some point in their life; and 3 percent have lived in a country 
outside the European Union (Eurofound 2006).
Internal mobility is difﬁ cult to compare across countries because its 
measurement depends on the size of the measurement unit. If the 
measurement unit is small—for example, the municipality—the corresponding 
internal migration rate will be high, because many more people move across 
municipalities than between provinces. Plotting the average size of the unit 
of measurement (like region or district) against the corresponding internal 
migration rate controls for the size of administrative units (ﬁ gure 6.29). Applying 
a log trend, the exercise reveals that many European countries, especially the 
transition economies, have low labor mobility.
Table 6.2: Internationally, the Irish are the most mobile Europeans
(percentage of population, by type of mobility)
Local move Move in country Move inside the European Union
Ireland 44.5 18.8 14.5
Luxembourg 53.8 19.4 13.2
Cyprus 47.8 17.2 8.1
Denmark 62.6 36.2 7.5
Sweden 65.9 41.8 7.1
United Kingdoma 52.3 23.7 6.6
Finland 64.5 34.7 5.1
Germany 59.4 18.1 4.9
Belgium 59.6 13.0 4.5
Spain 46.6 9.9 4.5
Greece 34.7 16.4 4.4
Netherlands 55.0 21.6 4.4
Portugal 41.7 8.6 4.2
Austria 54.1 9.4 3.4
Malta 27.6 6.2 2.7
France 58.2 28.8 2.6
Latvia 44.2 22.5 2.0
Czech Republic 41.9 8.2 1.6
Italy 43.8 7.9 1.6
Slovenia 38.2 9.6 1.6
Slovak Republic 34.2 5.8 1.4
Estonia 50.5 23.4 1.1
Poland 40.6 7.1 1.0
Hungary 47.5 9.9 0.7
Latvia 57.4 7.4 0.7
a. Includes Northern Ireland.
Note: The table shows weighted averages. Multiple answers allowed.
Source: Bonin and others 2008.
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But lower labor mobility within a single market could reﬂ ect the smaller size 
of countries and shorter distances between centers of economic activity. Why 
move when you can commute? In a 2008 report on labor mobility in Europe, the 
Institute for the Study of Labor adopted a broad deﬁ nition of geographic mobility 
that included not only changes of residency within countries and across borders 
but also cross-border and regional commuting (Bonin and others 2008, using 
the European Labor Force Survey). The report showed that ,even by the broader 
deﬁ nition, between 2000 and 2005, workers’ mobility within the European Union 
was barely 1 percent each year and that the movement of people in Europe was 
still lower than mobility across Australian (2 percent) and U.S. (3 percent) states.
The Institute for the Study of Labor report also showed that in the EU15, the share 
of the active working-age, foreign-born population from an EU27 country increased 
during the previous decade. Spain had the largest increase, followed by Greece, 
Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Austria. Among 
the newer member states, those with the highest initial share of foreign-born 
people (Latvia and Estonia) showed a decline over time. In most EU15 countries, 
foreign nationals from another EU15 country comprise only a small share of foreign 
nationals. An exception can be found in the United Kingdom: the largest nonnative 
resident minority group in London is from France.
These statistics present a paradox. The movement of people within the European 
Union is one of the Four Freedoms, and probably the one that comes most 
immediately to the average European’s mind when asked why the European Union 
is important. The Eurobarometer survey in 2005 showed that European citizens 
view geographical mobility positively (table 6.2). Yet, a large majority (almost 70 
percent) had no intention of moving in the near future.
This may be changing. The same survey showed that mobile Europeans are 
younger and have higher levels of education than those who have no intention 
of moving. In these respects, they are similar to mobile people in many countries, 
both wealthy and poor (Mansoor and Quillin 2006). Students in Europe are among 
the most mobile, enthusiastically taking advantage of such cross-border education 
programs as Erasmus. For many, these programs lead to longer-term resettlement 
Figure 6.30: Low labor mobility can keep unemployment high
Source: Hassler and others 2005.
(labor mobility and unemployment rates in 
the nine largest OECD countries, 1980–95)
(labor mobility and unemployment rates in 
EU member states, 1995–2006)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Bonin 
and others 2008; and Eurostat.
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for employment. Recent statistics show an increase in mobility. In 2008, about 
2.3 percent of EU citizens (11.3 million people) resided in a member state other 
than their citizen state, according to the European Commission.24 That number 
has grown more than 40 percent since 2001.
A lack of movement is often blamed for high unemployment rates in areas 
that lag and for labor shortages that drive up wages in places that lead. This 
negative correlation between mobility and unemployment is apparent in 
data from selected OECD countries for 1980 to 1995 (Hassler and others 2005; 
ﬁ gure 6.30). Labor markets can respond differently to shocks, often resulting 
in differences in the impact on jobs across areas. Adjustment to regional 
shocks in Europe has been achieved more through unemployment rates and 
changes in labor force participation (people stop looking for work if a region 
goes into economic decay) and less through mobility of labor.25 By contrast, 
in the United States, labor mobility leads to greater agility in responding to 
differences in wages and job opportunities across states, reducing disparities in 
unemployment rates and real wages.
Table 6.3: Not a single market for new members
(EU15 restrictions on workers from newer member states)
Entry of EU8 workers Entry of workers from Bulgaria and Romaniaa
May 2004 to April 2006 May 2006 to April 2009 2007–08
Austria Restricted Restricted Restricted
Belgium Restricted Restricted Restricted
Denmark Restricted Restricted Restricted
Finland Restricted Open Open
France Restricted Restrictedb Restrictedb
Germany Restricted Restricted Restricted
Greece Restricted Open Restricted
Ireland Open Open Restricted
Italy Restricted Openc Restrictedd
Luxembourg Restricted Restricted Restricted
Netherlands Restricted Opene Restricted
Portugal Restricted Open Restricted
Spain Restricted Open Restricted
Sweden Open Open Open
United Kingdom Open Open Restricted
a. Bulgarian and Romanian workers also face restrictions in Hungary and Malta.
b. Except for health care, transport, construction, hotels, and catering.
c. Since July 2006.
d. Procedures for obtaining work permits are simpliﬁ ed in certain sectors.
e. Since May 2007. Between May 2006 and April 2007, the Dutch labor market was open to EU8 
workers in a large number of sectors.
Source: OECD 2007.
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But does a mobile labor force really make much of a difference for a country’s 
economic prospects? Policymakers are aware of statistics showing the relative 
immobility of Europeans and eager to know what they can do about it. The phased 
withdrawal of restrictions on the movement of people from the newest member 
states of the European Union will bring a gradual disappearance of an obvious 
obstacle. Yet people from the newer member states still face explicit barriers to 
mobility within the European Union (table 6.3).26 Lessons from how different EU15 
members have managed this aspect of enlargement are still being absorbed, but 
evidence from movements since 2004 and in reaction to the crisis indicate that 
the member states that embraced newcomers from the newest member countries 
have beneﬁ ted.
Looking beyond adjustment to shocks and recovery from the recession, a growing 
literature provides evidence that internal labor mobility tends to have positive 
effects on countries’ productivity and growth. For example, without mobile labor, 
the growth rate of the United States would likely have been only half of what it 
actually has been (Rutkowski 2010). In Canada, the movement of people across 
provinces contributed to economic growth (Sharpe, Arsenault, and Ershov 2007). 
Due to the high volume of movement from low-productivity eastern provinces 
to high-productivity western provinces, Canada beneﬁ ted from a huge boost to 
economic growth in 2006. Net output gains arising from interprovincial movement 
are estimated to be 0.074 percent of GDP in constant 1997 prices and 0.137 percent 
of GDP in current prices. Interprovincial movement accounted for 1.56 percent of 
trend labor productivity growth in Canada over 1987–2006 and 6.23 percent of 
actual labor productivity growth in 2006 (Sharpe, Arsenault, and Ershov 2007).
Further, countries with higher labor mobility have better-performing labor markets 
and higher rates of employment. For instance, the three European countries that 
have reached the Lisbon employment targets—the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom—all have labor mobility rates in the top quartile (ﬁ gure 6.31). 
Conversely, countries with the highest dispersion in employment rates across 
their territories (Italy, Spain, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic) have mobility rates 
below the European average.27
Figure 6.31: Greater labor mobility 
is associated with higher rates 
of employment in Europe
(correlation between labor mobility 
rate [average 1996–2006, horizontal 
axis] and employment rate [average 
1996–2006, vertical axis], selected 
European countries: coefﬁ cient 0.677)
Note: Labor mobility is the share of the population that moved from one region (Nomenclature of 
Units for Territorial Statistics level 2) to another within a given year.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Bonin and others 2008; and Eurostat.
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Researchers have been trying to identify the impediments to mobility in 
economic areas where labor is legally free to move. Language and cultural 
barriers obviously play a role (OECD 2007). But putting language aside, even 
with a legal right to work in every member state, EU citizens face implicit 
but powerful deterrents created by differences in rules that determine social 
insurance coverage, the accrual of occupational pension rights, entitlements 
to social housing and other forms of assistance, and the recognition of their 
professional qualiﬁ cations and previous work experience. Perhaps reﬂ ecting 
the current tough times, as in Europe, local chambers of commerce and 
professional guilds of U.S. trade associations are starting to erect barriers—even 
to people offering their services online—in order to restrict movement and 
thus competition. This strict “rule of license” is an obstacle to movement and 
faster labor market adjustment. These impediments may be more serious for 
prime-aged workers than for the young or the retired. As the median age of 
Europeans increases from 40 years today to nearly 50 by 2050, the mobility 
imperative will become more pressing.
What keeps Europeans at home
Among the strongest deterrents to greater mobility in Europe are those created 
by failures in housing markets (ﬁ gure 6.32). In many European countries, 
housing is a good that is still exchanged informally on unregulated or poorly 
regulated markets (Janiak and Wasmer 2008). Rental markets are shallow, 
rent is expensive, and supply is limited by zoning restrictions. These problems 
constrain people’s mobility at both their origin and destination: moving can be 
a costly prospect, made more so by difﬁ culties selling or renting one’s house. 
Bottlenecks in the housing market are a serious impediment to mobility. 
Homeowners in Europe are more sluggish to move in response to changing 
labor market conditions than people who rent their homes (Hughes and 
McCormick 1985 and 1987; Henley 1998; Gardner, Pierre, and Oswald 2001). 
The relatively high unemployment rates in some European countries can be 
explained in part by a large portion of people who are owner-occupiers (Haavio 
Figure 6.32: Language, housing, 
and health care are the main 
impediments to mobility
(factors that deter people from moving 
to another EU country [percent])
Note: Figures are for respondents from the EU25 (EU27 excluding Bulgaria and Romania) who do not 
intend to move.
Source: Karppinen, Fernandez, and Krieger 2006.
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Box 6.5: Labor mobility is low even in countries in the European neighborhood: the case of Ukraine
Internal mobility in Ukraine is lower than in 
other countries. Between 2002 and 2009, 
an average of 1.5 percent of the Ukrainian 
population moved across rayons (districts), 
from rural to urban settlements, or between 
urban settlements. This corresponds to just 
over 600,000 of Ukraine’s 46 million people 
ofﬁ cially changing their place of residence 
during the year. During the economic crisis 
in 2009, internal migration rates actually 
fell compared with the average in previous 
years (from 1.5 percent to 1.3 percent when 
measured across settlements and from 0.6 
percent to 0.5 percent when measured across 
regions). As expected, mobility across regions 
is lower: the internal migration rate was 0.5 
percent in 2009. When compared with that 
in other countries, Ukrainian internal mobility 
seems to be about 0.5 percentage points 
below its expected value.
At the same time, labor market disparities 
in unemployment rates and average wages 
are high and persistent (box ﬁ gure 1). This 
suggests that the Ukrainian population is not 
responding to economic opportunities outside 
their current place of residence. Instead, 
Ukrainians are moving to where there are 
better services (such as schools and clinics) 
and infrastructure (such as housing)—the “push 
factors.” This could indicate that there are 
barriers to internal mobility that limit people’s 
ability to respond to economic incentives 
and to move to where higher returns to labor 
and human capital exist: for example, lack 
of affordable housing where jobs are, even 
after accounting for higher average earnings 
in these prosperous places. Cross-country 
evidence suggests that countries with 
higher labor mobility—notably the Nordic 
countries—also have lower spatial disparities in 
unemployment rates.
Box ﬁ gure 1: Migration gap and dispersion of unemployment rates
(average, minimum, and maximum across regions for various countries in various years)
Note: The migration gap measures the distance between the expected internal migration rates based on the actual migration rate. Most 
countries refer to 2007, except Italy (2005), Portugal (2001), and Ukraine (2009).
Source: World Bank 2011d, based on Eurostat; and State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
and Kauppi 2003). The constraints to labor mobility created by failures in the 
housing market have been documented elsewhere (Mansoor and Quillin 2006) 
and create powerful deterrents to movement even in countries on the European 
Union’s doorstep (box 6.5).
Another likely culprit preventing Europeans from moving is the relative rigidity 
of wages and generous pay-out period of unemployment insurance plans. Wage 
regulation leads to an earnings compression that can mute the signals that the 
labor market sends from one part of a country to another. If wages are not 
sufﬁ ciently ﬂ exible, they can fail to provide incentives for capital to ﬂ ow into 
economically lagging regions or for workers to move to economically booming 
regions. Generous unemployment insurance plans that provide support over 
long periods can act as a disincentive for workers with industry-speciﬁ c or place-
speciﬁ c skills to retrain and move. A negative relationship can be shown between 
the mobility rate and unemployment insurance: on average, high-mobility 
countries are characterized by low unemployment insurance beneﬁ ts, while low-
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mobility countries have the most generous unemployment insurance plans 
(Hassler and others 2005).
Higher structural unemployment in many European countries also deters the 
movement of labor. Although differences in unemployment rates between the 
lagging and leading parts of a country should encourage movement, a high 
overall national unemployment rate will discourage people from taking the risk. 
Unemployed workers will probably not want to pay the cost of moving to more 
dynamic parts of their country if they would still face the high likelihood of not 
ﬁ nding a job.28 
The lack of portable social beneﬁ ts—such as pensions, health care, and social 
assistance—might also constrain the mobility of labor between EU countries. EU 
legislation grants portability of such beneﬁ ts at a level not found in any other 
region of the world. In principle, the most important beneﬁ ts (for example, 
public pension and health beneﬁ ts) are fully portable within the European Union 
and, to some extent, with countries outside the European Union. Nevertheless, 
important challenges remain.29 First, the administration of portability can be 
burdensome for intra-EU migrants. For example, old-age pensions are not paid 
as a single beneﬁ t, but by each pension insurance fund separately. 
The determination of separate pensions, taking into account contribution 
periods from different member states, is complex and opaque. Second, 
legislation on portability does not apply to occupational beneﬁ ts, so moving 
might lead to considerable losses. Third, social assistance beneﬁ ts are excluded 
from portability; the lack of a Europe-wide social safety net could also act as a 
barrier to intra-EU mobility.
Finally, some EU policies may inadvertently be keeping Europeans immobile. The 
free ﬂ ow of trade in goods and foreign direct investment across the single market 
might reduce the need for labor to move. Trade ﬂ ows react more elastically than 
people, and capital is far more mobile. Trade in goods—particularly intermediate 
goods—along with capital transfers could make the movement of labor to other 
economic areas less important. This is a “good reason” for lower labor mobility 
in Europe, especially in the European Union. But other policies may not be 
so benign. European agriculture and cohesion policies and investments from 
regional and structural funds could be creating disincentives for mobility. Regional 
development policy instruments pour investment into economically lagging areas, 
sometimes with the stated objective of fostering job creation to retain young and 
qualiﬁ ed workers. Although the track record of these policies is mixed at best, to 
the extent that they deter movement of people at the margin, they obviate the 
need for European workers to move to where job opportunities are better and 
more durable.
Losing the global race for talent
There is a looming labor force deﬁ cit in Europe’s immediate future, and it is 
unlikely to disappear even if more people work, work longer, and become more 
productive. The aging of the European labor force cannot be prevented, not 
even under the most favorable scenario. In its annual report to the European 
Parliament, the European Commission pointed out that the population of the 
European Union will rise to 521 million in 2035 but then fall to 506 million 
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by 2060. In 2010, there were 3.5 people of working age (20–64 years) for 
every person age 65 or older. In 2060, there will be half as many (European 
Commission 2011). 
Europe will need immigrants
The European Commission’s report shows that immigration from outside the 
single market and even from far beyond the European neighborhood countries 
will be the main driver of population change in the European Union. In 2009, 
net immigration to the European Union was 857,000 people, contributing to 63 
percent of total population growth. At the start of 2003, the number of third-
country nationals in the EU25 was 16.2 million, or 3.6 percent of the population. 
But by 2010, 20.2 million non-EU27 citizens were living in the European Union 
(4 percent of the total population). The European Commission noted that foreign 
citizens living in the EU27 were signiﬁ cantly younger (median age of 34.4 
years) than the population of EU27 nationals (median age of 41.5 years). For this 
reason, immigrants are likely to help close the demographic deﬁ cit and meet 
the quickly rising costs of population aging.
People have been crossing seas, mountains, rivers, and political borders into, 
out of, and throughout Europe for centuries. During the ﬁ rst great period of 
globalization in the late nineteenth century, right up to the interwar period, 
Europe sent large waves of people to the Americas, Africa, and the Antipodes. 
Postwar immigration to Europe on a mass scale is a recent phenomenon, with 
roots in the guest-worker programs that became common in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s to help sustain the fast pace of Europe’s Golden Age (Maselnik 2010). 
Between 1950 and 1990, the resident foreign-born population in the EU15 grew 
more than fourfold, from 3.8 million (1.7 percent of the population) to 16 million 
(4.5 percent). Between 2005 and 2009, the resident foreign-born population 
increased on average by 1.6 to 2 million immigrants each year, and accounted for 
approximately 80 percent of the overall population growth. During this period, 
only 20 percent of the population increase in the EU27 could be attributed to 
natural growth (live births minus deaths). Ironically, the countries that lead the 
statistics of recorded live births are all also the largest immigrant destinations in 
the EU27: France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Figure 6.33: European countries host 
fewer immigrants than other 
OECD countries
(percentage of the population that 
is foreign-born, various OECD 
member countries)
Source: OECD 2008.
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The conclusion that one could draw is that before 2030 the European Union 
will experience a decrease of young (and semiskilled) workers with secondary 
education (Koettl 2009). The question addressed in this section is whether 
current European immigration policies can accommodate these needs or 
whether the policies need to be changed. 
Current immigration policies in Europe and other OECD countries provide some 
answers. Of particular interest are the lessons drawn from the four “Traditional 
Immigration Countries”: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States 
(ﬁ gure 6.33). To attract the right types of immigrants in the future, European 
policies will need to be more proactive in selecting immigrants and preferably 
will rest on strong, demand-driven mechanisms that respond quickly to shifting 
economic and labor market needs. If Europe does not adjust its policies, it risks 
labor shortages in the future.
Total
Residence
Origin United States EU15 Other EU OECD Australia Canada New Zealand Other OECD
United States –972 –178 –9 –219 -6 –665
EU15 972 –301 241 443 44 71
Other EU OECD 178 301 21 95 1 18
Australia 9 –241 –21 –1 –50 –11
Canada 219 –443 –95 1 –2 –30
New Zealand 6 –44 –1 50 2 –1
Other OECD 665 –71 –18 11 30 1  
Other countries 5,763 3,275 139 458 1,261 72 444
Net OECD 2,048 –1,469 –614 314 350 –12 –618
Net total 7,811 1,807 –475 772 1,611 60 –174
Less than five years of residence
Destination
Origin United States EU15 Other EU OECD Australia Canada New Zealand Other OECD
United States –154 –23 –5 –63 –1 –188
EU15 154 –14 25 15 7 29
Other EU OECD 23 14 1 5 0 4
Australia 5 –25 –1 –2 –12 –5
Canada 63 –15 –5 2 0 –7
New Zealand 1 –7 0 12 0 –1
Other OECD 188 –29 -4 5 7 1  
Other countries 1,211 412 7 114 334 29 38
Net OECD 435 –215 –47 40 –37 –6 –169
Net total 1,646 351 –18 158 360 25 58
Source: OECD 2008.
Table 6.4: The wealthier 
countries in Europe attract fewer 
high-skilled immigrants than 
countries in North America
(immigrants with a tertiary diploma 
in selected OECD countries by country 
of origin, total and recent immigrants 
in thousands, circa 2000)
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Europe’s immigrants are mostly unskilled
Relative to other popular OECD destination countries, EU countries mainly attract 
low-skilled immigrants—those with at most primary education—in stark contrast 
to the Traditional Immigration Countries, which attract much lower shares of 
primary-educated migrants and far higher shares of tertiary-educated migrants. 
Migration outcomes occur on many dimensions, just as migration policies take 
effect through a wide range of institutions. It can thus be helpful to distinguish 
immigrants by their motivation to migrate, their legal status, their duration of stay, 
and their education and skills. With regard to government policies, the framework 
of ananlysis will distinguish between policies with a direct effect on the size and 
composition of migrant ﬂ ows and stocks, like immigration rules, and policies with 
indirect effects, like social policies, labor market policies, and integration policies.
The limited data currently available on the educational attainment of immigrant 
populations suggest that the 49 percent of the EU25+ immigrant population 
originating from outside the EU25+ are primary-educated, while only 25 percent 
have secondary education, and 21 percent have tertiary education (table 6.4). 
Box 6.6: Beyond the white cliffs: immigration to the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is a major destination for 
immigrants in Europe, especially the highly 
educated. Among European countries, the 
United Kingdom enjoyed the third-highest 
inﬂ ow of permanent immigrants, amounting 
to 347,000 people in 2008—the foreign-born 
accounted for 10.8 percent of the British 
population—and attracted the second-
highest number of permanent highly skilled 
immigrants seeking employment (box ﬁ gure 
1). The United Kingdom was one of the few 
countries that did not impose any restrictions 
on labor from the newest member states of 
the European Union and is one of the hotspots 
for international students, hosting on average 
132,700 international students between 2003 
and 2008.
The strength of the United Kingdom’s policy 
orientation toward immigration is that it 
favors people who want to come to work. The 
employment rate among immigrants was 80 
percent, 5 percentage points above the OECD 
average. According to estimates by the British 
Treasury, immigrants grew the working-age 
population by 0.5 percent a year between 
2001 and 2006 and GDP by around £6 billion 
in 2006.
Due to a large volume of immigrants since 
2004, and to mitigate a possible threat 
to social cohesion, the United Kingdom 
introduced a points-based system, focusing 
more on the quality of immigrants than the 
quantity. The new system consists of ﬁ ve 
tiers, tier 1 for highly skilled migrants, tier 2 
for skilled workers required in certain sectors, 
tier 3 for low-skilled workers, tier 4 for 
students, and tier 5 for tourists, athletes, and 
musicians. A special cap of 21,700 for 2011–12 
non-EU work visas was introduced, limiting 
the number of economic immigrants per year. 
However, immigrants who are earning more 
than £150,000 were excluded from the cap.
There have also been problems related 
to integration of immigrants. According 
to Huddleston and Niessen (2011), British 
immigration policies are less favorable toward 
integration, to some extent due to the fact 
that immigrants are excluded from some 
social beneﬁ ts. But the strong points of the 
British immigration policy are: education, with 
a well-tailored living-in-diversity training, 
and anti-discrimination regulation. The 
weakest element is the difﬁ culty in obtaining 
permanent residence and nationality.
Box ﬁ gure 1: Immigrants 
in OECD countries and 
share of foreign-born with 
tertiary education, 2008
Source: OECD 2008; and 
OECD International Migration 
Database.
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By contrast, the Traditional Immigration Countries have much higher shares of 
tertiary-educated migrants. About 40 percent of immigrants to Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States have a tertiary education. Accordingly, their 
shares of primary-educated migrants are fairly low (16–30 percent). The range 
for secondary-educated migrants is wider, from 12 percent in Canada to 35 
percent in the United States.
Looking only at immigrants originating from the Middle East and North Africa, 
the outcomes for Europe appear worse. Almost two-thirds of the 2.5 million 
migrants from the Middle East and North Africa residing in the European 
Union have only a primary education, while those with secondary or tertiary 
education each comprise 17 percent. Again, the Traditional Immigration 
Countries attract much higher shares of tertiary- and secondary-educated 
migrants from the same Middle East and North Africa countries.
These statistics show the obvious importance of geographical distance in 
determining the composition of immigration ﬂ ows. Europe attracts a high share 
of low-skilled migrants from the southern Mediterranean, just as the United 
States attracts a relatively higher share of low-skilled migrants from Central 
America. Of migrants from Central America in the United States, 46 percent 
Box 6.7: The smarter North Americans? Immigration to Canada
Canada has one of the highest percentages of 
immigrants among developed countries, with 
highly favorable policies toward immigrants’ 
integration. In 2008, Canada’s foreign-born 
labor force accounted for 21.2 percent of total 
employment. Moreover, one in ﬁ ve people 
living in Canada was foreign-born. Between 15 
and 20 percent of foreign students remain in 
Canada and start working. 
According to MIPEX III, Canadian policies 
toward immigrants’ integration are very 
favorable, ranking third. This high ranking pays 
dividends in the form of immigrants with top-
notch skills. Canada has the second-highest 
share of immigrants with tertiary education 
among all OECD countries (box ﬁ gure 1). In 
drawing foreign talent, Canada relies on a 
well-managed selection process. With its 
scoring system of visa applications, Canada 
prioritizes certain features of the labor force 
that are crucial for the country’s development. 
Canada chooses whom to grant visas based 
on a system that ranks candidates according 
to their proﬁ le—having a job offer or tertiary 
education, for example, grants additional 
points. Highly skilled, talented immigrants 
without a job offer can be admitted to the 
country.
The Canadian system is designed to treat all 
immigrants equally, regardless of ethnicity, 
race, religion, or nationality. Permanent 
immigrants have the same access-to-work 
opportunities as Canadian citizens, including 
setting up a business. Immigration policy 
provides stable solutions for fostering family 
reunion.
Another aspect of integration policy is 
universal access to education for all children, 
regardless of immigration status. Political 
participation is one of the few aspects of 
life from which permanent immigrants are 
excluded. To become a citizen, one must pass 
a citizenship test, which measures language 
abilities and basic knowledge about the 
country. According to MIPEX, Canada has one 
of the most professional citizenship tests from 
all countries included in the ranking
Box ﬁ gure 1: Immigrants 
in OECD countries and 
share of foreign-born with 
tertiary education, 2008
Source: OECD 2008; 
and OECD International 
Migration Database.
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have just a primary education, compared with 23 percent of the overall immigrant 
population of the United States. If, in addition, the host country relies mainly on 
family reuniﬁ cation as its immigration policy—as the European Union does—and 
does not apply proactive economic immigration programs—as in the United 
States—the share of primary-educated migrants originating from these countries is 
likely to remain high.
Europe is losing the competition for highly skilled migrants to the Traditional 
Immigration Countries. The exception is perhaps the United Kingdom (box 6.6). 
Indeed, the European Union is losing some of its most skilled people to the United 
States. Currently, the United States hosts 1.7 million tertiary-educated migrants 
from the European Union, while the European Union hosts roughly 200,000 
tertiary-educated U.S. emigrants—a net drain of 1.5 million people educated mostly 
at the expense of European taxpayers.
Does this imply that the European Union should copy the Traditional Immigration 
Countries’ policies of large-scale permanent immigration programs and, in 
particular, systems like Canada’s, which seems to attract by far the highest share 
of tertiary-educated migrants (box 6.7)? Should the European Union imitate 
demand-driven temporary worker programs for specialized migrants like those in 
the United States, which seems to attract the highest share of secondary-educated 
migrants? Or is there a genuinely European guest-worker program that will help 
master future challenges of migration? It appears that countries in Europe will have 
to adopt some of the attributes of more successful immigration policies, both in 
and outside Europe.
Needed: a more self-interested immigration policy
When assessing the effects of institutional arrangements on immigration, it 
is useful to distinguish between types of migration. First, one can distinguish 
migration according to the intended duration of stay: temporary, transitional, or 
permanent. Temporary and permanent immigration are straightforward concepts. 
Temporary migrants arrive in the host country with no intention to stay long-
term, leaving after a short period of time once their work contract or assignment 
expires, their education or training has ﬁ nished, or their business objective is 
accomplished. Permanent migrants, by contrast, arrive in the host country to settle 
indeﬁ nitely, with no intention to return to their home country.
In reality, a large part of migrants fall somewhere in between, in the category of 
transitional migrants. These are migrants who arrive on temporary visas and work 
permits with no intention to stay permanently but eventually become long-term 
or permanent settlers. Many migrants who arrived in Europe through the guest-
worker programs of the 1960s in Austria, France, and Germany probably never 
imagined they would stay on. Yet, as they performed inherently permanent jobs 
they integrated into the labor market and developed nation-speciﬁ c expertise. 
They evolved into permanent migrants, generally with the support of their 
employers and host governments.
One might distinguish between immigrants by their main motivation for moving: 
humanitarian, family reuniﬁ cation, or economic migration. Family reuniﬁ cation 
should not be seen separately from good economic management of immigration, 
as it is essential for the integration of immigrants. If these rules are too generous, 
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though, family reuniﬁ cation programs can become the driving factor of a country’s 
immigration policy, as has been the case for years in some countries in Europe 
and even the United States. When family reuniﬁ cation becomes the main driver 
of immigration policy, it can bias the selection of immigrants. The same holds 
for humanitarian migration, based on the right to asylum and refugee status. 
Initiatives to legalize undocumented migrants are a part of many immigration 
policies, sometimes nearly replacing a proactive immigration policy with purely 
reactive regularization, as in Spain.
European immigration policies will have to be geared toward Europe’s economic 
and labor market needs, and immigration policies that focus on demand-driven 
elements may be the best way to do so. Well-designed immigration programs for 
temporary and transitional migrants are the best models for the “New Immigration 
Countries” of Europe to select the right types of migrants for their economies.
Demand-driven programs have the advantage of being ﬂ exible and reacting 
quickly to changes in the labor market. They require less research and government 
planning, putting the administrative burden on employers. The disadvantage 
is that they need more monitoring of compliance and enforcement efforts by 
the government. Static models—in particular, points systems for permanent 
immigration—are less ﬂ exible, requiring more capacity to determine labor market 
needs and ensure a consistent selection process. Successful demand-driven 
immigration programs for temporary migrants offer jobs of a truly temporary 
nature, like seasonal jobs in agriculture and tourism. In addition, certain jobs in 
sectors with a highly competitive goods market can be subcontracted to foreign 
companies through trade in services, opening the gates for a new type of 
temporary migration, through Mode 4 of the World Trade Organization’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services.
Well-designed immigration programs for transitional migrants help identify 
successful newcomers by granting migrants temporary access to the host 
country—with full or limited access to the labor market—and offering a clear option 
for permanent residency and work permission. Three main avenues of transitional 
migration exist: education-to-residency, business-to-residency, and work-to-
residency.
Governments’ capacities to assess labor market needs and plan responsive 
immigration and labor market policies are not limitless. Immigration policies 
are more likely to be effective if designed to require less government planning 
(Hopkins 2002). For example, Koettl (2009) ﬁ nds that Europe will need both highly 
skilled and semiskilled migrants with secondary education. Yet, all projections—
especially long-term forecasts—are uncertain. European economies might develop 
faster than anticipated toward a more knowledge-based economy, or the ﬂ ow of 
highly skilled migrants to other countries might increase. Both scenarios would 
shift the demand toward tertiary-educated migrants. At the same time, the need 
for low-skilled service providers might shift demand toward primary-educated 
migrants, as suggested by the increasing numbers of undocumented migrants.
Planned immigration programs—like well-designed points systems—require 
the government to assess labor shortages and adjust the selection process of 
immigrants accordingly, which require resources and time, without a guaranteed 
good outcome. For example, although Canada’s points system attracts the largest 
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share of tertiary-educated migrants, many end up overqualiﬁ ed for their jobs 
(Reitz 2011). This suggests that somewhere in the Canadian immigration system, 
there is a mismatch of supply and demand. The program seems designed to 
select highly skilled migrants, but the Canadian labor market either does not 
recognize immigrants’ skills or it simply demands less-skilled immigrants. Too 
many overqualiﬁ ed immigrants can be as distorting as too many underqualiﬁ ed 
immigrants. Allowing employers more say in the process could help reduce these 
mismatches.
Points systems can include demand-driven components by granting additional 
credit to migrants with a job offer, as the Australian system does. This is 
complemented by a special visa type granted to visitors interested in obtaining a 
job, making the Australian immigration system more responsive to shifting labor 
market needs. Nevertheless, the system puts the government in the driver’s seat, 
with all the associated responsibilities and administrative costs this role implies.
The biggest risk of government-controlled selection criteria is that they might fall 
prey to lobbying efforts. Such efforts could come either from the employers or 
from native workers. Demand-driven programs, by contrast, are less likely to be 
inﬂ uenced by lobbying efforts because they decentralize the decision process, 
putting the employer in control. If well-designed, they also put the administrative 
and cost burden on the employer. The U.K. Work Permits program, for example, 
can issue a visa and work permit within 24 hours of the employer’s request—
assuming the employer provides adequate documentation. Similarly, the U.S. 
H1-B visa procedure is initiated and sponsored by the employer for a speciﬁ c 
migrant, though the bureaucratic procedures and costs are far more burdensome 
for the employer. The drawback of employer-driven programs, however, is that 
they require regulations to prevent employers from abusing the system and to 
ensure that employers hire migrants only in sectors and skills segments with 
labor shortages. For this, a so-called “labor market test” is usually administered, 
requiring the employer to ﬁ rst post the job vacancy for native workers; only after 
sufﬁ cient time has passed with the post unﬁ lled can the employer turn to migrant 
labor.
Europe can learn from the strengths and weaknesses of the Traditional 
Immigration Countries’ immigration policies. There is no one good program that 
addresses all the challenges of a well-crafted immigration policy. Points programs, 
employer-based programs, and General Agreement on Trade in Services Mode 4 
programs all have their merits, but they serve different objectives. The underlying 
principle of a good immigration policy is its ability to respond to changing labor 
market needs. In this sense, European immigration policy has to become more 
selﬁ sh. But what immigration policies alone can achieve is limited. If Europe wants 
to win the global race for talent, it will need to make working and living in Europe 
more attractive for the world’s brightest. This can mean paying higher premiums 
on skills, increasing rewards for risk-taking, and encouraging entrepreneurship.
The European work model—reworked
The countries covered by this report—members of the European Union, the 
EFTA countries, the candidate countries, and the Eastern European partnership 
countries—will lose 50 million workers between now and 2060. Today, the 
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European labor force—the employed and active job seekers—consists of 323 
million people; in 50 years, it will be down to 273 million, a decrease of 15.3 
percent. Over the next 20 years, the labor force will lose 15 million workers 
(5 percent). The largest reduction will happen during the 2030s, when the 
European labor force is expected to fall an additional 14 million people. The fall 
will be especially severe for the European Union and EFTA countries. Their labor 
force will decrease by almost 40 million people (18 percent) over the next 50 
years. The other Eastern European countries will not fare much better, with an 
equally steep decline of 16 percent. The only exception is Turkey, where the 
labor force is projected to increase by 12 percent until 2060.
The current trends should not be allowed to persist. Many Europeans—
especially women, youth, elderly, and some minorities—do not work at all, and 
they should be encouraged to work. Many Europeans retire too early, and they 
should work longer. Some unemployed Europeans do not look hard enough for 
work, and they should be encouraged to look harder. Only with radical policy 
and behavioral changes could Europe counter the shrinking labor force. Yet, 
even under such optimistic scenario, Europe would not be able to prevent its 
labor force from aging. If participation rates in all countries were to converge to 
those in northern Europe, or the retirement age were to increase by 10 years 
across the board, the European labor force would actually increase by 2060 (by 
5 percent and 2 percent, respectively). If the participation in the labor force of 
women were to converge to that of men, the labor force would still decrease, 
but only by 5 percent, as opposed to 15 percent in the baseline scenario. None 
of these scenarios counteracts, however, the loss of young workers due to 
continually decreasing younger-age cohorts. Increased migration will also have 
to be part of the solution. With revamped immigration policies that combine 
the altruism of a humanitarian stance with the self-interest of an economic 
approach, Europe can attract bright Africans, Americans, and Asians.
This chapter is perhaps best concluded with simple (but uncomfortable) 
answers to the questions posed at the start. Is there a European work model? 
Yes. And it makes Europe less competitive. A central aspect is that European 
model gives disproportionate power to those with protected jobs—the 
“insiders”—through employment protection legislation. This approach would 
have become difﬁ cult to sustain even without the onset of rapid aging. With 
this aging, it is already unsustainable. Countries such as Austria, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands, which have kept unemployment low and labor force 
participation high during the last decade, have done so in some measure by 
reducing this protection. They have made jobs more contestable. 
In the context of demographic change, how can Europe achieve a stable, 
more productive labor force? Countering the decline of the European labor 
force through increasing participation rates is important but not sufﬁ cient. 
Such measures cannot prevent a substantial aging of the labor force. In addition 
to immigration, boosting productivity of the labor force through increased 
investments in human capital is necessary. This requires harnessing the full 
potential of existing workers by prioritizing investments in the skills that are 
most relevant for the labor market today, and those that will allow them to 
adjust to changing labor demands tomorrow. Interventions should focus on 
overcoming failures in information and quality assurance that lead many people 
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to make suboptimal skills investments (too few engineers, technicians, and 
competent managers). 
Are employment and social protection practices inhibiting labor participation 
and efﬁ ciency? Yes, by creating powerful insiders with well-protected jobs 
at the cost of marginalizing others. In the broadest terms, reforms will have 
to reduce job security while modernizing how income security is provided. In 
wealthier countries, reduced employment protection can be combined with 
relatively generous unemployment beneﬁ ts and social assistance, as long as 
there are strong incentives and effective assistance programs to return the 
unemployed to work and to encourage the inactive to participate. Governments 
capable of administering programs that supplement employment protection 
legislation with well-designed income support and job search assistance should 
institute them. But to work well, this “ﬂ exicurity” requires high labor force 
participation rates that are many years away for many in Europe, as well as 
institutional maturity and ﬁ scal and administrative resources that are out of 
reach for most. Especially in the east and south, there may be no alternative 
but to reconsider the extent of employment protection and the generosity of 
social protection. But all countries should synchronize social insurance for the 
unemployed with social assistance for the unlucky in order to align incentives 
for work, as Germany did between 2003 and 2005.
Is Europe taking advantage of the greater potential for labor mobility due to 
economic integration? Undoubtedly, the European Union is the most integrated 
region in the world, and migration between EU countries is higher than in other 
world regions. Europe’s aspiration is, however, more ambitious: the aim is a fully 
integrated labor market with no borders. Against this yardstick, Europe still falls 
short. Signiﬁ cant challenges to improving labor mobility, even within European 
countries, remain. Mobility does come with social costs—missing the support 
of family and friends—that governments cannot easily reduce. But the costs 
related to education, housing, and health care can and should be reduced. These 
are some of the features that make the United States the most mobile economy 
in the world, and Europe can learn without losing its uniqueness.
How can Europe attract the best and brightest? A million people emigrate 
to Europe every year, but less than one in ﬁ ve has more than a high school 
diploma—and three of ﬁ ve do not even have that. Attracting global talent 
would require looking closer at successful, demand-driven schemes from 
the Traditional Immigration Countries—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United States. Immigration policies should focus less on political factors 
such as family reuniﬁ cation, asylum, and human rights and respond more to 
the demands of employers and longer-term assessments of skill shortages. 
Changes in immigration policies need to be combined with reforms aimed at 
making Europe a good place to innovate, start businesses, and reward risks. 
Similarly, increased immigration without more contestable jobs and reformed 
social safety nets could undermine the success of immigration reform.
Over the last decade and a half, emerging Europe may have done better than 
advanced Europe in taking advantage of expanding opportunities for trade, 
ﬁ nance, and enterprise. The prospects ahead are bleaker. Demographic shifts 
threaten Central and Eastern Europe just as much as most countries in Western 
Europe, which have been reforming labor market policies and can more easily 
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become attractive destinations for immigrants. The exception is Southern 
Europe, which has not done well in recent years and is projected to shrink 
and age over the next decade. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain illustrate 
most starkly how work is simultaneously the weakest part of the European 
economic model and one of its most attractive attributes. Changing how 
the labor market is regulated and replenished will be difﬁ cult for politicians, 
but it is none the less urgent. Nor is it hopeless: countries such as Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, and Sweden have shown that the European work model’s 
characteristics can be changed while keeping its character distinctly European.
European economies generally have more stringent 
employment protection and more generous social 
beneﬁ ts than their peers in North America and 
East Asia.
Increased participation can help stem the decline 
of the workforce, but more competition for jobs, 
greater mobility within Europe, and measures to 
attract global talent will still be necessary.
Employment protection gives too much power to 
those with jobs while banishing others to the fringes 
of the labor market, and generous social beneﬁ ts 
weaken the incentives to work.
Migration among and within countries in Europe is 
still low, and even intra-EU migration falls short of 
the European Union’s aspiration of a fully integrated 
labor market.
Europe needs an approach to global talent with 
policies that link immigration to labor markets, and a 
business climate that rewards skills 
and entrepreneurship.
Answers to questions on page 291
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Chapter 6: Annexes
Annex 6.1: Principal component analysis
Principal component analysis is a way to identify patterns in data with high 
dimension, which is otherwise hard to simplify. It is a mathematical procedure 
that uses an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of 
possibly correlated variables into a set of values of uncorrelated variables—
called principal components. The main advantage of principal component 
analysis is that it can compress the data by reducing the number of dimensions, 
without much loss of information. For it to work properly, the main criterion is 
to subtract the mean from each data dimension. The weighting of indicators 
maximizes the variance of the components across countries.
The following instruments are used for the protection component: active labor 
market program spending as percentage of GDP, social assistance spending 
as percentage of GDP, gross replacement rate of unemployment beneﬁ ts, 
minimum paid annual leave days, and duration of unemployment beneﬁ ts. 
For the labor market ﬂ exibility component, the following indicators were used: 
the employment protection legislation (EPL) index as developed by the OECD 
and applied by the Institute for the Study of Labor to other countries, the tax 
wedge ratio, union density, minimum wage as a percentage of value added per 
worker, and maximum time limit in months of ﬁ xed-term contracts. 
The instruments in the ﬁ rst group (protection) are unidirectional, where higher 
values indicate more protection. The instruments in the ﬂ exibility group are, 
however, not unidirectional. To make them unidirectional, and to make the 
higher value representative of higher ﬂ exibility, the negative of EPL and the tax 
wage ratio was used. This transformation does not lead to loss of information, 
because principal component analysis is sensitive to relative scaling but not 
to the linear transformation of vectors. So, countries with highly ﬂ exible 
labor markets (higher values) are those with low EPL, low union density, low 
tax wedge, low minimum wages, and high maximum duration of temporary 
contracts; countries with high protection (higher values) are those with higher 
spending on “active” employment assistance programs, social assistance 
beneﬁ ts, high replacement rates of unemployment beneﬁ ts, and long duration 
of unemployment beneﬁ ts and annual leave. The value 0 represents the 
average position in terms of ﬂ exibility and protection across all countries in the 
sample.
Annex 6.2: Modeling procedure and results 
The regression exercise uses two-stage least squares estimation with 
instrumental variables. Standard panel estimation procedures (random or ﬁ xed-
effects estimation) were not employed because of insufﬁ cient explanatory 
power of these models and/or not enough data (tables A6.1–A6.4). Data were 
mainly from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), with supplements from the Institute for the Study of Labor, the World 
Bank, and Eurostat for the explanatory variables, and the International Labour 
Organization and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for 
dependent variables. 
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Three data samples are examined:
 · Sample 1: EU and OECD members in other regions (particularly North America 
and East Asia) Data come from the OECD and cover only OECD members. 
Time period is 2001–07.30
 · Sample 2: The EU15 and new member states31
Data come from the OECD. Use of the larger sample from the Institute for 
the Study of Labor was not possible due to a lack of relevant data. Thus, the 
sample covers three new member states with data available only (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Time period is 2001–07.32
 · Sample 3: EU new member states and aspirants in the European 
neighborhood Data come from the Institute for the Study of Labor database 
and time period covers years 1999, 2003, and 2007.33 Nine new member 
states (data for Cyprus, Lithuania, and Malta were not available) are covered.34
The model examines the impact of institutional factors on four indicators of 
labor market performance (Eurostat methodology): unemployment rate (UR), 
long-term unemployment rate (LTUR), employment rate (ER), and activity 
rate (AR). In line with the previous research, the dependent variables are 
represented in logs. The regression equation has the following form:
lnXti = α + β1 EPLti + β2 MWti + β3 TUti + β4 TAXti + β5 ALMPti + 
+ β6 UBRRti + β7 INFLti + β8 LEFTti + εti (1),
where X takes the form of UR, LTUR, ER, and AR in consequent regressions.
Explanatory variables are the following: employment protection legislation (EPL) 
is the second version of the OECD employment protection legislation index, 
covering a wide spectrum of employment protection policies. Minimum wage 
(MW) is a cluster variable constructed according to minimum wage level and its 
relative share on median wage in the economy. This variable was omitted in the 
analysis on Sample 3 due to unavailability of the data. The trade unions’ power 
is represented by the trade union density (TU).35 Tax system consequences are 
reﬂ ected by total tax wedge on labor (TAX).36 To reﬂ ect the inﬂ uence of labor 
market policies (LMP), expenditure on active LMP as percentage of GDP per 
percentage point of unemployment (ALMP) and initial unemployment beneﬁ ts 
replacement rate (UBRR) is included. Active labor market policies expenditure 
is instrumented.37 In the analysis on Sample 3, two other indices available from 
the Institute for the Study of Labor replaced the initial unemployment beneﬁ ts 
replacement rate—the average unemployment beneﬁ t (UNBEN) and maximum 
duration of unemployment beneﬁ ts (UNBENDUR)—to reﬂ ect the effects of 
passive labor market policy spending.38
The actual unemployment rate is used in the regressions, but labor market 
institutions affect the equilibrium unemployment. To reﬂ ect this, an additional 
variable was used in the model―the change in the annual rate of inﬂ ation 
(INFL; Nickell 1997). This variable captures the inﬂ uence of economic cycles 
and may also be considered an indicator of macroeconomic policy stance. 
Finally, unemployment level might also be inﬂ uenced by political preferences 
of governments and conﬂ ict of interest over the power resources (Korpi 1991). 
To account for these political factors, one more variable was added in the 
regression model―the government orientation with respect to the economic 
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policy. Variable LEFT is a dummy acquiring 1 for parties deﬁ ned as communist, 
socialist, social-democratic, or left-wing, where greater orientation on social 
issues resulting in lower unemployment is expected.39 As economic policy takes 
time to inﬂ uence labor market performance, the LEFT dummy is used with a 
one-year lag.
The model analyzes the correlations between labor market performance and 
labor market institutions. Its deeper explanatory power is rather limited, due 
to the lack of data on more countries and other relevant variables that might 
affect the dependent variables.40 Moreover, only three new member states 
are covered in Sample 2. It is thus impossible to run a separate analysis for this 
group. Generally, only the differences in the role of institutions between the 
whole region and one particular subsample—and their implications for the other 
subsample—are examined, using a modiﬁ ed Chow test (see also Cazes and 
Nesporova 2003).41
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Table A6.1: Regression estimation results: activity rate
OECD European Union NMS EU+European Neighborhood
Total OECD EU OECD non-EU OECD Total EU Old EU NMS EU Total NMS EU Neighborhood
ALMP 0.072 *** 0.101 *** -0.017  0.091 *** 0.117 *** -0.081  -0.077  -0.036  -1.257  
TAX -0.004 *** -0.004 *** 0.000  -0.004 *** -0.005 *** 0.005 ** 0.003  -0.015 ** 0.011  
EPL -0.029 *** 0.016  -0.106 *** 0.018  0.033 ** 0.092  0.017  -0.019  0.060  
MW -0.006  -0.016 *** -0.014 *** -0.017 *** -0.019 *** -0.042 ***       
TU 0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.006 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.017 *** -0.001 ** 0.004 *** -0.001  
UBRR 0.003 *** 0.002 ** -0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 * 0.002 *       
UNBEN             0.001  0.001  0.000  
UNBENDUR             0.000  -0.004  0.011  
INFL -0.001  0.000  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  -0.005  0.001  0.005 ** 0.002  
LEFT 0.008  0.011  0.017 ** 0.007  0.000  -0.079 *** -0.065 *** -0.054  -0.120  
constant 4.257 *** 4.215 *** 4.490 *** 4.225 *** 4.243 *** 3.547 *** 4.081 *** 4.835 *** 3.725 ***
R sq. 0.486  0.643  0.973  0.660  0.638  0.903  0.443  0.743  0.933  
N 168  119  49  126  105  21  30  19  11  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.081  
Chow test F p-value 0.5648 0.9999 0.8413
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: Regression method is a pooled two-stage least squares procedure with instrumental variables 
on panel data; robust standard errors are used. ALMP = active labor market policies, TAX = total 
tax wedge on labor, EPL = employment protection legislation, MW = minimum wage, TU = trade 
union density, UBRR = unemployment beneﬁ ts replacement rate, UNBEN = average unemployment 
beneﬁ t, UNBENDUR = maximum duration of unemployment beneﬁ ts, INFL = change in annual rate of 
inﬂ ation, LIFT = leftward-leaning government.
Source: Fialová 2011.
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Table A6.2: Regression estimation results: employment rate
OECD European Union NMS EU+European Neighborhood
Total OECD EU OECD non-EU OECD Total EU Old EU NMS EU Total NMS EU Neighborhood
ALMP 0.085 *** 0.100 *** -0.061  0.078 *** 0.070 *** -0.119  0.087  0.044  2.531  
TAX -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.004 *** -0.009 *** -0.010 *** 0.016 *** -0.003  -0.009  0.005  
EPL -0.057 *** -0.063 *** -0.071 *** -0.058 *** -0.066 *** 0.122  -0.069  -0.026  -0.373  
MW -0.004  -0.005  -0.025 *** -0.009 * -0.008 * -0.086 ***       
TU 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.006 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.027 *** 0.000  0.009 *** 0.002  
UBRR 0.003 *** 0.003 *** -0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.001        
UNBEN             0.005  0.001  -0.009  
UNBENDUR             -0.005  -0.009 ** -0.034  
INFL 0.005  0.009  -0.008 ** 0.006  0.002  -0.008  0.001  0.010 *** 0.002  
LEFT 0.009  0.017  0.026 ** 0.009  0.015  -0.215 *** -0.100 ** -0.070  0.117  
constant 4.201 *** 4.171 *** 4.408 *** 4.192 *** 4.227 *** 2.796 *** 4.179 *** 4.254 *** 4.819 **
R sq. 0.664  0.622  0.707  0.621  0.671  0.822  0.249  0.695  0.668  
N 168  119  49  126  105  21  30  19  11  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.198  0.003  0.736  
Chow test F p-value 0.5037 0.9999 0.8499
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: See note for Table A6.1.
Source: Fialová 2011.
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Table A6.3: Regression estimation results: unemployment rate
OECD European Union NMS EU+European Neighborhood
Total OECD EU OECD non-EU OECD Total EU Old EU NMS EU Total NMS EU Neighborhood
ALMP -0.327 *** -0.314 *** 0.624  -0.198 * -0.118  0.397  -1.249 ** -0.444  -31.016  
TAX 0.021 *** 0.013 *** 0.016  0.018 *** 0.026 *** -0.099 *** 0.020  -0.021  -0.047  
EPL 0.146 *** 0.378 *** -0.166  0.350 *** 0.383 *** -0.027  0.538 ** 0.123  2.793  
MW 0.010  -0.037 * 0.204 *** -0.018  -0.008  0.325 **       
TU -0.001  0.000  -0.008  -0.002  -0.002  -0.058 *** -0.007  -0.029 ** -0.033  
UBRR -0.002  -0.009 ** 0.019 *** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** 0.009        
UNBEN             -0.024 * -0.010  0.103  
UNBENDUR             0.029  0.039  0.128  
INFL -0.033  -0.058  0.044 * -0.040  -0.005  0.016  -0.004  -0.051 ** -0.011  
LEFT 0.125 ** 0.107 * -0.161 * 0.133 ** 0.081  0.876 *** 0.298  0.087  -1.463  
constant 0.982 *** 1.274 *** 0.046  1.174 *** 0.808 *** 5.724 *** 0.785  3.218  -1.603  
R sq. 0.378  0.401  0.787  0.345  0.495  0.889  0.369  0.583  0.856  
N 168  119  49  126  105  21  30  19  11  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.068  0.146  
Chow test F p-value 0.9838 0.916 0.6765
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: See note for Table A6.1.
Source: Fialová 2011.
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Table A6.4: Regression estimation results: long-term unemployment rate
OECD European Union NMS EU+European Neighborhood
Total OECD EU OECD non-EU OECD Total EU Old EU NMS EU Total NMS EU Neighborhood
ALMP -0.639  -0.975 ** 1.802  -0.683  -0.636  0.779 * -9.916 ** -10.011 ***
Insufficient 
number of 
observations
TAX 0.097 *** 0.036 *** 0.070  0.051 *** 0.068 *** -0.091 *** 0.068  0.018  
EPL 0.185  0.234  -1.354 * 0.179  0.139  0.068  -1.513  -1.611  
MW 0.135 ** -0.054  0.418 *** -0.004  0.033  0.235 **     
TU -0.012  -0.016 * 0.023  -0.022 ** -0.021 ** -0.034 ** 0.015  -0.103 **
UBRR -0.015 *** -0.004  0.004  -0.012  -0.015  0.012      
UNBEN             -0.073  -0.007  
UNBENDUR             0.119  0.181 **
INFL -0.133  -0.210 * 0.149  -0.167  -0.352  0.015  0.086  -0.110  
LEFT -0.177  -0.458  -0.957 ** -0.350  -0.413  0.864 *** 0.684  0.420  
constant -2.466 *** 0.392  -2.574  0.114  -0.513  3.827 ** 4.223  6.899  
R sq. 0.363  0.281  0.681  0.279  0.285  0.915  0.763  0.853  
N 168  119  49  126  105  21  18  17  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.180  0.067  
Chow test F p-value 0.9965 0.7392 X
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: See note for Table A6.1.
Source: Fialová 2011.
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1  Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2006) ﬁ nd 
no real correlation between the proportion 
of Protestants in a population and the 
average hours of work.
2  Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2006) 
indicate that the impact of taxes on labor 
supply disappears when controlling for 
unionization or labor market regulation. In 
an analysis of 16 OECD countries, they ﬁ nd 
a fairly strong negative correlation between 
hours worked and the percentage of the 
labor force covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. Working hours in Europe 
ßmight also be inﬂ uenced by the strong 
political power of unions over welfare 
states.
3 See, for example, Clark, Georgellis, and 
Sanfey (1998); Drago and Wooden (1992); 
Freeman (1978); Gordon and Denisi (1995); 
and Judge and others (2001).
4 However, “trust in the education system” is 
positively associated with work centrality, 
which may indicate strongly held beliefs 
that effort is fairly rewarded.
5 See Lisbon Council Presidency Conclusions 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
aboutparliament/en/0044c3dd41/EU-fact-
sheets.html;jsessionid=BD54698E30F3A038
BA1D36B3E4FCBB8E.node1
6 As a robustness check, this analysis was 
also carried out using clustering techniques, 
with similar results.
7 Only 2007 data are used because of 
restricted data availability, but also to avoid 
capturing increases in social spending that 
took place in most European countries in 
response to the 2008–10 crisis.
8 Countries that are “mixed”—low labor 
force participation and low unemployment 
rates or high labor force participation and 
high unemployment rates—are considered 
“inefﬁ cient.”
Notes
9 The Gini coefﬁ cient data are from the WDI 
and do not distinguish between equity in 
income and consumption. Inequality in 
outcomes goes far beyond labor markets, 
as social transfers are likely to play an 
important role here. One option would have 
been to look at inequality in wages or labor 
income more generally, but no such data are 
available for many countries, especially in 
emerging Europe.
10  This projection assumes that overall 
immigration and participation rates by sex 
and age group remain at current levels.
11 For a more detailed discussion on 
incentivizing formal work, see World Bank 
(2011a).
12 See Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) 
for a literature review of the empirical 
relationship between economic growth and 
school attainment. 
13 See Carneiro and Heckman (2002) for U.S 
evidence, Brunello and Schlotter (2011) 
for Europe, and World Bank (2011b) for 
summary evidence in middle-income 
countries.
14 The OECD has initiated its Program for 
the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies to measure cognitive skills in 
the working-age population (a complement 
to the Programme for International Student 
Assessment). The World Bank’s Skills 
toward Employment and Productivity 
initiative complements the Program for 
the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies initiative by also measuring 
noncognitive skills. First results are 
expected by 2013.
15 See, for example, Bowles and Gintis (2000) 
for evidence of employer surveys from the 
United Kingdom and the United States, Blom 
and Saeki (2011) for a study for India, and 
World Bank (2011b) for evidence from Latin 
America.
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21 The generosity of unemployment beneﬁ ts 
seems to have the reverse effect in non-
European OECD countries. 
22 Bertola and Ichino (1995) argue that the 
persistence of unemployment in Europe in 
the 1980s and 1990s was caused by a lack 
of labor mobility and by people remaining in 
lagging areas.
23 However, Ester and Krieger (2007) and 
Eurofound (2006 and 2007) present data 
that indicate a decrease in interstate 
mobility in the United States over 2000–05. 
24 See European Commission (2010c). In 
2008, 37 percent (11.3 million people) of 
nonnationals in EU27 countries were citizens 
of another member state. The number 
of nonnationals in EU27 has increased 42 
percent since 2001 (for further details, see 
Eurostat Statistics in focus 94/2009).
25 Tatsiramos (2009) makes reference to 
important work by Decressin and Fatás 
(1995) and Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) 
about European trends. For the United 
States, Tatsiramos quotes Blanchard and 
Katz (1992).
26 Restrictions on the freedom to work can 
be maintained for up to seven years after 
the entry of new member states into the 
European Union. The last restrictions were 
lifted on workers from the EU8 countries 
in May 2011. Restrictions will be lifted on 
workers from Bulgaria and Romania in 
December 2013.
27 Using Nomenclature of Units for Territorial 
Statistics 2 data from the European 
Commission’s data source Eurostat 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/
nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_
CLS_DLD&StrNom=NUTS_33&StrLangua
geCode=EN
28 See, for instance, Bentolila (1997) for Spain; 
Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) for the 
United Kingdom; and Fidrmuc (2004) for 
transition economies.
16 For an extensive treatment of the impact of 
labor unions on labor market outcomes in 
Europe, see Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 
(2006).
17 Following Fialová and Schneider (2009 
and 2011), Fialová (2011) uses two-stage 
least squares regression estimation with 
instrumental variables on pooled data. 
Standard panel estimation procedures 
(random or ﬁ xed effects estimation) were 
not employed for insufﬁ cient explanatory 
power of these models and/or too few data. 
Data were mainly from OECD with some 
supplements from the Institute for the Study 
of Labor, International Labour Organization, 
and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
18 The data are from the OECD, for 2001–07. 
The sample covers Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Of them, 17 are classiﬁ ed as EU OECD and 7 
as non-EU OECD.
19 The sample covers Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Of them, 15 are classiﬁ ed as old European 
Union and 3 as new member states of the 
European Union.
20 Data are from the Institute for the Study 
of Labor database, for 1999, 2003, and 
2007. The sample covers Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
Of them, 9 are classiﬁ ed as new member 
states of the European Union and 6 as 
European neighborhood.
29 For a detailed discussion on conceptual 
issues regarding portability of social 
beneﬁ ts, see Holzmann and Koettl (2011).
30 The sample covers Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Of them, 17 are classiﬁ ed as EU OECD and 7 
as non-EU OECD.
31 For this analysis, the new member states 
group generally consists of countries 
acceding to the European Union in 2004 and 
2007.
32 The sample covers Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Of them, 15 are classiﬁ ed as old European 
Union and 3 as new member states of the 
European Union.
33 For some countries, only some of these 
years with data available were covered.
34 The sample covers Albania, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Macedonia 
FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Of them, 
nine are classiﬁ ed as new member states 
of the European Union and six as European 
neighborhood.
35 Trade union density refers to the share of 
workers who were trade union members. 
However, even if the density is low in some 
countries, it is a common practice to extend 
trade union agreements to nonunionized 
workers, thus covering a large share of 
employees in the economy (France and 
Spain, for example). Thus, the real degree 
of collective bargaining coverage—the 
share of all salary earners whose wage is 
determined by a collective agreement in 
a legal extension of bargained wage rates 
to nonunionized workers—would be a 
preferred indicator; unfortunately, such data 
are not available for the examined period 
and country sample.
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36 Total tax wedge on labor represents 
the combined central and subcentral 
government income tax plus employee and 
employer social security contribution taxes, 
as a percentage of labor costs, deﬁ ned as 
gross wage earnings plus employer social 
security contributions; the tax wedge 
includes cash transfers. The indicator is 
calculated for a single individual without 
children, earning the average wage.
37 This variable is endogenous because it 
relates the expenditure to the actual rate of 
unemployment. For this reason, this variable 
was instrumented by a new variable 
relating the expenditure to the average 
unemployment rate in a ﬁ ve-year period 
before the actual year.
38 Average unemployment beneﬁ t is the 
average beneﬁ t as a percentage of the 
average wage. This deﬁ nition deviates from 
the estimates typically used by the OECD 
because OECD replacement rates are not 
very meaningful in the transition countries 
due to the caps on the size of the beneﬁ t 
in many countries. Maximum duration of 
unemployment beneﬁ ts is deﬁ ned as the 
period for which a 40-year-old person who 
has been employed for 22 years prior to 
unemployment receives unemployment 
beneﬁ ts, wherever possible. Data are from 
the Institute for the Study of Labor.
39 Data are from the World Bank’s database 
of political institutions; for details, see Beck 
and others (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage 
(2003).
40 These are, for example, the role of product 
market reforms (Boeri 2005; Grifﬁ th, 
Harrison, and Macartney 2007) or the 
importance of adverse economic shocks 
(Blanchard and Wolfers 2000).
41 A modiﬁ ed version of the test hypothesis 
and statistics was used, because the 
number of observations in the new member 
states group is smaller than the number 
of parameters, nNMS < k, and thus the 
standard methods in this case cannot be 
used. The hypothesis tested is H0 :E ( y | X; 
βOE) = E ( y | X; βNMS). 
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Government
To make sense of the relationship between government and well-being 
in Europe, Sweden might be a good place to start. The quintessential 
European welfare state, Sweden does well in social outcomes: children 
and students enjoy free education, the elderly receive a decent pension, 
everyone relies on a public health system that helps them live long and 
healthy lives, and social trust is high. The welfare system redistributes 
wealth and contributes to an equitable distribution of income. All this is 
done with big government. From 1980 to 2010, Sweden’s government 
spending accounted on average for 59 percent of GDP. 
These three-ﬁ fths of economic output that are spent by government 
are funded mainly by levying charges and taxes on workers, families, 
and enterprises. Such high taxation surely gets in the way of growth. Or 
does it? Over the last three decades, Sweden’s per capita growth was 1.7 
percent—as it happens, just about the same as that of the United States. 
Yet government spending in the U.S. was only 37 percent, or about three-
ﬁ fths of government spending in Sweden.
So what exactly allows Sweden to combine a sizable government, 
enviable social outcomes, and solid growth? After all, the economic 
literature on the size of government and the rate of growth tends to ﬁ nd 
that big government generally lowers growth. Is Sweden the exception 
from the rule, or are many European countries able to square the circle? 
And for those that don’t, what would it take to become like Sweden? 
Clearly, there are big governments in Europe that fail to deliver impressive 
results. Observers could point to Italy and Greece in Western Europe, or to 
Hungary and Ukraine in emerging Europe.
Chapter 7
Are governments in Europe bigger than elsewhere?
Is big government a drag on growth in Europe?
If big government impedes growth, how do 
countries such as Sweden do so well?
How can governments be made more efﬁ cient?
Should ﬁ scal consolidation be a top policy 
priority in Europe?
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Take Ukraine. Over the last decade and a half, Ukraine’s economy expanded at 
an annual average rate of 2.3 percent per capita. While this might be faster than 
Sweden or the United States, it is unimpressive relative to its peers: other non-
EU Eastern European countries grew almost 3 percentage points faster. At about 
41 percent of GDP the size of government was more than 6 percentage points 
higher in Ukraine than among its peers. And in 2010 government spending was 
almost half the size of the economy (49 percent of GDP), as public pensions 
absorbed 18 percent of GDP, among the highest in the world. In addition to 
large and ineffective public spending, Ukraine faces dim prospects: the growth 
drivers of the precrisis period up to 2008, such as capital inﬂ ows and credit 
expansion, along with favorable terms of trade adjustments, are unlikely to 
return. And ﬁ scal pressures are set to increase with a rapidly aging population 
and large investment needs (World Bank 2010).
This chapter links government and well-being in Europe in ﬁ ve steps. It ﬁ rst 
looks at whether governments are big spenders and how this affects growth. 
It next argues that there is more to government than just its size—namely, its 
quality—so it looks at how the size of government interacts with the quality 
of government. It then asks how well governments spend money on health, 
education, and pensions. Last, looking at pressures on public ﬁ nances, it asks 
what governments can do to put their ﬁ scal house in order. In other words, the 
chapter answers ﬁ ve questions:
First, are governments in Europe bigger than elsewhere? Yes. Governments 
in Europe spend about 10 percent of GDP more than their peers. Differences in 
government size within Europe and between Europe and its peers are largely 
explained by social spending. In 2010, countries in Western Europe spent 9 
percent of GDP more on social transfers and 13 percent of GDP more on overall 
public spending than four “Anglo-Saxon” countries (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States) and Japan. In the 2000s, Western Europe spent 
about 6 percent of GDP more on the social sectors than Eastern Europe, and had 
bigger governments by about 7 percent of GDP. Countries differ in the way they 
tax social beneﬁ ts, however, so when allowing for taxation, the difference in 
social spending between Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries declines 
from 11 percent to 6 percent of GDP, and the south is the biggest social spender 
in Western Europe.
Second, is big government a drag on growth in Europe? A qualiﬁ ed yes. Over 
the last 15 years, higher initial government size has led to slower economic 
growth. In Europe, a 10 percentage point increase in initial government 
size leads to a reduction in annual growth by 0.6–0.9 percentage points. 
Government reduces growth, particularly when it exceeds 40 percent of GDP. 
Perhaps because governments are smaller outside Europe, there is no evidence 
that government size generally harms growth in the global sample. In Europe, 
social transfers tend to reduce growth, and public investments to increase it. 
Large government revenues tend to reduce growth, but the evidence is less 
compelling than for public expenditures—perhaps because Western Europe’s 
tax system is often more growth-friendly than the systems of the four Anglo-
Saxon countries. Europe combines a high tax burden and labor taxes with low 
corporate tax rates and a greater reliance on indirect taxes.
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Third, if big government impedes growth, how do countries like Sweden 
do so well? The reason is that size is not the only feature of government 
that matters. What government does and how it ﬁ nances its activities are as 
important. European governments regulate the largest economic area in the 
world; encourage the exchange of goods, services, and capital with other 
continents; foster voice and accountability; and provide public goods and enable 
redistribution. Big governments are often good at doing these things, especially 
when social trust ensures that everybody plays by the same rules. Such big 
governments can go together with thriving, dynamic economies.
Fourth, how can governments be made more effi cient? Investigating the 
efﬁ ciency of the public sector is difﬁ cult because government output is hard 
to measure. But many studies identify vast “efﬁ ciency reserves” in the public 
sector: there is considerable scope for saving by moderating public wages 
and pensions, enforcing private contracts, and other means. The potential for 
increasing efﬁ ciency—getting more for public spending—differs across sectors. 
European governments are not big spenders in health or education, especially 
when considering that private spending in these sectors is less than in Anglo-
Saxon countries. For health, public spending does well in reducing maternal 
mortality rates. For education, public spending does less well in raising net 
secondary enrollment rates. Case studies for Armenia, Moldova, and Poland 
point to three sources of inefﬁ ciencies: the inability to adjust spending patterns 
to shifting demographic trends, the weak incentives for local cost savings, and 
attempts to improve equity without proper evaluation of policy outcomes. 
While public spending on health and education does not stand out as excessive, 
Europe does spend more than peer countries on public pensions. Indeed, 
pension spending is the main reason for big governments in Europe—thanks 
not just to an older population but also to the generosity of pensions. Many 
countries have initiated reforms of the pension systems since the 1990s.
Fifth, should fi scal consolidation be a top policy priority in Europe? Yes. Fiscal 
pressures are high for ﬁ ve reasons. First, ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and public debt increased 
sharply during the recent global crisis, accentuating structural weaknesses in 
public ﬁ nances. Second, because of the crisis, markets now pay more attention 
to ﬁ scal vulnerabilities. Third, growth will be weaker now than before the 
crisis. Fourth, rapid aging will add to ﬁ scal pressures over coming decades. 
Finally, public debt has to be reduced to put ﬁ scal policy on a stable footing 
before the next crisis. Simulations suggest Western Europe has to improve 
its primary balance (the difference between revenues and expenditure, not 
including interest on debt) after adjusting for the business cycle by about 6 
percent of GDP this decade to reduce public debt to 60 percent of GDP by 2030. 
Adjustment needs are highest in the south and lowest in the north. In the EU’s 
new member states, a ﬁ scal adjustment of about 4 percent of GDP is needed to 
bring down public debt to 40 percent of GDP. 
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Europe’s governments are big
How big are governments in Europe exactly, and how did they change in 
the period before the global economic and ﬁ nancial crisis? Before starting 
to answer, it is necessary to clarify some data issues. Mainly, it is necessary 
to decide how to measure government size. Usually, it is best to use public 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Other useful indicators include the tax 
burden, public employment, or the number of pages of government-drafted 
regulation. The advantage of government spending is that it focuses attention 
on the uses of the public money raised from taxpayers and other sources. The 
mid-1990s are taken as the starting point. This might seem an odd choice, as 
national governments have been around a lot longer, and government size 
grew strongly in Europe after the early 1960s. Still, 1995 is a natural reference 
point for Europe as a whole. While longer time series are available for EU15 and 
OECD countries, reliable national accounts data and public ﬁ nance statistics are 
hard to come by for countries from Eastern Europe before that year (box 7.1).
Governments are big, even in Eastern Europe
European governments are big. In 2010, government spending accounted for 
over half of GDP in Western Europe, and over two-ﬁ fths in Eastern Europe. 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate three patterns. First, European governments are 
bigger than non-European governments. In 2010, median government size 
was larger by 11 percent of GDP in Western Europe, and 13 percent of GDP in 
Eastern Europe, than among their respective peers. Second, government size 
is highest in the north, and lowest in eastern partnership countries. In 2007, on 
the eve of the global crisis, median public expenditure amounted to 47 percent 
of GDP in the north and 35 percent of GDP in the eastern partnership countries. 
Public expenditures ranged from over 50 percent of GDP in France, Sweden, 
and Denmark to around 35 percent in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic, and Turkey, and to less than 30 percent in Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Government size in the peer countries was less than 
40 percent of GDP. Third, the crisis increased government spending in 2007–10 
in Europe and elsewhere, offsetting reductions in government spending in 
1995–2007 in the north, the center, and the EU12 (ﬁ gure 7.2).
Box 7.1: Data and groupings
The sample in this chapter covers European 
and other countries with a population of at 
least 250,000 in 1995. This gives 167 countries, 
comprising 6 billion people in 2010, though 
most variables are available only for fewer 
countries. The data include 43 countries from 
Europe that are the focus of this report. In 
most cases, the unit of analysis is the country. 
We give the same weight to Germany, 
Europe’s most heavily populated country with 
a population of 82 million, and Iceland, the 
smallest with a population of 300,000. 
In addition, countries are grouped based 
mainly on geography to capture broad trends. 
In Europe, the west (EU15 and European Free 
Trade Association) is distinguished from 
the east (EU12, EU candidate, and eastern 
partnership countries). This results in 18 
Western European countries and 25 Eastern 
European countries. In Western Europe, we 
distinguish between the north (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), the 
center (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), and the 
south (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). To 
benchmark Western Europe against the rest 
of the world, Anglo-Saxon peers (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) 
and Japan are studied. For emerging Europe, 
the peers are Brazil, the Republic of Korea, 
and the Russian Federation, along with other 
emerging economies. Finally, to make sure 
that group averages are not driven by outliers 
or missing data, the median is used more than 
the mean.
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The impact of the crisis on government spending is visible in ﬁ gure 7.3, which 
shows a kernel density plot of government spending in Europe for 1995, 2007, 
and 2010. In 1995–2007, the density became more concentrated, as the variation 
in government size declined. In 2007–10, the distribution shifted to the right, 
indicating higher spending induced by the crisis across Europe. Seven European 
countries spent more than 52 percent of GDP in 2010, versus only one in 2007. 
Government spending increased during the crisis relative to output mainly for two 
reasons: governments stepped up social spending to mitigate the social impact 
of the crisis and stabilize the economy; and the collapse in output meant that 
government size rose, even with no change in public expenditures. Still, there is a 
fair amount of persistence in government size across countries (ﬁ gure 7.4).
Figure 7.1: Government size in G7 
countries, 1960, 1990, 2000, and 2010
(government spending, percentage of GDP)
Figure 7.2: Government size, 1995, 2007, 
and 2010
(median government spending, percentage 
of GDP)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; IMF WEO; and OECD National Accounts Statistics.
Figure 7.3: Density of 
government size in Europe
Figure 7.4: Government size in 1995 
and 2010
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; IMF WEO; and OECD National Accounts Statistics.
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Social spending makes for big government
Breaking down spending into its components provides better insight into what 
makes governments bigger in Europe. It makes sense to focus on social spending, 
as this turns out to drive much of the difference in overall government spending. 
It makes sense to start with social transfers; after all, the European welfare 
state is closely tied to large social transfer programs. Social transfers come in 
various types. They range from basic social assistance for poor families, to family 
beneﬁ ts and child allowances, and to social insurance programs for old age, 
unemployment, disability, sickness, and maternity. They are mostly made in cash 
but some are in kind, such as some health or housing services. 
Looking at social transfers allows us to trace spending patterns for seven OECD 
countries since 1970 and for 14 OECD countries since 1980. We also have data 
for Eastern Europe for the 2000s. We will also look at social spending more 
broadly for the 2000s for Europe as a whole.
Starting in 1970 is useful, much of the government expansion happened before 
the 1990s. Overall government spending moves in step with social transfers 
(ﬁ gure 7.5). Increases in social transfers tend to increase government size, as in 
Australia (to the early 1990s), Belgium (to the mid-1980s), Canada (to the early 
1990s), Germany (to the late 1990s, tied to reuniﬁ cation), the United Kingdom (to 
the late 1980s), the Netherlands (to the late 1970s), and the United States (to the 
early 1990s). Likewise, decreases in social transfers tend to reduce government 
size, as in Canada and the Netherlands (both from the early 1990s). 
Of course, the link is not perfect, as expenditure trends on other items often 
follow a different dynamic. The reduction in government size in Belgium 
since the mid-1980s, for example, did little to reduce social transfers. Instead, 
while maintaining social security spending constant, it relied mostly on 
lower federal spending and reductions in interest payments thanks to ﬁ scal 
surpluses and declining public debt (IMF 2011). Nevertheless, there is a high 
correlation between government spending and social transfers in the OECD 
country sample. A simple regression of government spending on social 
transfers, including country and year dummies, suggests that an increase in 
social transfers by 1 percentage point of GDP leads to an increase in overall 
government spending by somewhat more than 1 percentage point of GDP.
Figure 7.5: Social spending 
determines the size of governments
(social transfers and overall 
government spending, percentage of 
GDP, 1970–2008)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; IMF WEO; and OECD National Accounts 
Statistics.
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Figure 7.6 groups 14 countries in the usual fashion: Western Europe is 
represented by Denmark and Finland (north); Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (center); and Italy and 
Portugal (south). The peer countries are Australia, Canada, and the United States 
(Anglo-Saxon), and Japan. Three features stand out. 
 · Social transfers in Europe are much higher than elsewhere. Median spending 
on social transfers in 1980–2008 was 20 percent of GDP for Western Europe, 
but only 11 percent for its peers. Median government size was 50 percent of 
GDP and 37 percent of GDP, respectively, for the two groups. Hence, higher 
social transfers accounted for about two-thirds—that is, 9 percent of GDP out 
of 13 percent of GDP—of the difference in government size. 
 · Spending on social transfers moved up for Western Europe and the peers 
in 1980–2008, though slightly less so for Western Europe. These increases 
resulted in bigger governments for both groups—again, slightly less so for 
Western Europe. 
 · Differences within groups emerge. In Western Europe, social transfer 
spending in 1980 was highest in the center, followed by the north, and lowest 
in the south. The entitlement reforms of northern countries and a strong 
economy lowered real growth of per capita social transfers in the 2000s, 
so that social transfers fell as a share of GDP. By contrast, social transfer 
spending rose sharply in the south, reaching 20 percent of GDP in 2008 
compared with only 17 percent of GDP in the north. Social transfer spending 
also jumped in Japan. Its share in overall government spending rose from 
30 percent in 1980 to 50 percent in 2008, mainly because of population aging.
Social transfers are not all of social spending. They do not include salaries paid 
to public employees in social sectors, nor do they include education. Figure 7.7 
uses a “functional classiﬁ cation” that provides another way to assess social 
spending. It shows public spending on pensions, health, and education for 
European countries in 2000 and 2007. Spending on the three social sectors 
tends to be higher than that on social transfers, though the latter does not 
include social assistance. Again, social spending is instrumental in determining 
Figure 7.6: Social transfers 
increased fastest in the south
(social transfers, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 
2008, percentage of GDP)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; IMF WEO; and OECD National Accounts 
Statistics.
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the size and change in overall government spending (Handler and others 2005). 
In particular, government size in Western Europe is about 7 percent of GDP 
larger than in Eastern Europe, and social spending accounts for much of the 
difference (6 percent of GDP). Western Europe spends around 23 percent of 
GDP on these sectors, Eastern Europe around 17 percent. The south stands out 
among the economies of high-income Europe, in that social protection and total 
spending increased after the 1980s, and showed no signs of slowing until the 
recent crisis.
Social protection is more than pensions, and includes unemployment beneﬁ ts, 
active labor market policies, child and maternity support, and welfare. The north 
stands out through high spending on social protection unrelated to pensions. In 
2007–08, pensions were just over half of social protection spending in the north, 
compared with over three-ﬁ fths in the center and the EU12, about two-thirds 
in Japan, and close to three-quarters in the south. Anglo-Saxon countries also 
used about half their social protection spending on public pensions, but social 
protection spending remained low at less than 10 percent of GDP. Across the 
three social sectors, the north spent the most and the EU12 countries the least. 
The Anglo-Saxon countries spent less than Western Europe, the EU12, or Japan 
as a share of GDP on social sectors. 
Social transfers and services—summing pensions, health, and education—as 
a share of GDP in 2008 relative to per capita income adjusted for purchasing-
power shows that social spending increases with income. This is what leads to 
higher spending in Western than in Eastern Europe. But for a given income, big 
differences across countries are seen. For example, Germany spent almost 25 
percent of its income on social transfers, and Iceland just 6 percent. Ukraine’s 
spending is the highest in Eastern Europe for both social transfers and social 
sectors, though many countries are notably richer.
Looking at gross public spending in social sectors to assess what governments 
invest in education, health, and social protection is instructive, but potentially 
Figure 7.7: Social spending 
increased in the 2000s
(social and other government 
spending, percentage of GDP, 2000 
and 2007) 
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; IMF WEO; OECD National Accounts 
Statistics; and WDI.
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misleading. Countries differ in the extent to which they tax social beneﬁ ts. Net 
public expenditures take into account whether governments tax social beneﬁ ts 
or provide tax breaks for social purposes. They are a more accurate measure of 
the ﬁ scal resources beneﬁ ting the social sectors.
The OECD provides comparable numbers on gross public expenditures and 
net publicly mandated social expenditures for 26 member countries for 2001 
and 2007 (Adema and Ladaique 2009). The tax impact is strong for three 
main reasons. The social sectors are smaller than suggested by gross public 
expenditures in Europe. In 2007, taking Western Europe as one group, social 
spending declines from 34 percent to 29 percent of GDP. And while the center, 
the EU12, and the north tax many of their social beneﬁ ts, most of them remain 
untaxed in the south, giving it Europe’s largest social sector net of taxes. Finally, 
while taxation reduces social sectors in Europe, it leaves them unchanged (or 
even slightly increased due to tax breaks for social purposes) elsewhere. The 
gap between Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries, for example, declines 
from 11 percent to 6 percent of GDP.
Political institutions reveal preferences for big or 
small government
While government size changes over time, governments are systematically 
bigger in some countries than others. So what can we say about economic, 
social, and political factors that lead to big government? Lindert (2004) has 
conducted perhaps the most careful analysis for Europe, and found that the 
rise in the welfare state and the expansion of social transfer programs over 
the last two centuries is linked to ﬁ ve factors: democracy, social afﬁ nity, 
aging, prosperity, and globalization.1 Democracy gives people an equal vote, 
irrespective of income. Combined with social afﬁ nity across income groups, it 
makes the decisive median voter more likely to support redistributive tax-based 
programs. Because older people prefer social insurance and are a key voting 
group, social transfers increase as the population ages. Social transfers emerged 
with prosperity. They came about for the ﬁ rst time in 1880–1930 when living 
standards improved in Europe, reﬂ ecting the widening impact of the industrial 
revolution. Finally, voters might demand protection for those hurt from 
international competition in open economies.
The political variables deserve closer attention. Economic policies have 
distributional consequences, as they often create “winners” and “losers” in 
society. Political institutions such as electoral rules are important for policy 
outcomes because they determine how competing preferences are turned into 
public policies. In Europe, political structures differ among groups. Northern 
countries, for example, have political systems that are based on proportional 
representation and on coalitions rather than single-party governments, that are 
more centralized, and that have single legislative chambers and relatively weak 
presidential power. 
But do political institutions matter once we control for economic and social 
characteristics? For 67 European and peer countries in 1995–2009 it appears 
that, as expected, government size is inﬂ uenced by preferences for public 
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services and social afﬁ nity, the age dependency ratio, unemployment, income 
per capita, trade openness, and the debt servicing costs of public debt.2  
Consistent with the literature, political variables are important: government is 
bigger in countries with fractionalized (for example, coalition), proportional, 
and parliamentary political systems. Federalism also increases government 
size, which suggests cooperation of central and local governments rather than 
competition among governments. Even when the full set of economic, social, 
and political factors are controlled for, geographic regularities remain: northern 
Europe has the biggest governments, the emerging peers the smallest (table 
A7.1).
Big government, slow growth?
GDP per capita is the best single measure at hand to proxy a country’s living 
standards. Yet it has faults, including how to factor the government sector in 
production of domestic value added, how to incorporate quality improvements 
in provision of services, and how to account for depletion of national resources. 
Still, it is important to know whether big government helps or hinders growth, 
and even if well-being and happiness go beyond purely money-oriented 
notions, being rich and growing richer make it easier to get the things we want, 
such as food, education, health care, and time off from work. 
There are good reasons to suspect that big government is bad for growth. 
Taxation is perhaps the most obvious (Bergh and Henrekson 2010). 
Governments have to tax the private sector in order to spend, but taxes 
distort the allocation of resources in the economy. Producers and consumers 
change their behavior to reduce their tax payments. Hence certain activities 
that would have taken place without taxes, do not. Workers may work fewer 
hours, moderate their career plans, or show less interest in acquiring new 
skills. Enterprises may scale down production, reduce investments, or turn 
down opportunities to innovate. High taxes make market work less attractive, 
and time off from work and work at home more attractive. Thus high-income 
taxes inhibit the development of markets that offer home-produced services. 
Such service sector jobs could be important to keep workers in jobs and off the 
welfare system, especially as traditional manufacturing jobs dwindle (Davis and 
Henrekson 2005).
Over time, big governments can also create sclerotic bureaucracies that crowd 
out private sector employment and lead to a dependency on public transfers 
and public wages. The larger the group of people reliant on public wages or 
beneﬁ ts, the stronger the political demand for public programs and the higher 
the excess burden of taxes. Slowing the economy, such a trend could increase 
the share of the population relying on government transfers, leading to a 
vicious cycle (Alesina and Wacziarg 1998). Large public administrations can also 
give rise to organized interest groups keener on exploiting their powers for their 
own beneﬁ t rather than facilitating a prosperous private sector (Olson 1982).
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Yet, although taxes change market outcomes, they are also necessary. Without 
them, governments cannot fulﬁ ll the core functions vital for market economies 
(box 7.2). Indeed, governments around the world contribute to economic 
prosperity by ﬁ nancing, providing, or regulating services. Some services are 
replete with market failures, whether due to monopoly power, externalities, 
or information problems. Such concerns provide a justiﬁ cation for the welfare 
state (Barr 1992; Besley and Persson 2001). Of course, public social spending 
is often not so much about responding to market failure as it is about ensuring 
that basic needs are met and social inequities do not violate society’s values 
regarding fairness.
What’s the upshot of this discussion? Although voters have to judge whether 
the beneﬁ ts of public spending outweigh the costs of taxation, economic theory 
is ambiguous on the impact of government size on growth. But economic 
models argue that the excess burden of tax increases disproportionately with 
the tax rate—in fact, roughly proportional to its tax rate squared (Auerbach 
1985). Likewise, the scope for self-interested bureaucracies becomes larger as 
the government channels more resources. At the same time, the core functions 
of government, such as enforcing property rights, rule of law and economic 
openness, can be accomplished by small governments. All this suggests that 
as government gets bigger, it becomes more likely that the negative impact of 
government might dominate its positive impact. Ultimately, this issue has to be 
settled empirically. So what do the data say?
Europe is different
At ﬁ rst glance, the relationship between government size and growth is not 
clear-cut. In 1995–2010, median growth was higher in Western Europe than in 
its peers, but its governments were also bigger (ﬁ gure 7.8). Yet, emerging peers 
had smaller governments and grew faster than advanced regions. This suggests 
that there is no simple relationship between government size and growth at the 
regional level.
A different look at the data reveals another picture. Figure 7.9 groups annual 
observations in four categories according to the share of government spending 
in GDP during that year. Both samples show a negative relationship between 
government size and growth, though the reduction in growth as government 
becomes bigger is far more pronounced in Europe, particularly when 
government size exceeds 40 percent of GDP.
Box 7.2: Transaction costs and government bureaucracies
What accounts for government getting bigger 
even though it means taxes and red tape? 
Mulling over the nature of ﬁ rms, Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1985) suggest that transaction 
costs prevent companies from using market 
price signals to coordinate their everyday 
work. Complex production processes lead 
companies to enter into long-term contracts 
with employees as it would be too costly to 
hire workers daily with on-the-spot contracts 
for many interrelated tasks. 
Olson (1986), using transaction cost theory, 
sees a similar rationale for government. 
The public sector facilitates economic 
arrangements by keeping transaction costs 
low. Public bureaucracies produce large 
indivisibles, such as defense, police, justice, 
and other public goods. They are crucial 
for enabling businesses to hire and dismiss 
workers, sign contracts with suppliers and 
banks, or, in general, engage in buying and 
selling of goods and services at low cost. In 
short, transaction costs make public—and 
private—bureaucracies inevitable, even 
though they also generate inefﬁ ciencies. Of 
course, governments might fail just as markets 
fail, but market failures justify government 
intervention in the ﬁ rst place.
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Since regional aggregates could hide a lot of variation across economies, it is 
worth analyzing the picture at the country level. Looking at initial government 
size allows us to rule out reverse causality: low growth or contractions could 
lead to higher government spending rather than the other way around. The 
Europe sample shows a clear negative relationship between government size 
and growth. Taken at face value, this suggests that big government lowers 
growth in Europe, but not for the world as a whole.
This correlation might simply be picking up the impact of income levels. For 
example, growth was high in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This may 
be not so much because they have small government but because they are 
low-income countries beneﬁ ting from strong income convergence. And since 
government size tends to go up with higher-income levels, this leads to a 
spurious negative relationship between government size and growth. However, 
Figure 7.9: Growth is slower 
as government gets bigger
(median growth by average 
government size, percent, 1995–2010)
Note: The horizontal axis shows government spending as a percentage of GDP.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; IMF WEO; and OECD National Accounts 
Statistics; and WDI.
Figure 7.8: Government 
spending is higher in 
richer countries, and 
income growth is slower
(median growth, percent, 
and median government 
size, percentage of GDP, 
1995–2010)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; IMF WEO; OECD National Accounts 
Statistics; and WDI.
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many governments in Eastern Europe are already the same size as some in 
Western Europe, even though their income levels are lower. In only 7 of 24 
countries in Eastern Europe, governments spent in 2010 less than 40 percent 
of GDP. For the other 17, government size ranged between 40 percent and 50 
percent of GDP, similar to spending levels in richer countries such as Canada, 
Germany, Norway, and the United States. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, 
Montenegro, Slovenia, and Ukraine stand out as countries with the largest 
excess spending. Since the crisis boosted government spending relative to 
economic activity more in advanced Europe than in emerging Europe, these 
comparisons were even starker before the crisis.
Big governments come with slower growth
The standard way to isolate the impact of government size on growth from the 
impact of other variables is econometric analysis. A large economic literature 
explores the link between government size and economic growth, as reviewed 
in Bergh and Henrekson (2011), Barrios and Schaechter (2008), and Pitlik and 
Schratzenstaller (2011). Although many studies ﬁ nd a negative relationship 
between government size and growth, no consensus has emerged on whether 
big government is harmful to growth. The failure to establish robust ﬁ ndings 
is not unusual. The inherent difﬁ culties of empirical growth studies, along with 
the importance of the subject, have led to a busy research area called growth 
econometrics (Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan 2008; Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple 
2005).
A practitioner of growth econometrics confronts four difﬁ culties. First, the data 
are poor. Consistent national accounts data are available only since 1960, and 
only for some 100 countries. Data series for the countries from Eastern Europe 
start only in the mid-1990s. Second, there is “model uncertainty” because 
growth theories are not explicit about the salient determinants of growth. Third, 
macroeconomic analysis cannot exploit randomized trials as an investigation 
tool, making it difﬁ cult to establish causality. Fourth, growth econometrics has 
struggled to reconcile the desire to uncover common growth patterns across 
countries with the need to account for country-speciﬁ c features as well as 
differences at different stages of countries’ growth processes (Solow 1994; 
Eberhardt and Teal 2011).
For this chapter, we provide new econometric evidence on the impact of 
government size on growth using a panel of advanced and emerging economies 
since 1995. As estimates can be biased due to problems of omitted variables, 
endogeneity, or measurement errors, it is necessary to rely on a broad range of 
estimators. Depending on data availability and speciﬁ cation, the regressions in 
annex 1 report ﬁ ndings on 25–152 countries.
The results show a robust inverse relationship between initial government 
size and subsequent growth in Europe, but not worldwide. The parameter 
estimates differ in size and signiﬁ cance, which is not surprising given the host 
of estimation issues. They suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in initial 
government spending as a share of GDP in Europe is associated with a reduction 
in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.6–0.9 percentage points 
a year (table A7.2). The estimates are roughly in line with those from panel 
regressions on advanced economies in the EU15 and OECD countries for periods 
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from 1960 or 1970 to 1995 or 2005 (Bergh and Henrekson 2010 and 2011). This 
is by no means obvious. After all, our regressions cover a different and shorter 
period, and relate to a more varied group of countries. Among the 43 European 
countries, 18–24 countries were low- or middle-income economies in 1995–2010. 
A few points need emphasis:
 · In a race between the importance of initial per capita income and 
government size for growth, the former wins hands down. Growth declines 
with higher initial income both in Europe and the world.
 · The estimates for government size are consistently negative for Europe, but 
less so for the global sample. They are signiﬁ cant and negative for Europe ten 
times, but only three times for the world sample.
 · The results hold for two different time periods. Including all 16 years over 
the period 1995–2010 seems logical. But the global crisis led to a collapse 
in output in most countries, which inﬂ ated government size even without 
increases in spending programs. This is a case of reverse causality: a decline 
in growth leads to bigger government size, not the other way around. But the 
same analysis using data for 1995–2006 broadly conﬁ rms the ﬁ ndings for the 
whole period.
Box 7.3: Europe’s tax burden is caused by high labor and indirect taxes—in spite of low corporate taxes
Evaluating the impact of a country’s tax 
system on growth is no less a job than 
ﬁ guring out how public expenditures inﬂ uence 
growth. This report does not attempt this 
task. Still, since taxation is central for growth 
and public ﬁ nances, it does include a brief 
discussion. After all, taxes are the principal 
source of ﬁ nancing for public expenditures 
and the impact of an expansion of a particular 
government program depends always on how 
it is ﬁ nanced. 
Overall, Europe’s tax system is less growth-
friendly than those of Anglo-Saxon countries 
and Japan because of a high tax burden and 
heavy reliance on labor taxes, but it is more 
growth-friendly because of low corporate tax 
rates and greater reliance on indirect taxes 
(Pitlik and Schratzenstaller 2011).
• Europe’s tax take is high. This is especially 
true for the north and center, but even the 
EU12 countries in 2004–08 collected more 
taxes as a share of GDP than the Anglo-
Saxon countries or the Republic of Korea. 
This is a concern, as high taxes are often 
a drag on growth. However, they are also 
often good for ﬁ scal balances: ﬁ scal deﬁ cits 
tend to be lower in countries with a high 
tax-to-GDP ratio.
• High personal income taxes are one reason 
why Western European countries collect 
high tax revenues. In addition, social 
security contributions are often high, 
giving rise to big marginal and average 
income tax wedges. So overall, labor gets 
taxed heavily. In contrast, many countries 
in Eastern Europe undertook reforms to 
reduce, simplify, and unify personal income 
tax rates, and their top personal income tax 
rates are now often lower than in Anglo-
Saxon countries. Most studies ﬁ nd that 
workers with decent skills do not respond 
strongly to high labor taxes, but unskilled 
workers are discouraged from taking up 
formal work or working regular hours. 
High income taxes might also inhibit the 
development of markets that offer home-
produced services such as restaurants 
and personal services, as work at home 
becomes more attractive.
• European countries—especially the EU12—
stand out in taxing goods and services 
more heavily than Anglo-Saxon countries 
and Japan. Many European countries rely 
on value-added tax (VAT) as the main 
indirect tax. Along with property taxes, VAT 
is often considered among the taxes least 
harmful for growth. Since VAT taxes only 
consumption, it encourages exports. And as 
it is imposed on the whole production chain, 
it does not distort production, distribution, 
or sales choices. In addition, many European 
countries impose sizable excise taxes on 
products such as tobacco, alcohol, and 
gasoline. Since their consumption can lead 
to bad health or bad air, such taxes not only 
generate revenues but may also improve 
society’s welfare as people cut back on 
these products in response to taxation. 
Property taxes in Europe tend to be less 
important than goods and services taxes, at 
least outside the center.
• Although European countries leverage high 
personal income taxes and indirect taxes, 
corporate income taxes are generally low. 
Why do some European countries levy high 
taxes on labor and low taxes on capital? The 
answer is that, as globalization showed up 
the mobility of capital and the immobility 
of labor, the efﬁ ciency costs of taxing 
capital heavily quickly became apparent. 
In the late 1980s, Scandinavian countries 
began introducing dual tax systems, which 
combine low and uniform taxation of capital 
income with a higher and progressive 
taxation of labor income. Indeed, corporate 
income tax rates have been cut around the 
globe in the last few decades, although 
ﬁ scal concerns during the global crisis might 
have halted the trend for now.
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 · There can be threshold effects of government size, where size starts to 
matter only after it reaches a crushing mass. While the choice of a threshold 
for what constitutes “big government” is arbitrary, this chapter uses 40 
percent of GDP, which is close to the average government size in high-income 
countries in 1995–2010.3 Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), for example, suggest 
this as the upper limit for sufﬁ cient public spending. The results provide 
support for a threshold effect. The impact of government size on growth is 
negative for the countries with initial government spending of 40 percent 
of GDP or more, but positive (and mostly insigniﬁ cant) for countries with 
smaller government sizes. The same pattern holds for the world sample. This 
might explain why government size is harmful for growth in Europe but not 
elsewhere. Median government expenditures over the last decade and a half 
were 26 percent of GDP in the world, but 43 percent of GDP in Europe.
 · Parameter estimates can be sensitive to the selection of variables. 
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) have used the method 
of Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) to ﬁ nd out which 
combination of these variables explains economic growth best. BACE uses all 
possible combinations and generates average coefﬁ cients for each variable, 
weighted by the goodness-of-ﬁ t of each regression, as well as inclusion 
probabilities. Our goal is more modest: to ﬁ nd out whether government size 
is one of the variables among the set of nine explanatory variables that 
contributes to a high explanatory power of the regression model. This implies 
running more than 500 regressions. The coefﬁ cient on government size is 
negative in both Europe and the world, but larger in absolute terms in Europe. 
The inclusion probabilities are in excess of 90 percent for Europe, but below 
33 percent for the world. This conﬁ rms our ﬁ ndings of a robust negative 
relationship between initial government size and growth in Europe, but not in 
the world sample.
 · Government revenues can be studied as alternative measures of government 
size. Bergh and Karlsson (2010) argue that looking at tax revenues is one 
way to address concerns about reverse causality. Tax revenues as a share 
of GDP tend to increase during booms and decline during recessions (table 
A7.3). This makes it less likely that the causality runs from higher growth 
to lower government size. Since tax revenue data are harder to come by, 
total revenues have to be used rather than tax revenues. (For the sample of 
EU and OECD countries, tax revenues make up about 85 percent of overall 
revenues.) The results suggest that large public revenues come with slower 
growth (box 7.3).
Social transfers hinder growth—and public investments help
Some types of public spending increase growth, others reduce it (for example, 
Lucas 1988; Barro 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Gemmell, Kneller, and 
Sanz 2011). But the literature fails to agree on which categories of public 
spending are likely to be growth-friendly. Consensus is hard to come by 
because the growth impact of public spending is tied to a range of factors. 
Public spending programs can be executed well or poorly, and may work well 
in some stages of development but not others. High government consumption 
can reﬂ ect well-paid public servants who provide vital services to people 
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and businesses, or it can be a sign of bloated and ineffective bureaucracies. 
Whether government spending turns out to boost or dampen growth depends 
also on the way it is ﬁ nanced. In short, public spending’s impact on growth 
depends on institutional, ﬁ nancial, and economic factors (Bayraktar and 
Moreno-Dodson 2010).
Keeping these caveats in mind, we must ask: do social transfers hinder growth 
in Europe? Governments are big in Europe mainly due to high social transfers, 
and big governments are a drag on growth. The question is whether this 
is because of high social transfers. The answer seems to be that it is. The 
regression results for Europe, using the same approach as outlined earlier, show 
a consistently negative effect of social transfers on growth, even though the 
coefﬁ cients vary in size and signiﬁ cance (table A7.4). The result is conﬁ rmed 
through BACE regressions. High social transfers might well be the negative link 
from government size to growth in Europe.
A sizable economic literature argues that, unlike social transfers, public 
investment more often than not supports growth. Over the last decade and a 
half, public investment was higher in Eastern than Western Europe, as a share 
both of GDP and of total public spending, reﬂ ecting three factors. Since the 
east is more capital-scarce than the west, the return on investment is likely 
to be higher there. Also, capital ﬂ ows downhill in Europe, enabling emerging 
economies to boost investment. Finally, the EU’s structural funds allowed 
prospective and new member states to increase public investment. So, while 
the evidence is less clear-cut than for social transfers, it suggests that public 
investment is more likely to help than hinder growth in Europe.
Bumblebees can fl y
Big government is associated with slower growth in Europe. But the estimations 
discussed above pick up only the average patterns across Europe, and there are 
clearly countries that manage to combine big government with healthy growth. 
To return to the example at the start of this chapter, Sweden has managed 
to grow richer with big government, just as a bumblebee seems to defy the 
laws of aerodynamics. Sweden is not alone. In fact, the role of government 
has increased since the end of World War II in many countries, even during the 
“golden age” of European growth from the 1950s to the early 1970s. As market 
economies became richer, governments grew bigger. Government spending as 
a share of GDP among the G7 countries doubled from about 20 percent in 1950 
to more than 40 percent in 2010. Big governments might be more commonly 
associated with paper reshufﬂ ing and red tape rather than the frictionless 
machinery imagined by Max Weber (Gerth and Mills 1946). Yet the persistent 
rise in government size suggests a deliberate choice of societies to expand 
government.
The ﬁ scal footprint of governments through taxation and spending is only one 
feature of government. A growing literature explores the role of government 
more generally. This research comes under different names, including quality 
of government, good government, governance, government capacity, or 
institutions. Institutional economists point out that the accumulation of physical, 
human, and intellectual capital—emphasized by neoclassical and endogenous 
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growth theories as drivers of growth—are only proximate causes of growth. 
Institutions, along with geography, culture, and trust, are possible fundamental 
causes of growth that can explain why some countries fail to accumulate these 
forms of capital while others put them to good use and grow. 
The fi ve dimensions of government quality
Poorly run governments result in improperly functioning markets, and well-
run governments can make up at least part of any negative effects of big 
government on growth. Does this happen in Europe? It appears it does. To 
answer this question, the relationship between government size and the 
quality of government in Europe and the world are contrasted. The approach 
of La Porta and others (1999) is adapted to establish whether government 
size is systematically correlated with quality of government, after considering 
economic, political, and geographic factors. Five government responsibilities 
are assessed: regulator of the private sector, facilitator of economic openness, 
manager of its resources, enabler of voice and accountability, and enabler and 
provider of public goods.
 · Establishing well-deﬁ ned property rights and ensuring a functioning legal 
system is a core responsibility of government. Since the work of Adam Smith 
in the eighteenth century, the protection and enforcement of property rights 
and contracts has been seen as a precondition for the operation of markets 
and economic specialization.
 · Openness brings competition and pressures to improve productivity 
(Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006; Dreher 2006). It gives countries access 
to large, fast-growing markets that allow them to diversify and upgrade their 
products. Openness channels knowledge and technology through production 
networks, foreign direct investment, and learning from competitors. As 
chapter 2 discussed, Europe’s growth is also in good measure due to trade. 
Countries took their export-to-GDP share from 28 percent in 1970 to 54 
percent in 2009 in Western Europe, and from 36 percent in 1995 to 49 percent 
in 2009 in Eastern Europe.
 · The government can run more or less efﬁ cient bureaucracies. With 
governments commanding around 40–50 percent of GDP, productivity in the 
public sector, while hard to measure, is a key driver of growth. Managing civil 
servants well, keeping a cap on the public sector wage bill, and borrowing 
tools from the private sector to run services efﬁ ciently are all important to 
keep the public sector lean and productive.
 · Voice and accountability capture important aspects of European countries. 
Citizens’ voice in society and participation in politics connect them to 
politicians and policymakers who represent government. Elections and 
informed voting can make political commitments more credible and produce 
better outcomes. In addition, better information, thorough public disclosure, 
citizen-based budget analysis, service benchmarking, and program impact 
assessments and an active independent media can strengthen voice and 
accountability (World Bank 2004).
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 · Ensuring the supply of public goods such as health care or education is 
another responsibility of government, whether as provider, ﬁ nancier, or 
regulator.
The quality of government varies considerably across Europe. Figure 7.10 shows 
one illustrative indicator for each of the ﬁ ve dimensions. In Western Europe, the 
south does worse than the north or center in level, and, from the late 1990s to 
the late 2000s, in change. In Eastern Europe, the EU12 countries stand out as the 
best performers. Indeed, even though their per capita income is still only about 
three-quarters of the south’s, they match the south on several indicators.
The dimensions of government quality are interlinked. For example, voice and 
accountability, along with social trust, makes public programs accessible for 
lower-income households (Lindert 2004). Combined with a progressive tax 
system, this heavily reduces income inequality. OECD ﬁ gures, for example, 
Figure 7.10: Quality of 
government declines from 
north to south and west 
to east
(rule of law (left) and trade 
openness (right) [exports 
and imports as percentage of 
GDP], median, 1996–2000 and 
2006–10)
(government effectiveness 
(left) and political stability 
(right), median, 1996–2000 and 
2006–10)
(income equality (100 – Gini 
coefﬁ cient), median, 2000–06)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2010); IMF WEO; and UNU-WIDER 2008.
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suggest that the impact of Europe’s public spending and taxation is more 
redistributive than in the Anglo-Saxon countries or Japan (ﬁ gure 7.11; see ﬁ gure 
1.15 in chapter 1). As a result, the income distribution (after taxes and transfers) 
is more equal in the north, the center, and the EU12 (not in the south) than in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan. Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) argue 
that this greater equality is also related to Europe’s greater ability to ensure 
that households at the top of the income distribution contribute adequately 
to government ﬁ nances. For example, while the share of the top 1 percent of 
households in total after-tax earnings remained unchanged over the last four 
decades at about 11 percent in Germany, it increased from 9 percent to 20 
percent in the United States.
Big, high-quality government
A fairly consistent pattern emerges from the analysis in this chapter. Big 
government is systematically correlated with better quality of government, 
with two exceptions: collective wage bargaining and tax rates. This holds both 
for the world sample and for Europe. It holds also for all ﬁ ve dimensions of 
government quality. And it holds in most cases, even when we control for basic 
economic, political, and geographic determinants of institutions (table A7.6). 
 · Big government is associated with better enforcement of property rights, 
better regulation, and more independent judiciaries in both the world 
sample and Europe. Big governments come with more centralized collective 
bargaining, though there is no correlation with dismissal cost of workers in 
Europe. In addition, while tax compliance costs are not related to government 
size, income tax rates are higher in countries with big government. Clearly, for 
both labor markets and taxes, it is necessary to look at how systems work as 
a whole, country by country. 
 · Big government is related to economic globalization elsewhere, but not in 
Europe. Tariffs go up with government size generally, but not in Europe, 
perhaps because of the EU’s common external tariff. In Europe, countries’ 
trade shares are not related to government size.
Figure 7.11: Governments reduce 
inequality more in Europe
(Gini coefﬁ cients of income inequality 
before and after taxes and transfers for 
mid-2000s) 
Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty Database.
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 · Big government is related to effective government, better control of 
corruption, and small informal economies in both the world as a whole and in 
Europe. Low informality means, for example, a larger tax base, which in turn 
makes it easier to fund big government without imposing high taxes. These 
correlations also hold when controlling for other institutional determinants.
 · Big government goes with stronger institutionalized democracy, more voice 
and accountability, and greater political stability. This holds in the world and 
Europe, with and without additional covariates.
 · Big government does well with public goods. It is correlated with higher 
years of schooling, lower infant mortality, longer healthy life expectancy, 
and more equality in both the world and Europe. The relationship remains 
signiﬁ cant with the exception of schooling in Europe when controlling for 
other determinants.
Social trust makes for “big government lite”
Countries with efﬁ cient courts, open and deregulated economies, and impartial, 
honest, and accountable public administrations ﬁ nd it easier to combine 
big government with growth and well-being. Yet, efﬁ cient, high-quality 
government is a fairly recent phenomenon, limited to some high-income 
countries. For most countries for much of their history, governance was 
drenched in endemic corruption, patronage, and abuse of power. 
But given the importance of the right institutions for well-being, how is it 
that some societies maintain institutions that perpetuate economic failure? 
Turning bad governance into good governance could well require more than 
just a technical ﬁ x or a political push; it needs, rather, a profound change in 
institutions. Yet, such change takes time, as the seeds for strong institutions in 
some countries go back at least to the nineteenth century. And there is likely 
to be resistance to change. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that 
different institutions not only have different implications for economic growth, 
Box 7.4: Nordic social protection programs seem to be different
Nordic countries stand out for large spending 
on social protection outside pensions. This 
includes support for child care and women’s 
careers as well as active labor market policies. 
Generous social beneﬁ ts lead to high taxes 
and large tax wedges, which might undermine 
growth. But the Nordic countries have 
streamlined their welfare systems and reduced 
incentive costs over the last two decades, 
while maintaining comprehensive insurance 
against economic, social, and health risks.
For jobs, the system combines ﬂ exibility for 
ﬁ rms with security for workers, to facilitate 
structural change and job creation. A worker 
whose living standards are protected through 
a social welfare system has to worry less 
about losing his or her job. By protecting 
workers and not jobs, governments can foster 
job creation and destruction and keep the 
economy productive. Job search assistance 
is individualized and provided with light 
bureaucracy. 
Investment in skills and careers of mothers 
can also help job creation and income growth. 
Women will ﬁ nd it easier to combine family 
and work with a publicly funded infrastructure 
of affordable and quality child care, generous 
parental leave, and options for part-time 
work. Part-time work is encouraged, allowing 
women to combine family and work, and social 
beneﬁ ts are prorated for part-time work.
Since entitlement to programs does not 
depend on income, universalist programs 
ensure that low-income earners can improve 
their income by taking up work. They help 
to keep administrative costs down because 
targeted beneﬁ t entitlement is hard to 
determine. They also beneﬁ t from strong 
political support. At the same time, the 
recipient of social beneﬁ ts has to meet 
certain obligations, including welfare-to-work 
elements.
Source: Aiginger 2004; Kielos 2009; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004.
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but also for the distribution of the rewards from growth across different groups. 
Those groups that command the largest resources will push for economic and 
political institutions favorable to their interest, thus perpetuating their hold on 
power.
There is another factor, beyond profound institutional change, that matters. 
Developing good institutions may well be easier in countries with high social 
trust, where people are less worried about others taking advantage of the 
system. They abide by the rules not because of enforcement but social trust. 
Low welfare fraud and tax evasion allow the public sector to function more 
efﬁ ciently. And while social trust does not stop governments from becoming 
too big, it can raise the threshold at which big government becomes a drag on 
growth and well-being.4 
As social trust facilitates good institutions, and big government often relies 
on good institutions, is big government also correlated with strong social 
trust? We extend the regression speciﬁ cation used in the last section to look 
at this issue using World Values Survey data (table A7.7). We ﬁ nd, indeed, 
that big government tends to be correlated with high social trust, though the 
coefﬁ cients are not always signiﬁ cant, especially when we control for other 
institutional determinants. Big government is associated with more trust 
in other people, more tolerance of diversity, the opinion that government 
should take more responsibility, and the view that claiming beneﬁ ts is justiﬁ ed 
(box 7.4). So strong quality of government and social trust go a long way 
toward explaining how a country like Sweden manages to grow fast with big 
government (box 7.5).
Of course, even in countries with strong social trust and good quality of 
government, governments can be too big. But strong institutions help countries 
to undertake successful ﬁ scal consolidation. For example, in 1993, Sweden’s 
economy was in recession and the public ﬁ nances in dire straits. General 
government expenditures reached a record high of 72 percent of GDP, and 
the ﬁ scal deﬁ cit ran at over 12 percent of GDP. Sweden put together a strong 
ﬁ scal adjustment package to meet the EU Maastricht criteria. The program was 
successful: growth returned quickly and the ﬁ scal balance turned positive within 
ﬁ ve years.
Box 7.5: The north performs better than predicted in the models, and the south and the EU candidate 
countries worse
We have looked at Europe as a whole in our 
analyses of growth, quality of government, 
and trust. For example, we assumed that the 
growth model is the same across the west 
and east, or the north and south. Yet, to 
paraphrase a remark from the econometrician 
Harberger (1987): What do Greece, Sweden, 
and Ukraine have in common that merits their 
being put in the same regression analysis? This 
point is especially valid in the current context 
where we try to analyze why countries like 
Sweden can defy the growth moderation 
coming from big government.
One way to address this point would be to 
estimate country-speciﬁ c models. Values of 
parameter, and not just variables, could then 
vary from one country to another. However, 
the tradeoff would be that we lose the insights 
from unveiling common characteristics across 
a group of countries. In addition, time series 
for individual countries, especially in Eastern 
Europe, are simply too short for meaningful 
analysis. Instead, we use a simpler approach: 
we illustrate the regional differences by 
the differences in how well our models 
predict actual values of growth, quality of 
government, and trust. The pattern is fairly 
uniform: the north does better than predicted 
by our models for all indicators; the south does 
worse for all indicators; and the EU candidate 
countries do worse on all indicators except 
trust.
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Other Northern European countries have carried out similar reforms since the 
early 1990s, building on a long tradition of quality in public service:
Many of the northern European countries that started to develop 
encompassing welfare states during the ﬁ rst half of the twentieth century 
had successfully increased their quality of government during the preceding 
century. For example, during the nineteenth century Bavaria, Prussia, Britain, 
Denmark, and Sweden carried out large-scale changes in their government 
institutions that did away with systemic corruption and pervasive patronage 
and introduced impartial (meritocratic) systems for recruiting civil servants 
and implementing public policies. (Rothstein 2011, p. 126)
Doing more with less
With governments ﬁ nancially squeezed for a long time to come, making 
public sectors work better has become a main motivation for public ﬁ nance 
reforms. Looking for ways to reduce ﬁ scal imbalances and to lower public 
spending, governments in Europe and elsewhere are seeking ways to improve 
the efﬁ ciency of the public sector. Standard policy prescriptions include 
making budget processes more responsive, reforming management practices, 
improving information and accessibility through e-government, using market 
signals for publicly provided goods, and enlisting the private sector and 
communities to deliver services.
Collaboration with others can take many forms: transferring revenues to 
subnational governments and mandating service provision; contracting with 
commercial companies to supply public goods; and entering public–private 
partnerships to ﬁ nance, build, and operate infrastructure projects and other 
public projects. If done well, such reforms can reduce public bureaucracy and 
increase the productivity of services by introducing practices from the private 
sector. If done poorly, they can lead to high transaction costs and replace public 
with private red tape—without improving services. Ultimately, high-quality 
government is needed to outsource well, too. Outsourcing, whether directly to 
the end user or for government inputs, amounted to 10 percent of GDP in OECD 
member countries in 2009. The Netherlands, the leader, outsourced almost 
twice that.
With public wages absorbing about one-quarter of total government spending, 
reining in public sector pay is a potentially powerful instrument for improving 
public sector efﬁ ciency (Clements and others 2010). Indeed, the north and the 
center (and Japan) managed to keep a cap on public wages relative to GDP after 
the mid-1990s, when public sector wages rose in other regions, though higher 
public sector pay there rarely translated into better public services. 
More recently, in response to the global crisis, many countries have imposed 
nominal freezes or cuts in employees’ remuneration and hiring, or have 
streamlined bonuses and allowances. Such actions can be important to shore 
up macroeconomic stability by lowering the wage bill. More systemic changes 
are also often needed, however, including rationalizing the size and structure 
of the public sector, strengthening payroll systems, and tightening the link 
between pay and performance. While they take longer to implement, if done 
375
CHAPTER 7
well, systemic reforms can make the adjustments sustainable and give a boost 
to public sector efﬁ ciency.
Measuring public sector performance is hard
Making the public sector work better might well be harder than doing the same 
thing for the private sector. Let us take the case of civil servants. Improving 
their incentives to perform well through bonus payments is difﬁ cult without 
good measures of what they produce. Yet, public sector outputs are often 
indivisible and their production function is unknown. And since the output of 
civil servants is hard to deﬁ ne and seldom priced in markets, it is intrinsically 
hard to measure their productivity and to reward them according to their 
contribution to output. Because putting a value on the output of governments 
is difﬁ cult, national accounts therefore typically assume that the value of 
that output is simply equal to the total cost of the input. This implies that 
larger public spending translates one for one into larger output, rendering 
investigations of public sector productivity based on national accounts data 
meaningless. 
Box 7.6: Private social spending is low in Western Europe, especially the south
Public and private expenditures are to some 
degree substitutes. For public services, 
families pay taxes and social security 
contributions to the government. For private 
services, households pay fees to the private 
school or health center. Of course, families 
might be able to select their preferred type of 
service in a better way and to hold the service 
provider accountable in the private sector. 
Nevertheless, the impact on family income 
might be similar, whether the school or health 
center is public or private. Indeed, once one 
accounts for private health insurance, the U.S. 
tax burden is no longer far below Western 
European levels.
Accounting for private social expenditures 
gives a better picture of the national resources 
invested in social sectors. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
presents numbers for private social spending 
by 26 member countries for 2007 (box ﬁ gure 
1). The United States stands out in its heavy 
and increasing reliance on private social 
spending. But Western Europe also lags the 
other Anglo-Saxon countries, as well as Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. In Western Europe, 
private social spending matters least for the 
south and most for the center.
Box ﬁ gure 1: Private social spending for OECD countries, 2001 and 2007
(percentage of GDP)
Source: Adema and Ladaique 2009; and OECD Social Expenditure Database.
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The issue is not just about measuring output. The uncertainty about public 
sector output might make it easier for bureaucracies to appropriate some of the 
surplus that otherwise would belong to taxpayers, at least as long as politicians 
and citizens cannot exercise appropriate control.
Although measuring government output is tricky, economists often adopt a 
methodology originally designed for ﬁ rms. Taking education and health as 
examples, the idea is to relate the amount of public resources to outputs and 
outcomes, such as education enrollment rates or life expectancy. The results 
show that differences in performance and efﬁ ciency across countries are 
substantial; that there is no systematic link from more government spending 
to higher efﬁ ciency; and that public sector efﬁ ciency relates systematically to 
income levels, institutional factors, and demographic trends (Hauner and Kyobe 
2010; Tanzi and Schuknecht 1997 and 2000; Alfonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi 
2005; Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2010); Mandl, Dierx, and Ilzkovitz 2008; 
Estache, Gonzalez, and Trujillo 2007). 
Analyzing public sector performance and efﬁ ciency is not easy. In particular, 
the link between public spending and social outcomes is often tenuous. Public 
spending is only one among many factors explaining public sector performance, 
including a host of economic, social, and institutional variables. In addition, 
comparing public expenditure ratios across countries assumes that public 
sectors have a homogenous production function. Nevertheless, these attempts 
to measure public sector performance serve a purpose. Comparisons of the 
performance of public sectors are inevitable, so this is best done in a rigid and 
transparent fashion rather than using more or less ad hoc approaches.
The following sections present three ways to analyze public sector 
performance. First, we link public spending on education and health to 
secondary school enrollment rates and maternal mortality ratios. Then, we 
illustrate potential inefﬁ ciencies in education using examples from Eastern 
Europe. Finally, we discuss how governments have adjusted spending on 
pensions and other social transfers in response to population aging.
Figure 7.12: Private spending makes 
the United States the biggest 
health care spender in the world
(private and public health spending, 
percentage of GDP 1995-2009)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WHO Global Health Expenditure Database.
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Public spending is more effective for health care 
than education
Health and education absorb sizable amounts of Europe’s public spending 
in social sectors, although public health spending is higher in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and Japan than in Western Europe. Eastern Europe spends less on 
public health, despite the fact that eastern partnership and especially EU 
candidate countries have increased their spending in the last decade. The north 
leads education spending in Western Europe, and the EU12 countries in Eastern 
Europe. Anglo-Saxon countries spend almost as much as the north, while Japan 
spends less than the center and the south. Despite shrinking school cohorts, EU 
candidate and eastern partnership countries raised education spending over the 
decade. Taking health and education together, Anglo-Saxon countries spent as 
much as or more than Western European countries, even though they rely more 
on private spending than Western Europe (box 7.6).
In Europe, private health spending is highest in the eastern partnership 
countries (ﬁ gure 7.12). 
How effective are public resources in improving health and education 
outcomes? It is illustrative to compare the impact of government spending on 
maternal mortality ratios and net secondary enrollment rates. The maternal 
mortality ratio—the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births—is 
Figure 7.13: Western 
Europe has good health 
and education outcomes
(maternal mortality ratios 
(left) and net secondary 
enrollment rates (right), 
1995–2009)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from WHO and UNESCO.
Box 7.7: Randomized public health, Oregon
In 2004, Oregon closed its public health 
insurance program for low-income people for 
lack of public funds. By 2008, it had enough 
resources for 10,000 people. Because 90,000 
people were on the waiting list, a lottery was 
used to select the people who can apply. 
Analyzing the impact of public health 
insurance on people’s health, Finkelstein and 
others (2011) write: “This lottery provides a 
unique opportunity to gauge the effects of 
expanding access to public health insurance on 
the health care use, ﬁ nancial strain, and health 
of low-income adults using a randomized 
controlled design. In the year after random 
assignment, the treatment group selected by 
the lottery was about 25 percentage points 
more likely to have insurance than the control 
group that was not selected. We ﬁ nd that 
in this ﬁ rst year, the treatment group had 
substantively and statistically signiﬁ cantly 
higher health care utilization (including 
primary and preventive care as well as 
hospitalizations), lower out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures and medical debt (including 
fewer bills sent to collection), and better self-
reported physical and mental health than the 
control group” (from abstract).
Source: Finkelstein and others 2011.
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often used as a measure of the quality of health care, and is correlated 
with infant and under-ﬁ ve mortality rates. The net secondary enrollment 
rate provides a measure of the extent to which the population eligible to 
participate in secondary education is actually enrolled. Net rates are a more 
precise measure of participation than gross rates as they exclude over-age 
and under-age children. However, enrollment rates do not measure the quality 
of education and learning achievements. The analysis contrasts the impact 
of public spending on health and education outcomes as measured by these 
two indicators. This exercise is merely suggestive, as a proper consideration of 
health and education would require a more disaggregated look at inputs and 
outputs for a range of outcomes.
Figure 7.13 shows the geographic variation of the performance measures. 
Maternal mortality ratios are far lower, and net secondary enrollment rates 
somewhat higher, in Western than Eastern Europe. As a measure of the quality 
of government, we use the commonly used International Country Risk Guide 
indicator averaged over the dimensions of corruption, law and order, and quality 
of bureaucracy. We interpret this indicator as a broad measure of government 
effectiveness. As we saw earlier, quality of government declines in Europe as 
we move north to south and west to east.
How does the impact of public spending vary across the two outcome 
measures? (The regression results are summarized in table A7.8). For maternal 
mortality, a 1 percent increase in government spending leads to a 1 percent 
reduction in the maternal mortality ratio. By contrast, we ﬁ nd that the elasticity 
of public spending on education with net secondary enrollment rates is only 
0.2, suggesting that spending on health is effective than on education. Similarly, 
analyzing 114 countries over 1980–2004, Hauner and Kyobe (2010) argue that 
the link from more public spending to better performance is more tenuous in 
health than in education. 
What might account for these differences between the two sectors? One 
interpretation is that public spending is more effective in promoting good health 
care than good education because of the different nature of the services. 
In particular, infrastructure and equipment play a bigger role in health than 
education. In addition, there is a fundamental difference between health and 
education in most countries: education is delivered by the public sector; health 
is purchased by the public sector even though it owns some of the institutions. 
For all its problems, health may have been far more effectively privatized than 
education as far as provision is concerned (except at tertiary level). 
Furthermore, the public sector seems better able than the private sector 
to control costs for health care and to give access to a broad spectrum of 
people without any major loss in the quality of services, when one contrasts 
the experience of the United States with that in other countries (box 7.7). A 
ﬁ nal interpretation would be not so much about why public health spending 
works, but why public education spending does not. One aspect is that 
private spending might be better able to substitute for public spending in 
education. Another aspect is that public education systems might suffer from 
inefﬁ ciencies. The next section illustrates these inefﬁ ciencies in three countries.
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Identifying ineffi ciencies in government spending: 
three examples
Europe has made great achievements in the education sector, and education 
has made a vast contribution to growth and prosperity over the last half 
century. In the early 1960s, only the privileged beneﬁ ted from higher education, 
while today about one in three young adults has a tertiary degree (OECD 
2011a). While there are many good things to say about education, this section 
presents three examples of inefﬁ cient government spending on education and 
highlights policy responses aimed at improving sector efﬁ ciency that have been 
suggested in recent World Bank reports.
Moldova: adjusting the school network to changing demographics. Like many 
of its neighbors, the country has experienced a steady population decline in the 
past two decades. Lower birthrates combined with high levels of emigration 
have also led to a sharp aging of the population—particularly in rural areas—
resulting in 43 percent fewer students in Moldova’s schools over this period. 
But the school network has failed to adjust to the demographic changes: the 
number of teachers employed in 2009 was the same as in 2003, while the 
number of schools was virtually unchanged from 1994. The average school now 
enrolls 160 fewer students than it did in the early 1990s, with student–teacher 
ratios dropping from 14.5 in 2003 to 10.4 in 2009.
Shrinking schools and classes have caused education to become a drain on 
public resources, its spending surpassing 9 percent of GDP by 2009. Recent 
work at the World Bank examined the expenditures in Moldova’s general 
education subsector and identiﬁ ed ﬁ scal savings from optimizing the country’s 
school network. The government will have to do a lot: increase class and school 
sizes in rural areas by consolidating and closing underutilized schools; raise class 
sizes in large schools by consolidating small classes; implement nationwide per 
student ﬁ nancing of general education; and overhaul the legislative framework 
governing education to allow for a more efﬁ cient use of resources in line with 
actual needs, instead of ensuring compliance with outdated norms.
The ﬁ scal savings resulting from the proposed reforms—estimated to exceed 
7 percent of the general education budget—can then be used to improve the 
quality of education by investing in infrastructure, teacher training, technology, 
learning materials, and so on.
Poland: aligning spending with results in a decentralized education system. 
Poland’s education reforms are considered a great success. By restructuring 
schooling, deferring tracking in secondary education, launching curriculum 
reform, and boosting school autonomy, between 2000 and 2009, Poland 
rose from below to above the OECD average in the OECD Programme for 
International Student Assessment reading scores. 
Not all aspects of the reform have worked equally well. The decentralization 
reforms of the 1990s devolved responsibility for managing primary and 
secondary education to local governments (Rodriguez and Herbst 2011). In 
primary education (grades 1–6) most direct ﬁ nancing decisions are now made 
by the municipality (gmina), allowing for wide variations in funding and other 
inputs for primary schools across the country’s more than 2,000 municipalities.
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Given the high degree of discretion in municipalities’ decisions on how—and 
how much—to invest in primary education, one may ask whether municipalities 
that spend more per student receive a higher return on this investment in 
the form of better educational outcomes than similar municipalities with 
lower levels of spending. It seems not. Recent World Bank analysis found no 
relationship between municipal spending on primary education and grade 6 test 
scores when municipalities’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
were taken into account.
This ﬁ nding raises another question: Why do some communities get less 
from spending on education than seemingly similar but more “efﬁ cient” 
communities? For a possible explanation, consider two rural communities. 
The village of Rutka-Tartak spent less than half as much per student as did 
Tarłów village, yet its students scored signiﬁ cantly higher on the national grade 
6 exam. The two municipalities are similar—population density, household 
structure, adult education levels, and so forth—yet one community seems to 
be “more efﬁ cient” in converting inputs proxied by spending per student into 
outcomes, as measured by standardized test scores.
The difference in unit costs between Tarłów and Rutka-Tartak is explained in 
large part by the difference in average class sizes across the two municipalities. 
While one municipality groups students, on average, in classes of 24, the other 
has smaller classes of 15 students. Smaller classes increase unit costs but do not 
appear to contribute to improving education outcomes. In short, this suggests 
that some of Tarłów’s resources could be saved with little impact on the quality 
of education of its primary schools.
Armenia: protecting equity while ensuring quality of rural schools. A major 
concern in deciding how to allocate public resources in education arises from 
the goal of ensuring adequate access to high-quality education for all children. 
The focus is often on protecting access for vulnerable children, such as those 
from households with poor or less educated parents or in remote rural areas. 
In Armenia, the government’s policy of providing equal access to education 
is manifest in a large network of small rural schools that allows virtually all 
students to attend school in their village—Armenia averages one school per 
village. The question is: While this raises the unit costs of education, does it 
foster equality by providing high-quality education to vulnerable students?
Sadly, no. The government’s policy of maintaining a vast network of small 
rural schools is not only ﬁ scally inefﬁ cient but also fails to provide high-quality 
education to the target student population. The average allocation per student 
under the country’s per capita ﬁ nancing formula is nearly three times as high 
in the smallest schools as the national average. By itself, this is not surprising 
given the ﬁ nancing formula’s generous ﬁ xed per school component and the 
government’s commitment to funding schools in even the smallest villages. 
But more detailed analysis revealed a persistent gap in student achievement 
between urban and rural schools and between large and small schools. Of the 
students who took the university entrance exam at the end of the 2009/10 
academic year, those attending the smallest schools were almost 20 percentage 
points less likely to pass. These students were also less likely to take the uniﬁ ed 
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entrance exam. After controlling for a variety of demographic, socioeconomic, 
and geographic characteristics of the communities where these schools are 
located, it was still the case that the achievement gap between small and large 
schools remained.
The inability to ensure equal quality of education for rural students undermines 
the rationale for spending heavily on maintaining small schools in the more 
than 800 villages. The World Bank study recommended that the government 
consider shifting its focus from providing access to a school building in every 
village to ensuring access to high-quality education for every student. Potential 
measures include assessing the quality of education provided by rural schools, 
adjusting the per capita ﬁ nancing formula, addressing the low quality of 
teaching in rural areas, and ﬁ nding better ways of providing education to 
students in rural areas by, for example, forming fewer “hub schools” for groups 
of villages. With more informed analysis and a willingness to experiment, equity 
and efﬁ ciency in public service provision need not be conﬂ icting objectives. 
These three country examples illustrate how inefﬁ ciencies in government 
spending can be caused. One is the public sector’s inability to adjust spending 
patterns to shifting demographic trends (Moldova). Another (Poland) is that 
devolving spending decisions to local governments creates a laboratory that 
can illustrate the impact of different resource allocation decisions on results 
in otherwise similar municipalities. The challenge is for municipalities to learn 
from each other and adopt winning solutions. And last (Armenia), government 
policies that seek to improve equity at the expense of efﬁ ciency may achieve 
neither without proper evaluation of the policies’ outcomes. 
Aging and social transfers
An aging population puts pressure on pension systems. But who bears the 
costs? Is it the working-age population who have to pay more taxes or to face 
cuts in family beneﬁ ts imposed by the politically powerful elderly? Or does the 
burden fall on the elderly through less generous pensions? 
Population aging in the last three decades is almost a global phenomenon, but 
to different degrees in different regions. Taking 1980 as the benchmark and the 
Figure 7.14: The south spends 
more on pensions than others
(public pensions, percentage of GDP, 
1995–2000 and 2007–08)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; and OECD Pensions Statistics.
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old-age dependency ratio as the indicator, it was most rapid in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea. In Europe, it was fastest in the EU candidate countries, the 
eastern partnership countries, and the south. Populations in the north and the 
center aged relatively little. But the regions started at different points. Despite 
rapid aging, Korea and Eastern Europe still have fairly young populations. In 
2009, for each person age 65 or older there were seven working-age persons 
in Korea, but only three in Japan. In Europe, there were more than ﬁ ve working-
age persons in EU candidate and eastern partnership countries, but only fewer 
than four in the south.
The trends in public pension spending since the mid-1990s also reveal notable 
differences across regions. As a share of GDP, public pension spending increased 
in the south, the EU candidate countries, and Japan, but decreased in the north, 
the EU12, and the Anglo-Saxon group (ﬁ gure 7.14).
Comparing the trends in public pensions spending with population aging gives 
us a way to assess whether spending on public pensions is driven mainly by 
demographics or also changes in generosity and coverage. A good indicator 
is the pension support ratio (Lindert 2004), which is the public pension per 
elderly person relative to GDP per worker or, alternatively, the ratio of the share 
of public pensions in GDP relative to the share of elderly in the working-age 
population. This section looks ﬁ rst at OECD countries over 1980–2007, and then 
extends the analysis to Eastern Europe for 2000–2007/08. A similar approach is 
used to look at changes in social transfers.
For a group of 20 OECD countries, we ﬁ nd that pension payments increased 
over and above aging pressures only in the south, especially in Greece and 
Portugal. In other regions, pension payments increased in line with the rising 
share of the elderly in the working-age population (the north and Japan) or 
even declined due to a tightening of generosity (the center and Anglo-Saxon). 
Box 7.8: Some countries have managed to reform pensions in spite of a growing elderly population
Australia, a leader in pension reforms, has a 
near-universal system of mandatorily funded 
employer pensions. In the late 1990s, Canada 
raised the contribution rate for the public 
pension system well above current costs 
to build up a large trust fund for the future. 
Germany, Japan, and Sweden have all indexed 
their public pensions system, at least partly, to 
changes in longevity. Germany has also taken 
steps to encourage funded private pensions. 
Italy began in the early 1990s to adopt 
reforms to scale back beneﬁ ts, though with 
long transition periods. The Netherlands has 
a large, nearly universal, and fully funded 
occupational pension system, allowing the 
public pension system to be relatively modest. 
In the late 1990s, Sweden introduced a new 
system of national deﬁ ned contribution 
accounts along with a mandatory system of 
personal retirement accounts. Many countries 
are cutting back expensive early-retirement 
options. The United States has a modest public 
pension system thanks to a large funded 
private system and a young population.
On the basis of median voter models, Razin, 
Sadek, and Swagel (2002) and Galasso and 
Profeta (2004) argue that aging could either 
increase or decrease the size of social welfare 
depending on whether the political effect or 
the economic effect dominates. Population 
aging makes the median voter older, and 
hence increases that person’s demand for 
social welfare spending (the political effect). 
Aging also leads, however, to a higher tax 
burden on the median voter as the share of the 
old-age population increases, and this could 
reduce the median voter’s preference for social 
spending (the economic effect). Empirical 
analysis suggests that population aging is 
linked to higher social spending. Disney (2007), 
for example, uses ﬁ xed-effect panel analysis 
to show that demographic aging is associated 
with a larger welfare state using data from 21 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries for the 1970s to 
the 1990s. 
Using similar data and an error-correction 
speciﬁ cation, Sanz and Velázquez (2007) 
establish that aging is the main driving force in 
the growth of government spending. Likewise, 
Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009 and 2010) analyze 
OECD countries from 1980 to the early 2000s 
and ﬁ nd that population aging drives up 
pension spending, but not health spending 
or welfare programs for families and the 
unemployed. In addition, Capretta (2007) and 
Meier and Werding (2010) ﬁ nd that the increase 
in aggregate spending on pensions is mitigated 
by reductions in the generosity of beneﬁ ts.
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In addition, there is a notable shift in pension policy in the mid-1990s in the 
north and the center. Up to the mid-1990s, public pension pressures tended to 
increase over and above population aging partly due to policies to encourage early 
retirement. In response to the economic recession and rise in unemployment in 
the early 1980s, some countries encouraged early retirement of workers because 
rigid labor laws made it difﬁ cult for enterprises to lay off workers. By contrast, with 
growth and income convergence with other EU countries, the south responded to 
rising expectations of its populations in the 1990s by adopting the former social 
beneﬁ t norms that the north and the center were beginning to tighten.
There is a remarkably consistent pattern in the links between aging and spending 
(table A7.9). In 1980–94, for all OECD countries as well as just the European OECD 
countries, a 1 percent increase in the old-age dependency ratio triggered roughly 
a 1 percent increase in public pensions as a share of GDP. In other words, the 
pension support ratio remained constant, as public pension spending increased in 
line with population aging. In 1995–2007, the elasticity of the old-age dependency 
ratio for public pension payments was less than unity. Furthermore, it was smaller 
for European OECD countries (around 0.6–0.7) than for all OECD countries (around 
0.8–0.9). In other words, the pension support ratio declined. Countries reduced the 
generosity of pension payments to limit the rise in public pensions as population 
aging became more pressing. Led by the north and the center, pension reforms 
helped mitigate the ﬁ scal impact of population aging. These ﬁ ndings conﬁ rm the 
results in the literature (box 7.8). 
Figure 7.15: The burden 
of social transfers grew 
most in the south
(trends in social transfers, 
1994 and 2008, 1990 = 
100)
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; OECD National Accounts Statistics; and WDI.
Figure 7.16: The eastern 
partnership countries 
increased social transfers 
the most
(trends in pensions and 
social transfers, 2007/08, 
Eastern Europe)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; and WDI.
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A slight modiﬁ cation allows a similar assessment for social transfers (table 
A7.10). Since social transfers include various family, child, and unemployment 
beneﬁ ts, the dependent population has to be redeﬁ ned to include the elderly, 
the population under 15 years old, and the unemployed. As before, we relate 
this dependent population to the working-age population. Of course, such 
analysis is simplistic, as the link between demography and social transfers is 
more complicated. For example, social transfers include social assistance—not 
just unemployment beneﬁ ts but also payments linked to sickness, disability, and 
maternity.
Figure 7.15 shows the trends in social transfer indicators relative to 1990 for the 
19 OECD countries with data. In 1990–94, social transfer payments grew faster 
than the dependency ratio in all regions. After 1994, the social transfer support 
ratio improved substantially in the north, and deteriorated in the south and 
Japan. Regression analysis conﬁ rms this pattern, even though the coefﬁ cients 
are seldom signiﬁ cant. Including all countries with data from 1980, we ﬁ nd that 
the elasticity of the dependency ratio for social transfer payments declined 
after 1994, and more so in Europe than for the whole OECD sample.
The discussion so far has looked only at OECD countries. The data also permit 
a review of the changes in pension payments and social transfers in Eastern 
Europe since 2000. Some of these countries carried out pension reforms 
by modifying pay-as-you-go systems into multipillar systems (ﬁ gure 7.16). 
These include Hungary and Poland in the 1990s, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Figure 7.17 Public debt rose 
everywhere during the crisis 
except in the emerging peers
(ﬁ scal balances (left) and 
gross public debt (right), 
percentage of GDP, 2008 
and 2010)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
Box 7.9: Debt and growth
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) analyze the 
relationship of growth and debt for 44 countries 
over about 200 years. They sum up their main 
ﬁ ndings as follows:
First, the relationship between government 
debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt-to-
GDP ratios below 90 percent of GDP. Above 
the threshold of 90 percent, median growth 
rates fall by 1 percent, and average growth 
falls considerably more. The threshold for 
public debt is similar in advanced and emerging 
economies and applies for both the post–World 
War II period and as far back as the data permit 
(often well into the 1800s).
Second, emerging markets face lower 
thresholds for total external debt (public and 
private)—which is usually denominated in a 
foreign currency. When total external debt 
reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth 
declines about 2 percent; for higher levels, 
growth rates are roughly cut in half. 
Third, there is no apparent contemporaneous 
link between inﬂ ation and public debt levels 
for the advanced countries as a group (some 
countries, such as the United States, have 
experienced higher inﬂ ation when debt-to-
GDP is high). The story is entirely different for 
emerging markets, where inﬂ ation rises sharply 
as debt increases. 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff 2010.
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Lithuania, Romania, and the Slovak Republic in the 2000s. These reforms 
moderated the impact of population aging on public ﬁ nances. But eastern 
partnership countries lag their European peers in these reforms. In addition, 
they also expanded social transfers faster than increases in the dependency 
ratio, as they appear to have responded to the expectations of people to meet 
the social standards of Western Europe. Naturally, Western European countries 
can be more generous; they can mobilize resources for social programs more 
easily, possibly with smaller disincentive effects on work.
Getting the fi scal house in order
With the economic recovery losing steam three years after the Lehman 
crisis broke, governments in Europe would like to focus on creating jobs and 
generating growth. Instead, they are confronted with a public debt crisis. 
In many countries, putting the ﬁ scal house in order has become the main 
preoccupation of policymakers for ﬁ ve reasons: the size of government, ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cits, and public debt have risen due to the economic crisis, boosting the 
scale of the ﬁ scal challenge; learning from the crisis, ﬁ nancial markets have 
turned their attention to potential ﬁ scal vulnerabilities; the postcrisis growth 
prospects look uncertain, making ﬁ scal adjustment more difﬁ cult; population 
aging will accelerate in the coming decades; and restoring the ability of ﬁ scal 
policy to respond will help prepare for future crises. 
A bigger fi scal challenge
Even without the crisis, governments in Europe already had large public sectors. 
During the crisis, government expenditures increased even further.  In 2010, 
expenditures reached more than 50 percent of GDP in Western Europe and 
42 percent of GDP in Eastern Europe, the highest in a decade and a half. The 
crisis also led to an unprecedented peacetime deterioration in ﬁ scal balances 
as the revenue base collapsed, GDP contracted, and government spending 
rose to stabilize the economy and mitigate social impacts. The median general 
government deﬁ cit jumped from 0.5 percent of GDP in 2008 to 4.7 percent in 
2010 for Western Europe and from 2 percent to 4.2 percent in Eastern Europe 
(ﬁ gure 7.17).
Figure 7.18: Markets 
have learned to look at 
ﬁ scal vulnerabilities
(ﬁ ve-year credit default swap 
spreads and public debt, mid-
2008 and August 2011)
Note: Dark blue dots represent EU15 countries, and light blue EU12 economies.
Source: Eurostat; and Bloomberg.
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In Western Europe, the increase in deﬁ cits was the largest in the north. 
Nevertheless, the 2010 ﬁ scal deﬁ cits of the north remained among the lowest 
in Europe, as this region had run ﬁ scal surpluses before the crisis. By contrast, 
the already weak ﬁ scal position of the south deteriorated further. In Eastern 
Europe, the deterioration in ﬁ scal deﬁ cits was less striking and similar across the 
three groups, as governments were less active in supporting domestic demand 
and stabilizing the banking system. 
The large increases in ﬁ scal deﬁ cits—and to a lesser extent governments’ 
acquisition of unhealthy banks’ ﬁ nancial assets—sharply raised public debt-to-
GDP ratios. The median general government debt increased from 57 percent of 
GDP in 2008 to 74 percent of GDP in 2010 in Western Europe. Of 18 countries 
in Western Europe, 5 had public debt-to-GDP ratios higher than 90 percent in 
2010 (box 7.9). Public debt ratios increased from 25 percent of GDP in 2008 to 
39 percent in 2010 in Eastern Europe. Of the 25 countries in Eastern Europe, 
11 had debt above 40 percent of GDP. High public debt ratios put pressure on 
real interest rates and dampened growth prospects. International evidence 
suggests, for example, that a 10 percentage point increase in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio leads to a rise in long-term interest rates of 30–50 basis points, and a 
slowdown in growth of 0.15 percentage points a year (Kumar and Woo 2010).
For most countries, the increase in public debt has not triggered increases in 
public debt service burdens because of low interest rates. However, markets 
pay close attention to ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and public debt burdens and so, though 
government bond spreads in the European Union bore little relation to public 
debt before the crisis, bond spreads are now rising with higher public debt 
(ﬁ gure 7.18). The recurrent volatility in euro area markets is a reminder of how 
quickly doubts over ﬁ scal solvency can trigger a loss of conﬁ dence in ﬁ nancial 
markets. Government ﬁ nancing needs are expected to stay high in the coming 
years in view of high ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and large maturing debts. The supply of 
government bonds could increase further in high-income countries once central 
banks unwind extraordinary monetary policies.
Strong growth could make debt problems fade in importance, as investors 
care about the debt burden relative to GDP. Yet the prospects for a strong 
rebound are feeble. Even before the latest slowdown in the economic recovery, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) growth projections from April 2011 suggested 
that growth in Europe will decline from before the crisis (ﬁ gure 7.19). The 
Figure 7.19: The biggest 
declines in growth will be 
in Europe
(growth (left), percent, 
2003–08 versus 2011–16; 
output gap (right), 
percentage of GDP, 2003–08 
versus 2011–16)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.
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Box 7.10: Improving regional development policies—follow the Irish
Regional development is again coming to 
the forefront of debates in the European 
Union and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). This 
time, these policies are being debated in 
different economic conditions than before 
the global economic crisis of 2008–09. OECD 
economies now face weak growth prospects, 
with weakened ﬁ scal balances. Regional 
development efforts will have to contend with 
more pressing national growth imperatives, 
and there will be greater pressure to be more 
frugal with national ﬁ scal resources.
Some countries have done better than 
others in using EU cohesion funds. Box table 
1 shows three progressively more successful 
approaches to regional development in Europe, 
only a little simplistically called the Italian, 
Iberian, and Irish models. 
The experience of Ireland is especially 
educational. Between 1977 and 2008, Ireland’s 
GDP per capita grew from less than 75 percent 
of the EU average to more than 125 percent. 
Despite the crisis, Ireland remains among 
the 10 countries with the highest per capita 
income in the world. What is behind Ireland’s 
success? Among other things, a sensible 
regional development policy for a small 
economy. 
Since joining the European Union in 1973, 
Ireland received approximately €17 billion in 
EU Structural and Cohesion Funds through 
the end of 2003. In the ﬁ rst two rounds of 
EU funding, the entire country was classiﬁ ed 
as an Objective One area. Between 1993 
and 2003, cohesion funds supported 120 
infrastructure projects at the cost of about €2 
billion. The choice of projects was based on 
a national development plan, which focused 
on investments in economic infrastructure 
that stimulated national economic growth. 
The Irish invested aggressively in education 
and training and general public services in all 
of Ireland to create a good business climate 
countrywide. Today, Ireland is one of the top 
10 countries for doing business. Infrastructure 
improvements were more selective. These 
included investments in leading regions and 
in connecting leading and lagging areas, such 
as the M50 (Dublin Ring Road), M1 (Dublin-
Belfast), and improvements in others. With its 
business-friendly policies and good logistics, 
Ireland has become a popular destination for 
American ﬁ rms and European workers.
Contrast the Irish approach to cohesion funds 
with the “Iberian approach.” Ireland’s rapid 
convergence toward the incomes of Europe’s 
leaders was accompanied by a rising spatial 
concentration of economic activity. Compared 
with the other cohesion countries—Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain—Ireland’s economic 
concentration rose much more. But its per 
capita income grew much faster too. In 1977, 
Greece, Ireland, and Spain had per capita 
incomes of about $9,000; Portugal’s was 
$6,000. By 2002, Portugal had an income 
of $11,000, and Greece and Spain close to 
$15,000. Ireland’s per capita income had risen 
to $27,500. 
Today, almost all regions in the new member 
states of the European Union qualify for EU 
ﬁ nancial support. They should consider using 
the funds for international convergence 
and not—until later stages—for spatially 
balanced economic growth within their 
borders. European Union candidates—such as 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia and 
Turkey—may also be well advised to be single-
minded in using the funds for international 
convergence and not to try to spread economic 
activity out too soon.
As the older member states of Western Europe 
try to ﬁ nd new drivers of growth and greater 
efﬁ ciency in public spending, they too would 
do well to shift from an overreliance on place-
based interventions to a mix of policies that 
strengthen social services such as education, 
health care, and general administration 
everywhere, combined with selective 
investments in infrastructure to connect 
leading and lagging regions. In a few cases, 
place-based interventions such as special 
incentives to ﬁ rms to locate in lagging regions 
might be necessary. But these should be used 
least and last, and only along with efforts to 
improve basic social services and connective 
infrastructure.
Box table 1: Three approaches to Regional Development in Europe
“Italian” Model “Iberian” Model “Irish” Model
Rationale Bring jobs to people Bring jobs to people and enable 
them to access product markets
Prepare people to get jobs wherever 
they are
Objective Bring economic activity from leading 
to lagging regions
Facilitate access of producers in 
lagging regions to markets in leading 
regions
Integrate lagging and leading 
regions
Instruments Emphasize spatially targeted 
Interventions
Emphasize Interventions and 
connective Infrastructure 
Emphasize Institutions and 
connective Infrastructure
economic expansion of 2003–08 was fueled by large capital inﬂ ows, rapid credit 
expansion and, in some countries, rising current account deﬁ cits and ﬁ scal 
expansion. By contrast, growth in 2011–16 is set to remain weak, as households 
and governments reduce their debt, banks deleverage their balance sheets, 
and investors remain cautious about risks. In Western European countries and 
their peers, actual output could stay below an economy’s capacity to produce 
goods and services for years to come, even though the crisis may have lowered 
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potential output in many countries. Eastern Europe is likely to see the sharpest 
slowdown. Weak growth in turn implies that tax collection will be sluggish and 
public expenditure pressures elevated. This will make it difﬁ cult to rein in ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cits and decrease public debt.
Besides, the population is aging faster. By 2040, there will be only two 
working-age people for each elderly person in Southern Europe, against ﬁ ve 
to one in 1980. The ratios are only slightly higher for the other regions in 
Europe. Population aging tends to dampen growth. Other things being equal, 
a country with a large share of elderly people and children is likely to grow 
slower than a country with a large share of working-age people. The link is 
pretty straightforward: as workers age, they cut back on hours worked or retire. 
Declining hours and lower labor participation reduce labor supply, which in turn 
cuts growth. In addition, the skill composition of workers may worsen, as older 
workers tend to have more obsolete skills than younger workers. This can affect 
growth even more.
Aging not only undermines growth but also makes it hard to improve public 
ﬁ nances. Aging is a direct cost driver for public ﬁ nances, especially for 
pensions and health. Looking at the G7 countries over 1960–2007, Cottarelli and 
Schaechter (2010) ﬁ nd that health and pensions accounted for 80 percent of 
the increase in primary government spending as a share of potential GDP. This 
reﬂ ects population aging, along with other factors such as increases in coverage 
and generosity of social security plans as well as advances in technology to 
prolong people’s lives.
While the scale of the ﬁ scal challenge is large, a key lesson from the crisis 
is that it is essential to use the good times to improve ﬁ scal balances. Fiscal 
policy played a central stabilizing role during the crisis (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, 
and Mauro 2010). Monetary policy had reached its limits through low interest 
rates and quantitative easing in stimulating the economy. At the same time, 
the usual concerns about mistiming the ﬁ scal stimulus were less pressing as it 
became clear early on that the crisis would be long-lasting. Hence ﬁ scal policy 
became the main policy tool to support domestic demand in some countries, 
though others could not rely on ﬁ scal policy because they entered the crisis 
with weak ﬁ scal balances and high public debt. Indeed, some economies ran 
Figure 7.20: Spending on 
investment, education, 
and health was protected 
during the crisis
(public investment (left), 
and health and education 
spending (right), percentage 
of GDP, 2003–08 and 
2009/10)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; OECD National Accounts Statistics; and WDI.
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procyclical ﬁ scal policies driven by consumption booms and had to cut spending 
and increase taxes in spite of large recessions. The implication is that in order to 
prepare for the next crisis, many countries have to reduce public debt to below 
precrisis levels. 
Bringing about a sizable fi scal adjustment
Governments in Europe have to implement ﬁ scal consolidation strategies that 
ensure that the economic recovery translates into improved ﬁ scal positions. 
Most countries have started to implement bold entitlement reforms in response 
to ﬁ scal pressures, while safeguarding core social spending (Bornhorst and 
others 2010). An encouraging feature of the ﬁ scal adjustments to date is 
that countries succeeded in protecting or even increasing outlays for public 
investments in 2009 and 2010, apart from the south, as well as public education 
and health spending in 2009 (ﬁ gure 7.20). In Eastern Europe, access to structural 
funds or preaccession assistance played a vital stabilizing role, and can be 
used to improve growth prospects. But their use will have to be rethought; 
the experience in southern Italy and the original “cohesion countries”—Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain—should be reassessed in deciding how these funds 
can best be used to foster economic growth and convergence (box 7.10).
In 2011, countries envisaged sizable reductions in ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and public debt 
over the coming years. The pace and the structure of the ﬁ scal adjustment 
vary, reﬂ ecting primarily the differences in initial ﬁ scal positions, prospects, and 
market pressures. Countries with larger ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and public debt levels are 
planning larger ﬁ scal adjustments. Countries facing high unemployment rates 
tend to plan for less ambitious ﬁ scal adjustment, to limit additional short-term 
costs that arise from frontloaded ﬁ scal retrenchment. Countries facing higher 
borrowing costs tend to plan larger adjustments in the near future. For some 
countries, frontloaded ﬁ scal consolidation can ensure access to markets and the 
ability to ﬁ nance deﬁ cits at reasonable rates.
International experience shows that successful ﬁ scal consolidations share 
common features (Gray, Lane, and Varoudakis 2007; Clements, Perry and Toro 
2010; Blanchard and Cottarelli 2010). First, a ﬁ scal consolidation strategy is 
crucial to shore up conﬁ dence in ﬁ scal sustainability. Indeed, when markets lack 
Figure 7.21: Large ﬁ scal 
adjustments are not unusual
(size, percentage of GDP 
(left), number of large ﬁ scal 
adjustments (right))
Note: The ﬁ gure includes ﬁ scal consolidations over at least three years that reduced the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance by 5 percent of GDP or more.
Source: Abbas and others 2010.
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conﬁ dence in the government’s commitment to achieve the needed primary 
surpluses, a vicious cycle could emerge. Markets could demand higher risk 
premiums to hold public debt, worsening public debt dynamics further.
Second, laying out a clear timeline for ﬁ scal measures can be a way to square 
the need to shore up sluggish private demand and give public support today 
with the urgency to inspire conﬁ dence in ﬁ nancial markets in sustainable long-
term ﬁ scal balances. It might also be easier to phase in structural reform over 
time, as this allows people and businesses to adjust to the new circumstances.
Third, while ﬁ scal consolidation can involve a mix of expenditure and revenue 
measures (ﬁ gure 7.21), many countries would need to reduce expenditures. 
Coming into the recent crisis, many countries had poor structural primary 
ﬁ scal balances, reﬂ ecting the lack of progress in public expenditure reforms, 
generous spending, and weak public expenditure controls. If well done, ﬁ scal 
consolidation does not simply make across-the-board cuts. Instead, it focuses 
on areas where there is little value for money. Entitlement reforms are often 
part of such structural adjustments, as they are central to strengthening 
long-term ﬁ scal positions. Indeed, successful ﬁ scal adjustments rely on reducing 
transfers and wages more than investments in physical and human capital, 
which are crucial for strengthening an economy’s growth potential (Tsibouris 
and others 2006). Such measures have to be balanced with the objective 
of maintaining effective provision of public services to poor and vulnerable 
families, also because such reforms are more sustainable. Revenue measures 
can also help to make the ﬁ scal adjustment fairer. 
Finally, ﬁ scal institutions can make commitments to reducing debt-to-GDP 
ratios more credible. Medium-term budgetary frameworks, an effective 
budget process, and independent ﬁ scal agencies that monitor policy design 
and implementation all make ﬁ scal policy more effective. For example, ﬁ scal 
rules that limit public expenditure increases during an economic upturn could, 
with multiyear and performance-based budgeting, contribute to sustainable 
ﬁ scal ﬁ nances over the long term. Many EU12 countries have moved in this 
direction. In addition, the European Council has decided to strengthen economic 
governance to increase ﬁ scal discipline, broaden economic surveillance, and 
deepen coordination.
Large adjustments are needed
Public debt ratios are a good reference point for establishing longer-term ﬁ scal 
adjustment needs. We build on the analysis and methodology of the IMF Fiscal 
Monitors to assess the size of the required adjustment in Europe, along with 
possible options for reforms in pensions, health, and education. Western Europe 
and its peers are assumed to reduce debt to 60 percent of GDP by 2030, and 
Eastern Europe and its peers to 40 percent—for both groups, roughly precrisis 
levels. The debt threshold is lower for Eastern Europe, as ﬁ nancial markets have 
lower tolerance levels for public debt in emerging economies; their revenue 
bases might be more volatile; and public debt is shorter-term, more likely to be 
held by foreigners, or denominated in foreign currency. The assumption is that 
countries will meet these targets exclusively through improvements in their 
primary balances. 
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A large and sustained improvement in ﬁ scal balances is necessary to bring 
public debt in Europe to prudent levels. Table 7.1 presents the results:
 · In Western Europe, the median required improvement in the primary balances 
is close to 5 percent of GDP. The south faces the largest adjustment (8 percent 
of GDP). Adjustment needs are lower in Eastern Europe (3.7 percent of GDP), 
though they are close to 5 percent of GDP for the EU12 countries.
 · These numbers do not factor in the improvement in the ﬁ scal balances from 
the recovery. On that basis, the required adjustment goes down to 2.5 percent 
of GDP for Western Europe and 3.2 percent for Eastern Europe.
 · Countries have already adopted measures to improve ﬁ scal deﬁ cits. Taking 
into account the ﬁ scal impact of consolidation plans announced by spring 2011 
for the next ﬁ ve years, the additional average adjustment need goes down 
to 0.1 percent of GDP for Western Europe and 0.4 percent for Eastern Europe, 
net of the impact of trends affecting entitlement spending after 2016 (ﬁ gure 
7.22). Implementing the ﬁ scal adjustment path over the next ﬁ ve years would 
go a long way to put public ﬁ nances on a sustainable footing.
Table 7.1: Illustrative adjustment needs by 2030, median, percentage of GDP
IMF projections, 2010 Illustrative fiscal adjustment to achieve debt target in 2030
Gross debt PB CAPB CAPB in 2020–2030
Required 
adjustment in 
PB between 
2010 and 
2020
Required 
adjustment in 
CAPB between 
2010 and 
2020
Required 
adjustment in 
CAPB between 
2010 and 
2020 including 
pensions
Required 
adjustment in 
CAPB between 
2010 and 
2020 including 
pensions and 
health
Required 
adjustment in 
CAPB between 
2010 and 
2020 including 
pensions, 
health, and 
education
Western Europe 73.6 -2.8 -0.6 1.9 4.7 2.5 3.4 6.1 5.8
   North 48.4 -2.5 0.0 0.7 3.2 0.7 1.2 4.3 3.6
   Center 77.2 -2.2 -0.9 1.9 4.1 2.8 5.4 8.7 8.3
   South 101.2 -3.9 -3.1 4.0 7.8 7.0 8.6 11.1 10.9
Eastern Europe 39.5 -3.3 -2.8 0.4 3.7 3.2 - - -
   EU12 39.7 -4.0 -1.9 0.9 4.9 2.8 2.2 3.7 3.7
   EU cand. 40.9 -2.9 -2.9 0.5 3.4 3.4 - - -
   E. prtn. 34.4 -2.6 -2.8 0.3 2.9 3.0 - - -
Anglo-Saxon 
peers
84.0 -4.9 -4.2 0.9 5.8 5.1 6.3 8.4 -
   Anglo-Saxon 57.8 -4.9 -4.1 0.7 5.6 4.8 6.2 8.7 -
   Japan 220.3 -8.4 -6.7 6.6 15.0 13.3 13.1 14.1 -
Emerging peers 42.7 -1.0 -1.1 0.5 1.5 1.6 2.6 3.7 -
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries. PB and CAPB mean primary balance and cyclically-adjusted primary balance, respectively. 
The numbers in the last three columns include the ﬁ scal impact of aging in pensions, health, and 
education. They are missing for EU candidate and eastern partnership countries due to lack of data.
Source: Calculations by staff of the Institute for Structural Research in Poland and the World Bank, 
based on IMF WEO.
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Figure 7.22: Illustrative 
adjustment needs
(median, percentage of GDP)
Figure 7.23: Illustrative 
adjustment needs and 
projected increase in health 
and pension expenditures
(median, percentage of GDP)
Note: “EU cand.” refers to EU candidate countries and “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership 
countries. CAPB means cyclically-adjusted primary balance.
Source: Calculations by staff of the Institute for Structural Research in Poland and the World Bank, 
based on IMF WEO.
Box 7.11: Changes in behavior and policies enable countries to adjust to aging
Pessimism about Europe’s ability to meet 
economic challenges in the light of population 
aging may be unwarranted. One reason this 
concern may be misplaced is that the rise in 
life expectancy is not foremost an economic 
problem but a boon to people’s well-being. 
Also, age accounting, while useful as a 
benchmark, is also likely to overstate the 
impact of aging on growth and ﬁ scal outcomes 
for two reasons: people change their behavior, 
and policymakers change policies. As people 
age, they are likely to work in later years. A 
rise in healthy life expectancy enables people 
to work productively for more years, without 
reducing the number of years in retirement. 
In addition, as people realize they might live 
longer, they tend to increase their savings at 
working ages to fund consumption in old age.
The reduced fertility that adds to the shift 
toward older populations also means that 
more women can enter the labor force. Policy 
is crucial to support these changes in behavior. 
In particular, there should be no incentives for 
early retirement, as in an extreme form of a 
mandatory retirement age. Other measures 
include ﬂ exible old-age pension arrangements, 
legal efforts to ensure that employers do not 
discriminate against older workers, lifelong 
learning programs, investments in old-age 
health, and policies encouraging migration.
Source: Bloom, Canning, and Fink 2008.
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 · Adjustment needs increase with population aging. Assuming unchanged 
policies, expenditures on health and pensions are likely to increase the 
needed ﬁ scal adjustment by close to 3.6 percent of GDP in Western Europe 
and 0.9 percent in the EU12 (ﬁ gure 7.23). Public spending on health care alone 
is expected to contribute most to the spending increases. In Western Europe 
and the EU12, almost three-quarters of the increase in age-related spending is 
due to health expenditures. Overall, accounting for the ﬁ scal costs of aging in 
health, pensions, and education, the required adjustment in 2010–20 increases 
to 6 percent of GDP for Western Europe and 3.7 percent of GDP for the EU12. 
Structural reforms are necessary to deal with the long-term ﬁ scal challenges 
in Europe arising from precrisis weaknesses, the debt overhang from the crisis, 
and pressures from population aging. They are also needed to reinvigorate 
growth. Higher growth can help countries reduce the size of required ﬁ scal 
adjustment. For example, our simulations suggest that boosting growth by 
1 percentage point throughout 2011–30 would lower the required correction in 
cyclically adjusted primary balances by 0.6 percent of GDP in Western Europe 
and 0.4 percent in Eastern Europe. As the population adjusts to the tough 
economic reality, aided by the right policies, Europe might ﬁ nd out that the 
adjustment is easier to make than now imagined (box 7.11).
Reforming public pensions
Large spending on pensions is the main reason why governments are bigger 
in Europe than elsewhere. Public pensions are high relative to those in Anglo-
Saxon countries and Japan (ﬁ gure 7.24). This holds especially for the center, but 
also for the north and the south. Similarly, gross pension replacement rates are 
high in Europe (see ﬁ gure 1.14 in chapter 1). High public spending on pensions, 
combined with moderate spending on education and health, suggests that 
governments favor the elderly over the young and working-age generation, 
desiring long-term growth prospects. This indicates that there is room for 
further savings on public pensions, especially as private pensions become more 
important in providing incomes to the elderly. European OECD countries have 
succeeded in reducing pension generosity in response to population aging 
Figure 7.24: Pensions are 
more generous in Western 
Europe than elsewhere
(real public pensions per elderly 
person, thousand US$ PPP, 1980, 
1994, and 2007)
Source: World Bank Social Protection database.
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Box 7.12: Reversal of private pension pillars
Many countries in Eastern Europe have 
overhauled their pension systems during the 
last 15 years. Fourteen countries introduced a 
second private pillar to complement the ﬁ rst 
(mandatory unfunded) pillar. The second pillar 
is typically mandatory (workers are required 
to participate), funded (pensions are paid from 
a fund accumulated from contributions), and 
with deﬁ ned contributions (pension beneﬁ ts 
are determined by the assets accumulated for 
a person’s pension). Countries often combine 
the ﬁ rst and second pillars with a third, 
voluntary privately funded pillar. 
In response to the crisis, however, several 
countries reduced funding for the second pillar 
(box table 1). 
Countries backtracked on reforms for three 
reasons. First, the crisis has underlined the 
importance of making sure that ﬁ rst-pillar 
beneﬁ ts can be ﬁ nanced. Contributions to the 
ﬁ rst pillar have taken a hit with lower wages 
and higher unemployment. For example, while 
the ﬁ rst pillar was originally targeted to run a 
surplus from 2012, Poland feared the ﬁ rst pillar 
might remain in deﬁ cit until 2060. At the same 
time, it has become harder for government to 
be a backstop for deﬁ cits in pension systems.
Second, the introduction of second pillar 
pensions makes it more difﬁ cult for countries 
to comply with the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact. To support the buildup of second pillar 
funds, governments run higher ﬁ scal deﬁ cits 
and accumulate more public debt during the 
transition phase. While this comes at the 
beneﬁ t of improved long-term ﬁ scal balances, 
the Stability and Growth Pact’s ﬁ scal deﬁ cit 
and public debt criteria do not take this into 
account sufﬁ ciently. In addition, ﬁ nancial 
markets worry more about explicit than 
implicit debt.
Third, while the reforms might take more 
time to bear fruits because as the size of 
second pillars is in many countries still 
modest, the second pillar systems have not 
always performed as hoped. Private pillars 
generated decent rates of return before the 
crisis. Countries with second pillar pension 
systems also tend to look better in terms of 
long-term sustainability, though this mostly 
reﬂ ects that they were more active in lowering 
pension beneﬁ ts under the ﬁ rst pillar. Yet, it is 
clear that expectations proved too optimistic. 
Governments have had to subsidize the 
buildup of funds for the second pillar more 
than expected. 
Poland’s ﬁ nances illustrate these points. Due to 
the crisis, the ﬁ scal cost rose to 1.5 to 2 percent 
of GDP in 2000–10 instead of the predicted 0 
to 1 percent of GDP. The transition costs have 
turned out to be higher in part because of 
worse than anticipated trends in the economy 
(weaker growth), demography (sharper drop 
in fertility, larger emigration), and labor market 
(lower rise in formal employment). In addition, 
individuals have responded less well to 
incentives to increase savings for old age than 
expected. Private savings have been almost 
entirely offset by public dissaving. The public 
support of the second pillars was ﬁ nanced 
through public debt issues of about 15 percent 
of GDP, while private pension assets amounted 
to about 16 percent of GDP by end-2010. 
Many countries in Eastern Europe are set to 
make further adjustments in their pension 
systems. Most countries require further 
adjustments to their ﬁ rst pillar regimes; 
others are considering reversing or modifying 
their second pillar regimes; still others are 
considering introducing new second pillar 
systems. All of them would be well advised to 
consider some lessons of the recent reforms:
• Abrupt changes lead to instability and 
can undermine the credibility of pension 
systems and the trust in government. 
• The ﬁ scal effects of reversals are often 
negligible, as they trade off improvements 
in the short run with deteriorations in the 
long run in headline ﬁ scal balances. 
• The reversal of second pillar regimes should 
be no excuse to delay addressing structural 
problems, whether in the area of pensions 
or elsewhere. Many countries should raise 
the retirement age, rationalize special 
schemes and disability beneﬁ ts, move from 
wage- to inﬂ ation-indexation of pension 
beneﬁ ts, and improve the regulation of 
private pension funds.
• Countries like Chile and Sweden have 
managed to get beneﬁ ts from second 
pillar pensions. Countries in Eastern Europe 
considering second pillars should think 
carefully whether they will be able to 
replicate these successes. This involves 
looking at economic, distributional, 
and institutional aspects. Institutional 
prerequisites include a sustainable ﬁ rst pillar 
system, sound macroeconomic policies, 
adequate supervision and regulation of the 
ﬁ nancial sector, administrative capacity 
to manage individual accounts, and the 
political institutions to prevent undue 
political interference with the second pillar 
over generations.
Source: Barr 2010; Barr and Diamond 2008; 
OECD 2011b; Soto, Clements, and Eich 2011; 
Velculescu 2011; World Bank 2010a.
Box table 1: Recent measures to reduce contributions to the second pillar
Country Measure
Estonia Temporary suspension of contribution (4 percent)
Hungary Permanent diversion of contribution to ﬁ rst pillar; second pillar changed from mandatory to voluntary
Latvia Temporary reduction of contribution from 10 percent to 2 percent
Lithuania Temporary reduction of contribution from 5.5 percent to 2 percent
Poland Reduction of contribution from 7.3 percent to 2.3 percent from May 2011; increase to 3.5 percent by 2017
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since the early 1990s, even though the elderly are a political force. And many 
countries in the EU12 have adopted pension reforms to mitigate the impact of 
aging on public ﬁ nances (box 7.12).
As pension systems become more and more unsustainable, some governments 
show a propensity to push certain entitlements in the (noncontributory) social 
assistance area, while preserving eligibility and beneﬁ t formulas. For example, 
when the pension system went into deﬁ cit in 2005 in Romania, entitlements 
ﬁ nanced from social security contributions, such as farmers’ pensions and paid 
parental leave, were shifted to the general budget and are now tax-ﬁ nanced. 
These moves only created the illusion of restoring ﬁ scal sustainability of the 
pension system. They also maintained a regressive beneﬁ t (parental leave) that 
paid high beneﬁ ts for long periods to middle- and high-income parents, keeping 
them out of the labor market for about two years, while denying such beneﬁ ts 
to parents from low-income households. When former pension beneﬁ ts have to 
be shed, governments are well advised to design them using the objectives for 
good safety net programs, including restricting them to the most needy.
Increasing longevity and lower fertility put increasing pressure on pension 
systems. Following the European Commission methodology, without policy 
change, pension expenditures would increase by 1.1 percent of GDP by 2030 
in Western Europe, and decline by 0.3 percent of GDP in the EU12. In Western 
Europe, the challenge is largest in the center but moderate in the north. The 
required savings are not huge. For example, the pension reforms introduced in 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden in 1995–2005 should reduce public 
pension expenditures by more than 2 percent of GDP by 2030 (Clements, Perry, 
and Toro 2010).
As people get older, pension beneﬁ ts cannot simply keep up with workers’ 
incomes. These pressures are visible in both public and private pension plans, 
where actuarial changes are making systems less generous. Whatever the 
system, prolonging the retirement phase means that for a given return on 
savings, retirement beneﬁ ts have to shrink relative to wages earned during the 
Figure 7.25: Social insurance 
contribution rates in 
Europe are often high
(contribution rates of 
pensions and social 
insurance, percentage of 
gross earnings, latest data)
Source: World Bank Social Protection database.
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working life. Making the pension system more sustainable involves moderating 
the increase in the ratio of retirement to working life or moderating the ratio of 
pension beneﬁ ts relative to wages (or a combination). As pension contributions 
in Europe are already high, the second option mainly involves reducing the 
generosity of pension beneﬁ ts (ﬁ gure 7.25). 
Encouraging people to work longer would involve a combination of raising 
the statutory retirement age, penalizing early retirement, and removing 
legal or other impediments for people age 50 or older to get a job. Changes 
in indexation formulas from a combination of wage growth and inﬂ ation to 
inﬂ ation only is one way to adjust pension beneﬁ ts, especially for countries in 
Eastern Europe. Such reforms have been implemented in Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, and Sweden; others should consider them too. 
Alternatively, countries can focus public pension systems on the low-income 
elderly. Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand combine low public pension 
spending with low old-age poverty because their public pension systems are 
relatively redistributive. This approach can work well when countries succeed 
in encouraging people to compensate for lower public pensions with higher 
savings through private pensions (OECD 2011b).
As an illustration, one can look at the impact of raising the effective retirement 
age (for example, increasing the employment rate among those of working 
age) and increasing the statutory retirement age (for example, increasing the 
employment rate of the elderly) by 5 percent (ﬁ gure 7.25). For the EU12, this is 
equivalent to increases of three years in the effective and statutory retirement 
ages, resulting in longer working lives by six years. Of course, increases in 
the statutory retirement age do not lead to one-to-one increases in working 
lives. Instead, governments have to work on measures on both the supply side 
(strengthening incentives to work) and demand side (ensuring that there are 
jobs for the elderly) to make this happen. These reforms would keep public 
pension expenditures at 2010’s level in Western Europe. The EU12 countries 
would reduce outlays for public pensions from more than 8 percent of GDP 
in 2010 to less than 7 percent in 2030. Such reforms would also be good for 
economic recovery. As people’s future income increases, they are likely to scale 
up today’s consumption (ﬁ gure 7.26).
Figure 7.26: Raising the 
retirement age helps 
stabilize pension spending
(projected increase in pension 
expenditures and impact of 
pension reforms, medians, 
percentage of GDP)
Source: Calculations by staff of the Institute for Structural Research in Poland and the World Bank.
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Reforming public health
Europe’s public health spending is still moderate and most health outcomes are 
impressive. While some countries in Eastern Europe are struggling to overcome 
the challenges of the past—including heavy hospital infrastructure, overreliance 
on inpatient and specialized care, and neglect of preventive care—the problems 
of public health systems lie foremost in the future. Health care expenditures 
around the world tend to rise faster than incomes, and Europe, where median 
public health spending increased from 5.2 percent of GDP in 1995 to 6.4 percent 
in 2009 (ﬁ gure 7.27), is no exception.
Figure 7.27: Public health spending 
has increased faster than GDP
(public health spending in Europe, 
percentage of GDP, 1995 and 2009)
Source: Eurostat; and OECD Social Expenditure Database.
Box 7.13: Long-term care policies for older populations in new member states and Croatia
The new EU member states and Croatia are 
facing rapidly aging populations. In 2025, 
more than 20 percent of Bulgarians will be 
age 65 or older, up from just 13 percent in 
1990, and the average Slovene will be 47 
years old, among the oldest in the world. One 
consequence of these demographic changes is 
the expected increase in demand among the 
older population for long-term care (LTC). LTC 
services refer to the organization and delivery 
of a broad range of services and assistance to 
people who are limited in their ability to live 
independently over an extended period. 
Experience from Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries shows that LTC is expensive and 
generates a ﬁ nancial burden for individuals 
and households. Much ﬁ nancial uncertainty 
surrounds future LTC expenditures, and private 
LTC insurance systems are underdeveloped. 
Increasing good practice in OECD countries 
means promoting a policy of universal 
coverage. Yet if countries are to adopt such 
policies—given the growing size of the older 
population and growing dependency ratios—
they must closely examine the policies’ ﬁ scal 
sustainability. 
Thus the key policy challenge facing new EU 
member states and Croatia is how to balance 
the twin objectives of fair ﬁ nancing (where 
those in need can afford LTC) with ﬁ scal 
sustainability. Governments can meet this 
challenge in four ways:
• Develop a policy for universal LTC ﬁ nancing 
based on the concept of intergenerational 
ﬁ scal sustainability. Use actuarial and other 
ﬁ nancial models to cost out the revenue 
and expenditure implications of expanding 
universal LTC coverage. Identify the 
appropriate package and identify the role of 
supplementary LTC coverage through other 
instruments. 
• Do not expand LTC coverage on an 
inefﬁ cient base but use LTC ﬁ nancing to 
control demand for services and channel it 
toward the right types of services (home-
based with care coordinaton and conversion 
of hospitals into community centers and not 
LTC institutions). 
• Think about how to leverage LTC service-
delivery reforms and encourage private 
provision. (This depends heavily on LTC 
ﬁ nancing policies and the overall regulatory 
environment.) 
• Develop a strong evidence base on 
LTC ﬁ nancing and provision. As part of 
developing an LTC policy, begin monitoring 
LTC expenditures to learn  whether they 
pose a burden on households or how 
households are coping with them during old 
age. Build a database on coverage of LTC 
services and trends over time. 
Source: World Bank 2010b.
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Based on historical trends, unit costs of health treatment grow 1 percentage 
point faster than GDP per capita. This leads to increases in public health 
spending of 2.7 percent of GDP in Western Europe and 1.5 percent in the EU12 by 
2030. Further costs pressures could arise from faster technology adoption and 
imitation. For the EU12, this could imply that public health spending increases by 
as much as 3.5 percent of GDP by 2030.
The challenge is how to manage the pressures that lead to escalating costs 
and expenditures without undermining many countries’ generally sound 
health-system performance. After all, reducing public health spending in a bad 
way can ultimately undermine important health policy goals or simply defer 
spending. Governments are striving to control cost escalation while preserving 
the public sector’s crucial role in providing good health care. 
One major pressure point is spending on long-term care services (box 7.13). A 
recent IMF cross-country analysis concluded that international experience offers 
various options to control the growth of public health spending (Clements, 
Perry, and Toro 2010). They include pushing through with provider payment 
reforms using case-based payment or global budgets rather than fee for service, 
strengthening evaluations of the cost-effectiveness of medical treatments 
and technology, implementing health information technology to increase the 
efﬁ ciency of service delivery, and increasing patient cost-sharing to encourage 
patients to go to the doctor only when needed. At the same time, the most 
sustainable way to control health spending over the decades is to ensure value 
for money, though sometimes this might mean investing more upfront 
(OECD 2010).
Reforming public education
Population aging puts upward pressures on the costs of public pensions and 
public health, but also provides an opportunity for ﬁ scal saving in education. 
The population age 5–24 years changes little in 2010–30 in Western Europe but 
Figure 7.28: Young cohorts are 
shrinking in Eastern Europe
(population ages 5–24, 1980–2100, 
2010 = 100)
Source: UN 2011.
399
CHAPTER 7
is set to decline by about 15 percent in Eastern Europe (ﬁ gure 7.28), where many 
countries maintain too many schools, and are failing to consolidate schools and 
reduce teaching staff in line with shrinking student numbers.
Other problems are Europe-wide, including disappointing learning achievements 
in international assessments for some countries and minority groups, 
graduation of pupils and students without the skills needed by industry and 
other employers, little lifelong learning, and poor information on learning 
outcomes. Supporting education and training systems that serve the needs of 
the economy is one of the important roles of a high-quality government. Some 
European countries start focusing on technical skills too early in a student’s 
career, leaving graduates ready for their ﬁ rst job but possibly without enough 
generic skills to be retrained into a different ﬁ eld later. Other European countries 
now have sophisticated adult education and training systems in place; others 
have barely started. With aging populations, it is essential to have options, 
incentives (for workers and ﬁ rms), and quality assurance mechanisms; and 
these systems cannot be built overnight.
Following the methodology of the European Commission, we project public 
expenditures on education to change little in 2030 relative to 2010. Median 
expenditures on education would decline by 0.3 percent of GDP in Western 
Europe, and remain unchanged in the EU12 countries. Adjusting the number of 
education personnel in line with the changes in the number of students would 
generate sizable ﬁ scal gains. Education spending would decrease by 1.1 percent 
of GDP in the EU12 countries, 0.7 percent in the south, 0.3 percent in the north, 
and 0.1 percent in the center.5 Such saving could either be used to invest in 
education quality, or pay off public debt and reduce the size of government.
Make government more effi cient, 
or make it smaller 
Governments in Europe generate plenty of reasons to worry. When big, they 
hamper growth. The crisis has made governments even bigger, and countries 
are struggling to reassure nervous ﬁ nancial markets in the face of large ﬁ scal 
imbalances and rising public debt. These concerns are weighing on growth. 
The recovery has relied on public support and the global upturn rather than 
domestic investment and FDI. Population aging further dampens the outlook, as 
labor gets scarcer and demand for public services stronger.
Reform is an unrelenting task for all governments, but some governments need 
more—and more urgent—reforms than others. The south does poorly on key 
dimensions compared with the rest of Western Europe and, increasingly, with 
countries in Eastern Europe:
 · Although the south still has somewhat smaller government than the center 
and the north, government size has been increasing in the south over the last 
decade and a half. Efforts to consolidate government spending weakened in 
Europe during the boom years before the global ﬁ nancial crisis in 2008-09. 
But spending on pensions and social transfers rose far more in the south 
than in the rest of Western Europe. The south spends more than the north or 
center when taxes are factored in on the social sector as a share of GDP.
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 · Europe has been an economic convergence machine, helping poorer countries 
to catch up to richer economies. Yet even though the forces of convergence 
should have translated into faster growth in the south, growth in the south 
has been slower than in the north and the center over the last decade and 
a half. One reason for the south’s poor growth is that quality of government 
is worse than elsewhere. The south has fallen further behind the north and 
the center in quality of government, even though its public sector wage bills 
expanded.
 · Oversized government, moderate growth, weak institutions, and a rapidly 
aging population give rise to large ﬁ scal imbalances. And it is the south that 
faces the largest ﬁ scal adjustment in coming decades.
For Eastern Europe, the differences across countries are less striking than 
for Western Europe. Nevertheless, taking the EU candidate countries as an 
example, the need for substantial reform is evident:
 · Although the EU candidate countries are poorer than the EU12 countries, 
their government size (measured as government spending as a share of 
GDP) is about the same. Size declined in the EU12 from the mid-1990s to the 
late 2000s, but increased in the candidate countries. Spending on pensions, 
health, and education as a share of GDP is higher in the candidate countries 
than in the EU12 and eastern partnership countries.
 · The candidate countries have seen less convergence in living standards 
than the rest of Eastern Europe, even though they are poorer than the EU12 
countries. One reason is that many of the candidate countries have beneﬁ ted 
less from trade integration since the late 1990s than the EU12 countries. The 
other reason, more pertinent for this chapter, is that candidate countries lag 
the new member states of the EU in quality of government, and the gap has 
been widening over the last decade.
 · Candidate countries have weaker ﬁ scal balances than EU12 or eastern 
partnership countries, and face a larger longer-term ﬁ scal adjustment to 
stabilize public debt.
Such an array of difﬁ culties makes it easy to give in to pessimism. But there are 
also good reasons to be optimistic.
First, Europe has repeatedly shown a capacity to reform. The list of countries 
that have succeeded in bringing about large improvements in their ﬁ scal 
balances since the 1980s is long, though the advances have not always 
been sustained.6 But soon we might be able to talk about sustained ﬁ scal 
consolidation in countries like Estonia, Ireland, or Latvia. Indeed, public ﬁ nance 
reform might be easier today than in the past, largely because the crisis has 
convinced more people of its urgency, even if some countries’ large public debt 
originates in the private sector. Many countries are lowering public beneﬁ ts, 
reducing salaries, and increasing working hours. Countries like France, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom have recently adopted ﬁ scal 
reforms whose scope and size might have been unthinkable just a few 
years ago.
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Second, to ensure prosperity and well-being, well-run governments can make 
an enormous difference. With public sectors accounting for half of domestic 
output, making sure that government works better can help spur productivity 
and innovation in the economy. Absorbing lessons from other countries 
about what works (and what does not), countries can make the bureaucracy 
leaner, ﬁ scal institutions more reliable, public services more competitive, tax 
administration more effective, and citizens more informed through electronic 
government.
Third, Europe has demonstrated that it can adjust public ﬁ nances to population 
aging. In Western Europe, many countries have altered pension parameters 
to put a lid on public pension spending as elderly cohorts started to grow. In 
Eastern Europe, countries such as Estonia, Poland, and the Slovak Republic 
revamped their pension programs so that they have sound system ﬁ nances. 
As pensions remain fairly generous in Europe, many countries still have room 
to advance pension reforms as population aging accelerates. Countries also 
need to address education and health with equal urgency. Cost escalation in 
health care—driven by increased demand from rising incomes and by new, high 
technology–related health procedures—is the main risk to ﬁ scal sustainability. 
Countries in Eastern Europe can learn from their neighbors to the west about 
how to adjust spending on teachers in line with demographic trends.
Fourth, beyond putting public ﬁ nances in order, Europe can do much to improve 
trade, ﬁ nance, enterprises, innovation, and labor. Lifting growth even a little 
over the coming decade can cut the size of the required ﬁ scal adjustments. 
Faster growth increases tax revenues and can also lower government spending 
on social programs as earnings increase, on unemployment beneﬁ ts as jobs 
become more plentiful, and on servicing public debt as markets charge lower 
interest on government bonds. A well-run welfare state can help make this 
happen—its safety net allows people to take risks and invest in their business 
ideas without worrying about their families’ health insurance or children’s 
education if plans go awry.
There is no one “best” government form and size. Some societies care more 
about strong growth, others more about inclusive growth. Countries have 
diverse institutions, histories, and politics, which make governments different 
in more ways than size. Each country has to decide what type of government 
it wants and how it wants to reform what it has. Northern Europe outperforms 
much of the rest of Europe on many fronts, including growth, public services, 
equity, and quality of government. Northern Europeans have found that these 
beneﬁ ts come with big government but with many individual responsibilities:  
they have higher labor force participation rates, they stay engaged in the 
formal economy despite having to pay high taxes, they have enabled women 
to combine work and family, they have provided enterprises with the economic 
freedom needed to compete globally—undertaking sweeping economic reforms 
when necessary—and they maintain high levels of social trust. 
402
GOLDEN GROWTH
Governments in Europe spend about 10 percent 
of GDP more than their peers, and this is almost 
entirely because they spend more on 
social protection.
Controlling for other differences, European 
economies with government spending greater than 
40 percent of GDP have had much lower growth 
rates during the last 15 years.
Countries like Sweden have big governments, but 
they deliver high-quality social services, make it easy 
for citizens and enterprises to comply with taxes and 
regulations, and have high levels of social trust.
Countries where government works have made their 
bureaucracies leaner, ﬁ scal institutions more reliable, 
public services competitive, tax administration 
effective, and citizens more empowered.
To respond to market pressures and aging 
populations, almost every country in Europe must 
make big ﬁ scal adjustments to reduce public debt to 
precrisis levels.
Answers to questions on page 353
Doing all this is not easy. It might be more feasible for most countries to 
keep government small until the institutional and social prerequisites of 
“big government lite” are put in place. All the countries in Southern Europe, 
many in Eastern Europe, and even some in Western Europe should keep the 
main point of this chapter in mind: without high quality of public services 
and social programs, big government will be a heavy burden and become 
a drag on economic growth. With poor economic growth prospects, even 
reasonably sized governments inevitably become an unbearable burden.
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Chapter 7: Annexes
Table A7.1: Political institutions inﬂ uence government size
(OLS regression results on the logarithm of government size, 1995–2009) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log per capita GDP PPP  .27  (8.9)
Log public debt (percentage of GDP)  .10  (10.8) .08  (9.4) .08  (8.3)
Log trade openness (percentage of GDP)  -.08 (5.4) -.05  (4.0) -.05  (3.6)
Log old-age dependency ratio   .09  (1.4) .12  (1.9)
Log unemployment rate   .10  (9.0) .09  (8.1)
Fractionalization    .06  (2.5)
Federalism    .04  (2.7)
Electoral system    -.07  (4.2)
Bicameralism    .01  (0.9)
Constitutional design    -.06  (2.8)
Western Europe     
   Center -.09   (2.0) -.07  (2.5) -.09  (3.5) -.10  (3.3)
   South -0.12  (2.3) -0.18  (5.7) -0.21  (6.8) -0.19 (5.8)
Eastern Europe     
   EU12 -0.20  (4.8) -0.07 (2.6) -0.10 (3.5) -0.07 (2.3)
   Accession -0.27  (5.9) -0.15 (4.7) -0.24 (6.6) -0.23 (6.2)
   Eastern partnerships -0.67  (14.2) -0.19 (4.7) -0.11 (2.6) -0.11 (0.2)
Anglo-Saxon and Japan -0.27  (5.8) -0.33 (10.8) -0.32  (11.0) -0.25  (7.1)
Emerging peers -0.65  (17.2) -0.57 (20.9) -0.56 (20.9) -0.48 (14.1)
Constant   3.9  (76.7) 3.27  (37.4) 2.1 (7.1) 2.1 (7.1)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.42 0.68 0.71 0.73
Number of observations 1,023 833 808 800
Note: Western Europe North is omitted. t-statistics in parentheses. OLS refers to ordinary least squares.
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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Table A7.2: Regression Results for Growth and Initial Government Expenditures, 1995 to 2010
Variables (1)OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
Pooled OLS
(4)
Robust regression
1. World 1995 to 2010
Government size -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001
Real per capita income -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations 152 106 399 399
Adjusted R squared 0.0123 0.2703 0.2095 0.2337
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
2. World 1995 to 2006
Government size   -0.0001 0.0002
Real per capita income   -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations   301 301
Adjusted R squared   0.1992 0.2199
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
3. World 1995 to 2006 and government size more than 40 percent of GDP
Government size   -0.0009* -0.0005
Real per capita income   -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations   78 76
Adjusted R squared   0.3476 0.4163
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
4. World 1995 to 2006 and government size less than or equal to 40 percent of GDP
Government size   0.0001 0.0004
Real per capita income   -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations   223 223
Adjusted R squared   0.1968 0.1797
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
5. Europe 1995 to 2010
Government size -0.0016*** -0.0009** -0.0007** -0.0004*
Real per capita income -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations 42 33 124 124
Adjusted R squared 0.3978 0.6701 0.5350 0.6023
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
6. Europe 1995 to 2006
Government size   -0.0010* -0.0004
Real per capita income   -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations   91 91
Adjusted R squared   0.3955 0.5176
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
7. Europe 1995 to 2006 and government size more than 40 percent of GDP
Government size   -0.0014** -0.0011**
Real per capita income   -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations   66 65
Adjusted R squared   0.3586 0.4698
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
8. Europe 1995 to 2006 and government size less than or equal to 40 percent of GDP
Government size   0.0022 0.0028*
Real per capita income   0.0000 0.0000
Number of observations   25 25
Adjusted R squared   0.5438 0.5750
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: The rows government size and real per capita income show parameter estimates except for the last column. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity and country-
speciﬁ c autocorrelation consistent. Except for (1), the regressions also include these additional right-hand side variables: years of schooling, inﬂ ation, trade openness, 
old-age dependency ratio, terms of trade growth, quality of regulation, and rule of law. All regressors are initial values. Regressions (1) and (2) are cross-sectional 
regressions. Regressions (3) to (8) are four-year period panels. Regressions (3), (4), (6), (7), and (8) also include time-ﬁ xed effects. The null hypothesis of the Arellano-
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(5)
BE
(6)
FE
(7)
SGMM
(8) BACE, BE
Coefficient Including probability
-0.0003 -0.0003 0.0011** -0.0005 0.2822
-0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.000001 0.2067
399 399 399 399  
0.2039 0.3120    
  0.0550   
  0.0740   
-0.0001 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0000
-0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.000001 0.9997
301 301 301 301  
0.1971 0.2695    
  0.4920   
  0.4970   
-0.0013* -0.0012 -0.0017* -0.0015 0.0000
-0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.000002 0.9959
78 78 78 78  
0.4335 0.2221    
  0.5360   
  0.6000   
0.0003 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0319
-0.0000*** 0.0000 -0.0000* -0.000001 0.9659
223 223 223 223  
0.1798 0.2238   
  0.3080   
  0.4030   
-0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0017** -0.0006 1.0000
-0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.000001 0.9455
124 124 124 124  
0.3235 0.5876    
  0.5090   
  0.8700   
-0.0008* -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0009 0.9996
-0.0000** -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 0.9994
91 91 91 91  
0.5761 0.5640    
  0.4420   
  0.1890   
-0.0023** -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0022 0.9408
-0.0000*** -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000002 0.9882
66 66 66 66  
0.5015 0.3305    
  0.7980   
  0.2970   
0.0000 0.0001 0.0071 -0.0005 0.0000
0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0966 0.9598
25 25 25 25  
0.7984 0.8906    
  0.5360   
  0.9900   
Bond AR(2) test is that the ﬁ rst-differenced errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J-statistics is that the instruments are 
not correlated with the residuals. The prior mean model size in the BACE regressions is 3. For the estimation methods, OLS, BE, FE, SGMM, and BACE refer to ordinary 
least squares, between effects, ﬁ xed effects, system GMM (generalized method of moments), and Bayesian averaging of classical estimates, respectively.
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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Table A7.3: Regression results for growth and initial government revenues in Europe, 1995–2010
Variables (1)OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
Pooled OLS
(4)
Robust regression
Europe 1995 to 2010
Government size -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0001
Real per capita income -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000**
Number of observations 42 33 124 124
Adjusted R squared 0.2944 0.6253 0.5363 0.6033
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
Europe 1995 to 2006
Government size   -0.0009 -0.0001
Real per capita income   -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations   91 91
Adjusted R squared   0.4109 0.5259
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
Table A7.4: Regression results for growth and initial social transfer spending in Europe, 1995–2010
Variables (1)OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
Pooled OLS
(4)
Robust regression
Europe 1995 to 2010
Government size -0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0011** -0.0005
Real per capita income -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000*** -0.0000**
Number of observations 42 33 127 127
Adjusted R squared 0.3307 0.6017 0.5487 0.5934
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
Europe 1995 to 2006
Government size -0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0017** -0.0008**
Real per capita income -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000*** -0.0000***
Number of observations 42 33 94 94
Adjusted R squared 0.3307 0.6017 0.4497 0.5262
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
Table A7.5: Regression results for growth and average public investment spending in Europe, 1995–2010
Variables (1)OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
Pooled OLS
(4)
Robust regression
Europe 1995 to 2010
Government size 0.0101** 0.0033 0.0011 0.0009
Real per capita income -0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000**
Number of observations 42 33 126 126
Adjusted R squared 0.4341 0.6170 0.5646 0.5901
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
Europe 1995 to 2006
Government size 0.0101** 0.0033 0.0035 0.0036**
Real per capita income -0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000***
Number of observations 42 33 93 93
Adjusted R squared 0.4341 0.617 0.4494 0.5268
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p value)     
Hansen J-statistics (p value)     
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: See note for table A7.2.
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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(5)
BE
(6)
FE
(7)
SGMM
(8) BACE, BE
Coefficient Including probability
-0.0008* -0.0003 -0.0023** -0.0009 0.9979
-0.0000* -0.0000** 0.00000 -0.000001 0.9933
124 124 124 124  
0.4210 0.6011    
  0.63   
  0.46   
-0.0010** 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0272
-0.0000** -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 0.9588
91 91 91 91  
0.6132 0.5775    
  0.221   
  0.206   
(5)
BE
(6)
FE
(7)
SGMM
(8) BACE, BE
Coefficient Including probability
-0.0007 -0.0022 -0.0029** -0.0010 0.9982
-.00000 -0.0000** -.00000 -0.0000007 0.6956
127 127 127   
0.3425 0.5900    
  0.215   
  0.621   
-0.0012 -0.0039 -0.0044 -0.0017 1.0000
-0.0000** 0.000000 0.000000 -0.000001 0.7850
94 94 94   
0.5012 0.4585    
  0.674   
  0.577   
(5)
BE
(6)
FE
(7)
SGMM
(8) BACE, BE
Coefficient Including probability
0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0069 0.0023 0.9998
-0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000006 0.8710
126 126 126   
0.4185 0.6007    
  0.452   
  0.597   
0.0017 0.0109*** -0.0139 0.0007 0.2223
-0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.000001 0.8522
93 93 93   
0.5072 0.5215    
  0.836   
  0.859   
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: See note for table A7.2.
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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Table A7.6: Regression results of quality of government on initial government size
(1)
World
(2)
Europe
(3)
World
(4)
Europe
(5)
World
(6)
Europe
1. Enabler of private sector
Indicator Rule of law Regulation Indep. judiciary
Source WB Governance WB Governance Henisz Polcon
Bivariate regression
Coefficient 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02
Robust t-statistics 7.80*** 7.42*** 5.67*** 5.46*** 6.44*** 4.26***
Number of observations 167 43 166 43 160 42
Adjusted R square 0.34 0.38 0.25 0.38 0.21 0.25
Multivariate regression 
Coefficient 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Robust t-statistics 4.20*** 2.57** 2.51** 1.85* 3.05*** 1.73*
Number of observations 155 41 155 41 151 40
Adjusted R square 0.56 0.79 0.44 0.61 0.35 0.24
2. Enabler of economic globilization
Indicator Free trade Econ. globilization Tariff rate
Source Fraser Institute KOF Index Fraser Institute
Bivariate regression
Coefficient 0.96 0.63 0.04 0.04 -0.16 0.01
Robust t-statistics 8.39*** 3.78*** 4.46*** 2.90*** 5.03*** 0.31
Number of observations 133 41 120 34 138 42
Adjusted R square 0.34 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.12 -0.02
Multivariate regression
Coefficient 0.59 0.29 0.03 0.04 -0.12 0.02
Robust t-statistics 3.32*** 1.45 2.16** 1.62 2.18** 0.36
Number of observations 128 39 115 34 131 40
Adjusted R square 0.41 0.37 0.15 0.31 0.2 -0.08
3. Efficient administrator 
Indicator Gov. effectiveness Control of corrupt. Formal economy
Source WB Governance WB Governance Schneider 
Bivariate regression
Coefficient 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.52 0.88
Robust t-statistics 7.05*** 6.19*** 8.37*** 6.54*** 6.50*** 5.79***
Number of observations 167 43 166 43 145 40
Adjusted R square 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.47
Multivariate regression
Coefficient 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.35 0.46
Robust t-statistics 3.64*** 1.79* 4.74*** 2.73*** 3.48*** 3.27***
Number of observations 155 41 155 41 141 40
Adjusted R square 0.53 0.76 0.55 0.82 0.36 0.73
4. Enabler of voice and accountability
Indicator Instit. democracy Voice and account. Political stability
Source Polity IV WB Governance WB Governance
Bivariate regression
Coefficient 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04
Robust t-statistics 4.06*** 3.69*** 5.37*** 6.43*** 7.28*** 4.64***
Number of observations 155 39 167 43 167 43
Adjusted R square 0.11 0.52 0.22 0.53 0.28 0.31
Multivariate regression
Coefficient 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02
Robust t-statistics 2.03** 3.16*** 2.48** 3.09*** 4.18*** 2.27**
Number of observations 146 37 155 41 155 41
Adjusted R square 0.2 0.51 0.38 0.69 0.33 0.51
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: The quality of government indicators are 2003–08/9 averages. Higher values indicate higher quality of government. The multivariate regressions also include 
these additional right-hand side variables: 1995 to 2002 average per capita income and the time-invariant variables ethno-linguistic fragmentation, French legal origin, 
socialist legal origin, and distance to Brussels.
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(7)
World
(8)
Europe
(9)
World
(10)
Europe
(11)
World
(12)
Europe
(13)
World
(14)
Europe
Dismissal cost Centr. collect. bar. Tax compl. cost Top mar. tax rate
WB Doing Bus. Glob. Compet. Rep. WB Doing Bus. Fraser Institute
0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.17
3.90*** 0.46 3.00*** 4.11*** 2.92*** 1.85* 3.15*** 5.13***
133 41 122 42 135 41 125 42
0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.46
0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.12
1.58 0.05 1.94* 2.22** 0.39 0.22 1.65 3.30***
127 39 116 40 129 39 118 40
0.11 0.07 0.23 0.47 0.12 0.24 0.19 0.49
Trade openness
Penn World Table
0.74 0.25
1.92* 0.53
167 43
0.02 -0.02
-0.07 -0.6
0.18 0.83
155 41
0.07 0.12
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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Table A7.7: OLS regression results of people’s values on initial government size
(1)
World
(2)
Europe
(3)
World
(4)
Europe
(5)
World
(6)
Europe
(7)
World
(8)
Europe
Trust other people Tolerance of diversity Gov. more responsib. Claiming benefits
Bivariate regression
Coefficient 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0
Robust t-statistics 2.89*** 2.44** 4.04*** 6.95*** 1.03 4.72*** 2.82*** 0.07
Number of observations 56 20 52 20 56 20 55 20
Adjusted R square 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.49 0 0.39 0.1 -0.06
Multivariate regression 
Coefficient 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04
Robust t-statistics 1.53 0.46 2.71*** 2.64** 0.84 1.82* 1.36 2.18**
Number of observations 53 19 49 19 53 19 52 19
Adjusted R square 0.34 0.66 0.28 0.82 0.04 0.51 0.09 0.01
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: OLS refers to ordinary least squares. See note for table A7.6.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on World Values Survey (waves 2004 to 2008).
Table A7.8: Public spending helps improve health, spending on public schooling is less effective
(regression results for public spending in health and education, 1995–2009)
Maternal Mortality Ratio
Ln Government Spending (% of GDP) -0.99    (5.1)
Ln Private Spending (% of GDP) -0.09   (1.9)
Ln Age Dependency   1.2      (6.1)
Government Quality -.43     (3.0)
Economic Controls (Openness, Debt Ratio) YES
Political Institutions (Electoral System) YES
Year Dummies YES
Geo-group Dummies YES
R2 0.83
No. Observations 819
First Stage R2 0.68
Sargan chi2(1) .4368(p=0.51)
Net Secondary Enrollment Rates
Ln Government Spending (% of GDP) .22     (3.3)
Ln Age Dependency  -0.05  (0.6)
Government Quality .09    (1.2)
Economic Controls (Openness, Debt Ratio) YES
Year Dummies YES
Geo-group Dummies YES
R2 0.54
No. Observations 378
First Stage R2 0.59
Sargan Chi2(4) 5.961(p=0.20)
First Stage R2 0.68
Sargan chi2(1) .4368(p=0.51)
Note: Instruments used are debt ratio in logs, federal structures in political institutions. t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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Table A7.9: Regression results for log public pensions as a share of GDP
Variables (1)OLS
(2)
RE
(3)
FE
(4)
OLS
(5)
RE
(6)
FE
1980-1994 1995-2007
OECD
Log Old Age Dep. Ratio 0.9956*** 0.9880** 0.9956* 0.8276*** 0.8925*** 0.8276***
Log PC GDP PPP -0.2431*** -0.23930 -0.2431 -0.1392*** -0.1506** -0.1392*
GDP Growth -0.0082*** -0.0083*** -0.0082*** -0.0147*** -0.0154*** -0.0147**
Inflation Rate -0.0081*** -0.0081** -0.0081** -0.0178*** -0.0176*** -0.0178***
Democracy Index 0.0512 0.0471** 0.0512* 0.0046 -0.0029 0.0046
Number of observations 266 266 266 260 260 260
Adjusted R squared 0.9314  0.1845 0.9809  0.3176
OECD Europe
Log Old Age Dep. Ratio 1.0042*** 0.9335 1.0042 0.6151*** 0.7046** 0.6151
Log PC GDP PPP -0.2580*** -0.2426 -0.258000 -0.0815** -0.095200 -0.0815
GDP Growth -0.0097** -0.0101*** -0.0097** -0.0157*** -0.0167*** -0.0157**
Inflation Rate -0.0110*** -0.0110*** -0.0110*** -0.0210*** -0.0207*** -0.0210***
Democracy Index 0.0456 0.0409 0.0456 0.0099 0.0037 0.0099
Number of observations 196 196 196 195 195 195
Adjusted R squared 0.9130  0.1787 0.9812  0.218
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: The estimates are from a regression of the logarithm of public pensions as a share of GDP on the logarithm of the old-age dependency ratio, along with other 
controls. They include basic economic characteristics (GDP growth, per capita income, and the inﬂ ation rate) and a democracy index to capture any impact of elderly 
voters on pension entitlements. The regressions are run as pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects (RE), and ﬁ xed effects (FE). In addition, we run 
separate regressions for 1980–94 and 1995–2007; as well as for the whole OECD group, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, and for the 
European OECD countries only.
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
Table A7.10: Regression Results for Log Social Transfers as a share of GDP
Variables (1)OLS
(2)
RE
(3)
FE
(4)
OLS
(5)
RE
(6)
FE
1980-1994 1995-2007
OECD
Log Dependency Ratio 2.0234** 1.5682 2.0234 1.1568*** 1.1589*** 1.1568**
Log PC GDP PPP 0.2885 0.24970 0.2885 -0.00560 -0.0075000 -0.0056
GDP Growth -0.0087** -0.0080*** -0.0087*** -0.0135*** -0.0137** -0.0135**
Inflation Rate -0.0185** -0.0187* -0.0185* -0.0219*** -0.0221*** -0.0219***
Democracy Index  -0.2191**  -0.0062 -0.0109 -0.0062
Number of observations 92 92 92 247 247 247
Adjusted R squared 0.9578  0.4014 0.9455  0.2591
OECD Europe
Log Dependency Ratio 1.9568** 1.3012 1.9568 0.7310*** 0.7351 0.7310
Log PC GDP PPP 0.3568 0.325 0.356800 -0.049000 -0.050400 -0.0490
GDP Growth -0.0071 -0.0065** -0.0071** -0.0140*** -0.0143* -0.014
Inflation Rate -0.0182* -0.0179 -0.0182 -0.0297*** -0.0300*** -0.0297***
Democracy Index 0.1638* -0.1334  -0.0114 -0.0155 -0.0114
Number of observations 67 67 67 182 182 182
Adjusted R squared 0.9458  0.3747 0.9253  0.1827
***, **, and * denote signiﬁ cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Note: Dependent population includes population less than 15 years old, more than 64 years old, and the unemployed. For the estimation methods, OLS, RE, and FE refer 
to ordinary least squares, random effects, and ﬁ xed effects, respectively.
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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1 The United States does not have a 
European-style welfare state for, no doubt, 
related reasons. Most Americans seem to 
believe that redistribution favors minorities; 
they believe that the country is an open and 
fair society, so poverty is self-inﬂ icted; and, 
probably because of these beliefs, political 
institutions, marked by a pluralist system 
and strong courts that traditionally consider 
private property more important than public 
interest, limit the scope of government 
(Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001).
2 The economic and social factors are as 
expected—except trade openness, which 
reduces government size. This could be 
because of the sample, which includes 
successful emerging economies with small 
governments and open economies.
3 Reinhardt and Rogoff 2011, (pp 31-34) 
defend their use of the 90 percent of GDP 
public debt threshold as follows: “Anyone 
who has done any work with data is well 
aware that mapping a vague concept, 
such as ‘high debt’ or ‘over-valued’ 
exchange rates to a workable deﬁ nition for 
interpreting the existing facts and informing 
the discussion requires making arbitrary 
judgments about where to draw lines. … 
We do not pretend to argue that growth 
will be normal at 89 percent and subpar at 
91 percent debt/GDP any more than a car 
crash is unlikely at 54mph and near certain 
at 56mph. However, mapping the theoretical 
notion of ‘vulnerability regions’ to bad 
outcomes involves deﬁ ning thresholds, just 
as trafﬁ c signs in the US specify 55mph”.
Notes 
4 A number of empirical studies ﬁ nd that 
social trust matters for strong institutions 
and growth. Knack and Keefer (1997) show 
that higher trust in strangers is correlated 
with better government performance. 
Nannestad (2008) and Jensen and Svendsen 
(2011) argue that social trust makes social 
welfare systems more sustainable. Aghion 
and others (2010) ﬁ nd that low trust leads 
voters to demand government regulation. 
This is because detailed regulation 
disciplines bureaucrats, and because 
voters prefer state control to private sector 
corruption. Similarly, Bergh and Bjørnskov 
(2011) show that countries with strong 
social trust have lower business and credit 
market regulations. Bjørnskov (2009) ﬁ nds 
that a 10 percentage point increase in social 
trust is associated with an increase of 0.5 
percentage point in the annual real growth 
rate.
5 The size of the ﬁ scal saving depends 
on several assumptions, including the 
trends in enrollment rates and labor 
market participation rates, and physical 
infrastructure. Drawing on a more cautious 
set of assumptions, World Bank simulations 
ﬁ nd that potential saving amounts to 0.4 
percent of GDP for the new member states 
and Croatia.
6 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and 
the United Kingdom.
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Greening Europe’s growth
Europe’s success in adopting an environmentally 
sustainable growth model depends on companies 
developing cutting-edge products, generating 
jobs at home, and competing successfully abroad. 
Gamesa, a Spanish wind turbine manufacturer, is 
considered a European green growth success story.1 
Founded in 1976, the company moved into wind 
energy in 1994, and within 10 years it became the 
world’s second-largest turbine maker. Gamesa’s 
experience shows how growth comes with both 
opportunities and challenges.
Spotlight Two
Past to 1990 Present to 2008 Future to 2030
Emissions
Very high MediumHigh Low
The maps show per capita CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. 1990 and 2008 data by country are from the International 
Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2010. The 2030 map is based on an IEA scenario that limits atmospheric CO2 
concentrations to 450 parts per million (ppm), consistent with a global temperature increase of 2 degrees centigrade.
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Three points stand out:
First, Europe’s production is greening thanks to popular policies.2 Consumption 
is becoming cleaner too, but less than one might think. Structural change 
plays an important role in these shifts. In much of Europe, the rise of high-
tech companies making green products contrasts with an overall decline in 
manufacturing. Between 2000 and 2010, the manufacturing employment share 
in Spain dropped about 20 percent, while imports of consumer goods from 
China increased eightfold. Polluting industries left, reducing local emissions, 
but emissions embedded in products imported from China rose. Spain’s net 
emissions imports increased almost ﬁ vefold between 1998 and 2008, similar to 
those of many other European countries (ﬁ gure S2.1). For a truly green economic 
model, Europe needs even cleaner production, but it also needs cleaner 
consumption.
Second, green policies and investments will create growth opportunities for 
European countries, but not all countries will beneﬁ t equally. Ambitious national 
and EU policies, motivated by environmental and job-creation objectives, 
encouraged Gamesa to enter the wind turbine business. These policies created 
a large home market for Gamesa’s products, which also helped enter export 
markets. By the mid-2000s, Gamesa had created more than 5,000 jobs, most 
of them in Spain. Besides Spain, Denmark and Germany were Europe’s main 
wind turbine manufacturers, together accounting for more than half of global 
production by 2007. These countries used incentives to create domestic demand 
and develop research and innovation capacity. As national green policies 
expand in Europe, will many countries see growth and jobs beneﬁ ts? Or will 
such beneﬁ ts be conﬁ ned to a small group of early market leaders?
Third, some economic beneﬁ ts of EU green policies will leak outside the 
European Union. This leakage is expected and should be welcomed. Addressing 
global environment imperatives requires that many countries contribute, 
especially the world’s largest economies: the European Union, the United States, 
and China. Gamesa’s experience is illustrative. In 2005, Gamesa held a third of 
the Chinese wind turbine market. Five years later, its market share was down 
Figure S2.1: Europe is the 
world’s largest importer 
of carbon dioxide
(net carbon dioxide emission 
transfers [territorial minus 
consumption emissions], 2008)
Note: MtCO2 = million tons 
of carbon dioxide.
Source: World Bank staff, 
using data from Peters 
and others (2011).
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to 3 percent. The company entered the Chinese market early, but as green 
technology became a higher priority for the Chinese government, preferences 
for domestic industry forced Gamesa to transfer know-how and technology to 
Chinese suppliers. Some of the policies that helped Gamesa in Spain — including 
local content requirements and cheap land and credit — now helped Chinese 
wind turbine manufacturers. Today, some of Gamesa’s products are 95 percent 
Chinese, and 4 of the 10 largest wind turbine makers in the world are Chinese. 
Despite its shrinking market share, Gamesa’s Chinese business grew, and the 
company did not protest Chinese policies. In 2010, Gamesa opened its ﬁ fth 
manufacturing facility in China, from where it now ships equipment to North 
America. While Gamesa dropped to sixth place among global wind turbine 
companies, its revenues increased from $1.7 billion in 2005 to $3.3 billion in 
2009. During this time, globally installed wind energy capacity rose from 60 
gigawatts to 160, and by 2010 reached almost 200. Helped by technological 
progress and economies of scale, the price for wind power dropped about 27 
percent.3
Europe’s efforts alone are not enough to tackle global environment problems 
like climate change. Green technology investments will happen sooner if global 
innovation and manufacturing networks are mobilized. Europe will not always 
be able to compete in mass- producing standardized green products. It will need 
to retain its strength in knowledge-intensive green services and technology 
and rely on cheaper production in places such as the EU12, the EU candidate 
and eastern partnership countries, and even in East Asia. If Europe succeeds, its 
growth model will not just be the best in the world in helping its poorer parts 
and neighbors prosper, it will also lead the world to a greener future.
The green golden rule
Environmental policies have been essential in Europe since the early 1970s 
(Hey 2005). They have been outlined in six environmental action programs 
and formalized in numerous directives.4 Early policies focused on local 
environmental quality: highly visible but mostly reversible environmental 
problems that could be eliminated or reduced by strict emission and efﬂ uent 
standards, such as air and water quality. More recently, Europe has focused 
on environmental problems with less visible impacts but nonetheless severe 
and potentially irreversible effects. Global threats such as climate change, 
biodiversity loss, and nuclear waste now command Europe’s attention.
This second type of environmental problem poses new challenges. These 
complex problems resemble other large societal problems, like poverty or public 
health, with long-term consequences and no easy solutions (Hulme 2009). 
There is great danger in postponing action until future welfare diminishes and 
the ability to manage or reverse harmful trends is lost. These long-term threats 
call for a “green golden rule” — achieve the highest level of growth and welfare 
that does not diminish future generations’ ability to beneﬁ t from environmental 
goods and services.5
Considering the welfare of both current and future generations means that 
environmental policymaking must walk a ﬁ ne line. Reducing carbon emissions, 
for instance, costs both ﬁ rms and consumers. Given the uncertainty about the 
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effectiveness of policies and the impacts they avoid, determining the level of 
climate action that reduces emissions enough to avoid future damages without 
unduly affecting economic growth will be difﬁ cult. It implies determining the 
“optimal” or acceptable level of pollution — a controversial task.
Following the green golden rule, Europe has embarked on an ambitious 
program to ensure continuing growth with fewer environmental side effects. 
Policymakers still worry about employment, social stability, and ﬁ scal 
balances, but protecting natural resources long considered practically free 
and inexhaustible is now prominent and, in some countries, just as important. 
If Europe overcomes the signiﬁ cant technical, ﬁ nancial, political, and social 
barriers to implementing a green economy, it will become a world model — one 
with lessons for both developed countries that urgently need to reduce their 
environmental impacts and developing countries that need to achieve higher 
incomes without excessive environmental degradation.
Greening
Over the last two decades, Europe has improved environmental quality in 
many areas and reduced the impacts of its production. Europe measures 
its environmental progress in climate change, environmental health, nature 
and biodiversity, and natural resources and waste. Major sources of local air 
pollution in the EU15 dropped 30–70 percent over 1990–2008 (ﬁ gure S2.2). 
Organic water pollution dropped almost 20 percent since 1998, and ﬁ ne 
particulate matter dropped 20 percent on average (European Environment 
Agency 2010). Despite a commitment to reduce waste generation and materials 
consumption, both have increased modestly, but far less than economic output. 
But Europe’s progress on biodiversity conservation has been mixed. It did not 
reach its goal of halting biodiversity loss by 2010, despite making progress in 
habitat conservation and introducing biodiversity concerns in sector policies, 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy.
Figure S2.2: Advanced Europe has 
cut air pollution in half since 1990
(trends in air pollution in the EU15, 
1990–2009, 1990 = 100)
Note: Excluding the United 
Kingdom (no pre-2000 data).
Source: European Environment Agency 2010.
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EU climate policies sometimes veer into micromanagement (a recent directive 
limits carbon dioxide emissions in producing a ton of toilet paper to no more 
than 334 kilograms), but they have been effective. While in most parts of the 
world, greenhouse gas emissions have increased, over 1990–2008 they dropped 
7 percent in the EU15 and 11 percent in the EU27, despite a considerable increase 
in economic activity (European Environment Agency 2010).6 Europeans are 
also using energy more efﬁ ciently. Europe’s 2008 economic output per unit of 
energy was twice that in 1990. By further decoupling economic growth from 
energy use and emissions, the European Union is on track to achieve its climate 
policy goals for 2020: reduce greenhouse gas emissions 20 percent below 
1990 levels, lower primary energy use to 20 percent less than “business as 
usual,” and obtain at least 20 percent of energy from renewable sources. Some 
member states have already met some goals, for instance on renewable energy 
(ﬁ gure S2.3). The targets are more ambitious for 2050, as the European Union 
aims for an 80 percent reduction in emissions.
These gains have come from popular policies. One instrument for climate 
action is the European Emission Trading Scheme, introduced in 2005. Despite 
criticism of the scheme’s effectiveness and susceptibility to windfall proﬁ ts 
and fraud, industries now know there will be a long-term price on atmospheric 
carbon emissions. The scheme encouraged private investments in abatement 
technology and upgrading equipment. Europeans have shown a willingness to 
share the cost of environmental action. Indeed, 64 percent of EU15 residents 
believe that protecting the environment should be a priority, even at the 
Figure S2.3: Europe’s north is leading 
the push for cleaner energy
(percentage of ﬁ nal energy from 
renewables in 2009—and the targets 
for 2020)
Source: REN21 2011.
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expense of job loss and slower economic growth, compared with 58 percent in 
the rest of the world (World Values Survey 2005–2008).7 Environmental policies 
can win increased popular support by spreading ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts. Many 
Danish wind turbines are owned by local cooperatives, preempting “not-in-my-
backyard” opposition. And feed-in tariffs for renewable electricity generation 
have been turning home-based solar systems into investment opportunities.
Europe’s progress in reducing local air pollution and the climate impacts of 
production is substantial, but its gains in shrinking the environmental footprint 
of consumption are more limited. Lower industrial pollution is due at least in 
part to major structural economic shifts and trade expansion. As traditional, 
energy- and emission-intensive economic activities (such as iron and steel 
manufacturing) became uncompetitive in higher-wage European countries, 
they moved to other parts of the world, especially Asia. The EU15’s total steel 
output has stagnated since 1980, when Europe moved into more specialized 
and cleaner steel production. By contrast, India’s and the Republic of Korea’s 
output increased some 600 percent, China’s by almost 1,600 percent.8 Europe’s 
environmental dividend reduced local pollution from dirty industries and 
generally decreased use of local resources, a contrast with the increase in 
other regions.
Figure S2.4: Western imports, 
Eastern emissions
(net emission transfers, 1991–2008)
Source: Peters and others 2011.
Sometimes polluting industries quite literally moved to developing countries. 
In the late 1990s, Chinese companies purchased dozens of German industrial 
plants and dismantled, shipped, and rebuilt them in China. A Dortmund steel 
mill, for example, became a 250,000-ton three-dimensional puzzle (Kahn 
and Landler 2007). Air quality improved in Germany, but the shift increased 
air pollution in China (Chen, Hong, and Kan 2004).9 Many Asian products are 
made for European markets, leading to rising emissions embedded in imports. 
Between 1990 and 2008, the United Kingdom’s net imports of carbon dioxide 
emissions increased from 29 million tons to 159 million tons (ﬁ gure S2.4). 
Overall, when considering only carbon dioxide emitted in rich (Kyoto Annex B) 
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countries, there has been a 3-percent drop. By contrast, consumption-related 
emissions in those countries increased 11 percent (Peters and others 2011).10 
China alone has more than tripled its exports of emissions since 2000.
Europe has made progress in greening its production and has led the world in 
formalizing and implementing regional emission-reduction policies. But more 
action is needed. Marginal abatement costs will increase as cheaper clean-up 
solutions are implemented ﬁ rst, and tightening environmental regulations will 
become politically more difﬁ cult, especially at a time of economic uncertainty. 
Beyond its borders, Europe needs to green its consumption. One approach is 
to help other countries reduce the environmental impacts of their production 
while accelerating resource use. The European Union, already providing 
technical assistance for pollution and emission control, recycling, and other 
environmental priorities through bilateral and multilateral efforts (including 
through the World Bank), could do more by supporting European exports of 
environmental technology and more efﬁ cient capital goods to developing-
country producers, through export credit guarantees, for example. Measures 
that encourage green foreign direct investment would help develop domestic 
environmental technology ﬁ rms.
A more coercive approach would be to extend the reach of European emission 
policies to other countries through border tax adjustments (Umweltbundesamt 
2009). This would level the playing ﬁ eld for domestic companies, and foreign 
ﬁ rms exporting to Europe would then have the same incentives to reduce 
emissions as do domestic producers. The debate about the inclusion of foreign 
air carriers in the European Emission Trading Scheme in 2012 shows that this 
approach is controversial, but it might encourage domestic carbon restrictions 
so that revenues stay in the exporting country. The European Commission and 
several European countries contributed to the World Bank–led Partnership for 
Market Readiness, which helps countries set up carbon markets. The ﬁ rst round 
of countries includes China, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Green growth
Moving toward a European economy that puts a price on environmental 
goods and services involves a substantial structural shift. Further reducing 
local pollution and preventing global environmental problems from severely 
affecting current and future generations require massive transformations in 
energy, transport, and housing. Some observers have called for an energy 
industrial revolution.11 But change of this magnitude is not unprecedented. Both 
the information technology revolution and the invention of the steam engine 
triggered upheaval far greater than what one might expect from a green-
growth transformation (Fankhauser, Sehlleier, and Stern 2008). An energy 
industrial revolution will impose costs on some businesses but beneﬁ t others. 
How these costs and beneﬁ ts are distributed will determine whether green 
growth will be a broadly accepted economic model in the EU27 and beyond.
Tighter environmental standards will be costly, at least in the short to medium 
term. Unilaterally internalizing the cost of environmental degradation will 
render European ﬁ rms less competitive than ﬁ rms not subject to strict pollution 
controls. The money that consumers and ﬁ rms spend on pollution charges or 
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energy will not be available to spend or invest elsewhere (though these costs 
can be partly neutralized through appropriate revenue recycling). Predicting 
these costs of green policies is difﬁ cult. The costs of a proposed carbon cap-
and-trade system in the United States, for instance, would range from $69 to 
$808 per household by 2020 (Winchester and others 2010). A study for the 
European Commission estimated ﬁ rm-level costs of environmental compliance 
at 0.25–2 percent of production value (Vercaemst and others 2007). In Poland, 
the average cost to implement a comprehensive greenhouse gas abatement 
package is about 1 percent of GDP over 20 years, after which net beneﬁ ts 
accrue (World Bank 2011). These costs, though signiﬁ cant, are not enough to 
explain the exodus of energy-intensive and polluting industries out of Western 
Europe. High labor costs and other production factors have likely played a larger 
role. Energy prices are already high, and most EU15 countries moved out of 
energy- and emission-intensive industries some time ago, such as the United 
Kingdom, with its 1980s decline in the coal and steel industry. The impact 
will be larger in Eastern Europe, where economies have not yet completed 
structural shifts and where national environmental policies are more lenient.
Environmental action comes with costs, but so too does inaction.12 And 
sometimes doubted decisions become obvious in retrospect. The automobile 
industry and many consumers initially rejected catalytic converters as too 
expensive. But the averted costs of respiratory illnesses and other beneﬁ ts 
from reduced urban smog have been signiﬁ cant. With increased production and 
technical progress, a catalytic converter today is a tiny fraction of the cost of a 
car. Proponents of stricter environmental standards argue that green policies 
have sizable growth effects. Vehicle pollution abatement has generated new 
business opportunities — for example, the global catalytic converter industry 
is worth $20 billion today. And because green technologies are less mature, 
they require more innovation and research and development, which generate 
high-value jobs. At the lower end, investments in energy efﬁ ciency and cleaner 
energy generate jobs in installation, operation, and maintenance that cannot be 
outsourced.
The job gains in green industries are not small, though they are as difﬁ cult to 
determine as the costs of environmental regulation. By the late 2000s, the wind 
energy sector was thought to have generated some 100,000 jobs in Germany, 
42,000 in Spain, and 22,000 in Denmark, and for the solar photovoltaic (PV) 
sector, some 70,000 jobs in Germany and 26,000 in Spain (REN21 2011). 
European ﬁ rms are highly competitive in such areas as pollution-abatement 
technology and solid waste management, and job gains in these sectors 
are signiﬁ cant as well. Experience shows that policies matter. An ecological 
tax reform is credited with helping Germany reduce emissions and increase 
employment. The reform raised the cost of energy, triggering large efﬁ ciency 
gains. The increased revenue was used to reduce nonwage labor costs, which 
helped create 250,000 jobs (Rayment and others 2009, Iwulska 2011).
Economic gains have been concentrated in a few countries, mostly in the EU15. 
These countries have had government support, large home markets for green 
products, and the capacity to take advantage of green growth opportunities 
(ﬁ gure S2.5). Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, each 
accounting for between €5 billion and €15 billion in clean energy technology 
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sales in 2008, were far ahead of Poland (the leader in Eastern Europe), which 
had less than €300 million (van der Berg and van der Slot 2009). Figure S2.5 
shows a similar pattern in value added from renewable power technologies. 
The market leaders ensured domestic demand through, among other steps, 
feed-in tariffs for clean energy and supported technology development. In 
2009, Germany alone spent about €64 million on publicly funded research and 
development for solar PV technology, complementing €163 million in private 
research (Wissing 2009).13 Employment and economic opportunities also exist 
in other EU countries. With carbon trading, one would expect abatement 
investments to ﬂ ow to EU12 countries, where energy and emission intensities 
Figure S2.5: Germany, France, Sweden, 
and Italy have helped business by 
encouraging renewable energy
(total gross value added induced by 
renewable energy deployment in 
2005, by expenditure category, 
billion euros)
Source: Ragwitz and others 2009.
remain higher than in the EU15. But the resulting jobs will likely be smaller in 
number and lower in skill and value added. Examples include manufacturing and 
assembling green products, upgrading building energy efﬁ ciency, and producing 
biofuel. High-value-added activities, green intellectual property, and earnings 
from green exports will likely remain concentrated in today’s leading green 
economies.
All EU countries must adhere to the same environmental standards and carbon 
policy. While all EU countries bear the costs of green growth policies, not all 
have the structural endowments to take advantage of the opportunities these 
policies generate. An analogy to the eurozone is illustrative. Countries adopted 
a common currency without ﬁ rst resolving structural differences. The countries 
shared the beneﬁ ts of adopting the euro, such as low interest rates and reduced 
trade friction. They also faced the constraints imposed by a single currency, 
but with different structural and economic capabilities to adjust to the loss of 
monetary ﬂ exibility. Over the last several decades, EU interventions (such as 
the structural funds) have tried to reduce these differences — but with limited 
success.
A single carbon price has similar advantages and drawbacks. The effectiveness 
of the European green-growth model — especially in Southern and Eastern 
Europe — will depend on policy instruments that help countries cope with the 
426
GOLDEN GROWTH
burdens and share the beneﬁ ts of the transformation to a cleaner economy. 
Besides external support (through carbon ﬁ nance, for instance), green growth 
requires political commitment by countries that, rather than embrace new 
opportunities, often cling to sunset industries and fossil fuel–based energy 
systems. Europe missed many of the efﬁ ciency gains of the infotech revolution. 
It will have to be smarter to prosper in the green technology revolution. 
Global green growth
Europe is serious about greening its economy. Strong policies opened economic 
opportunities that European ﬁ rms like Gamesa were quick to exploit. But 
in an open economy, the incentives that beneﬁ t domestic producers also 
beneﬁ t foreign producers who export to the European market. This increases 
competition for European ﬁ rms and implies a leak of taxpayer-funded subsidies 
and other support. If the goal is to tackle global environmental challenges, 
however, these leaks will be beneﬁ cial even as they make it more difﬁ cult for 
Europe’s green enterprises to compete.
By far the biggest barrier to a green transformation is cost. Environmentally 
friendly technologies are often more expensive than conventional alternatives. 
For example, electricity from coal-ﬁ red power stations costs about $0.06 per 
kilowatt hour (kWh), while the price of wind energy ranges between $0.08 and 
$0.14 per kWh. Solar photovoltaic power (PV) costs more than $0.20 per kWh 
(REN21 2011). Even where life- cycle costs are lower — as with the new generation 
of energy-efﬁ cient lighting — high initial costs deter consumers. Reducing costs 
requires research and development, innovation, and economies of scale. 
With every doubling of production, wind energy is expected to become 15–20 
percent cheaper, and solar PV prices to drop 25 percent (Neij 2008). Regulation, 
taxes and subsidies, and public investments that reduce the price of clean 
technologies (or increase the cost of dirtier ones) trigger private investment 
and lead to increased scale. These interventions are justiﬁ ed because they 
compensate for nonpriced costs incurred by conventional technologies, such as 
the health effects of air pollution, the loss of such environmental services as 
natural water ﬁ ltration, and the damages from a warmer, wetter, more variable 
climate.14 The opportunity to get a foothold in emerging markets for green 
goods also motivates many countries.
Through EU directives and national policies, European countries have made 
credible commitments to support clean growth. These commitments should 
encourage investors to risk funding new products that are not proﬁ table 
according to current market prices. Generous subsidies and tariff guarantees 
have been effective, helping European leaders emerge in many green 
technology areas. By the late 2000s, environmental technologies accounted 
for almost 10 percent of GDP in Germany, and German ﬁ rms held global market 
shares of 6–30 percent in key green markets (BMU 2009).15
Public incentives have worked for European companies, but with open trade 
they are also attractive to foreign ﬁ rms. U.S. companies, such as General Electric 
and smaller high-tech ﬁ rms, quickly established distribution systems in Europe. 
As some green technologies move from research labs to mass production, 
Europe’s comparative advantage vanishes and low-cost producers enter the 
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market. Solar PV panels are an example. Generous feed-in tariffs in Germany, 
Spain, and other European countries initially beneﬁ ted domestic ﬁ rms, even 
causing a bubble in solar company stocks. This attractive market triggered large 
investments in production capacity in China. Between 2006 and 2010, China’s 
PV production increased twentyfold, from 400 megawatts to 8,000. During 
this time, the export share of panels in China never dropped below 94 percent, 
because the high price and low local subsidies meant that there was almost 
no domestic market.16 In wind energy, which is more cost-competitive with 
conventional sources, Chinese ﬁ rms have also increased production. Most of the 
demand so far is domestic, as China deploys the largest installed wind capacity 
in the world. But that will change as producers increase capacity and eye new 
markets. European ﬁ rms, such as Gamesa, should expect more competition.
Europe should welcome these developments. Competition and rising capacity 
have substantially reduced the prices of some green products. China’s solar 
expansion coincided with a price drop of more than 40 percent,17 making 
it cheaper for Europe to reach its “20-20-20” targets (a 20 percent cut in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, a 20 percent increase in the share of 
renewable energy, and a 20 percent cut in energy consumption) and creating 
room for cuts in subsidies. By indirectly contributing to faster price declines, 
European policies beneﬁ t green investments in the rest of the world, 
accelerating greener industrialization in developing and emerging nations.
The EU27 accounts for just 13 percent of global emissions (International Energy 
Agency 2010). This share will drop as the populations and economies of other 
regions grow faster than Europe’s. To limit global warming and reduce other 
global environmental threats, Europe must spread technology and know-how to 
places where environmental pressures will be most severe. Sharing technology 
with other regions will also reduce the emissions embedded in European 
imports. Even if much of the resulting economic activity takes place elsewhere, 
Europe is positioned to capture a large share of what some expect to be a €3.1 
trillion market for green technology by 2020 according to a study by Roland 
Berger Strategy Consultants in 2007.18 This will include exports of advanced 
green-tech products to China, which will require environmental technology 
investments estimated at 12 percent of GDP. Chinese solar panels, for instance, 
are produced with machines made in Europe.
Rather than compete on price, Europe should accept that manufacturing 
and assembly of basic green technology will move to countries with lower 
factor costs — including perhaps the EU12 and eastern partnership countries. 
Europe should promote innovative, high-tech companies that create green 
products and services that are less price- sensitive and less easily reproduced 
elsewhere. Europe needs “Green Apples” — the green-tech equivalents of an 
innovative info-tech company. Apple Inc. proﬁ ts from innovation and design, 
not from manufacturing. Similarly, European green technology ﬁ rms should 
focus on developing and retaining intellectual property and on specialized 
manufacturing, engineering, and related high-value-added activities. This 
focus will require support for applied research in Europe that makes the region 
attractive for non-European companies. Suzlon, a large Indian wind turbine 
manufacturer, maintains six of its eight research centers in Europe because of 
Europe’s accumulated know-how.
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Needed: will, ingenuity, and efﬁ ciency
Europe is already the leader in the transition to a greener economy. But 
environmental impacts, especially greenhouse gas emissions, are still too 
high per capita to reach global targets. And the picture is even grayer when 
considering the complete consumption footprint. In recent years, European 
policies have moved global climate goals forward. But the world’s second- and 
third-largest economies might soon match Europe’s green ambitions.
The United States has one of the largest environmental footprints. But it also 
has the most effective academic research capacity — and huge innovation 
potential. Much of basic climate-change science and many technical innovations 
— such as solar, wind, and battery technology — originated in U.S. labs. The 
United States is strong not only in technical innovation but also in ﬁ nancial 
and policy innovation. Venture capital funds in the United States channel vast 
resources to promising ﬁ rms, including those in green technology. While Europe 
is strong in process innovation and technological improvement, U.S.-style 
risk-taking is more likely to lead to the breakthrough technical innovations that 
many believe are necessary to solve the climate problem.
Federal climate action in the United States has been inadequate, but state 
and local policies show American potential. California’s air pollution standards 
have affected car manufacturing globally, and the state’s energy policy 
began decoupling power consumption from growth in the 1970s (Iwulska 
2011). Concerns about acid rain in New England spurred the development of 
a sulfur dioxide allowance trading system, which showed the feasibility of 
market-based instruments for pollution control. Ten eastern states joined the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade mechanism to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector. Twenty-three states and many 
local jurisdictions have set quantitative targets to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions, and more than thirty states have adopted renewable energy 
portfolio standards for utilities (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2011).
Figure S2.6: China now emits 
the most carbon dioxide
(total carbon dioxide emissions from 
energy use in the three largest global 
economies, million tons of 
carbon dioxide)
Source: International Energy Agency 2010b. 
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The capacity for policy experimentation and implementation at the state and 
local levels can lead to new, effective, and socially acceptable approaches to 
environmental management. When successful, innovation spreads quickly and 
regulatory diversity helps lift standards elsewhere. The “California effect” works 
even without strong federal action (Vogel 2000). But in the long term, state 
action cannot substitute for national policies.
China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, faces severe problems 
from air and water pollution. But to further reduce poverty, China’s economy 
must continue growing — even if double-digit growth rates will become harder to 
achieve. At current emissions per unit of GDP, China’s economic growth implies 
that by 2030 the country would account for the entire global emission allowance 
— 30–35 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent — that is consistent with the 
target of keeping Earth’s temperature from rising 2°C higher than preindustrial 
levels (Stern 2010). China has started tackling this enormous challenge. Aware 
of its own susceptibility to climate change, the country has embarked on an 
ambitious domestic greening program. The twelfth Five-Year Plan calls for a 15–
17 percent reduction in energy and carbon dioxide intensity by 2015, expansion 
of wind farms, new solar capacity of more than 5 gigawatts, construction of 
a smart grid to integrate a larger share of renewables, an emissions cap-and-
trade system, and a tax on coal.
China already contributes to global greening by lowering the cost of existing 
environmental technology, from light bulbs to solar water heaters to wind 
turbines. All seven strategic industries in the Five-Year Plan move the country 
from low-end manufacturing to a less resource-intensive economy. And three 
are explicitly green: new energy, new-materials and new-energy cars, and 
energy saving and environment protection. China’s huge market for green 
products will also reduce the price gap between clean and conventional energy 
and technology. Its goal is to become the world leader in green products like 
solar panels and electric cars, whose markets must grow if global emission 
targets are to be reached. China’s environmental impacts will continue to rise. 
But with strong commitments and better technologies, it could reverse the rapid 
Figure S2.7: But China’s per 
capita carbon dioxide emissions 
may not signiﬁ cantly grow 
beyond the European Union’s
(per capita carbon dioxide emissions 
from energy use in the three largest 
global economies, tons of carbon 
dioxide per capita)
Note: Solid lines show observed per 
capita emissions, and dotted lines show 
a per capita emission scenario based on 
450 ppm with ambitious mitigation.
Source: World Bank staff calculations 
based on International Energy 
Agency (2010) and UN (2011).
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Notes
1 Based on Lewis and Wiser (2007), Bradsher 
(2010), Gamesa annual reports, and market 
share information from Make Consulting 
and Emerging Markets Energy Research. 
2 There are numerous deﬁ nitions of “green 
growth” (OECD 2011) or “green economy” 
(UNEP 2011). This spotlight uses the 
term “greening” in a broader sense of 
reducing the environmental impacts of 
human activity; it uses “green growth” in 
a narrower sense of recognizing a shift 
to greater environmental sustainability 
as an opportunity for growth—through 
innovation and development of new 
products and markets. Both terms refer 
to traditional environmental problems 
(like water pollution or excessive resource 
use) as well as climate change.
3 Consistent cost estimates for wind power 
are hard to ﬁ nd. This ﬁ gure assumes the 
widely accepted learning rate of 20 percent 
reduction with a doubling of capacity.
4 Refer to the European Commission’s 
website on environment policies for a 
list of directives, available at ec.europa.
eu/environment/policy_en.htm.
5 Beltratti, Chichilnisky, and Heal (1995) 
note that this is “the highest indeﬁ nitely 
maintainable level of instantaneous utility, 
in a framework where environmental 
goods are valued in their own rights, i.e., 
are a source of utility, and are used as 
inputs to the productive process” (p. 151).
6 Part of that decrease was due to 
industrial restructuring and inefﬁ cient 
socialist-era industries closing.
7 In the EU12, just 50 percent agree. 
8 World Bank staff calculations 
based on data from the World Steel 
Association (www.worldsteel.org). 
9 There appear to be no estimates of 
displaced industries’ contributions to China’s 
local air pollution. But it is likely signiﬁ cant 
through increased energy demand (much 
of it from coal) and direct emissions from 
industrial processes. More recently, China 
has reduced urban air pollution substantially, 
including through the World Bank–supported 
China Air Pollution Management Project.
10 Aggregate estimates for EU15 or EU27 are 
unavailable, because the data set does 
not allow netting out intra-European 
trade-induced emissions. Annex B 
countries are high- and middle-income 
countries subject to emissions reductions 
in the Kyoto Protocol, including Russia 
and Ukraine. See http://unfccc.int/
kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php for a list.
11 For example, Nicholas Stern (presentation at 
the High-Level Dialogue on Low Emissions 
Development Policy Implementation, July 13, 
2011, World Bank, Washington, DC. Available 
at climatechange.worldbank.org/content/
climate-change-thinkers-converge-high-
level -dialogue-low-emission-development).
12 See the extensive literature on the 
health burden of environmental 
pollution and the emerging literature 
on climate change adaptation costs 
(for instance, World Bank 2010a).
13 The private sector ﬁ gure is for 2008. 
Globally, spending on clean energy 
research and development is considered 
far too low to support the kinds of 
technological breakthroughs needed to 
achieve climate goals (World Bank 2010b).
14 See, for instance, Gillingham, Newell, 
and Palmer (2009) for a discussion of 
market failures in energy efﬁ ciency 
that justify government intervention. 
15 These markets include energy efﬁ ciency, 
sustainable water, sustainable transport, 
energy generation, waste management 
and recycling, and natural resources 
and efﬁ ciency of materials use.
16 International Energy Agency 2010c. 
17 Price data are available on the website 
of Solarbuzz, an NPD Group Company, at 
solarbuzz.com/facts-and-ﬁ gures/retail-price
-environment/module-prices.
18 Presentation is available at www.
rolandberger.com/media/pdf/
rb_press/RB_Wirtschaftsfaktor_
Umweltschutz_20071127.pdf.
19 For evidence of Europe’s generally lower 
climate change risk compared with those 
of other regions, see Buys and others 
(2009) and the Climate Change Vulnerability 
Index released by Maplecroft, available at 
maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi.html.
growth of emissions (ﬁ gures S2.6 and S2.7) and reach higher incomes at lower 
levels of per capita pollution and atmospheric emissions than many of today’s 
industrialized countries.
Europe can help the global environment by continuing to pursue a greener 
growth model. The region’s continuing green growth will improve the quality 
of life for its current and future citizens, contribute to global sustainability, 
and offer economic opportunities for European ﬁ rms. Europe will incur short-
term costs, although the implications of failing to deal with long-term global 
environmental threats are less severe for Europe than other regions. Europe 
has already dealt with most local pollution and will be less severely affected 
by global climate change than many other regions.19 European leadership on 
environmental action is, therefore, even more remarkable. But despite Europe’s 
leadership, solving the toughest global environmental problems will require 
all three major economies to accelerate the transition to greener growth and 
nudge the world forward. Indeed, global green growth requires European 
political will, American innovation, and Asian efﬁ ciency.
Uwe Deichmann contributed this spotlight.
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CHAPTER 8
Golden Growth
In September 1961, an American professor named Edmund Phelps 
published a paper that proposed a simple rule for a nation’s wealth to 
grow and provide the highest standard of living for its citizens, present 
and future.1 Phelps called it “The Golden Rule” of economic growth. At 
around the same time, Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, a young German 
economist, submitted a doctoral dissertation proposing the same tenet.2  
The golden rule essentially speciﬁ ed how much people had to work, save 
and invest today so that future generations were at least as well off as 
they were. The goal was to maximize consumption, but in a way that was 
economically sustainable. The rule implied that today’s generation should 
consume just enough—no more, no less—that their children would neither 
pity nor resent them. Phelps’ paper cited the work of three economists—
from Great Britain, the US, and Australia—but the arguments built also on 
the insights of, among others, a Dutchman, a Frenchman, and a Hungarian.3
Fifty years later, the golden rule is still “the most basic proposition of 
optimal growth theory,” likely because it is simple enough for people to 
understand and appealing enough for policymakers to try to implement 
(Howitt 2007). The rule depends on many things, some that people and 
policymakers can choose or change more easily than others. It speciﬁ es 
how much goods and services people should consume given how hard 
they work. It depends on the size of future populations and is inﬂ uenced 
by the pace of technological progress. And—though Phelps’ paper did not 
specify this—it is contingent on how much the country could sell and lend 
to others, and how much it could buy and borrow from them. 
Chapter 8
How can Europe make the single market 
more efﬁ cient?
How can Europe maintain the momentum 
for regional economic integration?
What is needed to maintain Europe’s 
global leadership?
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Phelps wrote: 
“In deciding which growth path is best from its standpoint, a generation will 
look only at the amount of consumption which each path offers it. … Under 
conditions of natural growth, consumption along all these paths grows at 
the identical rate, g, so that these time paths of consumption cannot cross. 
Therefore, with resources limited, there must exist some uniformly highest, 
feasible consumption path. This dominant consumption path offers more 
consumption at every point in its history than any other natural-growth 
consumption path. All generations in such a history will naturally prefer this 
path, whence its corresponding investment ratio, to any lower consumption 
path. A rigorous demonstration is straightforward” (1961, p. 640).
Incorrect choices meant that the growth path would not be at its optimum, 
and policymakers could improve the lot of current and future generations by 
inﬂ uencing these choices. When consumption was above the optimal level 
and investment below that guaranteeing optimal consumption in the future, a 
tax on consumption to fund public investment or catalyze private innovation 
might help. Financing excessive consumption through foreign borrowing, by 
contrast, would hurt. If today’s consumption came at the cost of tomorrow’s 
environment, a tax on carbon emissions could help ensure a better future. The 
rule has implications for debates about broader economic welfare, not just 
economic growth narrowly deﬁ ned. 
Box 8.1: The structural prerequisites of a successful monetary union
The eurozone has lower aggregate ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cits and public debt as a share of GDP 
than the United States or Japan: as a whole, 
its current account is near balance. The 
eurozone’s problems are rooted not in 
aggregate imbalances, but in imbalances 
among member states. 
This report discussed returns to and 
responsibilities for greater integration in 
Europe. The policy implications speak directly 
to the structural prerequisites of successful 
monetary integration. Chapter 4 revealed 
how countries in the south failed to keep pace 
with productivity growth in the rest of Europe 
after monetary union, in part because of poor 
business regulation. Whether or not they 
entered the eurozone at an overvalued rate, 
their competitiveness problems have since 
been aggravated by poor policies. Prospective 
future euro members in the east should take 
note and ﬁ t their business environment for 
the euro. 
Chapter 6 showed that labor mobility is 
lowest and restrictions on hiring and ﬁ ring are 
highest among the same Southern European 
economies that suffer most from a lack of 
competitiveness. Economic theory implies 
that countries with inﬂ exible labor markets 
will struggle in a monetary union when faced 
with external shocks. The consequences of the 
2008–09 crisis in the eurozone are now playing 
out as economists might have predicted. 
Labor market reforms are thus an important 
prerequisite for successful euro adoption.
But this report shows that adjustment is 
possible. Chapter 7 indicated how countries 
can reduce excessive public debt without 
compromising the quality of public services. 
Adjustment is tough, and even the toughest 
adjustment will not sufﬁ ce in Greece without 
an orderly restructuring of public debt. But 
countries such as Finland, New Zealand, 
Singapore, and Sweden show that a leaner 
government contributes to long-term 
competitiveness.
Europe’s current debate over the ﬁ scal union’s 
merits and risks masks the fact that Europe’s 
single market—more than ﬁ scal transfers—is 
responsible for the convergence in living 
standards between Europe’s richer north and 
its poorer south, and more recently, between 
the west and the east. Whatever the solution 
European leaders arrive at, this feature of 
the European economic model should not be 
diluted or distorted.
Crises of conﬁ dence in governments’ ability 
to meet debt obligations are not new. What 
makes them special in Europe is that as 
eurozone members, countries cannot print 
money to meet domestic obligations. The 
common currency helped these countries 
during the global ﬁ nancial crisis of 2009; it may 
be hurting them in the sovereign debt crisis 
that followed in its wake. The fuzzy boundaries 
between solvency and liquidity complicate 
matters, as do concerns about moral hazard if 
deﬁ cit countries are bailed out. 
A break-up of the eurozone would be 
devastating for Europe as well as the 
world economy (for a summary discussion 
see Belke 2011). Countries with solvency 
problems should restructure their debts and 
close remaining public deﬁ cits through ﬁ scal 
transfers conditioned on structural reforms. 
Governments have to be ready to intervene 
to recapitalize some banks, though the 
experience of Ireland discussed in chapter 
3 should deter them from socializing all the 
losses. Sweden’s experience, discussed later in 
this chapter, shows how to do this better. 
Most solutions imply a loss of sovereignty for 
creditor and debtor countries in Europe. The 
ﬁ ndings in this book suggest that the beneﬁ ts 
of European integration make this a price 
worth paying.
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Phelps and researchers after him have focused on an economy in “steady state,” a 
term that describes a condition that is neither a crisis nor a bubble. Few countries 
are in steady state these days. But the problem addressed by this research is as 
important today as it was in 1961, in the developing world as in the industrialized. 
And perhaps nowhere are the choices of people and policymakers more important 
for the economic growth and welfare of future generations than in Europe today. 
Appropriately, policymakers are now focused on the crisis in the eurozone. This 
report does not devote much space to possible remedies, except to point to the 
structural prerequisites of monetary integration (box 8.1). Europe faces structural 
challenges that today seem less urgent but may prove more difﬁ cult than those 
that a common currency created: falling populations; faltering productivity, 
especially in services; unsustainable social spending; and—in some places—a 
fraying work ethic. When the euro is stabilized, policymakers will ask questions 
posed by Phelps’ “growthmen”: what must Europe do to grow sustainably again? 
What changes must be made to the European economic model so that it returns to 
the golden rules of growth? 
This report applies these principles, which economists have developed over the 
last 50 years, to assess how to make European growth “golden.” The remedies 
are possible for a part of the world that is intrepid and inclusive. The recent 
experiences of countries that have succeeded in addressing these problems—in 
Europe and around the world—offer insights into these remedies. As part of the 
work commissioned for this report, 32 case studies were compiled, spanning 16 
policy areas identiﬁ ed as important for European growth (table 8.1). For each of 
these policy areas—which range from managing ﬁ nancial inﬂ ows from abroad to 
providing social services at home—the case studies summarize the experience of 
Policy area
Selected countries
Europe World
1 Restructuring private debt Sweden Korea, Rep.
2 Managing ﬁ nancial foreign direct investment (EU) Poland (Non-EU) Croatia
3 Crisis-prooﬁ ng ﬁ nancial integration Czech Republic Canada
4 Increasing value-added Slovak Republic Singapore
5 Job creation Ireland New Zealand
6 Export generation Germany Korea, Rep.
7 R&D policy Switzerland United States
8 Tertiary education United Kingdom United States
9 Management quality Sweden United States
10 Internal mobility Ireland United States
11 Labor legislation Denmark United States
12 Immigration policies Sweden; United Kingdom Canada; United States
13 Social security Iceland Japan
14 Social service delivery Finland Singapore
15 Reducing public debt Turkey New Zealand
16 Green growth policies Germany California (US)
Table 8.1: Benchmark countries for selected policies
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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a pair of countries, one in Europe and one outside. Europeans should learn from 
one another, because some countries show how the European economic model 
can work well. Europeans should also learn from the Americans and Asians, 
whose governments have been facing similar tests and trials.
More Europe
Not all 45 countries covered by this report are in the European Union, but they 
share the aspirations summarized in the European Union’s growth strategy, 
Europe 2020: economic development that is smart, sustainable, and inclusive. 
In seeking all three at once, European aspirations seem higher than those in 
other parts of the world. Europe’s way of life—and its growth ambitions—seem 
to put a higher premium on combining economic dynamism with environmental 
sustainability and social cohesion. Some countries in Europe show that 
achieving these objectives is possible. Europe 2020 is a realistic vision. 
To make this vision a reality, Europe’s growth model needs to be adjusted, not 
abandoned. This is the central argument of this report for three main reasons: 
 · First, Europe has many attractive features that should be preserved. The 
economic model facilitated economic convergence, which helped 200 million 
Europeans escape the “middle-income trap” in the two waves of southern 
and eastern enlargement. Nearly another 100 million in southeastern Europe 
and Turkey could follow over the coming decade, and perhaps another 75 
million in the eastern partnership countries afterward. Vigorous trade and 
ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows, and growing exchanges of services and labor—all facilitated 
by pan-European institutions and infrastructure—enabled this convergence. 
 · Second, Europe’s most innovative economies show that economic dynamism 
need not be the price for more equal societies with attendant sizable 
governments. Finland and Sweden show that large governments can be run 
efﬁ ciently. Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands demonstrate that labor 
markets offering more security than those in the United States or East Asia 
need not be inﬂ exible. Ireland and the United Kingdom show that Anglo-
Saxon attitudes toward education and enterprise are compatible with the 
European social market economy. These examples might be exceptional, 
and for many European countries with weaker institutions, reducing the size 
of government could be easier than making it more efﬁ cient. But European 
companies compete successfully with their less regulated American or Asian 
peers, beneﬁ ting from the advantages of European integration. And as 
spotlight two highlights, Europe leads the world in green technologies, thanks 
to political will and regulatory foresight. 
 · Third, changes in the European growth model must lead to more Europe 
rather than less. Strengthening the Single Market for Services would boost 
Europe’s growth, helping also to surmount barriers to world class innovation 
clusters in Europe, particularly in industries such as ICT, biotechnology, and 
health equipment and services. A continuing push toward deeper European 
integration would extend European ﬁ nance, the beneﬁ ts of trade, and the 
credibility of European regulations to emerging markets in the neighborhood. 
It would spur structural reform in both Europe’s economic core and its 
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periphery, as it will be ever clearer that integration’s beneﬁ ts will accrue 
disproportionately to countries that make their people and enterprises better 
suited for a Greater Europe.4 As European societies accept and act on the 
reality of aging populations and demographic decline, Europe’s appeal as a 
caring society will make it more competitive in the global market for talent.
The 45 countries covered by this report have—to differing degrees—three 
assets: the European Union’s single market, momentum for regional integration, 
and Europe’s considerable global economic inﬂ uence. Europe should play to its 
strengths by investing in these assets and reaping the returns. Growth will be 
the natural outcome of measures to do the following:
 · Deepen the single market, perhaps the European Union’s biggest 
achievement and its most valuable institution but one which, like the euro, “is 
unﬁ nished business” (Almunia 2008).
 · Expand regional economic integration, a goal with a consensus 
unprecedented in European history and unequaled in the world today.
 · Strengthen Europe’s global economic leadership. A region that generates a 
third of the world’s annual output does not have to relinquish this position.
This chapter concludes the report, pulling together the lessons from earlier 
chapters by matching policy priorities in each principal activity—trade, ﬁ nance, 
enterprise, innovation, work, and government—to these three objectives. 
Chapter 1 shows how these activities are organized uniquely in Europe. To 
analyze intra-Europe differences in these components of the growth model, 
chapters 2 through 7 separate them somewhat artiﬁ cially. Because they are 
interrelated, however, this chapter recognizes these relations, and collates 
policy priorities. 
This chapter makes explicit what is needed to address the three tasks 
Europe has to get done: get the most of the service economy; close the 
two productivity gaps that have opened between the EU15 and the United 
States, and within the EU15 between the north and the south; and adjust 
to demographic changes and an aging society. This chapter identiﬁ es what 
needs to be done, using the experience of successful countries in Europe and 
elsewhere to suggest how these changes can be made. Europeans want growth 
to be smarter, kinder, and cleaner. It is common sense that to accomplish this, 
Europe should build on its uncommon strengths—the single market, regional 
integration, and its global economic heft. 
The ﬁ ndings in chapters 2 through 7 identify the most effective measures for 
reviving and sustaining European growth (table 8.2). To make the single market 
more efﬁ cient, they focus on the trade in services, which requires facilitating 
the trade in digital services and harmonizing regulations across countries, and 
labor mobility within the European Union. To realize the beneﬁ ts of greater 
European integration, the European Union’s existing members and its candidate 
and neighborhood countries have to expand production networks, attract 
foreign investment, and better manage ﬁ nancial linkages. They also need to 
reform public services and labor markets to stay ﬁ t for an integrated Europe. To 
maintain Europe’s global leadership it will be necessary to attract global talent, 
create world class innovation systems, address public sector debt, and reform 
social welfare systems to make public ﬁ nances sustainable. 
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Making the single market more effi cient
The single market is one of the European Union’s biggest achievements, 
justiﬁ ably called its “crown jewel.” Since its introduction in 1992, it has helped 
make Europe a trade powerhouse. As highlighted in chapter 2, of the $10 trillion 
of the global goods trade, $4.5 trillion involves Europe, more than Asia and North 
America combined. Europe also accounts for more than half the global trade 
in services. Although services account for almost three-quarters of total value 
added, Europe’s trade in services is only around $2.25 trillion, about half of the 
value of trade in goods. Chapter 2 measures European services trade against that 
of Canada, a uniﬁ ed national market with two main languages (and where, as in 
Europe, language barriers limit the tradability of personal and business services). 
It ﬁ nds that the services trade could double or triple in the coming decade if 
barriers resulting from imperfections in the single market are removed.
Facilitate trade in modern services
Chapter 2 shows that the potential for services trade remains most 
underexploited in modern services, such as ﬁ nance, communication, licensing, 
computing and information, and other business services. While Europeans can 
travel freely, European doctors, architects, and designers cannot freely offer 
their services outside the country where they obtained their professional 
license. When Europeans ﬂ y across the continent, it matters little which country 
they purchase the ticket in; but when they telephone or use broadband Internet 
to communicate with other European countries, the charges for cross-border 
communication services differ greatly depending on who calls whom. European 
airspace is open and competitive; Europe’s railways are not. Certain digital 
services such as Spotify or iTunes are not available in every EU member state. 
National regulations are insufﬁ ciently harmonized across Europe, imposing 
barriers to services trade. The solution is mutual recognition across the single 
market. Service providers registered in one EU member state should be allowed 
to operate across all. Professional and education certiﬁ cates obtained in one 
EU country should be recognized in others. Moreover, even when the European 
Union has hesitantly begun to harmonize services regulations, such as through 
the Service Directive, implementation has often lagged.
A good example of regulatory harmonization is the European Union’s 
ﬁ nancial market directive, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, which 
essentially requires all EU members to recognize banks and nonbank ﬁ nancial 
institutions licensed in one EU country, allowing the institutions to operate in 
their home market. But the example of ﬁ nancial services illustrates another 
policy challenge: the provision of services across borders requires closer 
coordination between home and host regulators. In the case of multinational 
banks, the European Union needs mechanisms to decide who bears the cost 
should they get into trouble. The efﬁ cient regulation of services across the 
single market thus requires European countries to relinquish sovereignty and 
accept collective liability. What is difﬁ cult in ﬁ nance has yet to be considered in 
telecommunications, energy, and transport. But the beneﬁ ts of strengthening 
the single market in all these services arguably far outweigh the loss of national 
regulatory authority. 
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The barriers created by inadequate harmonization of national regulations, 
which restrict services trade and modern business services, matter already 
and will bind economic growth even more in the future. According to van Ark, 
O’Mahony, and Timmer (2008), about two-thirds of Europe’s productivity gap 
relative to the United States can be accounted for by the productivity gap in 
services. Chapter 2 demonstrates the positive link between the increasing size 
and sophistication of services trade and economic growth. But many services 
will remain nontraded, so the emphasis should be on creating the conditions 
for productivity growth in service sectors. Chapter 4 outlines what needs to be 
done to unfetter enterprise. And chapter 5 traces Europe’s lack of young, highly 
innovative ﬁ rms in innovation-intensive sectors (such as ICT, health care, and 
biotechnology) to market fragmentation and the limited ability of innovators to 
beneﬁ t from the single market’s economies of scale. Some estimates put the 
beneﬁ ts of completing the single market for digital services alone at 4 percent 
of the European Union’s GDP—or about €500 billion every year.
Increase labor mobility
Labor mobility relates closely to trade in services. Many services require 
the movement of natural persons, while greater trade in services involves 
movements of workers within the European Union. While Europeans are half 
as mobile as Americans, they are not instinctively averse to moving—some 
such as the Irish are among the most mobile in the world (box 8.2). The young 
and better educated are more likely to move, and the share of European 
citizens residing in a country different from the one where they were born has 
increased by more than 40 percent since 2001.5 More can be done.
Language and cultural differences in Europe contribute to natural barriers 
to greater labor mobility. But there are also policy-induced barriers, most 
important in the housing market and in social beneﬁ ts. Most of the old EU 
member states restrict the movement of workers from new member states, 
though these restrictions are being gradually relaxed. The recognition of 
professional certiﬁ cates is not complete, and some professions still require 
national licenses. Housing markets in many European countries can be 
Instrument Coverage 
Imperative
Modern services Productivity growth Demographic trends
Deepen the 
single market 
EU27  · Facilitate trade in digital 
services
 · Increase internal labor 
mobility
Widen regional 
economic 
integration
Europe 45  · Crisis-proof ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows 
in Europe
 · Facilitate production networks
 · Align business regulation with a 
common market
 · Improve public service delivery
Strengthen 
global economic 
leadership
Global 70  · Address private 
debt overhang
 · Create world class innovation systems
 · Expand private funding of tertiary 
education 
 · Reform (external) immigration policies
 · Reassess employment-protection laws 
 · Reform social security
 · Reduce ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and public debt
Table 8.2: Europe’s imperatives, instruments, and policy priorities
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inefﬁ cient, making moving expensive. Zoning restrictions limit the supply of 
new housing, and the signiﬁ cant protection offered to long-term renters in many 
European countries segments rental markets, penalizing mobility. The transaction 
costs of buying or selling a house can be high, while property taxes tend to be low, 
to the beneﬁ t of existing owners. 
In addition, despite measures to ensure the portability of social beneﬁ ts, including 
pensions and unemployment insurance across the European Union, it is limited 
in practice because of cumbersome implementation mechanisms, reducing 
mobility. And generous unemployment beneﬁ ts in some European countries may 
discourage workers from seeking jobs in others. Collective bargaining agreements 
that limit territorial wage differentiation mute signals from the labor market. 
Reducing policy-based barriers to mobility is challenging: many Europeans worry 
that greater mobility will increase competition for scarce jobs. Such fears are 
misguided. Labor mobility may create new jobs—evidence does not support the 
idea that there is a ﬁ xed amount of labor to be shared among incumbents and 
newcomers. While greater mobility will make jobs more contestable—potentially 
creating pressures for those insufﬁ ciently skilled to beneﬁ t from new economic 
opportunities—more mobility will largely lead to more and better jobs. Given that 
Europe’s workforce is declining, employers and workers should welcome this. 
Europeans are generally ready to move; European leaders need to build on this to 
foster a new social consensus around a more mobile Europe.
Expanding regional economic integration
The story of European trade and ﬁ nancial integration is remarkable. This report 
celebrates the achievements of economic integration, productivity growth, and 
increasing global competitiveness among Europe’s newest member states in the 
east. At the same time, chapter 4 notes how the European Union’s old members 
Box 8.2: Internal mobility: Ireland and the United States
Ireland
The Irish are the most mobile of all Europeans. 
Internally Dublin is the preferred destination; 
regionally the United Kingdom; and globally 
the United States, where more than 10 percent 
of people claim Irish ancestry. The reasons 
the Irish are mobile span culture, geography, 
and labor laws. First, the Irish have reacted 
to big developments by moving, and their 
cultural proximity to the United Kingdom and 
the United States has made them prone to 
leaving when times are tough. Second, Irish 
labor laws make it easy for enterprises to hire 
and ﬁ re workers: indices of economic freedom 
rate Ireland the freest economy in Europe and 
the ﬁ fth freest in the world. Third, the national 
development strategy—including the use of 
cohesion funds—has promoted concentration 
around Dublin and made workers mobile by 
investing in their skills. Fourth, Ireland has kept 
barriers to immigration low. It did not impose 
quotas on workers from new member states. 
And the quantity and quality of immigration is 
high—in 2008 nearly half of all immigrants had 
tertiary education. The mobility of the Irish will 
help them deal better with the economic crisis.
United States
Labor mobility is much higher in the United 
States than in other developed countries. 
Over the past decade, three times as many 
Americans moved to ﬁ nd jobs and better lives 
than Europeans. On average, an American 
moves 11 times during his or her life. The 
reasons span culture and policy. The country’s 
culture was built through immigration. 
Americans consider mobility as an essential 
ingredient to the pursuit of a better life. It also 
reﬂ ects policy, as housing and labor market 
regulations make housing turnover easier 
than in other countries, allowing workers 
and employers ﬂ exibility. This mobility has 
direct and indirect costs: young Americans 
often live far from their families, and workers 
enjoy fewer protections than those in other 
developed countries. But they also beneﬁ t 
from the ability to negotiate wages, change 
employers quickly, and start businesses. 
Countries seeking to create jobs, nudge people 
back to work, increase earnings and economic 
growth, and make their economic structures 
more ﬂ exible should look at how the U.S. 
policy environment has supported labor 
mobility.
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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have not beneﬁ ted equally from enlargement. Europe’s southern economies in 
particular have failed to make their companies ﬁ t for a larger Europe due to poor 
business regulation. Easy ﬁ nance masked these shortcomings for a while, but the 
crisis exposed the risks of a three-speed Europe. European integration needs to be 
crisis-proofed. 
Crisis-proof fi nancial fl ows in Europe
A unique feature of European integration is the large volume of ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows 
from parent banks in Western Europe to subsidiaries in Central and Eastern 
Europe—a phenomenon we called “ﬁ nancial FDI.”6 As chapter 3 shows, ﬁ nancial 
integration is an enviable opportunity for Europe, but with tail risks. Countries 
that beneﬁ t from this opportunity adopt robust macroprudential regulations 
to moderate the credit booms that large foreign capital inﬂ ows induce. The 
policy arsenal includes capital and liquidity requirements, well-calibrated risk 
weights, and constraints on lending growth or forex lending. Regulations can also 
enhance credit quality by tightening eligibility criteria or loan-to-value and debt-
service-to-income ratios. But chapter 3 also highlights the limits of such policies 
in an integrated ﬁ nancial market, and recommends advancing supranational 
coordination: supervising ﬁ nancial institutions operating across borders, managing 
liquidity risks during crises, and setting appropriate prudential regulations tailored 
to country-speciﬁ c risks. 
Poland, among the European Union, and Croatia, among non-EU countries, show 
the beneﬁ ts of a well-managed ﬁ nancial foreign direct investment (FDI). As the 
result of integration into the international and regional economy, Croatia and Poland 
experienced large inﬂ ows of ﬁ nancial FDI. Poland shows how good regulations 
and sound macroeconomic management can work with informal ways of keeping 
currency mismatches in bank lending manageable. Croatia shows the pros and cons 
of a more rules-based macroprudential regime (box 8.3).
Box 8.3: Managing ﬁ nancial foreign direct investment: Poland and Croatia
Poland
As with any type of capital inﬂ ow, 
governments must balance encouraging 
ﬁ nancial foreign direct investment and 
managing macroprudential risks. After joining 
the European Union in 2004, Poland succeeded 
in striking this balance. Several factors helped. 
First, good macroeconomic performance: 
output has grown for 20 consecutive years, 
and growth has averaged more than 4 
percent since 1991. Inﬂ ation was brought 
down gradually and kept low for more than a 
decade. Second, Poland’s prudential banking 
sector regulations were relatively sound: 
capital adequacy trigger ratios are higher 
than the Basel Accord minimum, and banks 
must comply with binding liquidity standards. 
Moreover, Poland was among the region’s ﬁ rst 
to regulate foreign currency lending through 
Recommendation S in 2006. Third, an informal 
yet effective approach to regulation by the 
central bank: much of the macroprudential 
regime, such as Recommendation S, was 
enforced through moral suasion, without 
automatic punishment mechanisms for 
noncompliance. This informal approach may 
have worked because of Poland’s generally 
sound macroeconomic policies. 
Croatia
The foreign ownership of banks jumped 
from 7 percent in 1998 to 90 percent in 2002, 
remaining around this level since. Credit 
grew, especially for households. Between 
2000 and 2008 household loans grew at an 
annual average of 23 percent. But with rules-
based macroprudential measures, Croatia 
managed the boom and subsequent crisis 
of 2008 relatively well. Between 2008 and 
2010 banks enjoyed the highest average bank 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets in 
the region. The ratio of nonperforming loans 
to total loans is around 7 percent. What lies 
behind this performance? Croatia successfully 
implemented rules-based macroprudential 
policies. The exchange rate regime largely 
ruled out the use of monetary policy. Large 
structural budget deﬁ cits reduced the potential 
for ﬁ scal policy. Croatia’s formal prudential 
policy framework may have made up for 
weaknesses in macroeconomic management. 
This approach is not without drawbacks. It is 
difﬁ cult to limit credit expansion effectively 
and tailor policies to different sectors without 
creating distortions in the market. Restrictions 
on bank credit, for example, hampered the 
expansion of small banks. 
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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Recent developments cast a shadow over the success of ﬁ nancial FDI in Eastern 
Europe. In shoring up their balance sheets to deal with losses in Southern 
Europe, some western banks may decide to deleverage sharply or even leave 
Eastern Europe. Coordination between home and host bank regulators thus 
remains important. Under the “Vienna Initiative” in 2008–09, a combination 
of liquidity support from the European Central Bank, moral suasion by 
regulators, equity and subordinated debt injections, and stabilization facilities 
by international ﬁ nancial institutions encouraged western banks to stay. Similar 
efforts may be needed in the future. But the crisis in the eurozone also points 
to the need for greater supranational ﬁ nancial regulation.  
Supranational regulation would not absolve national governments from their 
responsibility to crisis-proof their economies and protect them from the risks 
of excessive credit growth. The Czech Republic and Canada built on good 
macroeconomic management to beneﬁ t from ﬁ nancial integration, without 
suffering from its excesses (box 8.4). 
Facilitate production networks and FDI
Chapter 4 shows how success in attracting FDI is correlated with the variation 
in productivity growth rates across EU12 countries. FDI has been good for 
Europe’s advanced countries too. Eastern European subsidiaries help their 
Western European parents remain proﬁ table. Productivity and growth among 
ﬁ rms with an international presence were signiﬁ cantly higher in all of the EU15’s 
old members. In France, average labor productivity among international ﬁ rms 
was $149,000 against $70,000 for ﬁ rms without an international presence, and 
productivity growth was four times faster. The creation of production networks 
between east and west following the fall of the Berlin Wall has been a boon to 
both sides, with Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and their eastern neighbors 
in the Baltics and among the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) as the biggest winners.
The policies required to attract FDI are well known: efﬁ cient regulation and 
transparent, predictable, and enforceable rules, complemented by public 
investments in infrastructure and human capital. Yet, many of Europe’s 
neighbors to the east seem unsure of FDI’s beneﬁ ts, keen instead to promote 
their own international champions. Ukrainians, Russians, and Kazakhstanis often 
point to the lack of domestic business groups of international scale in the new 
member states as a disadvantage, touting the beneﬁ ts of home-grown world 
champions. Evidence suggests otherwise: Europe’s eastern neighbors remain 
wedded to a commodity-based pattern of comparative advantage. In 1991, 
Ukraine and Poland started from comparable relative productivity. In 2009, after 
20 years of transition, Ukraine’s average productivity in purchasing power parity 
terms was a third of Poland’s. 
Regulate enterprises for a greater European economy
Eastern Europe’s success in attracting FDI and catching up with productivity 
in the European Union is striking. Similarly striking is the failure of Southern 
Europe’s enterprises to keep pace with productivity growth in the north and 
center. Chapter 4 documents the resulting “three-speed union.” The wheels of 
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Europe’s convergence machine ground to a halt in the south at the same time 
that they turned smoothly in the east. The failure of Greek, Italian, Portuguese, 
and Spanish ﬁ rms to beneﬁ t from the latest phase of European integration 
makes their economies uncompetitive, while the possibility of correcting this 
deﬁ cit through devaluation is closed off within the eurozone. Making their 
companies ﬁ t for an enlarged Europe is a priority in the south—not just for their 
own economies but for the eurozone’s economic health.
What is holding southern ﬁ rms back? Chapter 4 offers two explanations. First, 
Southern Europe lacks ﬁ rms of a sufﬁ cient size to effectively compete and 
beneﬁ t from European integration. Second, burdensome business regulations 
keep southern ﬁ rms small by discouraging investment and growing the shadow 
economy. Competition from the shadow economy can drag potential value-
added leaders down, perpetuating the low productivity equilibrium. This has 
not prevented job creation in the south. But too many workers in the EU15’s 
south are employed in small enterprises with low average productivity. An 
average gross output per worker of around $40,000, including gross proﬁ t and 
depreciation, is not sufﬁ cient to attract a college graduate, so many young 
skilled workers stay away.
The recipe to address the south’s productivity gap is straightforward: better 
regulation and more internationalization. Rigid employment legislation, 
cumbersome tax systems, and burdensome product market regulations all 
make Southern Europe uncompetitive. The last decade has seen a large number 
of countries make signiﬁ cant strides in improving their business climate. Among 
the European countries that have made the most impressive progress is the 
Slovak Republic (box 8.5). Countries looking to create value-added leaders 
might also look to Singapore’s experience for designing efﬁ cient and effective 
business regulation.
Box 8.4: Crisis-prooﬁ ng ﬁ nance: the Czech Republic and Canada
Czech Republic
Most believe that ﬁ nancial integration with 
the west made banking systems in emerging 
Europe more vulnerable to external shocks. 
Yet, banks in some countries such as the 
Czech Republic did better than others during 
the recent global economic crisis. In 2009, 
Czech banks recorded sound proﬁ ts: return 
on equity amounted to 26 percent, and the 
return of assets stood at 1.5 percent. This 
resilience reﬂ ected timely policy actions, 
a sound regulatory system, and prudent 
banking practices. First, the ﬁ nancial sector 
beneﬁ ted from a consolidation program that 
the central bank initiated in the mid-1990s, 
closing many small banks. Second, the process 
of ﬁ nancial sector prudential oversight was 
also consolidated. Since 2005, the Czech 
central bank has had the authority to oversee 
all segments of insurance markets and 
commercial and investment banking. Third, the 
banking sector has a strong retail deposit base 
and beneﬁ ted from prudent lending practices—
nonperforming loans were lower in the Czech 
Republic than in other Central and Eastern 
European economies. No country is crisis-
proof, but Czech ﬁ nancial sector practices and 
policies have been a source of stability during 
the ﬁ nancial crisis.
Canada
Canada’s banking sector survived the 2008–09 
crisis without a taxpayer-ﬁ nanced bailout, 
and its banks remained stable and well 
capitalized. What did Canada do right? First, 
heading into the crisis, the structure of bank 
funding was favorable, as banks relied much 
more on depository funding than wholesale 
funding. Second, the country has one of the 
most restrictive capital adequacy standards in 
the world in risk-weighting, allowable capital 
deductions, and deﬁ nitions of permissible 
regulatory capital. Third, the structure of the 
banking system has traditionally made the 
sector more stable. Heavy regulation and 
tight restrictions on entry led to a highly 
concentrated banking system dominated 
by ﬁ ve large competitors. While this system 
made the sector less competitive, it also 
made the sector easier to regulate, limiting 
the size of the shadow banking sector. 
Supervisors always face a tradeoff between 
competitiveness and stability—the “regulator’s 
dilemma.” The performance of the economy 
before the crisis—annual GDP growth rates 
ranged between 2 and 4 percent during 
1999–2008—and of the banking sector during 
the crisis suggests that Canada has struck the 
right balance. 
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
444
GOLDEN GROWTH
Improve the quality of public services 
Many countries in the western Balkans or the eastern neighborhood face the 
unenviable combination of large and highly inefﬁ cient public sectors. The same 
is true to a different degree in Europe’s south and among some core EU member 
states. Improved public services are key ingredients in the policy mix to make 
Europe’s periphery ﬁ t for competition in an integrated market. More efﬁ cient 
public services are also critical for ﬁ scal consolidation and creating ﬁ scal space for 
public investments. A vast repository of European and global experiences shows 
how to improve the quality of public services. This report highlights three key 
lessons. 
First, adjusting structures and stafﬁ ng levels to demographic developments in 
education and health services can offer a considerable scope for cost savings. For 
instance, adjusting the number of schools and educational staff to demographic 
developments could save between 1.1 percent of GDP in the EU12 and 0.7 percent 
in the south. Resistance from staff, parents, and patients can be overcome if 
savings are partly reinvested in quality improvements.
Second, improvements in education and health sector outcomes often result from 
selected public investments, greater autonomy for service providers (in some 
cases allowing competition between public and private sector providers, even with 
full public funding), and improved accountability through transparent performance 
criteria and public monitoring of performance. But country experiences have 
varied considerably. In Singapore, for instance, quality education outcomes were 
achieved in a centralized system with close quality monitoring and performance-
Box 8.5: Value-added leaders: the Slovak Republic and Singapore
Slovak Republic
The Slovak Republic is the European value-
added leader, increasing value added by 2.8 
percent annually between 1995 and 2009. At 
independence in 1993, Slovak manufacturing 
was oriented toward heavy industry, but it 
was able to quickly diversify. First, productivity 
growth was possible due to employees moving 
from farms to high-growth manufacturing 
and services. Second, exporting enterprises 
in medium- and high-tech manufacturing 
industries were able to add value through new 
solutions: Slovak companies produced the 
second-highest number of export discoveries 
in chemicals, and third-highest in animal 
products and raw materials in the region. 
Third, perhaps the biggest part of the story has 
been FDI, which grew from negligible amounts 
in the late 1990s to more than 10 percent of 
GDP by 2010. Good policies encouraged this 
investment through a stable macroeconomic 
environment, targeted tax incentives, and 
a good business climate—which scored 
41st in the World Bank’s Doing Business in 
2011, including top marks for new business 
registration. Fourth, unit labor cost growth has 
been more moderate in the Slovak Republic 
than other Central and Eastern European 
economies: in 2006, the minimum monthly 
wage in the Slovak Republic was €181, 
lower than €223 in Poland, €230 in Hungary, 
and €280 in the Czech Republic. With its 
ﬂ exible factor markets and supportive policy 
environment, the Slovak Republic may remain 
a European leader in value added for some 
years to come.
Singapore
Singapore is a world leader in international 
trade and investment. A poor country in the 
early 1970s, it now has the 12th-highest GDP 
per capita in the world ($43,324 in current 
dollars in 2010). Manufacturing’s share in GDP 
rose from 14 percent in 1965 to 24 percent by 
1978. In the 1990s and 2000s, manufacturing 
moved toward high-value-added sectors, 
and services became more predominant. This 
change has been the result of a development 
policy combining a free-market approach 
with state intervention. Singapore was able to 
attract multinational corporations, promoting 
investment and knowledge transfers as a 
result of stable macroeconomic conditions, 
efﬁ cient infrastructure services, and a 
supportive business environment. The country 
is a research and development center, topping 
the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings in 
2010 and 2011. The state invests heavily in 
education and R&D. In 2007, nearly a quarter 
of the labor force had a tertiary education. The 
National University of Singapore was 34th in 
the Times Higher Education World University 
2010 ranking, and Singapore scores in the top 
three in the TIMSS assessment measuring 
students’ performance in mathematics and 
science. The Economic Development Board 
focuses on attracting foreign investment 
and cooperates with other agencies such 
as human resources for speciﬁ c industries. 
Heavy state intervention can sometimes cause 
inefﬁ ciencies. But Singapore’s combination of 
institutions, infrastructure, and interventions 
has rapidly augmented its value added.
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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based incentives for teachers and schools (box 8.6). Finland, by contrast, has 
little centralized quality control, emphasizing community-based accountability 
and investing in raising the professional recognition and qualiﬁ cation of teachers. 
In health care, successful quality improvements have typically involved a move 
toward public contracting with private health care providers, with output-based 
performance targets and user charges to encourage responsible patient behavior. 
Health systems are only starting to adjust to the challenges of aging. Europe faces 
the challenge and opportunity for genuine global leadership in this ﬁ eld.
Third, the quality of public services is generally a function of public sector 
governance. Lack of trust in the state and a culture of administrative corruption 
hamper public sector performance in the east and south. Social trust is difﬁ cult to 
create, though in countries such as Estonia aggressive deregulation, administrative 
simpliﬁ cation, and the use of ICT to facilitate access to administrative services have 
greatly improved perceptions and performance of the government. The general 
lesson for countries not endowed with traditions of civic-mindedness and social 
trust is that government should either be run well or kept small.7
Strengthening Europe’s global leadership
In 2010, Germany lost the export world champion title to China. Yet, for a country 
with a population 13 times smaller than China’s, and 4 times smaller than the 
United States’, topping the world export table for much of the past decade is a 
remarkable achievement. It epitomizes Europe’s success as a trade powerhouse. 
Other countries in Europe such as Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and four 
Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) 
also do well in exporting. But many European countries have struggled to grow 
global leaders, and are pressured by their economic ties with dynamic neighbors. 
Box 8.6: Public service delivery: Finland and Singapore
Finland
Finns are well educated, but spend less on 
education than most other Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries. They live healthy lives, on 
average ﬁ ve years longer than the typical 
European. In 2010, Newsweek named 
Finland the best country to live in. How does 
Finland deliver high-quality social services 
at reasonable cost? The government uses 
a “citizens as customers” approach that 
minimizes layers of bureaucracy between 
users and public decisionmakers. The 
education system is decentralized, with 
municipal funding and schools that are 
responsible for daily management. Students 
are encouraged to engage in self-assessments 
and take charge of their learning schedules. 
Teachers are free to plan their classes and 
choose textbooks. There are no national tests, 
so teachers are responsible for measuring 
the results. Health care services are lean and 
decentralized, with municipal governments 
responsible for their delivery. Since 1990, the 
government has introduced several measures, 
such as user charges, to limit public spending 
on health care. And since 2006, “citizen’s 
ofﬁ ces” have improved communications 
between society and government.
Singapore
Singapore delivers high-quality public services 
at low cost. Government involvement in 
education and health care produced world-
leading systems at public spending well below 
other high-income economies. Spending on 
education is less than 3 percent of GDP and 
health care spending is below 2 percent. The 
centralized education system produces top 
outcomes: Singapore scores in the top three 
in the TIMSS assessment measuring student 
performance in mathematics and science, 
and in 2009 was ranked 6th in the OECD PISA 
test to assess reading, math, and science 
(OECD 2010). The government creates strong 
incentives for performing well in national 
tests, and plays a direct role in hiring world 
class teachers. Singapore also has one of 
the most inclusive and efﬁ cient health care 
systems in the world. The system ensures 
universal coverage in a cost-effective way 
through compulsory savings and price caps, 
with mostly private sector provision. Life 
expectancy is 81.4 years, and child mortality is 
one of the lowest among the OECD countries, 
at just 2.2 deaths per 1,000 live births. 
Singapore’s efﬁ cient and effective systems 
show that it is possible to have high-quality 
social services without straining the treasury.
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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This struggle is most starkly reﬂ ected in the imbalances within the eurozone. 
Europe’s laggards need to learn from its export leaders. Europe’s prosperity, 
not reduced competitiveness of its world champions, will require its laggards to 
become more competitive.
Global export leaders such as Germany and the Republic of Korea have used a 
common set of ingredients. These include increasing the economy’s ability to 
continually shift toward higher value-added activities and foster trade integration 
with neighboring countries so as to move fewer skill- and capital-intensive 
activities offshore. Stable ﬁ nance (or in Korea’s case, rapid private debt resolution) 
and responsible business and employment regulation have helped. And, in both 
countries, the proﬁ ts generated were reinvested in R&D (Iwulska 2011). The need 
to keep an eye on the long term and adapt to rapidly changing global markets may 
be the most important lesson for aspiring 
export champions. 
Reassess employment protection legislation
Labor market reform is among the toughest tasks facing such countries as 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The high cost of hiring and ﬁ ring makes their 
economies inﬂ exible, less able to react to shocks. It keeps people not in the 
labor force out of work, including the young, reducing aggregate productivity 
and fomenting social protest. Eastern European policymakers should take note. 
On employment legislation, many countries in the east lag far behind the EU15’s 
two decades of labor market reform. Lower unemployment, greater worker 
productivity, and higher labor force participation among the young all lead to more 
ﬂ exible employment legislation, as the experiences of Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and others demonstrate. Ideally, these outcomes should be combined 
with reductions in the tax wedge between gross and net earnings, well-designed 
unemployment beneﬁ ts, and active labor market programs. 
Box 8.7: Labor legislation: Denmark and the United States
Denmark
Every year, about 20 percent of Danes lose 
their jobs. But they don’t lose their income. 
Unemployment beneﬁ ts replace close to two-
thirds of their earnings, and the government 
helps them ﬁ nd work. The arrangement 
seems to work well. Between 1995 and 
2008, unemployment averaged 4.9 percent, 
compared with 8.5 percent in the rest of the 
EU15. How does Denmark have both ﬂ exibility 
and security? First, a tradition of productive 
industrial relations: in the Danish system, 
labor and trade unions, not the government, 
pay unemployment beneﬁ ts. Second, 
sensible adaptation: the arrangements were 
reformed in the 1990s after decades of high 
unemployment. Policies cut job protection, 
raised unemployment beneﬁ t coverage, 
and strengthened job search assistance and 
training. Unemployment fell from 10 percent 
in 1993 to 3.3 percent in 2008, and long-term 
unemployment fell from a third of the total 
to a tenth. Third, generous public spending: 
Denmark spent 4.5 percent of GDP on labor 
market programs in 2008, a good year. The 
Danes have “ﬂ exicurity” because of their 
history, and they can afford it because of 
participation rates of more than 80 percent. 
Others who want both ﬂ exibility and security 
should be mindful of this.
United States
Between 1995 and 2010, average 
unemployment in the United States was 5 
percent, about half the eurozone’s average 
of 9.4 percent. Labor participation rates are 
higher in the United States, anchored by 
a society that values work, ﬂ exibility, and 
competition. Employees can be hired or ﬁ red 
fairly easily—employment protection in the 
United States is the lowest in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Labor taxes are low: the tax wedge 
on labor of 30 percent is among the lowest in 
the advanced world. Unemployment beneﬁ ts 
are lower than in most European countries 
while net replacement rates for the long-term 
unemployed are the second-lowest in the 
OECD. What are the pros and cons? On the 
whole, the system succeeds in delivering jobs 
and productivity growth. Firms and workers 
have more freedom to negotiate contracts 
that suit their needs. States and municipalities 
can add programs that their voters want and 
their local economies can afford. Countries 
seeking to promote productive employment 
would do well to look to the United States for 
ideas. But the absence of a universal health 
care system in the United States means that 
most Americans need a job if they want good 
health care. 
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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Denmark’s “ﬂ exicurity” model combines relatively low employment protection 
with considerable spending on active labor market policies and generous 
unemployment beneﬁ ts, achieving a coveted combination of generous social 
security for workers with ﬂ exible labor markets and low unemployment (box 
8.7). But these expensive policies rely on the capacity of labor ofﬁ ces to place 
the unemployed rapidly into sustainable new employment—a tough task 
during a prolonged economic downturn. The United States has a more 
traditional model of high labor force participation, achieved through lower 
employment protection, ﬂ exible labor markets, and limited unemployment 
insurance beneﬁ ts. Countries in Eastern and Southern Europe will need to 
decide whether to opt for the expensive but less socially disruptive Danish 
system or the rougher efﬁ ciency of American labor markets. At the moment 
many have neither.
Address the private debt overhang quickly
While public sector debt is the focus of attention, a private debt overhang might 
drag down European growth. Chapter 3 shows that Eastern Europe’s enterprises 
and households—which absorbed a big rise in credit in the decade leading up 
to the 2008–09 crisis—generally are not overleveraged. This is not necessarily 
true of their counterparts in Southern Europe. And while banks in emerging 
Europe seem reasonably capitalized and have built adequate reserves against 
the increase in nonperforming loans, renewed economic uncertainty is cause 
for concern. A crisis of conﬁ dence would strain banking sector balance sheets, 
potentially causing a ﬂ ight of deposits from some countries. What should 
governments do if this happens? 
Ireland, which nationalized its banking system and took on all private sector 
liabilities, tells a cautionary tale. Sweden and the Republic of Korea are 
better examples (box 8.8). Both quickly recapitalized ﬁ nancial institutions, 
limited taxpayer liabilities by sharing losses with the private sector, and put 
corporate debt restructuring frameworks in place to facilitate a rapid workout 
of nonperforming loans. The synchronized nature of the current instability may 
require more coordinated approaches to bank recapitalization, particularly for 
sovereign debt restructuring in the eurozone. 
Create world class innovation systems
Germany’s success in exporting cars and machine tools to all corners of the 
world should not distract from the fact that new industries such as ICT, biotech, 
and health and medical services are likely to play a key role in Europe’s growth 
prospects and international competitiveness. As chapter 5 argues, Europe does 
not do well in these high-growth, innovation-intensive industries, especially 
when compared with the United States, the global leader. 
Several factors determine the quality of a country’s innovation system. They 
include world class universities, developed venture capital markets, public 
procurement policies, and regulations that stimulate innovation and maintain 
strong competition. Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and—to less 
extent—Germany have copied these features and built innovation systems that 
compete with the world’s best (box 8.9). 
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Three basic lessons: ﬁ rst, governments should ensure that the table is properly 
set; no amount of incentives and targeted policies can compensate for a poor 
business climate or inadequate infrastructure. Second, public support should 
work through the market, stimulating private investment, not aim to substitute 
for market ﬁ nance when proﬁ ts are paltry. Finland’s matching grant scheme 
for early innovators, for instance, catalyzed private venture capital funding, 
and Israel built a venture capital industry with initial injections of public funds 
and foreign investment. Third, public policy can encourage linkages between 
innovators and businesses, and help scientists expand their international 
collaboration—particularly in Eastern Europe, where national R&D institutions 
need to be thoroughly reformed.
Yet, innovation in Europe’s frontrunners is held back by scale; Turku is not Tokyo 
and Zurich is not San Francisco. European markets for ICT, pharmaceuticals, 
and health services are not sufﬁ ciently integrated. Achieving global leadership 
in innovation will require more than world class national innovation systems. 
It will require a Europe-wide approach to create the necessary scale to match 
America’s and Asia’s dynamic innovation clusters. A good example of what 
holds Europe back is the lack of a single European patent, because EU member 
states cannot agree on the language requirements.8 An encouraging example 
is the pooling of public funding for excellence in scientiﬁ c research at the 
European Research Council, with a budget of around €1 billion a year.
Box 8.8: Reducing private debt: Sweden and the Republic of Korea
Sweden
Sweden illustrates how to reduce private 
sector debt after a crisis. After the crisis in the 
early 1990s, the government not only revived 
the economy but also restored the health of 
household balance sheets. The ratio of debt 
to disposable income of Swedish households 
fell from 130 percent in 1989 to 90 percent in 
1996. Interest payments were halved from 
10 percent of disposable income in 1990 to 
5 percent in 1997. The government kept the 
costs of the bailout low. By 1997, the total bill 
amounted to only 2 percent of GDP, due to a 
comprehensive program that was tailored to 
different classes of ﬁ nancial institutions and 
realistic about ﬁ nancial sector losses. First, 
the government quickly recognized these 
losses. Transparency and true valuations were 
conditions for government support. Because 
banks were forced to write down losses, 
markets received accurate information. The 
government guaranteed their liabilities or took 
an ownership stake in the bank. By 1992, the 
Swedish authorities owned nearly a quarter of 
bank assets. Second, the government adopted 
an approach that was sensitive to distinctions 
among classes of ﬁ nancial institutions. 
Government assistance was available to not 
only Swedish banks but also foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in the country. And the support’s 
structure and amounts were tailored to the 
necessities of particular banks or institutions. 
A special body—the Bank Support Authority—
was set up in 1993 to assess the magnitude 
of the troubled loans, as well as each bank’s 
earning potential in the long run. The actions 
of the Swedish government show the potential 
for public policy to address the fallout of a 
ﬁ nancial crisis, if implemented quickly with an 
honest recognition of ﬁ nancial sector losses.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s policies after 
the 1997–98 crisis show how quick and 
comprehensive intervention can reduce private 
sector insolvency and restart growth. Korea’s 
corporate and ﬁ nancial sectors were heavily 
indebted when the East Asian ﬁ nancial crisis 
hit. A rapid-debt-reduction program brought 
the overhang under control. In manufacturing, 
the debt-to-equity ratio shifted from 396 
percent in 1997 to 211 percent in 2000. The 
share of nonperforming loans fell from more 
than 8 percent in 1999 to just below 2 percent 
in 2002. What can other countries learn? First, 
the policy response was comprehensive. 
All corporations, large and small, were 
included in the government’s plan to restore 
solvency. Under government pressure, the 
country’s largest conglomerates negotiated 
debt workout programs with the banks. 
Government intervention led to the rollover 
of 90 percent of small and medium enterprise 
loans between July and November 1998, the 
worst months of the crisis. Nonperforming 
loans fell in part due to the government’s 
program to recapitalize healthier banks and 
merge or liquidate insolvent institutions. 
Second, new statutes allowed banks to 
go bust. The Korean Asset Management 
Corporation was created to handle bad loans 
and prevent “zombie banks.” Third, the size of 
the government’s response was proportionate 
to the crisis: ﬁ nancial sector support amounted 
to 13 percent of GDP between 1998 and 1999. 
Fourth, monetary policy managed deﬂ ation 
risks while participation in an International 
Monetary Fund program and the introduction 
of central bank independence in 1998 sent 
strong signals to the markets. Timeliness, 
broad scope, targeting, and scale of response 
are all important in dealing with a private debt 
overhang.
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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Expand private funding of tertiary education
As the tasks performed by Europe’s emerging economies grow more 
sophisticated, and the competition from middle-income countries in Asia 
intensiﬁ es, workforce education becomes ever more important. Europe lags 
Japan and North America in the share of the workforce with tertiary education, 
and within Europe, the east and south lag the center and north, both in the 
quantity and quality of higher education. 
Most European countries see higher education as a task for the state. Private 
funding is limited, private universities are the exception, and links between 
business and university-based research are weaker than in the United States. 
Europe’s tertiary education policies are designed to ensure equal access to higher 
education and to keep research free from corporate agendas. Yet, the approach 
must be questioned. High fees have not discouraged young Americans from 
seeking a higher education; wages for graduates are much higher than for those 
who leave school, offering a good rate of return on investment for a university 
degree. And it is not just Americans who are encouraged: U.S. universities have 
many more international students than most universities in Europe. Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom are the notable exceptions (box 8.10). 
Rethink immigration policies
In Europe, immigration policy is often seen as a humanitarian intervention. Many 
immigrants are refugees from countries with oppressive political regimes or civil 
wars, and Europeans—mindful of their own history of war and displacement—
accept immigration as a moral duty. Family reunions are also an important 
part of European immigration. Many Europeans, however, would oppose more 
immigration for economic reasons: workers moving to Europe in search of 
higher wages, and employers inviting immigrants to ﬁ ll positions with few local 
applicants for the wages offered. 
Box 8.9: R&D policy: Switzerland and the United States
Switzerland
Switzerland is Europe’s leader in innovation. 
In 2007, it obtained the highest number of 
patents per capita among industrialized 
countries, roughly three times the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) average. According to the Global 
Benchmark Report 2011, Switzerland is the 
most competitive country in the world, ahead 
of Canada, Australia, the United States, and 
Sweden (Confederation of Danish Industry 
2011). The reasons? First, Switzerland started 
early. Its emphasis on research and innovation 
has a long history. The ﬁ rst two institutions 
funding university-based research were 
established in or soon after 1943. Second, 
there are strong public-private links in 
the funding and conduct of research, and 
Switzerland has more private spending. Swiss 
companies spend twice as much on R&D as the 
EU27 average (Switzerland spends 2.2 percent 
of GDP; EU27, 1.1 percent of GDP). Third, 
Switzerland has some outstanding universities: 
with a population of just 8 million, it has four 
universities in the top 100 of the Times Higher 
Education World University 2010 ranking. In 
part due to its R&D policies, Switzerland may 
be Europe’s most innovative country.
United States
Half of the 50 most innovative companies in 
the world, as ranked by Business Week in 2010, 
are American. The country dominates the 
most R&D-intensive sectors. For example, it 
creates a third of the value added in the global 
information and communications technology 
industry. How does the United States do so 
well? First, sizable public spending: gross 
expenditure on R&D was almost 3 percent of 
GDP in 2008, above the OECD average. Second, 
this spending is linked well to a broad tertiary 
education base: the United States accounted 
for a third of the total OECD population with 
higher education. Its universities can reap the 
commercial payoff of R&D, even when it is 
federally funded. Third, federal funding is not 
the sole driver of R&D and innovation: private 
ﬁ rms spend a lot. The partnerships of venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs in places like 
Silicon Valley have driven new innovations, 
changing business and expanding the 
technology frontier. Fourth, product market 
competition, labor market ﬂ exibility, and 
substantial management talent increase the 
payoff to R&D spending. 
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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As chapter 6 argues, this attitude toward immigration puts Europe at a 
competitive disadvantage with immigration-friendly countries in North America 
and Oceania. Immigrants are needed to compensate for the decline in Europe’s 
labor force, even with efforts to increase labor force participation and promote 
greater internal mobility. Europe should devise a more “economic” immigration 
policy. This should not imply that humanitarian motives for Europe’s immigration 
policy are wrong. Instead, Europe should look at immigration as a gain rather 
than a gift. Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have immigration policies 
that reﬂ ect good practices in other parts of the world, such as Canada and the 
United States (box 8.11). 
What are the ingredients? Nondiscriminatory labor markets attract the best 
and brightest. Language training for adults, access to education for immigrant 
children, and the prospect of acquiring citizenship all facilitate integration 
into society. “Points” systems can ﬁ lter immigrants with required skills, 
and immigrants with job offers can be granted additional points. Opening 
universities to talented foreign students often attracts and retains a skilled labor 
force. A more conscious and proactive immigration policy could help Europe 
maximize economic gains while keeping social tensions low.
Reform social security
Europe’s social security systems (public pensions, unemployment insurance, 
and social welfare) largely account for the bigger size of its governments. The 
pension system accounts for the bulk of social security spending. Keeping 
pension spending under control remains the most important task—not only 
for ﬁ scal consolidation, but also to prevent payroll taxes from rising and 
making European enterprises uncompetitive in world markets. As chapter 
7 demonstrates, pension reform has begun in parts of Europe. Pressed by 
markets, governments have increased the retirement age, abolished early 
retirement schemes, and encouraged private savings for old age and inﬁ rmity. 
Box 8.10: Tertiary education: the United Kingdom and the United States
United Kingdom
British universities are the best in Europe, with 
two or three regularly among the top 10 in 
the world. After the United States, the United 
Kingdom has the second-largest number of 
foreign students. Expenditures are around 6 
percent of GDP, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development average. How 
has the United Kingdom gotten exceptional 
results with an ordinary budget? It has done 
a better job than its neighbors in combining 
a rich European heritage with modern know-
how. First, spending per student is higher 
in the United Kingdom than most European 
countries. Second, universities charge high 
tuition fees by European standards, supported 
by student loans. Third, universities in the 
United Kingdom enjoy more independence 
from government. This creates greater 
competition for funding and talent and more 
innovative curricula. The United Kingdom 
still faces challenges in getting the tuition 
cap right, supporting part-time students, and 
ensuring that schools are producing needed 
skills. But it has shown that it is possible 
to meld the tradition of great European 
universities with current needs and a modern 
approach. 
United States
American universities successfully address 
two important issues: a growing demand 
for tertiary education, and limited capacity 
and public funding. A diversity of academic 
opportunities helps target different 
educational needs, while abundant funding 
and favorable governance allow top 
universities to attract world scholars, students, 
and companies, channeling knowledge into 
ideas, innovations, and business solutions. 
Moreover, universities enjoy autonomy and 
diversity in funding, which is important in 
setting standards. U.S. universities dominate 
the international league tables, taking the 
top 5 positions—and 7 of the top 10—in the 
latest Times Higher Education World University 
ranking. Moreover, U.S. universities attract 
20 percent of all international students. Given 
the role of top universities in building human 
capital for public and private sectors, and as 
direct and indirect contributors to innovation, 
other countries should look at how the United 
States regulates and ﬁ nances its higher 
education systems. 
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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Iceland appears to have achieved these objectives, maintaining a high level of 
old-age security (as reﬂ ected in generous replacement rates) at reasonable cost 
to the government. Japan’s experience should also provide encouragement: the 
fastest-aging economy in the world spends around 10 percent of GDP on its public 
pension system, less than France, Germany, or Greece (box 8.12). The average 
public spending on pensions is essentially the same as in Europe ($16,000 in 2000 
prices). The main difference: the Japanese work longer, up to almost age 70 for 
men and more than 67 for women.
Chapter 7 advocates the principle that social security spending should exceed 10 
percent of GDP only in exceptional circumstances (such as those in Japan). Over 
the medium term, savings of around 1 percentage point of GDP must be found in 
Europe’s north, around 2 points in the center, and around 3 in the south. Serbia and 
Ukraine, with pension spending in excess of 15 percent of GDP, have more radical 
reform needs.
Reduce defi cits and public debts
Fiscal austerity has become the battle cry of European leaders as they try to 
restore conﬁ dence in the eurozone. For much of Europe, it is necessary. As chapter 
7 demonstrates, ﬁ scal discipline is not just needed to reassure nervous investors—
it is required to restore long-term growth. During the 2008–09 crisis, there was 
a coordinated push by governments in the industrialized countries to adopt ﬁ scal 
stimulus packages to stem the decline in aggregate demand and pull western 
economies out of recession. A more differentiated approach might have been 
more suitable then; it is deﬁ nitely needed now. Large government is associated 
with slower growth in Europe. Even in the short term, expansionary government 
spending will not restore growth. 
But politically, achieving a lasting ﬁ scal consolidation is not easy. A crisis such 
as that currently gripping the eurozone is an opportunity to muster the political 
energies to push through such a consolidation. Constitutional debt ceilings 
and “golden rule” provisions limiting new borrowing to the amount of public 
Box 8.11: Immigration policies: Sweden and Canada (and the United Kingdom and the United States)
Sweden (and the United Kingdom)
Immigration plays a big role in both countries: 
in 2008, the foreign-born were 14 percent of 
Sweden’s population and 11 percent of the 
United Kingdom’s. Both have fairly liberal 
policies toward migrants from the new EU 
members, but they have different ways 
of assimilating foreigners. Sweden allows 
foreigners access to almost all beneﬁ ts 
available to natives, setting clear rules on how 
to obtain citizenship. The United Kingdom’s 
appeal does not come from its migration 
policy. The country attracts highly skilled 
newcomers for a range of reasons: cultural 
diversity, low language barriers, metropolitan 
centers such as London, and the presence of 
multinational companies. European countries 
need models to learn from in managing 
immigration. Sweden and the United Kingdom 
offer contrasting examples, but both have 
aspects that deserve study, adaptation, and 
even emulation.
Canada (and the United States)
As global magnets for talent, the United States 
and Canada are exceptional, for somewhat 
different reasons. The U.S. economy is 
powered by immigration, and more than a 
million people immigrate there every year. 
Canada also has one of the highest shares of 
immigrants: one of ﬁ ve residents is foreign-
born. The quality of immigration is high in 
both countries. But immigration policy differs 
in many ways. The United States attracts 
migrants through its size, its tradition as a 
country of immigrants, and its contestable 
labor markets and job opportunities. Of all the 
immigrants coming to the United States, more 
than a quarter have tertiary education. But 
the lack of a comprehensive policy can lead 
to undocumented migration and weak public 
institutions for integrating immigrants. Canada 
has a more comprehensive set of policies 
based on a “points” system to both meet labor 
market needs and reunite families. 
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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investment can provide focal points for consolidation efforts. The European Union’s 
macrosurveillance framework provides for an annual reduction of public debt by 
one-twentieth of the difference between current debt and the Maastricht criterion 
of 60 percent of GDP. Using a 60 percent of GDP debt ceiling for the EU15 and a 40 
percent ceiling for the EU12, the candidate countries, and the eastern partnership, 
chapter 7 calculates the required improvement in the primary balance to range 
between 3 percent of GDP (for the eastern partnership countries) and almost 8 
percent of GDP (for the southern EU member states). 
For inspiration in matters of ﬁ scal adjustment, European leaders might turn 
to Turkey—a country with repeated ﬁ scal and external imbalances resulting in 
bouts of inﬂ ation and exchange rate instability. Since 2001, however, Turkey has 
stabilized public ﬁ nance, rapidly reduced public debt, and enjoyed fast (if volatile) 
economic growth. The 2008–09 crisis left the country much less vulnerable than 
previous episodes. Turkey’s approach to ﬁ scal stabilization and its economic 
reforms to boost competitiveness may have lessons for Southern Europe (box 
8.13). New Zealand, where a crisis precipitated a reform of public ﬁ nances and 
social service delivery, is another example.
Growth’s golden rules
To conclude this chapter on the subject it began with, one can ask whether there 
are there any “golden rules” to guide policymakers to ensure the maximum 
consumption for Europe’s current generation, while keeping future generations’ 
prospects bright. The discussions around greater ﬁ scal prudence, and the 
proliferation of constitutional brakes on public debt, suggest that governments in 
Europe are searching for a new set of rules. A set of golden rules for growth might 
look something like the following:
Box 8.12: Social security: Iceland and Japan
Iceland
Iceland may show a way forward for countries 
trying to meet social security promises while 
holding public spending in check. Its system 
delivers one of the highest replacement 
rates in the world—close to 97 percent for 
the average worker—at a low public cost of 
less than 2 percent of GDP, compared with 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) average of more 
than 7 percent. It helps that, for a developed 
country, Iceland has a relatively young 
population with a high fertility rate. But there 
are other reasons. First, the system has had 
a pensionable age of 67 years for both men 
and women for several decades. Tax and 
other policy incentives encourage workers 
to stay in the labor force beyond the legal 
minimum, and the country has one of the 
world’s highest elderly participation rates. 
Second, beneﬁ ts are means-tested. Third, a 
mandatory occupational pension scheme must 
deliver more than 50 percent of replacement 
wages for workers meeting minimum tenure 
requirements. The pension system contributed 
to the development of Iceland’s ﬁ nancial 
sector and has already recouped most of the 
losses experienced during the country’s recent 
economic collapse. 
Japan
Japan has the oldest population in the world. 
The ratio of Japanese ages 65 and older to 
the working-age population is 35 percent, 
compared with 25 percent for the EU15 and 20 
percent for the United States. What is Japan 
doing, and what can aging countries learn? 
First, an aging society is a big ﬁ scal burden, 
but it can be looked after by adjusting the 
system. Public pension spending in Japan is 
10 percent of GDP, nearly 3 percentage points 
higher than the OECD average. But Japan 
still spends less than younger countries: for 
example, the ratios are higher in France (13 
percent), Greece (12 percent), and Germany 
(11 percent). The pension system has been 
adjusted several times: in 2004, for example, 
the government cut beneﬁ ts for new retirees 
by 0.9 percent a year. Second, people have 
to work longer. Japan’s system punishes 
early retirement with lower beneﬁ ts, and 
encourages later retirement with the lowest 
implicit tax on working beyond retirement age. 
Third, the elderly can be protected by making 
public pensions progressive, with lower 
replacement ratios for high-income retirees. 
Japan may need to do even more: female work 
participation could be much higher and Japan 
may need more immigrants. 
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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 · Extend the beneﬁ ts of freer trade to those outside the European Union. 
Enlargement has made Europe stronger, and Europe should continue to extend 
economic integration toward the east. Trade is the most important part of 
Europe’s convergence machine, and the single market is the European Union’s 
“crown jewel.” The European Union should strengthen the single market, and 
speed up the extension of its beneﬁ ts to its neighbors. 
 · Borrow from abroad only for investment. Where foreign ﬁ nance has been used 
for private investment, it has fueled productivity growth and convergence in 
Europe. But countries relying on ﬁ nance mainly to boost consumption have added 
less to productivity, becoming more vulnerable. Rules for countercyclical ﬁ scal 
policy and macroprudential regulations follow.
 · Give enterprises the freedom to start up, grow, and shut down. Efﬁ cient 
regulation of enterprise should trust but verify, make compliance easy but 
punish violation, and concentrate regulatory resources where risks are highest. 
Regulation in Europe should promote competition by making entry and exit easier 
for enterprises, and should reduce the costs of running or growing a business.
 · Public funds should catalyze private innovation, not substitute for it. Effective 
innovation policy sets the table for innovators to thrive. It supports inventors, 
mobilizes ﬁ nance, understands the importance of economic agglomeration, and 
brings choice and business resources into universities.
 · Labor laws should treat insiders and outsiders more equally. Regulations should 
not treat those who seek jobs and those who have jobs differently. Seeing labor 
as a ﬁ xed lump to be divided among workers leads to poor rules. Contestable 
labor markets, greater mobility within Europe, and talent attracted from outside 
will help Europe create jobs, make workers more productive, and help offset the 
demographic decline. 
 · Public debt should mainly ﬁ nance public investment. With high debt and modest 
expected growth rates in Europe, government spending should now be based on 
the premise that future generations are not likely to be a lot wealthier. Taxation 
Box 8.13: Reducing public debt: Turkey and New Zealand
Turkey
Turkey halved the ratio of public debt to 
GDP from almost 80 percent in 2001 to less 
than 40 percent before the global crisis of 
2009. Several factors helped. First, global 
prosperity, reforms at home, and accession 
talks with the European Union spurred growth. 
Second, through greater ﬁ scal discipline, 
Turkey generated primary ﬁ scal surpluses 
between 2002 and 2005. Third, it granted 
more independence to the central bank 
and implemented better monetary policies, 
increasing the conﬁ dence of global markets 
in the lira. Fourth, it better managed public 
debt, leading to longer maturity periods and 
lower interest rates. And ﬁ fth, it prudently 
used privatization proceeds to repay sovereign 
debt. It takes a lot to reduce public debt, but 
Turkey shows it can be done. Its neighbors 
in Southern Europe might learn by studying 
its debt management practices, monetary 
policies, and reform and privatization program 
during the 2000s.
New Zealand
Since the early 1990s, New Zealand has halved 
its public debt—from around 60 percent of 
GDP to 30 percent in 2010. The country led 
in ﬁ scal prudence: it was second in Stanford 
University’s Sovereign Fiscal Responsibility 
Index rankings in 2010. What did it do? First, 
deep reforms in state ﬁ nances helped return 
it to primary ﬁ scal surpluses in 1994, after 
two decades of deﬁ cits. The ﬁ scal reforms 
were comprehensive: the government set up 
a management framework for a sustainable 
ﬁ scal policy—using, for example, ﬁ nancial 
reporting standards similar to private sector 
accounting rules. Second, New Zealand used 
privatization proceeds of NZ$14 billion in 1988–
96 well, and made operations ranging from air 
trafﬁ c control to postal services competitive 
through deregulation. Third, these steps were 
part of a broader reform program that included 
reducing inﬂ ation from more than 8 percent in 
1986–91 to 2 percent in 1992–97.  
Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.
worldbank.org/goldengrowth
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Greater labor mobility and more uniform national 
regulations for modern business services are 
making the single market more efﬁ cient.
Sustaining economic integration requires making 
the single market efﬁ cient, crisis-prooﬁ ng ﬁ nancial 
ﬂ ows, and facilitating production networks through 
improved public services in emerging Europe.
To remain a global economic leader, Europe has 
to sustain regional integration, reduce public 
debt, reform social security, revamp employment 
protection laws, and institute policies to attract 
talent from around the world.
should ﬁ nance social security, public services, and the government wage 
bill. Efﬁ ciency considerations—not equity—should drive borrowing. 
With policies that reﬂ ect these rules, Europe can restore the lustre of its 
economic model. It can secure the welfare of the 500 million people who 
live in the European Union today. The European convergence machine 
can bring another 100 million people in Europe’s candidate and potential 
candidate countries to high-income status—and accelerate improvement in 
the living standards of 75 million people in the eastern partnership. 
There are many reasons to believe that Europeans will make these changes. 
The main reason for optimism is that many countries in Europe have already 
made changes, and others are making them. The sovereign debt crisis 
has obscured the fact that Europe has done quite well over the past two 
decades. As this book demonstrates, Europe excels at managing trade and 
most aspects of private ﬁ nance. It has done reasonably well in regulating 
enterprise and promoting innovation, though with big differences across 
countries. Its weaknesses lie mainly in how it has organized work and 
government. But even in these aspects, some countries in Europe have 
rebuilt their institutions and can serve as models for others. 
A report card on Europe’s performance for the last two decades would 
be a solid “B.” Over the next two decades, with strengthened economic 
structures, better social policies, and efﬁ cient government, an “A” is not out 
of reach. 
Answers to questions on page 433
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1 Phelps, Edmund. “The Golden Rule of 
Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen.” 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 51, 
No. 4. (Sep., 1961), pp. 638-643. 
2 von Weizsäcker, Carl Christian. 
1962. Wachstum, Zins und optimale 
Investitionsquote, Tübingen 
(Mohr-Siebeck), 96 pages.
3  They were Tjalling Koopmans, Maurice 
Allais, Christian von Weizsacker, and John 
von Neumann. 
4  In an excellent account of the euro’s origins 
and prognosis, Marsh (2009, p. 194) cites 
an excerpt from a 1996 speech by former 
Bundesbank president Hans Tietmeyer: 
“In a monetary union, countries have to 
tackle and solve their economic problems 
and challenges in a similar way and with 
similar speed. If the countries decide 
fundamentally different answers, then 
great problems will arise. Countries which 
implement the right solutions soon become 
more competitive against those which react 
wrongly or late.” What is true of monetary 
union is also true for broader economic 
union. It is also sensible for those expected 
to join the eurozone to get a head start on 
reforms needed to make their economic 
structures more ﬂ exible.
5  Labor mobility also improves the ﬂ exibility 
of labor markets and is associated with 
lower unemployment (chapter 6). By 
allowing workers to move to where jobs 
are and their skills are in highest demand, it 
increases aggregate productivity. Chapter 5 
hypothesizes that despite progress over the 
last two decades, Europe’s labor markets 
are still too fragmented to allow leading 
innovation clusters such as Silicon Valley or 
Tokyo to emerge. Labor mobility would also 
help all European countries deal with their 
demographic challenges, by getting more 
of Europe’s young people and workers in 
structurally weak regions into work.
6 Strictly, the ﬂ ows from parents to 
subsidiaries include various forms of 
ﬁ nancing, and not all can be classiﬁ ed 
as FDI. There clearly is, however, a close 
relationship between the large equity 
stakes western banks took in Eastern 
Europe and their willingness to have large 
debt exposures to their subsidiaries in order 
to ﬁ nance rapid expansion of their business. 
Many have acquired valuable franchises 
that are unlikely to be wound down. But 
some have come in late, or moved too 
aggressively into risky business areas, and 
may be forced to recognize losses and exit 
due to the need to shore up balance sheets 
back home.
7  World Bank (2012) discusses Georgia, where 
a legacy of poor public sector performance 
has begun to be overcome through radical 
simpliﬁ cation and deregulation, allowing the 
state to focus on essential tasks, pay public 
servants better, and reduce administrative 
corruption.
8  This is persuasively argued in the Report 
of the Polish Presidency of the Council of 
the European Union on rekindling economic 
growth in Europe (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Poland 2011).
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Table A1. Basic indicators
GNI, per capita, US$
GDP
Per capita, PPP, 
international $
PPP, international $, 
billions
Real, per capita, 
growth, percent
2010 2010 2010 2000-10
EU15
Austria 47,060 40,005 335 1.3
Belgium 45,910 37,600 409 1.0
Denmark 59,050 39,489 219 0.6
Finland 47,720 36,651 197 1.9
France 42,390 33,820 2,194 0.7
Germany 43,110 37,260 3,044 1.2
Greece 26,940 27,805 315 2.0
Ireland 41,000 41,188 185 1.6
Italy 35,150 31,555 1,909 0.0
Luxembourg 77,160 86,899 44 1.8
Netherlands 49,050 42,255 702 1.2
Portugal 21,880 25,610 273 0.6
Spain 31,750 32,070 1,478 1.0
Sweden 50,110 39,029 366 1.8
United Kingdom 38,370 35,904 2,234 1.1
European Free Trade Association
Iceland 32,710 34,895 11 1.2
Liechtenstein 137,070a — — 1.0b
Norway 84,290 56,692 277 0.9
Switzerland 71,530 46,581 365 1.0
EU12
Bulgaria 6,270 13,780 104 5.1
Cyprus 29,430 31,092 34 1.4
Czech Republic 17,890 25,283 266 3.1
Estonia 14,460 20,615 28 5.0
Hungary 12,850 20,029 200 2.4
Latvia 11,620 16,312 37 4.9
Lithuania 11,390 18,184 60 5.1
Malta 19,270 26,640 11 1.5
Poland 12,440 19,783 755 4.1
Romania 7,840 14,287 306 4.7
Slovak Republic 16,830 23,423 127 4.5
Slovenia 23,860 27,063 56 2.6
EU candidate countries
Albania 3,960 8,817 28 5.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,770 8,590 32 3.8
Croatia 13,870 19,516 86 3.1
Kosovo 3,290 — — 5.7
Macedonia, FYR 4,570 11,159 23 2.4
Montenegro 6,750 13,016 8 3.7
Serbia 5,630 11,281 82 4.2
Turkey 9,890 15,321 1,115 2.8
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Population
CO2 emissions, metric 
tons per capitaTotal, thousands
Working age, 
percent Old age, percent Total, thousands
Working age, 
percent Old age, percent
2010 2010 2010 2050 2050 2050 2008
8,214 67.6 18.1 7,521 56.4 30.1 8.1
10,423 66.2 17.8 9,883 58.1 27.7 9.8
5,516 65.5 16.6 5,575 60.3 24.6 8.4
5,255 66.6 17.2 4,820 58.2 27.3 10.6
64,768 64.9 16.5 69,768 58.9 25.5 5.9
81,644 66.0 20.6 71,542 56.3 30.1 9.6
10,750 66.4 19.4 10,036 54.8 32.1 8.7
4,623 67.7 11.3 6,334 59.9 23.3 9.9
60,749 66.1 20.1 61,416 55.6 31.0 7.4
498 66.8 14.8 721 62.8 20.6 21.5
16,783 67.7 15.2 17,334 59.3 26.0 10.6
10,736 66.0 17.8 9,933 56.2 30.6 5.3
46,506 68.1 16.9 52,491 55.2 31.2 7.2
9,074 65.2 19.3 9,085 59.5 25.7 5.3
62,348 66.3 16.3 71,154 60.8 23.6 8.5
309 67.1 12.4 351 60.0 24.2 7.0
35 69.2 14.5 36 57.5 28.5 —
4,676 66.2 15.6 4,966 59.9 25.0 10.5
7,623 68.0 16.6 7,296 57.4 29.0 5.3
7,149 68.3 17.9 4,651 53.9 33.8 6.6
1,103 73.3 10.2 1,392 61.5 25.8 7.9
10,202 70.7 15.9 8,540 54.7 33.1 11.2
1,291 67.4 17.6 862 53.7 32.2 13.6
9,992 68.3 16.7 8,490 56.7 29.9 5.4
2,218 69.6 17.0 1,544 55.9 31.2 3.3
3,545 69.7 16.3 2,788 55.7 32.0 4.5
407 69.0 15.1 396 57.2 29.7 6.2
38,464 71.7 13.5 32,085 55.4 31.7 8.3
21,959 70.3 14.8 18,060 56.1 31.3 4.4
5,470 71.7 12.6 4,944 56.7 30.0 6.9
2,003 69.9 16.6 1,597 53.6 34.0 8.5
2,987 67.3 10.3 2,824 62.8 24.0 1.3
4,622 70.9 14.9 3,892 54.4 33.8 8.3
4,487 67.8 16.9 3,864 57.0 29.6 5.3
1,815 65.9 6.6 2,223 66.3 17.0 —
2,072 69.7 11.5 1,991 59.8 26.2 5.8
667 70.7 13.5 578 54.1 32.4 3.1
7,345 68.1 16.6 5,869 58.0 29.0 6.8
77,804 66.9 6.2 100,955 63.9 19.3 4.0
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GNI, per capita, US$
GDP
Per capita, PPP, 
international $
PPP, international $, 
billions
Real, per capita, 
growth, percent
2010 2010 2010 2000-10
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia 3,200 5,463 17 8.1
Azerbaijan 5,330 9,943 90 13.6
Belarus 5,950 13,928 132 7.8
Georgia 2,690 5,073 23 5.9
Moldova 1,810 3,110 11 5.1
Ukraine 3,000 6,721 308 5.4
North America and Oceania
Australia 43,590a 39,407a 865a 1.7b
Canada 43,270 38,989 1,330 1.2
New Zealand 28,770a 29,531 129 1.2b
United States 47,390 47,199 14,587 0.9
East Asia
China 4,270 7,599 10,170 9.6
Indonesia 2,500 4,325 1,037 4.0
Japan 41,850 33,753 4,302 0.9
Korea, Rep. 19,890 29,004 1,418 4.1
Malaysia 7,760 14,731 418 3.0
Philippines 2,060 3,969 370 2.8
Singapore 40,070 57,936 294 3.7
Taiwan, China 19,280 35,800 828 3.6
Thailand 4,150 8,554 591 3.4
Vietnam 1,160 3,205 279 6.0
Latin America
Argentina 8,620 16,012 647 3.1
Brazil 9,390 11,210 2,185 2.5
Chile 10,120 15,732 269 2.7
Colombia 5,510 9,462 438 2.5
Mexico 8,890 14,498 1,644 0.9
Peru 4,700 9,538 277 4.2
Uruguay 10,590 14,384 48 2.6
Venezuela, RB 11,590 12,233 353 1.7
Africa
Algeria 4,450 8,384 297 2.0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2,420 6,180 501 3.0
Morocco 2,850 4,712 151 3.5
South Africa 6,090 10,570 528 2.1
Tunisia 4,160 9,550 101 3.5
Other
India 1,330 3,582 4,195 5.8
Russian Federation 9,900 19,840 2,812 5.7
a. 2009.
b. 2000-09.
— = not available.
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Population
CO2 emissions, metric 
tons per capitaTotal, thousands
Working age, 
percent Old age, percent Total, thousands
Working age, 
percent Old age, percent
2010 2010 2010 2050 2050 2050 2008
2,967 71.8 10.3 2,943 61.2 25.2 1.8
8,304 70.0 6.6 9,955 65.1 18.1 5.4
9,613 71.6 14.2 7,739 57.8 29.6 6.5
4,601 68.0 16.2 3,785 58.0 28.8 1.2
4,317 73.7 10.6 3,635 58.6 28.3 1.3
45,416 70.7 15.5 33,574 57.9 29.3 7.0
21,516 67.8 13.7 29,013 61.7 22.5 18.6
33,760 68.6 15.5 41,136 58.9 26.3 16.3
4,252 66.5 13.0 5,199 60.8 23.0 7.8
310,233 66.9 13.0 439,010 60.6 20.2 17.9
1,330,141 73.4 8.6 1,303,723 59.5 26.8 5.3
242,968 66.2 6.1 313,021 64.4 18.2 1.7
126,804 64.1 22.6 93,674 52.1 37.0 9.5
48,636 72.7 11.1 43,369 53.9 35.9 10.5
28,275 65.3 4.8 42,929 63.3 16.0 7.6
99,900 60.9 4.2 171,964 64.8 11.7 0.9
5,140 78.0 7.2 8,610 64.3 23.9 6.7
23,025 73.0 10.8 20,161 55.0 34.6 11.2
66,336 70.8 9.0 69,611 59.3 26.0 4.2
89,571 68.8 5.5 111,174 63.7 20.7 1.5
41,343 63.6 10.9 53,511 62.9 18.9 4.8
201,103 66.9 6.6 260,692 62.8 19.3 2.1
16,746 67.9 9.3 19,387 62.0 22.6 4.4
44,205 66.8 6.0 56,228 64.4 19.1 1.5
112,469 64.9 6.4 147,908 62.1 19.0 4.3
28,948 64.7 6.2 36,944 65.1 17.1 1.4
3,301 63.8 13.6 3,495 62.8 21.6 2.5
27,223 64.7 5.3 40,256 64.6 15.3 6.1
34,586 70.1 5.1 44,163 62.8 21.8 3.2
80,472 62.8 4.4 137,873 64.3 13.1 2.7
31,627 65.7 6.0 42,026 62.3 18.6 1.5
49,109 65.9 5.5 49,401 66.8 11.4 8.9
10,525 69.2 7.4 12,180 59.3 24.3 2.4
1,173,108 64.6 5.3 1,656,554 65.5 14.7 1.5
139,390 71.7 13.3 109,187 59.0 26.4 12.0
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Table A2. Trade
Exports, percentage of GDP
Goods Services
Consumption Intermediate Capital Traditional Modern
2009–10a 2009–10a 2009–10a 2010 2010
EU15
Austria 7.1 20.0 6.9 8.8 5.6
Belgium 22.4 44.8 7.2 8.1 9.9
Denmark 9.8 11.8 5.1 9.3d 5.5d
Finland 2.0 15.7 6.7 3.0 8.6
France 5.1 8.8 3.8 3.5 2.1
Germany 6.0 16.9 7.6 3.2 3.9
Greece 2.7 2.8 0.4 11.1 1.2
Ireland 20.4 27.3 5.0 4.3 43.2
Italy 6.2 9.7 3.8 2.6 2.1
Luxembourg 3.6 17.6 2.4 17.0 105.3
Netherlands 11.9 18.7 7.9 5.3 6.5
Portugal 6.7 9.9 1.7 7.5 2.5
Spain 4.9 7.6 1.7 5.6 3.1
Sweden 5.9 15.7 5.6 4.7 9.5
United Kingdom 4.0 8.1 2.3 3.1 7.4
European Free Trade Association
Iceland 15.0 19.4 1.4 13.9 5.7
Liechtenstein — — — — —
Norway 2.7 24.8 1.5 5.1 4.5
Switzerland 13.6 17.5 5.3 3.9 11.7
EU12
Bulgaria 10.3 22.7 3.1 11.0 3.5
Cyprus 2.9 2.1 0.5 18.0 16.7
Czech Republic 9.8 34.3 13.1 6.7 4.5
Estonia 11.9 29.0 7.9 15.5 7.1
Hungary 14.7 31.6 17.4 8.3 6.4
Latvia 9.4 20.9 2.9 10.6 4.6
Lithuania 15.2 21.2 5.2 9.7 1.4
Malta 5.6 18.0 1.8 34.3 12.9
Poland 10.1 13.9 3.9 4.2 2.7
Romania 6.3 15.7 4.4 2.7 2.5
Slovak Republic 17.7 32.8 8.8 4.9 1.8
Slovenia 12.8 25.7 4.6 9.2 3.6
EU candidate countries
Albania 4.5 8.2 0.2 16.4 2.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.3 18.6 0.9 6.3 1.4
Croatia 4.6 8.7 3.9 15.4 2.8
Kosovo — — — 7.5 3.3
Macedonia, FYR 11.6 7.0 0.6 5.8 4.1
Montenegro — — — 22.0 2.7
Serbia 6.6 15.8 1.5 5.1 4.0
Turkey 5.2 6.6 1.6 4.3 0.3
463
SELECTED INDICATORS
Imports, percentage of GDP
Goods Services
Consumption Intermediate Capital Traditional Modern
2009–10a 2009–10a 2009–10a 2010 2010
8.8 20.6 5.3 6.3 3.4
18.8 45.8 7.3 8.8 8.1
8.2 11.0 4.4 8.9d 4.8d
5.2 15.5 3.7 4.4 6.7
5.7 11.6 3.3 3.1 2.0
5.9 16.6 4.5 4.5 3.4
6.1 9.6 3.2 4.7 1.8
8.2 11.6 4.6 4.8 47.6
4.8 13.8 2.4 2.6 2.7
8.2 14.6 4.4 12.6 55.3
9.6 19.2 6.3 5.3 5.6
8.2 17.0 3.4 3.9 2.3
5.6 12.0 2.3 3.0 3.2
6.9 16.1 4.5 4.9 5.4
6.6 10.7 3.2 3.7 3.6
7.3 15.3 3.8 9.5 7.8
— — — — —
4.3 8.1 3.7 6.3 3.9
10.5 14.8 4.7 3.8 3.8
9.6 31.1 5.8 5.7 3.7
11.7 10.3 4.4 10.8 2.7
10.4 38.7 9.7 4.7 4.7
13.4 27.9 7.4 8.7 5.3
8.9 37.8 8.2 5.7 6.4
12.6 19.3 4.9 5.8 3.4
13.1 39.0 6.4 6.2 1.3
15.6 19.5 7.4 10.2 20.6
6.5 18.6 5.5 3.4 2.8
6.5 22.2 5.3 3.2 2.5
13.1 47.9 9.2 5.1 2.7
11.2 29.2 6.0 4.8 4.2
11.4 18.2 3.8 14.7 2.3
14.4 29.4 5.1 2.6 0.8
8.3 17.2 4.4 2.5 3.1
— — — 7.0 4.0
11.1 22.1 6.2 4.8 4.0
— — — 5.4 4.2
6.4 21.8 4.2 5.7 3.3
2.3 14.2 3.9 1.8 0.6
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Exports, percentage of GDP
Goods Services
Consumption Intermediate Capital Traditional Modern
2009–10a 2009–10a 2009–10a 2010 2010
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia 2.0 8.4 0.2 6.3 1.7
Azerbaijan 0.9 35.5 0.4 2.7 0.9
Belarus 8.4 17.8 5.8 6.6 1.6
Georgia 2.9 8.0 0.7 11.8 1.2
Moldova 15.8 9.4 1.3 7.2 4.0
Ukraine 5.7 26.2 3.4 8.8 3.3
North America and Oceania
Australia 1.6 13.5 0.5 3.2c 1.0c
Canada 2.4 15.6 2.0 1.9 2.4
New Zealand 11.5 8.2 1.2 4.9 1.2
United States 1.1 4.4 1.5 1.4 2.1
East Asia
China 7.4 9.6 7.8 1.6 1.3
Indonesia 3.3 17.3 1.3 1.4 0.8
Japan 0.6 7.1 3.3 1.2 1.4
Korea, Rep. 1.9 20.0 14.3 6.0 2.1
Malaysia 10.4 56.4 11.3 11.3b 3.6b
Philippines 3.1 17.2 6.6 2.3 4.7
Singapore 11.5 84.9 18.7 21.6 28.7
Taiwan, China — — — — —
Thailand 13.7 30.1 11.9 8.2 2.4
Vietnam 30.6 23.8 4.9 — —
Latin America
Argentina 3.1 12.1 1.2 2.0 1.5
Brazil 1.4 6.7 0.8 0.5 0.9
Chile 6.3 25.1 0.4 4.0 1.2
Colombia 2.0 10.4 0.2 1.2 0.3
Mexico 5.6 12.8 6.6 1.3 0.2
Peru 2.7 18.6 0.1 2.0 0.4
Uruguay 8.1 8.5 0.2 4.8 1.3
Venezuela, RB 0.0 11.6 0.1 0.4 0.1
Africa
Algeria 0.2 30.2 0.0 0.9b 1.1b
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.3 7.2 0.1 9.7b 1.6b
Morocco 6.6 9.9 0.4 8.6 3.1
South Africa 2.0 14.8 1.7 3.0 0.8
Tunisia 13.1 16.4 1.9 10.5 1.8
Other
India 3.9 6.1 1.1 1.8 6.2
Russian Federation 0.5 18.3 0.5 1.8 1.2
a. Data for the most recent available year.  b. 2009.  c. 2008.  d. 2004.  — = not available.
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Imports, percentage of GDP
Goods Services
Consumption Intermediate Capital Traditional Modern
2009–10a 2009–10a 2009–10a 2010 2010
9.6 18.8 5.5 9.2 1.3
2.1 6.2 2.7 3.5 3.3
6.9 42.7 7.7 4.0 1.2
13.0 15.7 5.2 6.6 1.9
19.2 23.2 7.6 9.9 2.6
8.4 26.5 4.7 5.7 2.9
3.4 6.0 3.1 3.3c 1.2c
5.1 12.1 4.5 3.4 2.4
5.4 8.9 3.6 4.2 2.0
3.0 6.1 2.2 1.1 1.4
0.7 17.1 4.0 2.1 1.2
1.2 11.3 3.8 2.2 1.4
2.5 7.9 1.3 1.5 1.3
2.8 28.1 5.2 4.9 4.3
5.1 47.8 10.4 9.2b 5.0b
3.4 22.2 2.6 4.5 1.4
11.5 77.0 17.6 20.7 22.5
— — — — —
4.0 42.9 7.8 8.9 5.4
5.9 43.6 14.4 — —
1.8 7.8 3.0 2.4 1.3
0.8 5.1 1.5 1.4 1.5
4.0 11.4 5.0 4.2 1.4
2.1 6.5 3.5 1.7 1.1
3.2 16.7 4.8 1.0 1.1
2.7 10.5 4.2 2.5 1.3
4.0 11.2 3.8 2.6 0.8
3.2 5.6 2.7 2.3 1.2
3.6 14.2 6.3 4.6b 3.4b
3.5 14.7 3.2 4.5b 2.2b
3.6 20.9 5.1 3.7 1.8
3.1 10.6 4.2 3.6 1.5
5.3 26.3 7.0 5.8 1.4
0.9 16.0 2.6 3.8 3.7
4.4 5.3 3.5 3.0 1.8
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Table A3. Finance
Private sector credit 
by domestic banks, 
percentage of GDP
Cross-border 
banking flows, 
percentage of GDP
Loan-to-deposit 
ratio, percent
Foreign bank assets, 
percentage of total 
banking assets
Foreign assets 
plus liabilities, 
percentage of GDP
2010 2010 2010 2009 2007
EU15
Austria 122.3 7.3 141.4 20 583.0
Belgium 95.4 16.8 108.5 50 1,016.8
Denmark 218.3 16.2 404.5 20 462.0
Finland 94.3 8.8 158.3 65 479.9
France 114.5 10.0 163.0 6 581.1
Germany 107.0 11.4 114.0 12 412.3
Greece 114.3 10.6 152.5 14 277.1
Ireland 215.0 128.8 222.8 56 2,573.1
Italy 122.5 2.2 170.9 6 281.6
Luxembourg 179.3 366.8 57.1 95 24,380.3
Netherlands 199.3 32.7 163.3 2 972.6
Portugal 190.8 7.6 166.2 15 485.3
Spain 211.2 6.9 147.5 2 360.1
Sweden 135.8 13.6 246.7 0 512.1
United Kingdom 204.0 34.1 115.2 15 932.6
European Free Trade Association
Iceland 107.4 20.3 175.8 — 1,160.3
Liechtenstein — — — — —
Norway 87.0b 7.9 176.7b 16 462.5
Switzerland 176.0 27.1 125.6 5 1,357.1
EU12
Bulgaria 74.2 19.5 131.2 79 240.9
Cyprus 283.5 120.9 119.3 19 838.1
Czech Republic 55.0 8.5 112.1 86 179.5
Estonia 97.2 10.4 176.6 99 298.7
Hungary 68.8 15.2 189.5 64 387.1
Latvia 96.0 12.1 236.7 66 248.7
Lithuania 65.2 5.4 166.3 92 158.7
Malta 131.3 114.6 109.8 — 1,275.3
Poland 52.7 6.4 137.6 68 128.7
Romania 40.3 12.3 157.7 85 112.7
Slovak Republic 48.1 9.3 124.5 88 157.9
Slovenia 92.9 21.2 182.3 25 240.1
EU candidate countries
Albania 37.8 4.6 98.5 93 81.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 56.8 6.5 127.3 93 133.0
Croatia 70.1 31.6 137.1 91 209.7
Kosovo 34.2 — 85.6 — —
Macedonia, FYR 45.3 4.6 99.0 70 138.0
Montenegro 68.6 19.0 151.9 87 —
Serbia 50.5 12.2 147.0 75 161.9
Turkey 43.9 9.7 139.1 14 100.8
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Net debt, percentage 
of GDP
Current account 
balance, percentage 
of GDP
Capital flows, net, percentage of GDP
Total FDI Portfolio Other
2007 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
–14.6 3.2 –3.5 –2.3 1.4 –2.6
10.0 1.2 –0.8 –16.8 9.5 6.5
–37.7 5.0 2.4 –1.5 –0.3 4.1
3.1 3.1 –2.6 –1.9 –4.4 3.7
–10.7 –2.1 0.1 –3.3 8.3 –4.8
14.0 5.3 –4.1 –1.7 –5.0 2.7
–71.9 –10.4 9.5 0.3 –9.1 18.2
193.9 –0.7 9.0 5.3 61.5 –57.8
–36.9 –3.5 5.8 –0.7 2.5 4.1
3,008.4 7.7 — — — —
–15.9 7.1 –6.7 –3.7 –3.6 0.6
–68.6 –9.9 9.7 4.4 –5.6 10.8
–66.7 –4.5 4.4 0.1 3.3 1.0
–33.7 6.5 –7.4 –2.0 1.3 –6.8
–36.0 –2.5 2.4 –0.7 3.6 –0.5
–241.9 –8.0 27.5 9.0 2.4 16.1
— — — — — —
22.5 12.9 –9.7 0.3 –4.7 –5.3
109.6 14.2 10.7 –4.3 –3.3 18.3
1.2 –0.8 –1.1 3.4 –1.7 –2.8
34.6 –7.0 6.8 3.5 –5.0 8.3
14.2 –2.4 4.9 2.6 4.2 –1.9
–32.7 3.6 –13.2 6.2 –2.0 –17.4
–40.9 1.6 0.8 –0.4 0.5 0.7
–46.1 3.6 6.2 1.4 –0.8 5.6
–27.3 1.8 –2.6 1.4 5.1 –9.2
76.2 –0.6 –0.9 7.0 –18.5 10.6
–15.7 –3.3 8.7 1.1 5.8 1.8
–11.2 –4.2 7.5 2.0 0.5 4.9
–3.5 –3.4 2.7 1.8 0.8 0.2
–15.0 –1.2 1.1 1.4 5.1 –5.4
14.6 –10.1 11.0 6.8 0.0 4.2
0.7 –6.0 6.0 1.2 0.0 4.9
–29.5 –1.9 –3.7 2.7 2.5 –8.9
— –17.3 — — — —
–3.3 –2.8 3.2 3.2 –0.9 1.0
— –25.6 21.5 17.9 0.3 3.3
–14.5 –7.1 3.6 2.9 0.2 0.4
–17.0 –6.5 7.7 1.0 2.2 4.6
468
GOLDEN GROWTH
Private sector credit 
by domestic banks, 
percentage of GDP
Cross-border 
banking flows, 
percentage of GDP
Loan-to-deposit 
ratio, percent
Foreign bank assets, 
percentage of total 
banking assets
Foreign assets 
plus liabilities, 
percentage of GDP
2010 2010 2010 2009 2007
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia 25.7 1.5 179.1 79 84.0
Azerbaijan 18.1 4.1 188.7 3 88.7
Belarus 42.7 1.9 227.9 18 54.9
Georgia 32.4 2.1 148.1 64 122.2
Moldova 33.3 1.9 109.4 49 152.2
Ukraine 61.7 4.5 198.0 56 140.8
North America and Oceania
Australia 125.4 4.9 142.3 2 258.1
Canada 128.3a 4.6 143.9a 5 219.7
New Zealand 146.7 4.5 169.1 79 233.2
United States 56.9 9.0 120.6 18 278.7
East Asia
China 131.1 1.1 85.8 1 112.7
Indonesia 26.0 3.6 97.1 32 86.8
Japan 102.0 2.6 104.1 0 193.9
Korea, Rep. 100.3 2.5 147.0 19 135.3
Malaysia 114.8 4.7 107.7 18 222.1
Philippines 24.9 5.0 91.3 1 132.2
Singapore 102.1 17.6 103.7 2 1,038.9
Taiwan, China — 2.9 — — 336.8
Thailand 97.0 3.3 119.4 6 141.8
Vietnam 125.0 6.7 125.1 2 129.8
Latin America
Argentina 14.2 2.5 116.9 28 147.6
Brazil 52.3 3.2 151.7 21 102.7
Chile 72.7 10.5 140.8 34 199.8
Colombia 35.2 2.2 212.3 9 81.7
Mexico 18.7 5.6 152.3 75 83.7
Peru 24.6 5.5 87.5 50 123.9
Uruguay 22.3 9.1 68.4 55 174.5
Venezuela, RB 18.7 1.7 88.1 17 115.4
Africa
Algeria 15.3 0.7 85.0 14 104.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 33.1 3.8 98.8 23 122.5
Morocco 82.3 4.9 119.5 34 134.3
South Africa 72.6 2.9 149.6 22 174.6
Tunisia 65.4 4.3 130.2 25 169.9
Other
India 49.0 4.1 105.3 5 85.4
Russian Federation 42.9 4.0 121.8 12 179.3
a. 2008.
b. 2006.
— = not available.
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Net debt, percentage 
of GDP
Current account 
balance, percentage 
of GDP
Capital flows, net, percentage of GDP
Total FDI Portfolio Other
2007 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
4.2 –13.7 11.0 8.1 0.0 3.0
8.2 27.7 –24.8 0.1 –0.1 –24.8
–8.2 –15.5 12.9 2.3 2.2 8.4
–15.7 –9.8 10.0 4.3 2.4 3.4
–19.4 –10.9 11.9 2.9 0.1 8.9
4.6 –1.9 6.7 4.2 3.1 –0.6
–52.2 –2.6 2.6 0.4 5.4 –3.2
–19.4 –3.1 3.4 –1.0 6.4 –2.0
–59.7 –2.2 2.4 0.1 2.3 0.1
–39.4 –3.2 1.6 –1.0 4.5 –1.9
52.3 5.2 2.8 2.2 0.2 0.4
–17.0 0.9 3.7 1.4 2.2 0.2
55.8 3.6 –2.6 –1.1 –2.8 1.3
3.4 2.8 0.2 –1.9 3.8 –1.7
53.1 11.8 –2.9 –2.0 5.9 –6.8
–5.6 4.5 4.3 0.6 2.1 1.5
150.4 22.2 –3.0 8.5 –9.8 –1.6
109.0 9.4 –0.3 –2.0 –4.8 6.5
32.3 4.6 4.9 0.4 2.7 1.8
8.8 –3.8 13.0 5.9 2.3 4.8
19.2 0.9 –0.1 1.3 2.4 –3.7
1.2 –2.3 4.7 1.8 2.8 0.2
7.5 1.9 –2.9 3.1 –3.9 –2.1
0.1 –3.1 4.2 0.9 1.0 2.3
–0.6 –0.5 3.5 0.5 3.6 –0.6
0.2 –1.5 8.4 4.7 1.9 1.8
10.1 0.5 –1.2 3.2 –3.1 –1.4
46.9 4.9 –5.2 –0.1 1.1 –6.2
86.3 9.4 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0
36.2 –2.0 6.0 2.6 3.4 –0.1
24.0 –4.2 4.2 0.2 0.0 3.9
4.5 –2.8 3.1 0.3 3.0 –0.3
–28.1 –4.8 4.0 3.1 –0.1 0.9
7.5 –3.2 4.9 1.5 2.2 1.2
20.9 4.9 –1.5 –0.2 0.0 –1.3
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Table A4. Enterprise
Labor productivity, constant 2005 US$, thousands
Total Industry
Level CAGR
percent
Level CAGR
percent1995 2009 1995 2009
EU15
Austria 60.8 73.7 1.4 53.1 81.0 3.1
Belgium 73.2 80.2 0.7 63.3 76.3 1.3
Denmark 71.3 78.9 0.7 71.3 89.1 1.6
Finland 59.1 71.8 1.4 56.8 94.2 3.7
France 72.6 77.2 0.4 56.1 63.6 0.9
Germany 62.1 67.0 0.5 53.0 58.9 0.8
Greece 46.1 56.4 1.4 35.2 40.8 1.1
Ireland 73.3 98.1 2.1 77.7 159.7 5.3
Italy 73.2 68.2 –0.5 60.1 55.6 –0.6
Luxembourg 142.8 188.2 2.0 96.7 185.6 4.8
Netherlands 67.4 76.5 0.9 77.2 96.6 1.6
Portugal 31.9 36.7 1.0 24.2 26.6 0.7
Spain 60.8 56.9 –0.5 56.0 59.3 0.4
Sweden 60.6 74.1 1.4 54.8 91.9 3.8
United Kingdom 59.2 71.8 1.4 62.4 74.7 1.3
European Free Trade Association
Iceland 61.5 84.7a 2.5 63.0 96.3a 3.3
Liechtenstein — — — — — —
Norway 105.6 111.9 0.4 209.5 210.2 0.0
Switzerland 81.6 96.9 1.2 80.6 116.3 2.6
EU12
Bulgaria 6.4k 8.8 2.5 4.9k 7.3 3.1
Cyprus 32.0 34.0a 0.5 27.3 27.2a 0.0
Czech Republic 18.4 27.1a 3.0 15.4 27.0a 4.4
Estonia 10.6 21.7a 5.7 8.2 17.3a 5.9
Hungary 17.9 25.7a 2.8 14.5 24.8a 4.2
Latvia 8.6 15.3 4.2 6.1 11.7 4.7
Lithuania 10.1 18.1 4.3 9.4 19.1 5.2
Malta 32.8j 33.1 0.1 43.2j 41.7 –0.3
Poland 15.0 22.7 3.0 11.4 21.8 4.7
Romania 9.7 15.6 3.4 5.8 11.1 4.8
Slovak Republic 18.1 26.7 2.8 13.5 33.1 6.6
Slovenia 25.7 40.2a 3.5 17.8 36.6a 5.7
EU candidate countries
Albania 8.3 12.5d 4.2 7.9 10.7d 3.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.0g 6.5 3.4 3.4g 5.8 7.0
Croatia 17.6k 25.2 2.8 13.8k 22.3 3.8
Kosovo — — — — — —
Macedonia, FYR 9.2f 10.3a 1.9 7.1f 9.2a 4.3
Montenegro 10.3h 13.3b 3.8 8.1h 11.6b 5.3
Serbia 7.9e 10.9a 8.4 7.6e 9.2a 5.0
Turkey 21.1 24.8 1.2 17.7 23.3 2.0
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Doing Business, index 0–100Services
Level CAGR
percent
Total Start-up Operations Institutions
1995 2009 2011 2011 2011 2011
64.9 71.0 0.6 77.1 86.9 83.2 75.6
77.2 81.5 0.4 80.9 87.6 83.4 79.4
71.3 76.2 0.5 91.3 97.5 96.9 75.1
60.0 64.2 0.5 82.2 96.9 84.3 74.2
79.2 81.4 0.2 73.7 80.7 81.7 73.7
67.5 70.3 0.3 74.0 82.6 81.1 75.8
50.6 61.4 1.4 55.8 71.1 69.1 50.4
71.3 80.4 0.9 89.2 92.0 90.2 90.6
80.6 73.7 –0.6 64.4 82.6 75.1 48.2
160.2 188.7 1.2 64.3 76.8 74.7 63.4
64.3 71.9 0.8 76.6 91.6 81.2 71.0
36.4 41.3 0.9 71.2 91.7 76.3 64.4
63.1 56.0 –0.9 66.2 83.7 72.6 63.4
62.7 69.4 0.7 82.9 94.9 88.3 72.5
58.0 71.1 1.5 90.2 90.7 91.9 91.9
60.9 81.2a 2.2 79.2 95.7 77.7 79.6
— — — — — — —
72.1 86.1 1.3 82.6 98.9 83.3 76.3
82.0 91.2 0.8 76.7 86.5 86.4 66.6
7.5k 9.8 2.1 68.9 79.8 74.4 71.4
33.8 36.1a 0.5 68.9 83.5 78.3 58.0
20.8 27.1a 2.0 70.3 81.9 78.9 69.0
12.0 24.3a 5.6 74.9 86.2 82.8 71.1
19.7 26.2a 2.2 68.6 84.5 74.7 65.6
9.8 16.5 3.8 75.2 86.6 77.3 83.6
10.4 17.6 3.8 73.6 88.6 77.7 74.3
26.9j 30.0 0.9 — — — —
17.5 23.2 2.0 68.2 77.1 75.3 71.1
14.0 18.8 2.1 61.6 78.2 64.0 77.2
21.5 22.6 0.4 67.3 85.7 71.5 69.4
33.1 42.5a 1.9 65.7 88.2 69.6 59.1
8.5 13.4d 4.7 58.5 79.2 59.2 74.3
6.1g 6.9 1.6 55.4 72.3 66.3 59.0
19.8k 26.6 2.3 57.4 77.7 64.6 60.6
— — — 56.1 78.0 66.9 45.6
10.8f 11.0a 0.3 76.7 87.0 81.1 75.6
11.3h 14.0b 3.1 70.8 81.4 78.9 65.1
8.1e 11.8a 9.9 61.3 76.8 68.4 67.5
23.4 25.5 0.6 61.2 78.1 69.9 63.6
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Labor productivity, constant 2005 US$, thousands
Total Industry
Level CAGR
percent
Level CAGR
percent1995 2009 1995 2009
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia 1.5 6.3 10.6 2.0 10.1 12.2
Azerbaijan 2.8 8.7a 9.2 5.2 32.7a 15.2
Belarus 3.1 7.8 6.9 2.7 10.2 9.9
Georgia 2.9i 6.6b 9.5 4.5i 9.4b 8.5
Moldova 1.6k 2.7a 4.4 1.8k 1.4a –2.4
Ukraine 5.5 4.7a –1.2 2.6 6.1a 6.8
North America and Oceania
Australia 52.9 64.1a 1.5 67.6 78.7a 1.2
Canada 58.5 66.2c 1.1 88.3 94.6c 0.6
New Zealand 45.9 50.7c 0.9 47.8 53.1c 1.0
United States 68.8 84.6a 1.6 66.8 90.7a 2.4
East Asia
China 2.3 6.1a 7.8 2.6 7.3a 8.3
Indonesia 4.2 4.7 0.8 6.9 7.9 1.0
Japan 65.7 76.3a 1.2 59.6 80.2a 2.3
Korea, Rep. 26.3 38.1a 2.9 24.5 55.9a 6.6
Malaysia 11.8 15.3 1.9 16.8 23.6 2.4
Philippines 4.1 4.7 0.9 6.3 7.8 1.5
Singapore 41.6 58.1 2.4 44.5 80.2 4.3
Taiwan, China 34.0g 39.7a 2.2 21.7g 29.0a 4.2
Thailand 7.7 7.8 0.1 8.4 11.3 2.1
Vietnam 2.0k 2.0b 0.1 2.4k 2.5b 0.3
Latin America
Argentina 10.6 11.1 0.3 15.0 17.9 1.3
Brazil 10.6 10.6 0.0 13.6 11.3 –1.3
Chile 17.1 20.0 1.1 25.6 31.0 1.4
Colombia 8.5 11.0 1.9 11.6 15.4 2.0
Mexico 21.9 21.5 –0.1 27.0 26.3 –0.2
Peru 5.4 7.7a 2.7 7.4 12.6a 4.1
Uruguay 10.9 11.5b 0.4 10.6 14.6b 2.7
Venezuela, RB 18.5 13.4d –3.2 43.8 34.6d –2.3
Africa
Algeria 10.9g 10.1e –2.5 23.7g 20.5e –4.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.2 5.7a 2.4 5.6 7.3a 2.1
Morocco 4.0 8.5a 5.9 3.7 7.5a 5.6
South Africa 16.9h 18.5 1.0 20.0h 21.5 0.8
Tunisia 10.8d 12.1 2.8 8.8d 9.8 2.5
Other
India 2.8h 3.5d 4.2 2.5h 2.8d 2.0
Russian Federation 7.6 11.8 3.3 7.3 13.2 4.3
a. 2008.
b. 2007.
c. 2006.
d. 2005.
e. 2004.
f. 2002.
g. 2001.
h. 2000.
i. 1998.
j. 1997.
k. 1996.
— = not available.
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Doing Business, index 0–100Services
Level CAGR
percent
Total Start-up Operations Institutions
1995 2009 2011 2011 2011 2011
1.2 4.7 10.2 66.9 90.2 70.4 58.9
1.6 2.5a 3.5 55.4 83.9 50.9 72.1
3.3 6.3 4.7 57.7 82.8 60.4 67.6
2.5i 5.8b 9.7 82.2 89.8 87.2 79.5
1.5k 3.2a 6.4 57.0 81.9 57.6 71.5
11.3 4.2a –7.3 44.6 63.1 49.4 72.1
48.2 59.9a 1.7 85.8 94.1 88.3 80.6
49.7 58.0c 1.4 89.4 97.4 90.1 79.2
45.1 49.9c 0.9 92.4 100.0 88.7 96.5
69.4 83.0a 1.4 90.7 93.2 92.3 90.4
2.1 5.2a 7.3 59.7 74.0 69.7 67.0
2.9 3.3 0.8 51.8 67.4 72.3 44.4
69.1 74.7a 0.6 82.8 89.7 86.9 80.6
27.4 31.5a 1.1 82.6 89.8 87.4 79.1
8.3 11.5 2.3 80.7 84.8 82.3 92.9
3.3 3.8 1.1 49.4 58.1 71.9 48.3
40.3 51.8 1.8 100.0 98.9 100.0 100.0
42.2g 46.7a 1.4 70.1 94.3 74.2 58.0
7.2 6.0 –1.3 76.4 81.1 86.7 73.4
1.7k 1.6b –0.5 60.0 73.7 72.2 65.7
9.0 9.0 0.0 55.9 69.9 67.0 61.7
9.5 10.4 0.6 38.4 60.1 48.7 51.4
13.3 16.1 1.4 68.4 77.2 79.4 68.9
7.0 9.5 2.2 71.6 88.3 75.2 62.2
19.8 19.6 –0.1 69.4 82.9 75.1 68.9
4.7 6.3a 2.2 67.3 82.1 73.4 71.4
11.1 10.5b –0.4 58.7 79.7 65.1 57.2
9.0 6.9d –2.6 10.1 54.5 19.9 37.3
5.2g 5.0e –1.4 48.0 69.6 60.0 47.8
3.5 4.8a 2.6 56.7 74.5 69.7 51.8
4.2 9.0a 6.0 58.5 77.3 68.7 55.6
15.6h 17.4 1.2 65.3 79.8 62.8 87.8
12.1d 13.6 2.9 66.9 82.3 77.4 59.4
3.0h 4.0d 5.7 50.0 67.7 63.7 50.1
7.7 11.2 2.7 49.1 81.3 48.9 61.7
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Table A5. Innovation
Enrollment in 
doctorate level, per 
1,000 population 
ages 25–34
Tertiary education attainment, 
percentage of population ages 30–34 R&D expenditure, percentage of GDP
IIASA/VID Public Business
2005–10a 2010 IUS 2005–10a 2005–10a
EU15
Austria 18.2 20.5 23.5 0.8 1.9
Belgium 9.7 42.0 42.0 0.6 1.3
Denmark 10.7 32.9 48.1 1.0 2.0
Finland 31.6 47.2 45.9 1.1 2.7
France 8.8 39.4 43.3 0.8 1.4
Germany — 29.1 29.4 0.9 1.9
Greece 13.5 28.3 26.5 0.4 0.2
Ireland 9.1 44.1 49.0 0.6 1.2
Italy 4.9 16.8 19.0 0.6 0.7
Luxembourg — 25.5 46.6 0.4 1.2
Netherlands 3.8 29.1 40.5 1.0 0.9
Portugal 9.5 30.0 21.1 0.7 0.8
Spain 10.3 15.4 39.4 0.7 0.7
Sweden 18.4 29.3 43.9 1.1 2.6
United Kingdom 10.3 35.1 41.5 0.7 1.1
European Free Trade Association
Iceland 6.4 — 41.8 1.1 1.4
Liechtenstein 7.1 — — — —
Norway 12.2 38.1 47.0 0.9 0.9
Switzerland 19.4 — 43.5 0.7 2.2
EU12
Bulgaria 3.7 27.9 27.9 0.4 0.2
Cyprus 2.3 24.7 44.7 0.3 0.1
Czech Republic 15.3 16.1 17.5 0.6 0.9
Estonia 13.2 22.0 35.9 0.8 0.6
Hungary 4.5 18.7 23.9 0.5 0.7
Latvia 6.4 23.1 30.1 0.3 0.2
Lithuania 5.7 21.4 40.6 0.6 0.2
Malta 1.2 21.1 21.1 0.2 0.3
Poland 5.1 23.4 32.8 0.5 0.2
Romania 7.7 14.2 16.8 0.3 0.2
Slovak Republic 11.3 17.1 17.6 0.3 0.2
Slovenia 6.6 24.9 31.6 0.7 1.2
EU candidate countries
Albania — — — 0.2 —
Bosnia and Herzegovina — — — 0.0 —
Croatia 4.9 15.0 20.5 0.5 0.3
Kosovo — — — — —
Macedonia, FYR 0.7 14.7 14.3 0.2 0.1
Montenegro — — — 1.1 0.1
Serbia 2.8 — 19.2 0.8 0.1
Turkey 2.7 12.5 14.7 0.5 0.3
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SELECTED INDICATORS
Patent applications, per billions 
of GDP
Medium- and high-
tech product exports, 
percentage of goods 
exports
Knowledge-
intensive services 
exports, percentage 
of services exports
Royalties and license 
fees from abroad, 
percentage of GDP
Public tertiary 
education spending, 
percentage of GDPPPP$ PPS€
2005–09a IUS 2009–10a 2008–10a 2008–10a 2005–10a
7.9 5.0 52.4 46.3 0.17 1.1
2.1 3.7 48.1 63.4 0.46 1.2
7.9 8.0 37.8 — 0.74 1.6
10.3 10.0 45.6 46.6 0.98 1.6
7.5 3.9 58.6 19.8 0.40 1.1
20.0 7.7 63.2 61.3 0.43 0.9
2.2 0.4 28.6 9.2 0.02 1.4
5.4 2.6 49.3 80.5 1.10 1.1
5.0 2.1 50.4 43.8 0.18 0.7
2.0 1.2 31.6 71.9 0.87 —
4.2 6.4 40.5 58.7 0.67 1.1
1.5 0.5 36.6 38.7 0.02 0.8
2.6 1.3 49.2 41.1 0.06 1.0
7.8 11.0 51.0 27.1 1.35 1.4
10.3 3.5 50.6 66.5 0.64 0.4
7.4 3.0 12.2 19.1 0.00 1.2
— — — — — 0.2
18.7 3.1 14.2 69.8 0.12 1.2
5.9 9.1 63.6 54.7 2.46 1.2
2.5 0.4 25.7 40.7 0.07 0.8
0.5 0.5 40.0 48.9 0.04 0.9
3.3 1.0 62.1 56.8 0.06 0.9
3.6 2.0 34.5 53.7 0.10 1.0
3.9 1.5 68.0 40.2 0.80 0.9
4.4 0.7 28.4 62.3 0.05 0.9
1.9 0.3 31.8 54.2 0.00 0.9
2.8 1.3 71.3 29.9 0.36 0.4
4.3 0.3 52.4 58.2 0.05 0.9
3.6 0.1 50.7 66.4 0.29 1.1
1.9 0.5 62.3 51.1 0.05 0.6
6.8 2.6 56.9 43.7 0.14 0.9
— — 11.6 21.7 0.01 —
2.2 — 17.1 34.0 0.09 —
3.6 0.9 45.1 18.9 0.05 0.8
— — — 26.6 0.02 —
19.7 0.1 13.3 53.3 0.08 0.5c
105.8 — — 18.1 0.08 —
4.3 — 26.1 57.1 0.10 —
2.7 0.7 38.6 26.8 0.00 0.7b
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Enrollment in 
doctorate level, per 
1,000 population 
ages 25–34
Tertiary education attainment, 
percentage of population ages 30–34 R&D expenditure, percentage of GDP
IIASA/VID Public Business
2005–10a 2010 IUS 2005–10a 2005–10a
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia 2.8 27.4 — 0.3 —
Azerbaijan 1.3 — — 0.2 0.1
Belarus 2.9 — — 0.2 0.3
Georgia 2.5 — — 0.2 —
Moldova 2.5 — — 0.5 0.1
Ukraine 5.0 22.6 — 0.4 0.5
North America and Oceania
Australia 14.5 33.9 — 0.9 1.4
Canada 8.1 50.2 — 0.9 1.1
New Zealand 13.4 31.3 — 0.7 0.5
United States 11.0 32.9 54.4 0.7 2.0
East Asia
China 8.7 9.3 9.0 0.4 1.1
Indonesia 1.9 11.7 — 0.0 —
Japan 4.5 52.7 56.7 0.7 2.7
Korea, Rep. 6.6 48.3 — 0.8 2.5
Malaysia 3.2 22.2 — 0.1 0.5
Philippines 0.5 29.6 — 0.0 0.1
Singapore 6.9 50.9 — 0.7 1.9
Taiwan, China — — — — —
Thailand 2.1 24.5 — 0.1 0.1
Vietnam 3.5 7.0 — 0.2c 0.0c
Latin America
Argentina 2.0 18.9 — 0.4 0.1
Brazil 1.7 10.6 11.9 0.5b 0.4b
Chile 1.5 35.1 — 0.3b 0.3b
Colombia 0.2 21.0 — 0.1 0.0
Mexico 1.0 18.0 — 0.2 0.2
Peru — 16.9 — 0.1b 0.0b
Uruguay 0.4 9.2 — 0.5 0.1
Venezuela, RB 1.4 — — — —
Africa
Algeria 8.3 — — — —
Egypt, Arab Rep. — 21.8 — — —
Morocco 6.6 12.0 — 0.5 0.1
South Africa — 13.9 — 0.4 0.5
Tunisia 17.3 — — 0.9 0.2
Other
India — 10.8 9.0 0.5 0.3
Russian Federation 7.1 30.2 70.2 0.5 0.8
a. Data for the most recent available year.  b. 2004.  c. 2002.  — = not available.
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SELECTED INDICATORS
Patent applications, per billions 
of GDP
Medium- and high-
tech product exports, 
percentage of goods 
exports
Knowledge-
intensive services 
exports, percentage 
of services exports
Royalties and license 
fees from abroad, 
percentage of GDP
Public tertiary 
education spending, 
percentage of GDPPPP$ PPS€
2005–09a IUS 2009–10a 2008–10a 2008–10a 2005–10a
7.8 — 16.8 38.7 0.00 0.3
3.0 — 2.0 47.4 0.00 0.2
14.1 — 34.6 80.2 0.02 0.7
22.4 — 45.9 41.4 0.04 0.3
13.6 — 17.8 63.5 0.08 1.4
16.6 — 39.5 53.4 0.10 1.8
33.0 — 9.4 26.1 0.07 0.7
29.4 — 36.0 50.2 0.24 1.5
50.4 — 11.9 11.8 0.13 1.1
32.5 4.3 52.3 45.9 0.72 1.0
34.7 1.1 58.1 34.3 0.01 —
6.0 — 18.0 21.6 0.01 0.3
85.4 8.3 73.8 40.3 0.49 0.5
123.6 — 73.7 58.9 0.31 0.6
13.7 — 53.2 32.9 0.14 1.6b
10.0 — 74.4 75.7 0.00 0.3
34.6 — 62.2 36.5 0.84 1.2
— — — — — —
12.3 — 52.5 18.0 0.05 0.8
10.9 — 16.6 — — —
— — 25.0 48.6 0.04 0.9
11.8 0.4 24.7 62.9 0.02 0.7
16.2 — 4.6 59.7 0.03 0.3
5.2 — 12.6 39.4 0.02 0.8
9.2 — 63.2 17.4 0.00 0.9
2.8 — 2.7 29.4 0.00 0.4
17.5 — 9.6 33.7 0.00 0.6
— — 1.8 37.6 0.00 1.6
3.2 — 0.1 61.0 0.00 —
4.0 — 16.1 21.8 0.00 —
7.4 — 29.8 42.0 0.00 1.0
— — 31.4 18.9 0.02 0.6
5.2 — 33.7 34.6 0.06 1.7
10.2 0.5 25.5 79.6 0.01 0.6
14.4 0.5 9.0 59.3 0.04 0.9
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Table A6. Labor
Labor force Unemployment, 
percentage of labor 
force
Net migration, per 
1,000 populationTotal, thousands
Change from 2010, 
younger, percent
Change from 2010, 
older, percent
2010 2020 2020 2005–09a 2010
EU15
Austria 4,266 –2.9 4.4 4.8 19.1
Belgium 4,739 –1.6 2.9 7.9 18.4
Denmark 2,862 –1.3 0.5 6.0 16.3
Finland 2,664 0.4 –5.6 8.2 13.5
France 28,497 –0.4 0.0 9.1 7.7
Germany 41,967 –4.7 –0.4 7.7 6.7
Greece 5,066 –17.5 9.6 9.5 13.6
Ireland 2,271 –6.3 30.0 11.7 22.3
Italy 24,864 –17.0 8.1 7.8 33.0
Luxembourg 225 12.7 12.7 5.1 84.0
Netherlands 8,899 2.5 1.7 3.4 3.0
Portugal 5,337 –16.9 11.4 9.5 14.1
Spain 22,522 –14.9 25.6 18.0 48.8
Sweden 4,835 1.7 3.8 8.3 28.3
United Kingdom 31,046 4.0 4.2 7.7 16.4
European Free Trade Association
Iceland 192 3.0 15.4 7.2 32.8
Liechtenstein — — — — —
Norway 2,513 4.2 9.6 3.2 35.1
Switzerland 4,197 0.9 2.2 4.1 23.4
EU12
Bulgaria 3,494 –20.6 2.1 6.8 –6.6
Cyprus 440 9.9 13.5 5.2 40.0
Czech Republic 5,099 –18.8 12.3 6.7 22.8
Estonia 670 –9.4 –0.2 13.7 0.0
Hungary 4,227 –16.1 10.0 10.0 7.5
Latvia 1,153 –11.3 3.9 17.1 –4.5
Lithuania 1,526 –6.7 –5.0 13.7 –10.7
Malta 169 –4.3 8.8 6.9 12.1
Poland 17,146 –10.4 1.3 8.2 1.5
Romania 9,016 –19.7 7.2 6.9 –4.7
Slovak Republic 2,724 –13.6 11.5 12.1 6.8
Slovenia 1,005 –13.6 2.1 5.9 10.7
EU candidate countries
Albania 1,411 10.4 4.0 12.7 –14.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,910 –9.3 3.2 23.9 –2.7
Croatia 1,941 –9.6 –1.0 9.1 2.3
Kosovo — — — 45.4 —
Macedonia, FYR 900 –6.9 6.5 32.2 1.0
Montenegro — — — 30.3 –4.0
Serbia 4,294 –6.9 5.1 16.6 0.0
Turkey 25,393 1.7 28.9 14.0 –0.7
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SELECTED INDICATORS
Emigration of tertiary 
educated, percentage of 
total tertiary educated
Self-employment, 
percentage of total 
employment
Shadow economy, 
percentage of 
officialbGDP
Minimum wage, 
international $, PPP
Hiring and firing 
practices, index 1–7
2000 2004–08a 2007 2006–09a 2010
13.5 9.0 9.5 — 3.6
5.5 10.0 21.3 1,492 2.9
7.8 5.0 16.9 — 6.1
7.2 9.0 17.0 — 4.0
3.5 5.9 14.7 1,443 2.7
5.8 6.8 15.3 — 2.8
12.2 27.0 26.5 1,096 3.0
33.7 11.7 15.4 1,368 3.7
9.7 18.6 26.8 — 3.0
8.6 5.2 9.4 1,687 3.4
9.6 9.4 13.0 1,606 3.1
19.0 18.5 23.0 618 2.4
4.2 11.8 22.2 911 2.6
4.5 6.6 17.9 — 2.5
17.1 10.5 12.2 1,507 4.4
21.0 8.7 15.0 — 5.3
18.5 — — — —
6.2 5.7 18.0 — 2.8
9.6 10.1 8.1 — 5.8
9.6 8.7 32.7 292 4.1
34.2 14.4 26.5 1,044 3.9
8.5 12.5 17.0 526 3.2
9.9 5.8 29.5 426 4.5
12.8 7.1 23.7 498 4.2
8.5 6.8 27.2 421 4.2
8.4 9.4 29.7 428 3.2
58.3 9.0 26.5 — 3.5
14.3 18.9 26.0 628 3.3
11.3 31.2 30.2 320 3.6
14.3 10.6 16.8 485 3.2
11.0 11.0 24.7 855 2.3
17.5 — 32.9 329 4.7
20.3 26.9 32.8 — 4.5
24.6 16.2 30.4 613 3.2
— — — — —
29.4 22.2 34.9 — 4.3
— 19.5 — — 4.1
— 22.7 — 376 3.6
5.8 35.3 29.1 609 4.0
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Labor force Unemployment, 
percentage of labor 
force
Net migration, per 
1,000 populationTotal, thousands
Change from 2010, 
younger, percent
Change from 2010, 
older, percent
2010 2020 2020 2005–09a 2010
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia 1,603 2.1 –5.8 28.6 –24.3
Azerbaijan 4,226 11.7 9.8 6.1 5.9
Belarus 4,916 –12.9 –3.6 — –5.3
Georgia 1,987 –6.1 –2.6 16.5 –33.7
Moldova 1,409 –1.6 –11.5 6.4 –48.2
Ukraine 21,382 –14.6 –3.2 8.8 –0.9
North America and Oceania
Australia 11,102 4.9 12.2 5.6 50.4
Canada 18,731 4.7 9.8 8.3 32.2
New Zealand 2,263 7.4 9.1 6.1 14.9
United States 157,138 6.5 8.6 9.3 16.0
East Asia
China 776,111 –5.0 11.4 4.3 –1.4
Indonesia 110,128 2.1 32.3 7.9 –5.4
Japan 59,721 –18.3 3.5 5.0 2.1
Korea, Rep. 23,014 –10.5 15.5 3.6 –0.6
Malaysia 11,928 12.1 26.0 3.7 3.0
Philippines 38,134 14.5 33.4 7.5 –13.2
Singapore 2,543 9.3 6.6 5.9 142.2
Taiwan, China — — — 5.9 —
Thailand 37,372 –4.7 14.2 1.2 7.1
Vietnam 47,204 4.1 26.2 2.4 –5.0
Latin America
Argentina 18,337 3.8 24.5 8.6 –4.9
Brazil 98,703 3.8 28.1 8.3 –2.6
Chile 7,347 9.1 22.8 9.7 1.8
Colombia 18,630 8.6 28.3 12.0 –2.6
Mexico 47,019 0.0 38.5 5.2 –15.9
Peru 13,252 9.3 33.5 6.8 –24.9
Uruguay 1,612 3.0 13.4 7.3 –14.9
Venezuela, RB 13,101 14.5 29.1 7.6 1.4
Africa
Algeria 14,855 1.1 44.8 11.3 –3.9
Egypt, Arab Rep. 27,634 14.2 27.7 9.4 –4.3
Morocco 11,919 7.2 26.3 10.0 –21.1
South Africa 19,358 7.6 6.9 23.8 14.0
Tunisia 3,722 0.4 28.4 14.2 –1.9
Other
India 474,806 14.0 25.3 4.4 –2.6
Russian Federation 73,322 –11.0 –1.8 8.2 8.0
a. Data for the most recent available year.  b. 2006.  c. 1994.  — = not available.
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SELECTED INDICATORS
Emigration of tertiary 
educated, percentage of 
total tertiary educated
Self-employment, 
percentage of total 
employment
Shadow economy, 
percentage of 
officialbGDP
Minimum wage, 
international $, PPP
Hiring and firing 
practices, index 1–7
2000 2004–08a 2007 2006–09a 2010
8.9 50.3 41.1 144 4.8
1.8 62.6 52.0 121 5.3
3.2 — 43.3 250 —
2.8 62.2 62.1 21 5.0
4.1 32.4 44.3b — 3.5
4.3 19.3 46.8 311 4.8
2.7 9.3 13.5 1,597 3.5
4.7 10.4 15.3 1,325 4.9
21.8 11.9 12.0 1,367 3.7
0.5 7.2 8.4 1,257 5.1
3.8 — 11.9 173 4.3
2.9 63.1 17.9 148 4.2
1.2 10.8 10.3 944 2.8
7.5 25.2 25.6 797 3.3
10.5 22.3 29.6 — 4.5
13.6 44.7 38.3 379 3.3
14.5 10.2 12.2 — 5.8
12.8 19.8 23.9 — 3.8
2.2 53.3 48.2 295 4.4
27.0 73.9 14.4 85 4.3
2.8 20.1 23.0 896 2.7
2.0 27.2 36.6 286 2.9
6.0 24.8 18.5 400 3.4
10.4 40.9 33.5 390 3.9
15.5 29.5 28.8 170 3.1
5.8 39.6 53.7 334 3.5
9.0 25.1 46.1 258 3.0
3.8 29.8 30.9 481 2.3
9.5 34.9 31.2 308 3.8
4.7 24.8 33.1 14 3.7
18.6 51.1 33.1 371 4.0
7.4 2.7 25.2 390 2.5
12.6 20.9c 35.4 315 3.9
4.3 — 20.7 121 4.0
1.4 5.8 40.6 223 3.7
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Table A7. Government
Government revenue, percentage of GDP
Total Taxes
Individual 
income tax
Corporate
income tax
Taxes on goods 
and services
2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a
EU15
Austria 48.8 27.6 10.0 1.9 12.2
Belgium 48.2 28.4 12.1 2.5 10.5
Denmark 55.9 47.1 26.7 2.4 14.7
Finland 53.1 30.6 13.2 3.5 12.8
France 48.9 25.1 7.6 1.3 10.6
Germany 44.9 24.0 10.0 0.7 11.1
Greece 37.8 19.5 5.1 2.4 10.7
Ireland 34.3 22.0 7.8 2.5 —
Italy 46.7 29.1 11.8 2.4 11.5
Luxembourg 41.4 25.8 7.7 5.5 11.3
Netherlands 46.0 24.0 8.6 2.1 11.9
Portugal 38.7 21.7 5.7 2.9 11.2
Spain 34.7 18.7 7.0 2.3 7.2
Sweden 54.0 38.3 16.5 2.8 13.4
United Kingdom 40.3 27.8 10.4 2.8 10.1
European Free Trade Association
Iceland 41.1 30.8 12.9 1.8 11.7
Liechtenstein — — — — —
Norway 57.2 32.2 10.5 8.4 11.8
Switzerland 34.3 22.4 9.1 3.3 5.3
EU12
Bulgaria 36.1 22.4 3.0 2.5 15.3
Cyprus 39.8 26.3 3.9 6.5 13.8
Czech Republic 37.4 18.2 3.5 3.5 10.8
Estonia 43.4 22.4 5.7 1.8 14.5
Hungary 46.1 26.2 7.3 2.2 15.5
Latvia 35.4 17.9 5.5 1.5 10.1
Lithuania 34.9 17.5 4.1 1.8 11.1
Malta 39.2 27.6 6.1 6.8 13.6
Poland 37.0 20.4 4.6 2.3 11.8
Romania 32.1 18.4 3.6 2.7 11.0
Slovak Republic 33.6 15.8 2.7 2.6 10.1
Slovenia 43.9 21.7 5.9 2.0 13.1
EU candidate countries
Albania 26.0 19.6 2.3 1.7 13.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 43.1 22.3 1.0 1.0 18.8
Croatia 38.2 21.9 3.1 2.8 14.8
Kosovo 29.3 — — — —
Macedonia, FYR 34.9 20.5 2.2 2.1 13.4
Montenegro 42.4 — — — —
Serbia 44.1 25.9 4.9 1.2 17.3
Turkey 33.9 19.3 4.0 2.0 11.6
483
SELECTED INDICATORS
Government expenditure, percentage of GDP
Public debt, 
percentage of GDPTotal Health Education
Social 
protection
2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2009
52.3 8.2 5.8 21.8 69.6
54.3 8.0 6.4 19.5 96.3
58.8 8.8 8.0 25.4 41.8
55.6 7.9 6.6 23.6 43.3
56.5 8.4 6.2 23.7 79.0
48.0 6.9 4.4 21.8 74.1
53.2 5.2 3.2 20.4 127.1
48.6 8.8 5.6 16.4 65.2
51.9 7.5 4.8 20.4 116.1
42.3 5.0 5.0 18.3 14.6
51.4 6.8 6.0 18.1 60.8
48.0 7.0 6.6 17.4 83.0
45.8 6.7 5.0 16.1 53.3
55.2 7.4 7.3 23.0 42.8
51.5 8.5 6.9 18.0 68.3
51.0 8.4 8.6 11.3 88.2
— — 2.1 — —
47.1 7.8 6.1 18.3 55.4
33.7 1.9 5.7 13.8 54.8
36.6 3.9 4.2 13.3 15.6
45.8 3.0 7.8 9.9 58.0
44.2 6.6 4.3 13.6 35.4
45.2 5.6 7.0 15.7 7.2
50.5 5.0 5.3 18.3 78.4
42.3 3.7 6.7 13.3 32.8
44.1 6.7 6.8 16.4 29.6
42.9 5.5 5.5 14.7 67.3
44.1 5.1 5.3 16.9 50.9
37.6 3.7 4.2 10.7 23.9
41.6 7.5 4.3 12.3 35.4
49.8 7.1 7.1 17.9 35.5
32.9 2.7 3.4 8.2 59.8
50.4 6.7 — 12.5 35.9
42.5 6.6 4.6 13.7 34.5
29.9 — 4.3 3.8 —
33.2 4.6 3.5c 10.3 23.8
48.9 6.7 — 12.9 40.7
47.9 6.7 4.6 19.2 38.2
37.6 5.1 3.1 7.2 46.1
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Government revenue, percentage of GDP
Total Taxes
Individual 
income tax
Corporate 
income tax
Taxes on goods 
and services
2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia 23.7 17.1 1.9 2.6 9.4
Azerbaijan 27.3 16.7 1.4 7.4 6.4
Belarus 47.2 30.1 3.1 3.5 14.7
Georgia 29.3 24.4 6.2 2.9 13.9
Moldova 39.2 21.6 2.7 0.5 16.5
Ukraine 42.1 22.4 5.0 3.7 12.6
North America and Oceania
Australia 33.6 27.1 10.2 5.8 6.9
Canada 41.5 29.6 12.6 4.3 7.8
New Zealand 39.8 33.3 15.2 5.6 9.7
United States 31.2 17.5 8.1 1.7 4.3
East Asia
China 26.6 18.6 1.2 3.6 11.6
Indonesia 18.4 12.3 4.2 1.0 5.9
Japan 33.0 16.3 7.3f n.a. 2.6
Korea, Rep. 28.9 19.7 3.9 3.3 7.0
Malaysia 26.2d 18.8d — — —
Philippines 14.1 12.3 1.6 3.4 5.2
Singapore 18.1 13.7 6.4f n.a. 4.7
Taiwan, China 19.1 — — — —
Thailand 20.4 16.4 2.0 5.1 8.0
Vietnam 25.1 21.5 0.5 7.7 9.7
Latin America
Argentina 29.4 22.9 1.6 3.6 11.0
Brazil 35.6 22.9 2.5 4.5 13.5
Chile 22.0 17.0 5.7f n.a. 10.1
Colombia 30.7 16.1 4.5 0.0 8.2
Mexico 12.8e 10.1e — — —
Peru 18.7 14.1 1.5 3.8 6.9
Uruguay 29.5 18.9 2.6 2.7 12.0
Venezuela, RB 28.3 15.5 0.3 5.8 7.0
Africa
Algeria 36.3 34.3 1.8 2.7 4.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 27.7 15.7 1.4 6.3 6.0
Morocco 35.2 25.0 3.6 6.0 10.8
South Africa 35.1 26.9 8.6 6.4 9.4
Tunisia 29.4 20.3 4.0 3.9 9.3
Other
India 23.0 19.6 2.3 4.0 9.3
Russian Federation 52.4 22.7 4.3 3.4 6.7
a. Data for the most recent available year.
b. 2003.
c. 2002.
d. 2001.
e. 2000.
f. Data include corporate income tax.
— = not available.
n.a. = not applicable.
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Government expenditure, percentage of GDP
Public debt, 
percentage of GDPTotal Health Education
Social 
protection
2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2004–09a 2009
28.6 2.0 4.4 6.3 40.2
34.8 1.4 2.8 5.8 12.1
47.8 4.5 5.8 13.6 21.7
36.9 2.0 3.2 7.3 37.3
45.2 6.4 9.4 15.0 29.1
48.3 4.2 7.2 23.2 35.4
36.9 6.5 5.2 10.9 16.9
39.7 7.5 6.0 11.9 83.3
36.6 5.6 5.6 11.7 26.1
42.5 8.7 6.7 9.0 85.2
25.7 1.0 3.7 4.7 17.7
19.5 0.3 0.8 1.1 28.6
42.5 8.5 4.3 14.9 216.3
33.1 4.3 5.2 4.1 33.8
32.9 2.2 4.1 — 55.4
17.8 0.5 2.8 1.1 47.1
17.9 1.4 3.3 2.2 109.3
24.3 — — — 38.1
23.5 3.3 4.1 0.6d 44.3
33.4 2.8 5.3 2.7 51.2
37.9 6.3 5.4 9.2 58.7
38.7 4.1 5.1 13.1 68.1
26.4 3.8 4.0 7.6b 6.2
29.1 5.4 4.7 6.5 35.8
27.0 3.1 4.8 3.5c 44.7
20.7 2.7 2.5 3.9 27.1
32.3 4.7 2.8 10.1 61.0
26.1 1.9 4.5 2.0 32.7
41.7 5.0 4.3 8.7e —
34.2 1.5 3.8 12.7 75.6
28.5 1.9 5.6 — 47.9
41.9 3.9 6.6 5.1 31.5
31.0 1.4 5.8 7.4 42.8
29.1 1.4 3.1 4.3 74.2
47.5 5.1 4.8 11.9 11.0
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Sources and defi nitions
Table A1. Basic indicators
Indicator Sources Definitions
GNI per capita, US$ World Bank
Gross national income (GNI; formerly gross national product), per 
capita, expressed in current U.S. dollars. To smooth fluctuations in 
prices and exchange rates, the series is adjusted by the World Bank’s 
Atlas method.
GDP, per capita, PPP, international $ World Bank
Gross domestic product (GDP), per capita, adjusted by purchasing 
power parity (PPP). GDP per capita is converted to international 
dollars using PPP rates defined by the World Bank. The series is 
expressed in current international dollars.
GDP, PPP, international $, billions World Bank GDP, adjusted by PPP, expressed in billions of current international dollars.
Average growth of real GDP per 
capita, percent World Bank
Average annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita in constant 
local currency over 2000-10.
Population, total, thousands, 2010 U.S. Census
Total number of people living in a country in 2010. The data shown 
are midyear (that is, July 1 of the given year) estimates. The series is 
expressed in thousands.
Population, working age, percent, 
2010 U.S. Census
Working-age population, expressed as a percentage of total 
population, in 2010. The working-age population is defined as people 
ages 15–64.
Population, old age, percent, 2010 U.S. Census Old-age population, as a percentage of total population, in 2010. Thebold-age population includes people ages 65 and older.
Population, total, thousands, 2050 U.S. Census
Total number of people living in a country in 2050, projected by the 
U.S. Census. The series is based on midyear estimates and expressed 
in thousands.
Population, working age, percent, 
2050 U.S. Census
Working-age population in 2050, projected by the U.S. Census. The 
series is expressed as a percentage of total population.
Population, old age, percent, 2050 U.S. Census Old-age population in 2050, projected by the U.S. Census, as a percentage of total population.
CO2 emissions, metric tons per capita World Bank
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions stemming from the burning of fossil 
fuels and the manufacture of cement, consumption of solid, liquid, 
and gas fuels, and gas flaring. The amount is in metric tons, divided by 
population.
Table A2. Trade
Indicator Sources Definitions
Exports, percentage of GDP, 
consumption goods
United Nations (UN); 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)
Exports of consumption goods to the rest of the world, as a 
percentage of GDP. The consumption goods include products in the 
following classification codes of Broad Economic Categories (BEC): 
112, 122, 522, 61, 62, and 63.
Exports, percentage of GDP, 
intermediate goods UN; IMF
Exports of intermediate goods to the rest of the world, as a 
percentage of GDP. The intermediate goods include products in the 
following BEC classification codes: 111, 121, 21, 22, 31, 322, 42, and 
53.
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Indicator Sources Definitions
Exports, percentage of GDP, capital 
goods UN; IMF
Exports of capital goods to the rest of the world, as a percentage of 
GDP. The capital goods contain those belonging to the following BEC 
classification codes: 41 and 521.
Exports, percentage of GDP, 
traditional services IMF
Exports of traditional services to the rest of the world, as a 
percentage of GDP. The exports of traditional services consist of the 
sum of credits in the following categories of the fifth edition of the 
IMF Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5): 205, 236, 249, and 287.
Exports, percentage of GDP, modern 
services IMF
Exports of modern services to the rest of the world, as a percentage 
of GDP. The exports of modern services contain credits of the 
following BPM5 codes: 245, 253, 260, 262, 266, and 268.
Imports, percentage of GDP, 
consumption goods UN; IMF
Imports of consumption goods from the rest of the world, as a 
percentage of GDP.
Imports, percentage of GDP, 
intermediate goods UN; IMF
Imports of intermediate goods from the rest of the world, as a 
percentage of GDP.
Imports, percentage of GDP, capital 
goods UN; IMF
Imports of capital goods from the rest of the world, as a percentage 
of GDP.
Imports, percentage of GDP, 
traditional services IMF
Imports of traditional services from the rest of the world, as a 
percentage of GDP. The imports of traditional services are the sum of 
debits in the same classification categories as in the exports (credits).
Imports, percentage of GDP, modern 
services IMF
Imports of modern services from the rest of the world, as a 
percentage of GDP. The imports of modern services include debits of 
the same BPM5 items as in the exports (credits).
Table A3. Finance
Indicator Sources Definitions
Private sector credit by domestic 
banks, percentage of GDP IMF
Domestic commercial banks’ claims on private sector, as a percentage 
of GDP. The main series is line 22D in the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) by the IMF. If necessary, the series is extrapolated by 
line 22S (claims on other sector). GDP is also from the IMF.
Cross-border banking flows, 
percentage of GDP
Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS); IMF
External loans of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis the non-bank sector 
in respective countries, as a percentage of GDP. The series shows 
amounts outstanding and is taken from Table 7B of BIS Locational 
Banking Statistics. GDP is from the IMF.
Loan-to-deposit ratio, percent IMF
Domestic commercial banks’ credits to all sectors, divided by 
commercial banks’ deposits. The former is a sum of IFS lines 22A to 
22S, and the latter comes from IFS lines 24 and 25.
Foreign bank assets, percentage of 
total banking assets
Claessens and van 
Horen (2012)
Banking system assets held by foreign banks, as a percentage of total 
banking assets.
Foreign assets plus liabilities, 
percentage of GDP
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007)
Total foreign assets and total foreign liabilities, as a percentage of 
GDP. It is a measure of financial integration.
Net debt, percentage of GDP Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Net debt is measured by a sum of international debt assets and 
foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) minus international debt 
liabilities. The series on debt includes both portfolio debt plus other 
investment. GDP is also from the same source.
Current account balance, percentage 
of GDP IMF
The sum of net exports of goods and services, net income, and net 
current transfers, as a percentage of GDP.
Capital flows, net, percentage of GDP, 
total IMF Net inflows of all types of capital, as a percentage of GDP.
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Indicator Sources Definitions
Capital flows, net, percentage of 
GDP, FDI IMF Net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), as a percentage of GDP.
Capital flows, net, percentage of GDP, 
portfolio IMF
Net inflows of portfolio investment, as a percentage of GDP. The 
series includes both public and private components.
Capital flows, net, percentage of GDP, 
other IMF
Net inflows of other investment, as a percentage of GDP. The series 
includes both public and private components.
Table A4. Enterprise
Indicator Sources Definitions
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, total, level, 1995
World Bank; 
International Labour 
Office (ILO 2010b); 
UN; country sources
Gross value added divided by employment in industry and services, 
expressed in thousands of constant U.S. dollars (price level as in 
2005). The data refer to 1995, but if unavailable, the figures for the 
earliest available year after 1995 are shown. Industry and services 
are defined by the International Standard Industrial Classification 
of All Economic Activities (ISIC), Revision 3, and correspond to ISIC 
divisions 10–45 and 50–99, respectively. Due to the statistical reason, 
services also include any statistical discrepancies.
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, total, level, 2009
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
Gross value added divided by employment in industry and services, 
expressed in thousands of constant U.S. dollars (price level as in 
2005). The data refer to 2009, but if unavailable, the figures for the 
most recent available year are shown.
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, total, CAGR, percent
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of gross value added divided 
by employment in industry and services. The rate of growth in labor 
productivity in industry and services is computed with the two 
constant price data defined above (1995 and 2009).
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, industry, level, 1995
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
Gross value added divided by employment in industry, expressed in 
thousands of constant U.S. dollars (price level as in 2005). The data 
refer to 1995, but if unavailable, the figures for the earliest available 
year after 1995 are shown. Industry includes ISIC divisions 10–45.
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, industry, level, 2009
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
Gross value added divided by employment in industry, expressed in 
thousands of constant U.S. dollars (price level as in 2005). The data 
refer to 2009, but if unavailable, the figures for the most recent 
available year are shown.
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, industry, CAGR, 
percent
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
CAGR of gross value added divided by employment in industry. The 
rate of growth in labor productivity in industry is computed with the 
two constant price data defined above (1995 and 2009).
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, services, level, 1995
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
Gross value added divided by employment in services, expressed in 
thousands of constant U.S. dollars (price level as in 2005). The data 
refer to 1995, but if unavailable, the figures for the earliest available 
year after 1995 are shown. Services correspond to ISIC divisions 
50–99 and, due to the statistical reason, also include any statistical 
discrepancies.
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, services, level, 2009
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
Gross value added divided by employment in services, expressed in 
thousands of constant U.S. dollars (price level as in 2005). The data 
refer to 2009, but if unavailable, the figures for the most recent 
available year are shown.
Labor productivity, constant 2005 
US$, thousands, services, CAGR, 
percent
World Bank; ILO 
(2010b); UN; country 
sources
CAGR of gross value added divided by employment in services. The 
rate of growth in labor productivity in services is computed with the 
two constant price data defined above (1995 and 2009).
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Indicator Sources Definitions
Doing Business, index 0–100, total World Bank
The principal component of all Doing Business indicators, rescaled to 
range from 0 to 100, showing that higher the score, the better quality 
of overall business environment. The principal component analysis 
(PCA) is exercised using all countries over 2003–11 (that is, Doing 
Business 2004 to 2012).
Doing Business, index 0–100, start-up World Bank
The principal component of Doing Business indicators in three 
areas related to business entry/exit. The score is rescaled to range 
from 0 to 100, indicating the higher the index, the better quality 
of regulation. The indicators are for starting a business, closing a 
business, and registering property. PCA is exercised using all countries 
over 2003–11 (that is, Doing Business 2004 to 2012).
Doing Business, index 0–100, 
operations World Bank
The principal component of Doing Business indicators in four areas 
related to business operations. The score is rescaled to range from 0 
to 100 (higher, better). The indicators are for paying taxes, trading 
across borders, employing workers, and obtaining construction 
permits. PCA is exercised using all countries over 2003–11 (that is, 
Doing Business 2004 to 2012).
Doing Business, index 0–100, 
institutions World Bank
The principal component of Doing Business indicators in three areas 
related to institutional environment. The score is rescaled to range 
from 0 to 100 (higher, better). The indicators are for protecting 
investors, getting credit, and enforcing contracts. PCA is exercised 
using all countries over 2003–11 (that is, Doing Business 2004 to 
2012).
Table A5. Innovation
Indicator Sources Definitions
Enrollment in doctorate level, per 
1,000 population ages 25–34
United Nations 
Educational, 
Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO); U.S. Census
Enrollment in doctorate-level education, classified as the level 6 in 
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), per 
thousands of population ages 25–34. The doctorate-level education 
includes both public and private institutions. The enrollment considers 
both male and female, and both full-time and part-time students.
Tertiary education attainment, 
percentage of population ages 30–34, 
IIASA/VID
World Bank
Percentage of population ages 30–34 with tertiary education, 
projected through the educational attainment model developed by 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and 
the Vienna Institute of Demography (VID), Austrian Academy of 
Sciences.
Tertiary education attainment, 
percentage of population ages 30–34, 
IUS
European Commission 
(2011)
The number of people ages 30–34 with some form of post-secondary 
education (ISCED 5 and 6), as a percentage of total population ages 
30–34. For non-European countries, namely, Brazil, China, India, Japan, 
Russian Federation, and the United States, the age group refers to 
25–64, instead of 30–34. The reference year varies by country but is 
2008 or 2009, in most cases.
R&D expenditure, percentage of GDP, 
public UNESCO; World Bank
All R&D expenditure, performed by government and higher education, 
as a percentage of GDP.
R&D expenditure, percentage of GDP, 
business UNESCO; World Bank
All R&D expenditure, performed by enterprises, as a percentage of 
GDP.
Patent applications, per billions of 
GDP, PPP$ World Bank
Patent applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 
procedure or with a national patent office, by both residents and non-
residents, per billions of GDP in international dollars.
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Indicator Sources Definitions
Patent applications, per billions of 
GDP, PPS€
European Commission 
(2011)
The number of patent applications filed under the PCT, at international 
phase, designating the European Patent Office, divided by billions of 
GDP in international euros adjusted by purchasing power standard 
(PPS). The reference year varies by country but is 2007, in most 
cases.
Medium- and high-tech product 
exports, percentage of goods exports UN
Exports of medium- and high-tech products to the rest of the world, 
as a share of total exports in goods. The medium- and high-tech 
products include items in the following 38 classification codes of 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 3: 266, 
267, 512, 513, 525, 533, 54, 553, 554, 562, 57, 58, 591, 593, 597, 
598, 629, 653, 671, 672, 679, 71, 72, 731, 733, 737, 74, 751, 752, 
759, 76, 77, 78, 79, 812, 87, 88, and 891.
Knowledge-intensive services 
exports, percentage of services 
exports
IMF
Exports of knowledge-intensive services to the rest of the world, as a 
share of total exports in services. The knowledge-intensive services 
exports contain credits of the following BPM5 codes: 245, 253, 260, 
263, 272, 273, 850, and 851.
Royalties and license fees from 
abroad, percentage of GDP IMF
Credit part of the international transactions in royalties and license 
fees, as a share of GDP. The code of the series is 266 in BPM5.
Public tertiary education spending, 
percentage of GDP UNESCO
Total expenditure on tertiary educational institutions and 
administration, from public sources, as a percentage of GDP.
Table A6. Labor
Indicator Sources Definitions
Labor force, total, thousands ILO
The number of economically active population ages 15 and older, 
expressed in thousands. Economically active population includes both 
employed and unemployed people.
Labor force, change from 2010, 
younger, percent ILO
Projected percentage change in the number of younger labor force 
ages 15–39, from 2010 to 2020.
Labor force, change from 2010, older, 
percent ILO
Projected percentage change in the number of older labor force ages 
40 and older, from 2010 to 2020.
Unemployment, percentage of labor 
force World Bank
The number of labor force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment, as a percentage of total labor force.
Net migration, per 1,000 population World Bank
The number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants, including 
citizens and noncitizens, for the five-year period, expressed in 
thousands of population.
Emigration of tertiary educated, 
percentage of total tertiary educated World Bank
Stock of emigrants ages 25 and older, residing in a country belonging 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) other than that in which they were born, with at least one 
year of tertiary education, as a percentage of population ages 25 and 
older with tertiary education.
Self-employment, percentage of total 
employment ILO
Self-employed workers, as a percentage of total employment. Self-
employed workers are defined as the sum of own-account workers 
and contributing family workers.
Shadow economy, percentage of 
official GDP
Schneider, Buehn, and 
Montenegro (2010) Estimated shadow economy, as a percentage of official GDP.
Minimum wage, international $, PPP ILO (2010a) PPP-adjusted minimum wage, in international dollars.
Hiring and firing practices, index 1–7 Schwab (2011)
The index, ranging from 1 to 7, to assess the rigidity of hiring and 
firing of workers. The higher the index, the more flexible practices are 
(1 = impeded by regulations, 7 = flexibly determined by employers).
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Table A7. Government
Indicator Sources Definitions
Government revenue, percentage of 
GDP, total IMF
General government total revenue, as a percentage of GDP. The main 
series is line 1 in the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) by the IMF. 
For Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela, RB, the 
numbers are for central government only.
Government revenue, percentage of 
GDP, taxes IMF
General government total tax revenue, as a percentage of GDP. 
The main series is line 11 in GFS. For Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela, RB, the numbers are for central government 
only.
Government revenue, percentage of 
GDP, individual income tax IMF
General government revenue from individual income tax, as a 
percentage of GDP. Line 1111 of the IMF GFS is used as the main 
series. For Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, RB, the 
numbers are for central government only.
Government revenue, percentage of 
GDP, corporate income tax IMF
General government corporate tax revenue, as a percentage of GDP. 
GFS line 1112 is mainly used. For Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, RB, the numbers are for central government only.
Government revenue, percentage of 
GDP, taxes on goods and services IMF
General government revenue from taxes on goods and services, as 
a percentage of GDP. The main series is line 114 in GFS. The taxes on 
goods and services include value-added taxes, sales taxes, excises, 
taxes on use of goods and on permission to use goods or perform 
activities (such as motor vehicle taxes), and so on. For Azerbaijan, 
Indonesia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, RB, the numbers are for central 
government only.
Government expenditure, percentage 
of GDP, total IMF; OECD
General government total expenditure, as a percentage of GDP. Line 7 
in GFS is used as the main data series. For Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Venezuela, RB, the numbers are for central government only.
Government expenditure, percentage 
of GDP, health
IMF; World Bank; 
OECD
General government expenditure on health, as a percentage of GDP. 
The main series is line 707 in GFS. For Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Venezuela, RB, the numbers are for central government only.
Government expenditure, percentage 
of GDP, education
IMF; World Bank; 
OECD
General government expenditure on education, as a percentage of 
GDP. The main series is line 709 in GFS. For Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Venezuela, RB, the numbers are for central government only.
Government expenditure, percentage 
of GDP, social protection
IMF; World Bank; 
Weigand and Grosh 
(2008); OECD
General government expenditure on social protection, as a 
percentage of GDP. The social protection includes pensions and social 
assistance of various kinds. The main series is line 710 in GFS. For 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Venezuela, RB, the numbers are for 
central government only.
Public debt, percentage of GDP IMF General government gross debt, as a percentage of GDP.
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ABBREVIATIONS
BIS Bank for International 
Settlements
BMU German Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety
BOPS Balance of Payments Statistics
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
EBRD European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development
EC European Commission
ECA Europe and Central Asia
ECB European Central Bank
EFTA European Free Trade 
Association
EPL Employment Protection 
Legislation
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFS Government Finance Statistics
ICRG International Country 
Risk Guide
ICT Information and 
Communication Technology
IFS International Financial Statistics
ILO International Labour Ofﬁ ce
IMD International Institute for 
Management Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPTS Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies
IT Information Technology
kWh Kilowatt hour
LAC Latin America and 
the Caribbean
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
Key country groups (45 European Countries)
The following are the country groups into which 45 European countries, on which 
this report focuses, are distinguished. These categories are broad and commonly 
used across all the chapters. In addition, each chapter has its own groupings of 
countries, and how the countries are classiﬁ ed is deﬁ ned in each chapter.
Abbreviations
Eastern partnership countries
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine [sometimes, 
shown as “E. prtn.”]
EFTA 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
and Switzerland
EU candidate countries 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Turkey [sometimes, shown 
as “EU cand.”]
EU10
Countries join the EU in 2004: Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia
EU12 
Countries joined the EU in 2004 or 
2007: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia
EU15 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom
EU27 
EU15 plus EU12
R&D Research And Development
SME Small and Medium 
Enterprise
TFP Total Factor Productivity
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development
UNEP United Nations 
Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, 
Scientiﬁ c and Cultural 
Organization
WDI World Development 
Indicators
WEF World Economic Forum
WEO World Economic Outlook
WGI Worldwide Governance 
Indicators
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
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Country codes and names
The 3-letter country codes used in this report are taken from the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 3166-1 alpha-3 codes, except for a few 
countries, as described by the World Bank (data.worldbank.org/node/18). 
The use of the word countries to refer to economies implies no judgment by the 
authors and contributors about the legal or other status of a territory. 
The following are the codes and corresponding country names which can be 
found in the report.
Code Name
ALB Albania
DZA Algeria
ARG Argentina
ARM Armenia
AUS Australia
AUT Austria
AZE Azerbaijan
BLR Belarus
BEL Belgium
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina
BRA Brazil
BGR Bulgaria
CAN Canada
CHL Chile
CHN China
COL Colombia
HRV Croatia
CYP Cyprus
CZE Czech Republic
DNK Denmark
EST Estonia
FIN Finland
FRA France
MKD FYR Macedonia
GEO Georgia
DEU Germany
GRC Greece
HKG Hong Kong SAR, China
HUN Hungary
ISL Iceland
IND India
IDN Indonesia
IRL Ireland
ISR Israel
ITA Italy
JPN Japan
KAZ Kazakhstan
KOR Korea, Rep.
Code Name
KSV Kosovo
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic
LVA Latvia
LIE Liechtenstein
LTU Lithuania
LUX Luxembourg
MYS Malaysia
MLT Malta
MEX Mexico
MCO Monaco
MNE Montenegro
MDA Moldova
MAR Morocco
NLD Netherlands
NZL New Zealand
NOR Norway
POL Poland
PRT Portugal
ROM Romania
RUS Russian Federation
SRB Serbia
YUG Serbia and Montenegro
SGP Singapore
SVK Slovak Republic
SVN Slovenia
ZAF South Africa
ESP Spain
SWE Sweden
CHE Switzerland
TJK Tajikistan
THA Thailand
TUN Tunisia
TUR Turkey
TKM Turkmenistan
UKR Ukraine
GBR United Kingdom
USA United States
UZB Uzbekistan
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